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ENABLERS AND INHIBITORS

OF THE EU AND US RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

How the EU Pulled Ahead

By McKenzie Stevens '20

ABSTRACT

Climate change is by far one of the most significant issues facing the world today, yet still lacks the comprehensive multilateral response needed to address it. The EU has substantially increased its relevance on the global stage by assuming a leadership role in international climate mitigation efforts. Through enacting ambitious climate policy across its member states, the EU aims to spur similar action within other major greenhouse gas-emitting countries such as the US. With this in mind, to what extent has the EU been more successful than the US at addressing climate change through policy initiatives? Additionally, what are the underlying factors that have enabled this? These questions will be explored through a comparative analysis of the current emissions trajectories, climate policies, and public perceptions of climate change in both the EU and the US to determine what circumstances allow for meaningful climate action.



Although the EU has thus far successfully curbed its emissions according to its internal standards, it has struggled to meet the rigorous emission standards agreed upon in external forums, such as those of the Paris Agreement. The 2020 objective of a 20% reduction in emissions below 1990 levels was attained several years earlier due to a vast expansion of renewable energy implementation within Europe.¹ However, recently this growth in renewables has slowed considerably. In 2017, the EU's investment in clean energy was the lowest it had been in over a decade, with the UK and Germany spending 50% less than in 2007.² This has resulted in predictions that the EU's longer-term goals, including 40% emissions reduction and 32% renewable energy use by 2030, will not be met.³ Additionally, the current policies of individual EU member states lack the rigidity needed to enforce the 2030 targets.⁴ The emission standards that the EU committed to meeting in the Paris Agreement are even more demanding than its long-term goals, and as a result seem implausible considering current policy direction. According to the Climate Action Tracker, which measures countries' alignment

with the Paris Agreement, the EU's progress is rated insufficient.⁵ If all countries were to follow the EU's emissions path then warming could be expected to exceed the 2-degree limit set by the Paris Agreement and possibly reach 3 degrees by the end of the century. The EU has struggled to sustain the momentum it built up earlier in the decade to reduce emissions at the rate needed to prove its reliability as a frontrunner in the global fight against climate change. Waning commitment by key member states coupled with insufficient climate policies threatens the EU's ability to adhere to the emissions objectives it has committed itself to.

Meanwhile, in the US, emission reduction efforts have oscillated dramatically over the past decade between that of a country fully dedicated to its obligation to lead climate change mitigation to a country abandoning all international climate commitments in the name of conserving American preeminence in the global economy. The recent shift in the presidency has featured a deliberate unraveling of policy from the previous administration, adopting a new stance that is most zealously against climate initiatives. In 2016, at the

end of Obama's term, the US's status towards meeting its NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions) of 26-28% emissions reductions a part of the Paris Agreement was rated medium defined as "not quite sufficient but not also not inadequate."⁶ Two years later, in the midst of the Trump administration, the US was determined to be "critically insufficient" towards meeting its emissions target, with predictions of only 15-19% emissions reductions.⁷ This new designation meant that if all countries were to follow the example of the US, warming would exceed 4-degrees Celsius by the end of the century.⁸

The rapid decline in the US's compliance with the Paris Agreement is largely due to the repeal of key climate legislation by the Trump Administration.⁹ In the absence of effective national climate policy, 14 Climate Alliance states have taken the initiative to meet their share of the US's pledge under the Paris accord.¹⁰ Although they are on track to reduce emissions by 24-29% through local mandates, these 14 states only represent 36% of the US's population and will not have a large enough effect to bring the country as a whole into compliance.¹¹

While the EU has been hindered by the lack of

progress within some of its member states, the US has experienced the opposite phenomenon, where the national government's leadership is lacking and states have had to fulfill a large part of its role. Under the Trump presidency, the US has undergone a shift from a country with emission reductions on par with those of the EU to a country refusing to cooperate in international action on climate change. Unless comprehensive national climate policy is reinstated, the US will continue to fall behind the EU, undermining its authority on the global stage.

While the EU is often viewed as a political dwarf in the amount of influence it exerts over international affairs, the role it has taken in spearheading the fight against climate change is a major exception. The EU's motivation for assuming this leadership role has been dual; to make a significant difference by dynamically addressing the issue, while simultaneously using climate change as a platform to, "establish itself as a leading actor on the global political scene."¹² To retain its status on climate-related issues, the EU has sought to lead by example, employing the use

of soft power to encourage other countries to join in the fight against global warming. Its aggressive energy and climate plan has shown how a low-carbon economy is not only compatible with energy security, but also with sustainable economic competitiveness.¹³ The EU presenting itself as the case study for effective climate management is undoubtedly its strongest mechanism in garnering support for universal climate policy. It also possesses the ability "to act as a gatekeeper for those who want access to the EU market", meaning it can "enforce EU standards on trading partners."¹⁴ Through both an indirect approach, inspiring through successful regulation, and a direct one, imposing environmental standards on trading partners, the EU has leveraged its position as a prominent economic power to influence climate policy internationally.

Perhaps most notable of all EU climate initiatives is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a necessary component of attaining the directives set by the 2020 goals. The EU ETS created an emissions trading system between high-emitting industry sectors, covering around 45% of total EU

emissions, to encourage the utilization of less carbon-intensive production methods.¹⁵ The program features several unique, key features including an "Innovation Fund" to spur development of renewable energy technology and a "Modernization Fund" to assist poorer EU countries in a transition away from fossil fuels.¹⁶ These aspects are vital to ensuring the longevity of the EU ETS and enable less wealthy EU countries to participate in a future economy based on clean energy. The EU has further catered to its less developed members by including an "Effort Sharing Regulation" which includes national emissions reduction goals that account for the GDP and resources of each specific country.¹⁷ Bulgaria, for instance, is expected to reach "emissions stabilization" while Sweden has a much loftier expectation of 40% emissions reduction.¹⁸ Between 2005 and 2016, the EU ETS caused emissions from heavy industry to decline 26%, exceeding its expected target of 23% reduction by 2020.¹⁹ The EU ETS was a major enabler in procuring the EU's 2020 goals which aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% below 1990 levels, increase the capacity of renewables by 20%, and improve

energy efficiency by 20%.²⁰ Motivated by the swift achievement of the 2020 goals, the EU built out longer-term emissions objectives for the year 2030 and 2050. These objectives are even more ambitious than those of 2020 and require a significant escalation in the execution of current policy. While the EU hopes that the EU ETS will assist in reaching emissions targets by lowering the cap on available emissions annually, the program, even in conjunction with current climate policy, falls short of the EU's designated reductions for 2030 and 2050. Further innovative policy measures are needed if the EU is to be brought in compliance with its future emissions ambitions.

The capricious nature of the US's political system has prevented the establishment of any climate policy as coherent and enduring as that of the EU. Changes in administration within the US are frequent and often marked with a complete reversal of the previous administration's policy direction. This turbulence in American political ideology causes innovative policy, such as the Clean Power Plan, to be immediately repealed upon the inauguration of a new president, making it increasingly difficult

for the US to make any progress on issues like climate change. The Clean Power Plan was an unprecedented act of legislation that would have played a critical role in curbing US GHG emissions and bringing the country further into compliance with the Paris Accord. Enacted by President Obama, the CPP's objective was to reduce emissions by 2030 to 32% of 2005 levels.²¹ This was to be achieved by regulating carbon pollution of US power plants, the largest source of emissions domestically while individual states were given the authority to develop their own plan for emission reductions with regulatory mechanisms of their choosing.²² Inherent in the provisions of the CPP was a broader goal of the Obama administration for the policy to serve as a catalyst for a transition to an economy reliant on renewables as opposed to fossil fuels. The US was clearly inspired by the EU's economic prominence as a low-carbon economy and the myth that economic growth is linked to high carbon emissions began to unravel within the American mindset. Due to its potential to reestablish the US's position in global mitigation efforts, the CPP was not only an important step in achieving international

emissions targets but also a necessary one.

One of the first items on the Trump Administration's agenda was to repeal much of the environmental commitments of the previous presidency, including the Clean Power Plan and the US's commitment to uphold the Paris Agreement. Support for Trump's repeal of the CPP can largely be attributed to the rhetoric he used throughout his campaign that described climate policy as an overreach of government power and a threat to American economic competitiveness.²³ His proposed replacement for the plan weakened many of the original standards and gave states so much autonomy that compliance with the act become voluntary. This particular action by Trump completely reversed the progress the US had made over the past several years toward meeting global emissions trajectories. The populist rhetoric within the administration manifested itself in one of the most politically significant actions taken by President Trump, the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Citing his signature slogan of "America First", Trump announced that the agreement was an unfair deal on the US's end, despite it being non-binding and

therefore posed little harm towards the US. The seemingly unfounded claims made by Trump to justify the US's withdrawal from the largest international agreement on climate change has severely hindered the US's ability to contribute to mitigation efforts on a global issue that has only become more serious since the start of his term. There is no secret formula that has enabled the EU's success at addressing climate change through policy measures. In fact, past presidencies have clearly demonstrated the capability the US has to emulate the EU's success. Unlike the US, the EU is a relatively stable entity that, when it comes to climate change, has been able to act unilaterally and rationally. The unique political structure of the US combined with its increasing political polarization has made progress on controversial issues such as climate change increasingly challenging. If every new administration did not make it a primary objective to eradicate the policies of the previous president, perhaps the US would be a more active participant in global mitigation efforts.

The EU's adoption of the issue of climate change as one of its key policy priorities has

created an atmosphere among its citizens of general support for climate mitigation action. This congruence between the objectives of the government and its citizens has in part been enabled by the already existing social capitalist ideals within Europe that allow for “economic experimentation”, such as investment into renewable energy.²⁴ The EU has demonstrated its ability to combine social endeavors with economic growth by expanding the renewable energy market to reduce its contribution to climate change which has, in turn, created


more jobs and exportable technologies. It has shown its commitment to the renewable energy industry through numerous financial incentives that have allowed for the large-scale implementation of these technologies.²⁵ The EU has singlehandedly disproven the belief among Americans that emission regulations hurt the economy and have even demonstrated how such regulations can stimulate the economy.²⁶ The EU’s unwavering efforts to mitigate climate change through strict regulation have set a precedent that enjoys widespread support

among its citizens. The generally high level of trust in government evident in its members makes climate change a much less contentious issue among EU citizens compared to Americans. According to a survey conducted by the European Commission, 92% of EU citizens see climate change as a serious issue and 89% think their governments should be setting targets for increasing renewable energy.²⁷ The political salience of the climate change issue among EU citizens is also demonstrated by the fact that 80% of those surveyed believe that fighting climate change will bring economic benefits.²⁸ Europeans do not see climate action as a necessary evil, but instead as an opportunity for securing future market competitiveness through the creation of a sustainable economy.²⁹ Such a system will be undisturbed by the increasing instability of the fossil fuels market, minimizing their risk of involvement in future international conflict. A fundamental difference between the European and American perspective towards climate policy is that while Americans fear economic repercussions of such regulation, Europeans regard it as an imperative social and economic opportunity.

Another aspect of the climate change issue that has stalled dialogues on the problem within the US but not the EU is the US’s reluctance to acknowledge their contribution to and subsequent responsibility for climate change. According to a Pew Research study on global attitudes towards climate change, while 60% of Europeans believe rich countries should be doing more than developing countries on mitigation, only 40% of Americans feel the same.³⁰ This illustrates the clear hypocrisy of the American mindset towards the issue; even though the US’s development over the past century has been a considerable variable in global warming, it now refuses to recognize its part. The attitude of thoughtlessness within the American psyche leads to the general disillusionment Americans have with the issue. The US is the highest carbon emitting country per capita, yet is the least concerned with the potential impact of climate change. Only 41% of US citizens believe that global warming is currently harming people around the world, in contrast to 60% of EU citizens.³¹ The effects of warming are already playing out in every country around the world, but because of the

Global public support for energy sources

"Please indicate whether you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose each way of producing energy"



Source: Ipsos, May 2011

widespread skepticism towards climate change that exists in the US, Americans are unable to make the necessary connection between increased natural disasters and climate change. Instead, many Americans incorrectly view global warming as a distant and low-priority nuisance that deserves little attention by today's political leaders.

The partisan nature of climate change in American politics is the single largest inhibitor of action on the problem. Climate change has become symbolic of one's stance toward a number of other things including the role of government, trust in science, and concern for the environment. Instead of considering the issue at face value, politicians deliberating on climate policy let their personal values and party affiliation prevail over any productive and rational solutions that might be reached. Climate change is much less contentious within the EU because it is viewed primarily as a scientific issue on which action must be taken. In the US, the severity of the issue is not unanimously agreed upon throughout the population, so the solutions are not evaluated in terms of merit but instead on whether or not they seem to overestimate the

problem. Republicans are unwilling to allow government intervention into economic policy and infringement into citizen's personal lives, giving them a clear incentive to downplay the effects of global warming. Democrats, however, take a much more European approach; believing that regulation on the economy and personal consumption can coexist with the American way of life.

Party loyalty is so dominant within the American mindset that people often default to the opinion of their leaders rather than science and evidence. When asked in 2017 if the US should remain in the Paris Agreement, an overwhelming majority, 77%, of Americans said yes. However, when told that Trump planned to pull out of the agreement only 64% of respondents supported US involvement in the accord.³² In this case, a significant percentage of personal opinions on a specific policy issue was completely transformed upon learning about Trump's plan. Global warming is not important enough of an issue to many Americans for them to form a concrete view on, so they instead adopt the outlook of whichever party they most identify with.³³ As Robinson Meyer explains in

his article "What Americans Really Think about Climate Change," "the heart of the climate issue" is that people do not change their voting patterns based on global warming.³⁴ Economic fear, social privileges, and defense policy are policy concerns with much more of an impact on American voting patterns.³⁵ According to Meyer, the way to achieve effective climate mitigation policy in the US is to make adjustments to energy, tax, foreign, transportation, and industrial policy.³⁶ Concentrated changes to multiple sectors of the US economy could be an effective substitute to the alternative of a single US climate policy, which so far has proved to be difficult to establish and short-lived even when it is. The US government is a body dependent on the will of its citizens to a much greater extent than the EU, which makes constructing a climate action plan in the US a more turbulent process. If the current partisan divide on the issue cannot be bridged, it is unlikely that the US will be able to act on a level consistent with what is needed under the Paris Agreement and US emissions will continue to be a threat to climate security. Over the past decade, the EU has enjoyed success in achieving many of its climate

mitigation targets due to its strict regulation and the support it holds from its member states. Although it currently faces challenges in meeting its longer-term emission objectives, these obstacles are surmountable and can be addressed through heightened policy initiatives. Former US climate policy, such as the Clean Power Plan, has had the potential to elevate the country to a position on the global stage, rivaling that of the EU, but due to the volatility of the US political system, such policies have been fleeting and failed to realize its potential. The partisan divide within the country threatens to undermine any considerable action taken on climate change, crippling the US' ability to emerge as a global leader in climate change mitigation – a status currently held and very much deserved by the EU.

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1964 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

A Competing Contest for Legitimacy & Legacy

By Isabel Catanzaro '20

ABSTRACT

My paper attempts to demonstrate the significance of the 1964 Democratic National Convention in solidifying the Kennedy legacy and in symbolizing a political “passing of the torch” from John F. Kennedy to Robert F. Kennedy, the next in line in the Kennedy political legacy. This event acted as a critical turning point in American thought following the assassination, in which Americans decided to honor JFK through attributing a legacy and mystique to his aura, all displayed publicly at the convention. Thus, the 1964 Democratic National Convention remains a paramount event in that it acted as a decisive political crossroads, celebrating both the past through a sobering remembrance of the late John F. Kennedy, and paving the way for the future through a public celebration of Robert F. Kennedy. An exploration of the 1964 Democratic National Convention can both more narrowly demonstrate JFK’s formidable legacy, and pinpoint a critical historical segway in the transfer of political power from one Kennedy to the next. Through all of this can we see the importance of the 1964 Democratic National Convention as a critical event in the aftermath of the Kennedy Assassination.



On the evening of August 27th, 1964, Robert F. Kennedy stood before a grieving American public. Only nine months earlier, these men and women had lost their beacon of hope, their injection of political vitality, and their symbol of liberal idealism. Thus, when Bobby Kennedy took the stage at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City to deliver a tribute to his brother, the nation saw one of their own. They poured out every ounce of their condolences in screams, claps, and cheers; the crowd remained on its feet for twenty-two straight minutes. Once Kennedy finally spoke, he broke their hearts, saying, “When I think of President Kennedy, I think of what Shakespeare said in Romeo and Juliet: “When he shall die take him and cut him out into stars and he shall make the face of heaven so fine that all the world will be in love with night and pay no worship to the garish sun.”¹ The crowd responded with more cheers and adoration. After Robert Kennedy left the stage, he sat on a fire escape and wept.²

The months leading up to the summer of 1964 set the stage for a captivating power struggle between Lyndon Johnson and Robert

Kennedy. Both stood in line as potential successors to JFK’s legacy: Johnson politically and Kennedy emotionally. Although the American people ultimately accepted Lyndon B. Johnson as their Democratic presidential nominee, amid a twenty-two minute standing ovation and an unprecedented show of collective emotion, they also offered Robert F. Kennedy the torch in continuing the legacy of his departed brother. Thus, the 1964 Democratic Convention proved a paramount event in that it acted as a decisive political crossroads, featuring both Lyndon Johnson’s determined quest to become a president on his own, and Robert F. Kennedy’s desire to solidify his brother’s memory, and to continue his political legacy. Almost from the moment of John F. Kennedy’s death on November 22nd, 1963, Lyndon Johnson turned his attention to winning the presidency in his own right. The 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City would name the party’s presidential nominee for the subsequent presidential election. Eyes fixed on the presidential prize, LBJ set forth to secure the nomination; however, Johnson was not the sole contender

in the succession of JFK's liberal idealism. The American public refused to let go of President Kennedy or at best the romanticized memory of his Camelot White House. Within this painful nostalgia emerged an immortalization of the late President Kennedy, and in this immortalization emerged a formidable obstacle to Johnson's re-election: Robert F. Kennedy.

Kennedy's assassination was a devastating blow to his younger brother, Robert. After dedicating almost all of his political life thus far to aiding his brother, RFK had yet to consider a career of his own. The only feeling more powerful than his grief, however, was the commitment RFK felt to furthering his brother's legacy. Bobby saw this legacy, this unfinished narrative, as his to continue. Following the assassination, Robert Kennedy intended to preserve his brother's dream, internalize his passion, and accept responsibility as his rightful heir. This newfound independence forced Kennedy, much like LBJ, to develop his own political identity independent of the late JFK. To both men, the presidency appeared to be the only plausible platform to accomplish their objectives. Timing, however, proved crucial. According

to Kennedy confidant Nicholas Katzenbach, RFK had named the 1968 Presidency as his ultimate goal, therefore leaving his role in the 1964 Election uncertain.³ Kennedy faced two choices entering the summer of 1964: to run for the Senate, or to be named as Lyndon Johnson's Vice President.

President Johnson recognized the necessity of the Kennedy spirit to his campaign. A Southern Democrat in the wake of a civil rights crisis, Johnson stood at odds with many of the party's Northern liberals. He knew all too well that he, a coarse Texan who attended community college, stood in the shadow of the handsome, wealthy, and East Coast educated Kennedy brothers. He thus jumped at the opportunity to seize JFK's death (and the nation's grief) to refashion the Kennedy liberal idealism as his own. With this reimagination of political identity, Johnson planned to win over the northern portion of the Democratic Party, thus securing his nomination at the upcoming convention. Already the people's leader by legal right, Johnson still felt a need to win political justification from his Democratic peers. Determined to submerge himself in the Kennedy

aura, LBJ could not escape the potential power of the Kennedy memory in his preparation for the summer of 1964.

The relationship of LBJ and RFK radiated tension; the two men did not get along. Their disagreement derived from conflicting perspectives of one another. Johnson saw Robert Kennedy as a spoiled brat, whose family wealth and connection had dropped political power effortlessly into his lap. Kennedy, on the other hand, saw Johnson as a rough and unprincipled bully. In Robert Kennedy's eyes, Johnson appeared the undeserving successor of John F. Kennedy's political legacy. The history of their hostility dated back to the 1960 Democratic Convention, in which the younger Kennedy ardently opposed Johnson as his brother's running mate. Johnson, well aware of Kennedy's attempts to thwart his White House dreams, started referring to him as the "Bobby problem."⁴ This so called "problem" developed over time into more of an obsession for Johnson. Forced to balance his need for Robert Kennedy's support with an utter disdain for his character, Johnson faced a difficult decision entering the summer of 1964: should he appease a mourning America

by embracing Kennedy, or should he avenge Bobby's 1960 snub by denying him a coveted chance at the vice presidency? Thus, with a critical convention fast approaching, John F. Kennedy still managed, even in death, to play a decisive role in the nation's politics. On January 11, 1964, the Democratic National Committee held a meeting in the Sheraton-Park Hotel of Washington, D.C., featuring a tribute to the late President Kennedy by Pennsylvania Governor David Lawrence.⁵ The dispirited committee members mourned the late president, reminiscing wistfully over the centrality of his idealism to the Democratic Party. They quickly turned to the future, however, noting both an "opportunity" and an "obligation" to memorialize JFK through an unwavering support of Lyndon Johnson.⁶

As president, Johnson inherited a turbulent political environment: a stark polarization existed between parties, and the looming civil rights crisis deepened regional differences within the Democratic Party itself. This tumultuous climate placed immense importance on Johnson's running mate in the upcoming election. Eyes fixed on reelection,

Johnson set out to find a vice presidential candidate who would soften his strong southern ties and ultimately help to reunite the Democratic Party. The pressure of the Kennedy mystique aside, Johnson entered the summer considering three main candidates: Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey, Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, and, naturally, Robert Kennedy.

A continual player in Lyndon Johnson's political quest, the primary challenge to Johnson's choice proved none other than his rival, Robert F. Kennedy. Johnson knew that Kennedy would help secure him the North, and possibly even the Midwest, although not the South; however, Robert Kennedy's regional support was not his greatest asset. His image as the mourning brother, a pained inheritor of a political legacy, appealed to nostalgic Americans nationwide. These people felt a deep loss over JFK's death, a loss that Robert Kennedy could and wanted to share with them. His presence represented a comfort to a traumatized nation, and Johnson could not ignore that authority. Everything changed, however, on July 15, 1964, when the Republicans announced Barry

Goldwater as their presidential nominee. Goldwater, a highly conservative, derisive politician, had dedicated his political rise to an emerging neo-conservative movement. His platforms sought to reemphasize the conservative cornerstone of states' right and included an open opposition of the Civil Rights Bill. An example of Goldwater's polarizing character exists in one of his more inflammatory comments, "Sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off the Eastern Seaboard and let it float out to sea."⁷ This disposition made Goldwater of little threat to Johnson in the Northeast, the same region in which Robert Kennedy would help him the most. Turning, per usual, to the political polls of Oliver Quayle, Johnson found that with Goldwater as his opposition, his candidate for vice president would create a difference of only two percentage points.⁸ Johnson reveled in this liberating news, telling his brother, "I don't need the little runt to win. I can take anybody I damn well please."⁹

Knowing that RFK was unnecessary for reelection, Johnson now needed a way to break the news to the public. Not only would he have

to navigate the political ramifications of staunch Kennedy supporters, but the reality of Robert Kennedy's great emotional impact also lingered. The continual conundrum Johnson faced was whether he could become a president in his own right. He knew and Bobby knew that it was JFK's election that had put him in office. Thus, Johnson felt torn between a need to establish his own political legitimacy and the knowledge that Robert Kennedy represented to Americans the same idealism and vibrancy that had gotten Johnson to the White House in the first place.

Before Johnson made any public

announcement, however, he had to tell Kennedy the news. In their meeting, Johnson provided Goldwater's nomination as the basis of his decision. Johnson and Kennedy were not the only topics of conversation as the late President Kennedy once again emerged as a bargaining tool. In his reasoning Johnson made a direct appeal to Robert Kennedy's admiration of his brother, arguing that he made his decision out of an obligation that President Kennedy had shared, an obligation to make decisions "on the basis of what he thought was best for the country and for the party and for himself."¹⁰



The perpetual tension between the two politicians surfaced in the conclusion of this historic conversation. As Johnson recounted later that day to presidential aide Clark Clifford, the young Kennedy departed the meeting, smiling, with the comment, "Well, you didn't ask me, but I think that I could have done a hell of a job for us."¹¹ To this final remark, Johnson smugly returned the smile, replying, "Well, I think you will do a hell of a job for us. And for yourself too."¹²

Now, after speaking with Kennedy privately, Johnson still found himself tasked with having to deliver the news to the public. This would prove difficult, as Johnson knew the press held a certain affinity for Bobby Kennedy. Johnson had always felt a sort of insecurity in comparison to JFK, and this same insecurity extended to other members of the Kennedy family as well. Johnson acknowledged this, confiding to colleague Carl Sanders that while the Kennedys exuded style, he simply lacked class.¹⁵ Recorded phone calls replay an anxious Johnson pouring over newspaper articles in support of RFK. A New York News article from late July reported of both general Northern

favor and of political boss support for Kennedy. Johnson confidant and Mayor of Chicago Richard Daley tried to soften this discouraging news, labeling the reports as a mere press attempt to create party divides entering Atlantic City.¹⁴ Daley's explanations did little to ease Johnson's insecurity, however, and the media's incessant preoccupation with Robert Kennedy continued to haunt his pursuit for reelection.

The answer, Johnson soon discerned, lay in depriving Kennedy of any personal preference and instead categorizing his vice presidential candidates. Johnson planned to announce his decision to not consider any members of his Cabinet for the vice presidency. Instead, he would consider only senators, governors, and mayors, a broad category which allowed for Humphrey and McCarthy to remain in consideration. Johnson revealed his strategy in a conference call with colleagues shortly after his conversation with Kennedy. When Senator Richard Russell noted the success of the proposed plan in eliminating candidate choices, Johnson immediately chuckled, and smartly replied, "I just had to eliminate one."¹⁵ Thus, in an effort to remove the notion of Kennedy as a

serious candidate, Johnson safely shuffled the "Bobby Problem" among other respected names as Adlai Stevenson, Sargent Shriver, and Robert McNamara, in his intent to remove all cabinet members from vice presidential consideration.

With Robert Kennedy safely out of the running for the vice presidency, Johnson now narrowed his search, directing his attention as late as August 21 to Minnesotan Hubert Humphrey and a new candidate, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. The press got hold of the information regarding these final two choices, a leak Johnson quickly blamed on a bitter Robert Kennedy.¹⁶ With the Convention beginning in only a few days, Johnson still lacked a concrete vice-presidential nominee. He had dodged the Kennedy bullet, however, and for Johnson this meant one less obstacle in his quest for Democratic power.

While Johnson and his team discussed the difficult question of the vice presidency, a developing crisis threatened to disrupt the convention: the Mississippi Freedom Democrats. The outward death of liberal idealism that accompanied the Kennedy assassination exacerbated the nation's already tense race

relations, a response seen clearly in the struggles of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. The 1964 Democratic National Convention occurred at a critical point in the development of civil rights. While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had prompted important reforms in American civil society, the government had not yet addressed the issue of voting rights.¹⁷ When the Mississippi Democratic Party met to elect their convention delegation, they strategically excluded all of their African American citizens, thus denying their voting rights and sending an all-white delegation to Atlantic City. These marginalized Mississippians, led by civil rights activist Robert Moses, responded with the creation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, a group organized to bring awareness to the state's violation of voting rights. These "Freedom Democrats," as they were called, set out in the summer of 1964 to gain both active representation at the convention and a platform for their cause.

Lyndon Johnson understood the ultimatum posed by the MFDP. He could seat the MFDP at the Convention and lose the much needed support of white Southerners,

or he could seat the original Mississippi delegation and thus risk negative coverage over MFDP protest and demonstration. Johnson's initial plan was to seat the Freedom Democrat delegation as "honored guests."¹⁸ This way, he could attempt to please both parties, offering symbolic acknowledgement of the Freedom Democrats and their platform, yet still vesting the real voting power in the all-white Mississippi delegation, thus appeasing their elitist exclusion.

This preliminary plan for Democratic harmony stalled, however, when the MFDP would not accept symbolic recognition of their cause. Overwhelmed by the growing strength of this movement, Johnson delegated

the problem to Hubert Humphrey. Referring to the phenomenon as "white backlash," the controversy became a continual thorn in Johnson's quest to secure complete political support at the Convention. Johnson resented the disruption caused by the MFDP, calling the group "a bunch of Communists," and agreeing with majority whip Hale Boggs that "seating the MFDP would be 'a hell of a mistake' that 'destroys the party.'"¹⁹ He also claimed that government wiretaps showed twenty of the Freedom Party's top members to be Communist.²⁰

Johnson's commitment to painting the controversy as a political conspiracy led him



to accuse none other than his original nemesis, Robert F. Kennedy, for the developing crisis. Still paranoid over Kennedy's potential to usurp his Democratic nomination, LBJ repeatedly referred to the issue as "Bobby's trap," musing that Robert Kennedy had himself engineered the MFDP controversy to disrupt the convention. In a conversation with Hubert Humphrey on August 20, Johnson bitterly argued of a Kennedy plan "to get this convention disturbed any way he can," arguing that RFK was "not interested in promoting harmony."²¹

As fervent conversations over the seating of the MFDP took place, circumstances finally required President Johnson to intervene. On August 22, 1964, Freedom Democrat Fannie Lou Hamer prepared to deliver a testimony before the DNC's Credentials Committee. Hamer, a Mississippi sharecropper and MFDP leader, planned to give a riveting speech describing the serious plight of her fellow black Mississippians. Aware of this planned testimony and the negative press it would bring to convention coverage, Johnson knew he had to somehow obstruct Hamer's speech. In an act of quick thinking, LBJ announced that he would hold a

spontaneous press conference—a public address to take place conveniently in congruence with Hamer's testimony. Therefore, while Fannie Lou Hamer delivered an impassioned account of her experience in a Mississippi county jail, Lyndon Baines Johnson cut into all major television networks, orating arduously for ten minutes, only to inform the press that he had not yet chosen a vice presidential running mate. The two speeches concluded simultaneously, and Johnson breathed a sigh of relief.

Hamer, however, would not be silenced. Johnson's plan backfired, as later that evening, in response to the reaction of an affected Credentials Committee, the three major television networks replayed Hamer's speech. Her story was truly harrowing: ruthless, continual beatings, horrible screams, and the dehumanizing demand, "Can you say, 'Yes, sir,' nigger?"²² (Watson, 2010, p. 248) She spoke with authority and with emotion, and with tears in her eyes concluded her testimony powerfully, saying, "And if the Freedom Democratic Party is not seated- NOW- I question America. Is this America?"²³ Hamer's testimony ultimately reached more audiences than she would have

with the original airing, and despite Johnson's best efforts, Americans of all races and politics heard her message that night.

A very disconcerted America switched off their TVs that evening. President Johnson, however, could not let himself dwell on the turmoil caused by the MFDP. Amid the disarray surrounding Hamer's powerful speech, it would have been easy to miss another crucial news alert released that same day: Robert F. Kennedy had announced his intention to run for the U.S. Senate.²⁴ The Convention was set to open in only two days. Nonetheless, with many unanswered questions remaining and an important development in RFK's future, it was finally time to head to Atlantic City.

Atlantic City in the summer of 1964 was no longer the famed Atlantic City of the past. Once a hub of entertainment and escape for Easterners and visitors from across the country, Atlantic City had decayed, both physically and financially, transforming itself from a playground for the rich to a budget family getaway. The delegates arrived regardless, all in eager anticipation of the next three days.

The convention was scheduled to run

from Tuesday, August 25th, to Thursday, August 27th. Tuesday would kick off the event with general committee reports and a presentation of the Democratic Platform, while Wednesday would include the nominations for Johnson and Humphrey. Then, on Thursday, the much anticipated memorial to JFK would take place. This memorial was to be one of three that evening, the first two slated for Eleanor Roosevelt and Sam Rayburn.²⁵ This was not the original schedule. The initial convention agenda called for the JFK memorial film and tribute, which Robert Kennedy would deliver, to take place on Tuesday. Johnson, however, did not approve of this, and decided that it should instead be moved to Thursday, strategically placing it after all ballots for the vice presidential and presidential nominees had been cast. This way, Johnson could solidify his nomination as Democratic Presidential nominee before Robert Kennedy had any chance to sway the minds of the American delegates. Here, Lyndon Johnson found himself once again balancing the undeniable weight of the Kennedy mystique with his own desire to establish his political legitimacy.

Over the next few days the press and public would witness a monumental display of Democratic pride, party unity, and Johnson political success. What they did not see, however, was the immense amount of anxiety LBJ felt during this time. Amid fervent conversations over the MFDP and his vice presidential candidate, Lyndon Johnson found himself plagued by feelings of inferiority, the majority of which were spurred by Robert Kennedy. In describing this emotional burden to Texas Governor John Connally, Johnson once said, "when this fellow looks at me, he looks at me like he's going to look a hole through me like I'm a spy or something."²⁶ Kennedy's unremitting attitude of indifference towards Johnson infuriated the president, and contributed to a constant fear that Bobby would somehow manage to steal the Democratic nomination from his grasp. Although this fear proved doubtful considering RFK's recent announcement to run for the Senate, with nomination so close, Kennedy's popularity and influence still appeared to Johnson all the more frightening and real.

Johnson's insecurities prompted him to

enlist the help of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in monitoring and assessing the motives of Robert Kennedy, a request Hoover obligingly jumped to fulfill. Johnson was furious, for example, to hear at one point that Kennedy friend Paul Corbin had attempted "to promote a vice-presidential write-in for Kennedy in New Hampshire," an action Johnson immediately read as subversive to his presidential campaign.²⁷ Per Johnson's request, Hoover sent a team of thirty FBI agents "to assist the Secret Service in protecting President Johnson and to ensure that the convention itself would not be marred by civil disruption."²⁸ The reality, however, was that these agents were sent with the purpose of monitoring Bobby Kennedy and the members of the MFDP, or all parties whom Johnson feared threatened to cause "civil disruption." Kennedy knew of this surveillance, however, aware since his brother's death that the FBI had wiretapped a direct phone line of his. In a July phone conversation with Johnson, Kennedy confronted him, saying "I understand that he (Hoover) sends all kinds of reports over to you about me." Johnson played off the attorney general's accusation, replying, "Not any

that I have seen. What are you talking about?"²⁹ Thus, in a conversation wholly representative of their relationship, the tension between Johnson and Kennedy had been acknowledged, and just as quickly dismissed.

Johnson not only sought political support in quelling this Kennedy preoccupation, but emotional support, as well. On August 25th, only a day from his nomination, Johnson turned to his closest circle for reassurance and promises of loyalty. That morning, in a phone call with White House Press Secretary George Reedy, Johnson mentioned a "little statement" he had drafted containing remarks he planned to read either in a press conference or in Atlantic City itself. The statement was one of resignation, a withdrawal from the presidential race. One of many in a difficult press week, a critical New York Times article had questioned Johnson's accepting of a stereo gift set while Vice President, a gift which then led to a query into his personal finances. Spurred by this negative article and clearly weighed down by the pressure of the Mississippi Freedom controversy, Johnson needed a fortification of confidence. Lamenting to George Reedy that he was old and tired, a somber LBJ

admitted, "The nation ought to have a chance to get the best available. That's who I want my children to have, and I know that I am not."³⁰

From the minute he joined Jack Kennedy on the 1960 Democratic ticket, Lyndon Johnson tortured himself through perpetual comparison with the princely JFK. Born and raised in Texas and a graduate of Texas State Teachers College, Johnson remained an outsider to the East Coast hierarchy of Washington, D.C. The crude Texan was obsessed with power, control, and simply being on top, and had clawed his way through



the congressional ranks to reach his high position of power and authority entering the 1960 Presidential Election. All of this effort, however, suddenly rendered itself useless in the company of John F. Kennedy. In describing Kennedy, Johnson recalled, "It was the goddamnedest thing, here was a whippersnapper...He never said a word of importance in the Senate and he never did a thing. But somehow...he managed to create the image of himself as a shining intellectual, a youthful leader who would change the face of the country."³¹ Thus, culminating from years of insecurity and self-consciousness, it remained clear on the morning of August 25th that the convention had put Johnson's deep-seated feelings of inferiority to the test.

In another conversation the same day, Johnson spoke to aide Walter Jenkins of "younger men and better-prepared men and better-trained men and Harvard-education men."³² These were not the traits used to describe President Johnson, but rather provided an apt description of his rival, Robert Kennedy. The words of old friend Albert Moursund shocked President Johnson back into reality, however. After seeking Moursund's opinion on

his potential withdrawal, Johnson's long time confidant reminded him of the the consequences of such a political move: if he chose to withdraw, the torch would fall to none other than Bobby Kennedy. Thus, following a rare admission of mediocrity, Johnson's aides proved successful in abating the president's Kennedy-inspired insecurities. Reassured of his follower's loyalty, Lyndon Johnson quickly returned his focus to the two remaining issues at hand: the MFDP and his vice president.

The convention began just as its planning phase had concluded: dealing with the Freedom Democrat crisis. After three days of continuous negotiation, the Credentials Committee and Hubert Humphrey finally reached a compromise with the Freedom Democrats. Accepted Tuesday evening, the compromise read that "no Mississippi regular delegate could sit unless he pledged allegiance to the ticket; that two of the Freedom Party leaders would sit as delegates at large with full right of vote; and that at the Convention of 1968, and thereafter, no delegations would be seated from states where the Party process deprived citizens of the right to vote by reason of their race or color."³³

Johnson moved quickly to paint this victory as a demonstration of Democratic Party unity. Just as his convention had appeared to be falling apart mere days before with Fannie Lou Hamer's speech, Johnson could now deem this crisis critically averted.

The next day Johnson conquered his next big obstacle: his vice-president. From the moment Johnson had eliminated his Cabinet from the running, Hubert Humphrey emerged as a front-runner in vice presidential deliberations. A well-known Democratic politician, Humphrey's Catholicism would also help Johnson's campaign in the Midwest. Johnson had kept the press on their toes leading up to the convention, mentioning a variety of names during his iconic walks around the White House grounds.³⁴ The time had come, however, and finally Johnson delivered an official go-ahead, sending aide Jim Rowe to interrogate Humphrey for any lingering secrets, as well as to seek reassurance of the most important quality Johnson needed in a vice-president: loyalty.

Humphrey passed the test, and found himself summoned to Washington late on Tuesday. Hubert Humphrey arrived at the

White House to see a jovial, almost relaxed Lyndon Johnson awaiting him. Johnson curtly described the position to Humphrey as "like a marriage with no chance of divorce," and then casually asked the Minnesota man, "Hubert, how would you like to be my Vice-President?"³⁵ Humphrey's affirmative reply wed the two politicians into a remarkable Democratic ticket, and Johnson's arduous selection process came to an end. The day flew by with a multitude of press conferences and administrative housekeeping. By late afternoon it came time to depart for Atlantic City, and Johnson and Humphrey appeared just in time to receive their respective nominations.

Governor John Connally of Texas and Governor Pat Brown of California delivered Johnson's nominating speeches. Connally was the same Connally who had been wounded alongside JFK by Lee Harvey Oswald's bullets on November 22nd, 1963, his presence an eerie reminder of the Democratic Party's tumultuous last year. Following these speeches came Johnson's chance to share his vice presidential nomination, offering the convention Hubert Humphrey's name. Atlantic City eagerly

accepted both suggestions, and the convention concluded its second night with a thunderstorm of applause and cheer. Little did anyone in Atlantic City that evening know, however, that the convention's greatest moment had yet to occur.

Despite the festive display of harmony at the close of Wednesday night's session, one more event remained: the tribute to John F. Kennedy. In the last forty-eight hours Lyndon Johnson had dodged a civil rights crisis, navigated the tangled politics of choosing a vice president, and managed to secure himself a nomination as the Democratic candidate in the 1964 Presidential Election. On the night of Thursday, August 27th, however, all of this appeared obsolete. Through the words of his dotting brother and the image of

his iconic personage, John F. Kennedy emerged from death to eclipse the legacy of the 1964 Democratic National Convention.

After nine months of agonizing grief, Robert Kennedy finally stood to address a grieving nation. Washington Senator Henry M. Jackson introduced Kennedy to the crowd as "the man who stood closer to him in times of crisis and in times of fun than anyone else,"³⁶ thus reaffirming the public's notion of Bobby as the closest tangible remains of JFK, and subtly placing him in the role of political successor. As soon as his name left Jackson's mouth, the people roared, and roared, and for a complete twenty-two minutes, they did not stop.

In that moment the convention saw Robert F. Kennedy as themselves. He embodied



the sorrow they felt, the anguish they had endured, and on August 27th, they simply kept on cheering. He tried to silence the masses, but was prevented by Senator Jackson, who pleaded with him, saying, "Let it go on...Just let them do it, Bob....Let them get it out of their system."³⁷ After the twenty-two minute ovation finally calmed, RFK spoke. The speech began a political memorial, opening with a summary of the late president's achievements. Robert detailed his brother's social and military policies, and described the cornerstones of his Presidency which gave, as Senator Jackson had previously described, a "new vitality to our highest office."³⁸ Following this summary, he launched into the emotional nucleus of the speech. In thinking about President Kennedy, Bobby mused, he thought of a line from *Romeo and Juliet*: "When he shall die take him and cut him out into stars and he shall make the face of heaven so fine that all the world will be in love with night and pay no worship to the garish sun."³⁹ These tragic lyrics, a last minute addition from Jacqueline Kennedy, left the convention in tears.⁴⁰

Following this seismic wave of emotion, Kennedy made sure to pay his proper respects,

delivering a small yet effective endorsement of LBJ, and reminding convention attendees that they must confer the same passion and commitment they felt towards President Kennedy to the new Johnson-Humphrey ticket. Bobby did not end his speech on the topic of Lyndon Johnson, however, but instead made careful note to conclude with his own ominous allusion to the future. Sharing one of President Kennedy's favorite Robert Frost quotes, he ended, "The woods are lovely, dark and deep, but I have promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep."⁴¹ With this conclusion, not only had Americans across the country been rocked emotionally by the nostalgic memory of John F. Kennedy, but they also knew that this was not the last they would see of Robert F. Kennedy.

After RFK's impassioned address, a tribute film to the late President appeared before the convention. The film, entitled *A Thousand Days*, was a melange of commentary on the late President, interspersed with the words of others. Guest speakers included Chief Justice Earl Warren, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, and even a brief clip of Jacqueline Kennedy speaking in

Spanish, all to remind viewers of the romantic Camelot days.⁴² The short film closed with an image as heartbreaking as his brother's words, showing "the dead President teaching his baby boy how to tickle his chin with a buttercup."⁴³ After his speech, Robert Kennedy left the stage, sat on an outdoor fire escape, and for fifteen long minutes, he wept.⁴⁴ The power of his words and the reaction of the convention had hit him all at once. In that moment, America saw not a mourning brother, but a rightful heir. In that moment, Robert Kennedy had forever preserved the legacy and the myth of his departed brother.

Amid the fierce sensation of RFK's monumental speech, many forgot about another significance: it was Lyndon Johnson's birthday. The President of the United States turned fifty-six on August 27th, and he intended to celebrate it. The birthday celebration included over 4000 people and a massive cake. Festivities continued late into the night, all culminating at one in the morning with a firework show, in which patriotic colors painted Johnson's image onto the late Atlantic City sky.⁴⁵

By morning it was over. Johnson and Humphrey returned to Washington to


begin a monumentally successful presidential campaign. Robert F. Kennedy embarked to launch a campaign of his own, a trying journey that would also end in success later that year. Atlantic City was left to pick up the pieces of the past three days, returning once again to its depressed image as a fleeting symbol of the past. Although the people and the chaos departed Atlantic City that day, however, a certain memory still remained. To all convention attendees, the last three days had been a whirlwind. The Convention had witnessed a near civil rights crisis, and Lyndon Johnson had finally broken the silence to choose Hubert Humphrey as his running mate. And, most importantly, the Democratic Party had overcome national tragedy and internal friction to produce a viable ticket for the coming election. Within these momentous feats, however, one event stood above the rest. Robert Kennedy's tribute to his brother touched a nation. Ever since the tragic events of November 22nd, the American people had attempted to reconcile the passing of an iconic personage. John Kennedy had been for many a piece of American royalty, and, as in any

royal family, his untimely abdication called for a worthy successor. With his moving words on that warm summer evening, it was Robert Kennedy, not Lyndon Johnson, who accepted the title of heir to the Kennedy legacy.

Lyndon Johnson had been to some degree correct in his anxiety over RFK's influential role in the 1964 Convention. While Bobby neither stole the nomination, nor succeeded in causing the disruption that Johnson so ardently believed he would, he did manage to seize the memory of those three days. There was no denying that John Kennedy had been a looming presence in the atmosphere

of Atlantic City, however, and this presence manifested itself in the poignant performance of RFK. The nation saw his sorrow, they saw his pain, and in that moment, just as John Kennedy had once been theirs, now he was too. Thus, although the Democratic Party accepted Lyndon Johnson as their official nominee, the American people accepted Robert Kennedy as the successor to the Kennedy political legacy. As the colorful fireworks lit up the evening sky that final evening, Johnson could finally rest assured that the Convention was his. And as these streaks shot into the night, Robert Kennedy knew that it was time to move forward. He was

ready to carry the torch, and the next chapter in the Kennedy tale would be his.



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BRAZIL

IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY



By Michael Griglak '20

ABSTRACT

Brazil has a complicated relationship with free trade. A founding member of the World Trade Organization and a key player in the Mercosur agreement, Brazil has long participated in free trade when determined to be advantageous. However, in particular industries of domestic importance, Brazil has avoided constraining themselves to international trade agreements in the same manner. Clearly, Brazil's choice to lean into free trade is not ideological, rather it is strategic — and selective. Similarly, Brazil has had a wavering relationship with free trade agreements as they relate to attempted impositions of environmental protections. The decisions of the Brazilian government with regard to selective ecological concern are often reflective of the nation's status as a semiperiphery economy and the internal core-periphery structure. Within this world economic structure, international trade agreements represent an underdeveloped tool for strengthening environmental protections within Brazil and particularly within the most disadvantaged, internal periphery communities.

The experience of the Brazilian economy over the past several decades is a story of cautious optimism for countries of the global south seeking to advance and develop within and even utilizing the context of globalization and free trade agreements. A variety of micro-experiments in free trade have been conducted throughout various industries in the Brazilian economy with highly variegated levels of success. One of the most successful industries of the Brazilian economy has been aircraft manufacturing. Looking at trends across industries within the Brazilian economy and at what separates industries like aircraft manufacturing from less successful industries, the conditions which allow for global trade to be beneficial and the conditions that allow for exploitative free trade become apparent.

First, one must consider whether or not Brazil did participate in global free trade, and, if so, to what extent and in what ways. One of Brazil's most notable forays into free trade is the 1991 Mercosur agreement, which initially brought Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay into economic and political alignment based on eliminating internal trade

restrictions, implementing common external trade policies, and pursuing similar goals to those of the European Union, going so far as to have considered instituting a shared currency.¹ A notable aspect of this agreement is that all founding nations, current member nations, and affiliated nations are members of the global south. In 1995, Brazil became a founding member of the World Trade Organization, having previously been a member nation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1948.² Despite overwhelming international pressure, Brazil did not sign on to the WTO's 1980 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and has negotiated their own trade agreements in the domestically important industry of aircraft manufacturing.³ Since the foundation of the global movement towards free trade in the mid-20th century, Brazil has been a participant. And, as of the 1990s, Brazil was actively advancing the global free trade agenda. Though it is important to note that Brazil is careful to only participate in free trade agreements that Brazil feels can benefit the nation. Brazil does not favor free trade policies ideologically, but rather strategically participates with peer nations, such

as in the South American Mercosur agreement, and avoids foreign interference in particular industries, like aircraft manufacturing.

In order to determine the potential effects of these agreements and other movements towards free trade, an analysis of Brazilian economic conditions before and after integration into these global agreements must be considered. The Brazilian economy has undoubtedly, though unsurprisingly, grown significantly across the past half century. In 1960, the GDP was just over \$15 billion; by 1990 the GDP was about \$462 billion; in 2011 the GDP peaked at \$2.6 trillion.⁴ GNI per capita has undergone similar growth to a current value of \$8,840, qualifying Brazil as an upper-middle income nation.⁵ Data on the percent of the population living in extreme poverty (defined as living on \$1.90 or less per day) has only been available since 2001, but since then it has fallen from 24.7% to 8.7%.⁶ Data on the percent living in poverty (defined as living on \$5.50 or less per day) has been collected intermittently since 1981. In 1981, 60.4% of the population lived in poverty; now 19.4% of Brazilians live in poverty.⁷ These figures suggest that at least some of the economic

development that has occurred in Brazil over the past several decades has had positive impacts on even the most impoverished members of Brazilian society.

Clearly, over the time period analyzed Brazil enjoyed economic growth and improvement, and Brazilians across the income and wealth spectra had some benefits from this growth. Free trade, however, is only one of many dynamic variables across this era. For integration into free trade compacts to be considered responsible for Brazilian economic improvement, specific links between globalization and particular industries must exist. Today the non-agricultural industries which are most important for the Brazilian economy are mining, automobile manufacturing, oil, aircraft manufacturing, and steel,⁸ which account for 10.63%, 6.0%, 3.95%, 2.96%, and 2.55% of exports, respectively.⁹ These industries, which account for over \$47 billion or 26.09% of total Brazilian exports, are all dependent on exporting their products to foreign markets. The major corporations in each of these industries, excluding automobile manufacturing, began as state-owned enterprises, including Gerdau,

CSN, Usiminas, Embraer, Vale, and Petrobras. Additionally, leading companies in key domestic industries began as state-owned enterprises, such as Telemar in the telecommunications industry.¹⁰ This dependency on exports suggests that Brazilian economic development was dependent upon integration into foreign markets through global trade. An important unique characteristic of Brazilian development is the extent to which state owned entities were the basis for economic growth. This suggests that though globalized trade was important, complete free trade devoid of Brazilian government intervention was not a successful strategy for economic development. Certainly some industries did not have the massive government interventionism experienced in aircraft manufacturing, steel, mining, or oil production, however, only one such industry, auto manufacturing, had the same success of these industries.

A particular case study of the unique Brazilian model of economic development through globalization can be seen in the aircraft manufacturing industry. One of the most successful Brazilian businesses is the aircraft manufacturer Embraer. Embraer, the

company's current name, is a portmanteau of Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica, the Ministry of the Air Force entity which first began manufacturing aircraft for the Brazilian military in 1969. This subdivision of the air force held key partnerships with several government sponsored research universities and Finep, a financial institution organized out of the Ministry of Science and Technology for promotion of Brazilian scientific research. Up until 1994, Embraer was entirely controlled by the Ministry of the Air Force under the Brazilian government, though it had begun to transition to commercial aircraft manufacturing during the 1980s. In the early 1990s, as the Brazilian government planned to privatize the corporation, there were initially no offers made to purchase Embraer at auction.¹¹ It is clear that for the first several decades of Embraer's existence the company was only able to survive due to massive government intervention and subsidization; Embraer was not competitive in a free market. However, in 2009 Embraer employed 17,000 Brazilians, a 10,000 employee increase in 10 years, sold more regional aircraft than any other manufacturer globally, and was

the third largest aircraft manufacturer overall, behind Boeing and Airbus.¹² Obviously a massive shift occurred over the 15 year period from 1994 to 2009 for Embraer to become such a successful company. Embraer's contemporary business model is dependent upon their highly successful line of regional aircraft. In 1996, airlines in the United States saw growing demand for regional air travel, and, thus, U.S. airlines increased demand for regional aircraft. Embraer was uniquely positioned to take advantage of this newfound demand; in the 1990s grants from and partnerships with Brazilian universities specifically encouraged Embraer to pursue massive research and development in the regional aircraft product category. In 2009, Embraer exported \$4 billion in regional aircraft, 95% of all regional aircraft produced.¹³ For several years, Embraer was able to experiment with new models while selling products below the costs of raw materials because of extensive grants from Brazilian universities and the Ministry of Science and Technology.¹⁴ Without this unique competitive advantage in the niche market of regional aircraft, Embraer could not have

taken advantage of the shift in U.S. markets. Of course, international trade is facilitated by trade agreements between countries. Today, the United States is the destination of 52% of all aircraft manufactured in Brazil,¹⁵ which are nearly entirely Embraer aircrafts.¹⁶ The assistance of government universities and the Ministry of Science and Technology was essential and they worked in tandem with beneficial trade structures.

It is clear that Embraer is an incredibly successful company and of great benefit to the Brazilian economy. However, it is important to consider the dynamics behind the success of Embraer. The WTO has a specific agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft which mandates duty-free trade of aircrafts and over 250 aircraft parts between signatory nations. Only five nations in the world produce commercial aircrafts, and Brazil is the only one of these nations that did not sign onto the Trade in Civil Aircraft agreement;¹⁷ Brazil also happens to be the only one of these five nations in the global south. The Brazilian government retains a veto-power stake in Embraer and has traditionally resisted the efforts of foreign companies to

acquire significant ownership.¹⁸ The Brazilian government has established bilateral trading policies with the United States that seem to protect both nations' comparative advantages, a relatively unusual agreement to come by between nations of the global north and global south.

Currently, exchange in aircraft manufacturing between Brazil and the United States is complex. Most Brazilian regional jets produced by Embraer go to the United States.¹⁹ However, 70% of the parts in Embraer regional aircraft come from the United States.²⁰ Embraer's primary competitor is U.S. manufacturer Boeing, which benefits greatly from extensive indirect U.S. government subsidization of aircraft manufacturing, mostly under the guise of national security. Brazil has been able to set up a key trade exchange with the United States, though only in such a way that causes minimal threat to U.S. manufacturers. This is, however, still a massive achievement for the Brazilian government and economy which directly facilitates the existence of one of the nation's flagship corporations. Though Brazil has not been able to outperform nations of the global north, by being strategic in the realm of free

trade, Brazil has been able to establish their own competitive niche for the benefit of the domestic economy, providing a model for other industries and possibly other countries.

The Brazilian case study, at least with regards to one of their most important industries, aircraft manufacturing, seems to contradict Friedman's view of globalization. It does not appear that ties to stronger economies gave Brazil any technological access or allowed for a "leap-frog" of development. The Brazilian technology that gave Embraer a competitive advantage was domestically developed with painstaking protectionism. On the other hand, Brazil would seem to fit into Stiglitz conception of "semi-periphery" nations which the global north has allowed to develop into manufacturing strong houses, but no further. It is interesting that Brazil is able to exist as a semi-periphery nation, as opposed to a periphery nation, not because of free trade, but in resistance to free trade, which would otherwise cripple key industries, like the case study of state organized aircraft manufacturing.

Brazil can serve as a model for nations of the global south seeking to carve out a niche

in the increasingly tilted global markets. By strategically resisting free trade and promoting the domestic development of key industries, Brazil is able to sustain competitive positions in elusive industries typically reserved for the global north. However, Brazil has not resisted globalization. Globalization is what allows for the export oriented economy and its key corporations, like Embraer, to exist and grow. Brazil has simply chosen to globalize on their own terms, not terms dictated by the global north. Of course, the luxury of developing their own terms is not afforded to many nations, which have become entangled in weaponized forms of debt. Brazil has the luxury of defining

their own course in the global market: Brazil has used free trade when advantageous, such as among peer, South American nations through the Mercosur agreement, but Brazil has resisted attempts of the global north to compete with Brazilian industries that would not be able to keep up with the massive advantages afforded to pre-existing corporations of the global north. When possible, this course of integration, paired with strong domestic government interventionism and protectionism, appear to spur economic development for the Brazilian economy.



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RADICALIZATION

OF CHINA'S

UYGHURS

Militant Responses to Chinese

State Repression

By Daniel Fu '21

ABSTRACT

China's repression of Xinjiang's Muslim minority, the Uyghurs, has made recent international headlines. Preexisting inter-ethnic tensions, in addition to cultural and economic discrimination, have helped cultivate a Uyghur identity rooted in political Islam and strong ethnic pride. This paper explores the process through which Chinese state repression has led to the radicalization of certain elements in Xinjiang's Uyghur minority: claims for secession and independence, the Uyghur exodus, radicalization abroad, ethnic clashes, and the attempted erasure of Uyghur identity are all factors that have increased the potential for future terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and mainland China.



INTRODUCTION

Until recently, China has been relatively unaffected by terrorism instigated by radical Jihadist groups.. Nonetheless, the western province of Xinjiang— largely populated by Turkic Sunni Muslims called Uyghurs—have cultivated a political identity rooted in resistance against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) because of systematic repression. In fact, perceived attacks on cultural and religious facets of Uyghur life have motivated calls for secession and independence. Through repeated “strike hard” campaigns, direct Chinese repression has fostered an extremist mentality among Chinese Uyghurs living abroad such as in the terrorist East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM), now known as the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), one of many militant groups that have made sizable contributions to the continued perpetration of global Jihad.

The forced internment of over one million ethnic Uyghurs in re-education camps, coupled with a long history of ethnic friction and violence, has undoubtedly contributed to further escalation in inter-ethnic tensions. While pre-existing hostilities have been

evident , continued Chinese-state repression will undoubtedly embolden Jihadist groups seeking recruitment from disalusioned Uyghurs. Similarly, China's authoritarian security tactics have enabled the politicization of Islam and the subsequent creation of a Jihadist ethos among homegrown extremists interested in countering the state. This paper will examine how Chinese-state repression could potentially lead to the empowerment of Jihadist groups such as the TIP. Furthermore, this paper will explore how issues of self-determination and secession impact religious extremism within the context of Xinjiang.

A BRIEF HISTORY

When discussing Uyghur responses to repression, it is important to note that the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang has cultivated a united ethnic identity over time. After the collapse of the Uyghur empire in 840 CE, waves of migration to areas that compose modern-day Xinjiang became popular.¹ The Uyghurs later converted to Islam en masse after 1200,² achieving near religious homogeneity between the 1400s and 1600s.³ Xinjiang did not



become Chinese territory until 1884; but when it was formally integrated into China's ruling Qing Dynasty,⁴ the first efforts for Uyghur independence were made between 1864 and 1888 when a military official was directed by a Khanate to establish a Muslim state in Kashgar.⁵

After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911, Xinjiang was governed by the newly formed republican government, later called the Kuomintang (KMT).⁶ In 1933, a short-lived "East Turkestan Islamic State" was founded.⁷ Between 1944 and 1949 though, the Soviet Union supported Uyghur efforts to create a national entity in northern Xinjiang called the East Turkistan Republic.⁸ Historian Xiaowei Zang argues that this was of paramount importance in the cultivation of a secessionist mindset in the post-Mao Uyghur population.⁹ When the KMT was defeated by the CCP, the newly-formed government established the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955. This marked the beginning of a period during which Uyghurs were subjected to unprecedented levels of persecution. While the Qing dynasty and the KMT had allowed the Uyghurs to maintain relative religious autonomy, the CCP

viewed self-identity among Chinese minority groups as a threat to their newly consolidated power.¹⁰ From the CPP's perspective, Islam was an avenue for alternative allegiance to an entity independent and separate from the Chinese state.¹¹ As such, the CCP proceeded to begin a campaign of religious repression that has lasted to present day. General Wang Zhen of the People's Liberation Army executed Uyghurs who advocated alternative views to that of provincial authorities.¹² Additionally, the land on which mosques were built was seized, and Islamic taxation was abolished.¹³ As a result of these injustices, the One Hundred Flowers Campaign, which encouraged general criticism of the CCP, brought Uyghurs to forcefully speak-out against government policy, expressing concerns regarding attacks on their identity.

General persecution of Uyghurs during this period, however, was minimal as compared to the repression that occurred during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.¹⁴ Out of the 106,000 minority party cadres in Xinjiang, 99,000 were dismissed.¹⁵ The Uyghur people were forced to witness the burning of mosques and religious

texts, along with relentless persecution of Uyghur intellectuals and religious leaders.¹⁶ Public bazaars were closed, and large-scale religious oppression was instigated in an effort by Mao Ze Dong to rid Xinjiang and the rest of China of its previous historical, cultural, and educational institutions.

MODERN HISTORY

The advent of the Cultural Revolution motivated the general liberalization of Xinjiang between the late 1970s and early 1990s.¹⁷ By the time Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, concerns were widespread among Chinese central leadership regarding potential rebellion in Xinjiang. Thus, Uyghurs were given special opportunities for job training and preferential consideration for college admissions.¹⁸ One of the most prominent examples of this trend was that the Uyghur intelligentsia was given ample opportunity to explore and propagate Uyghur culture.¹⁹ The CCP also introduced the Great Western Development Policy in 2000 which enabled Xinjiang's GDP per capita to grow from 1,680 RMB in 1997 to 16,820 RMB in 2007.²⁰

The CCP hoped that general

liberalization and their efforts to generate economic growth would cultivate a sense of national unity among the Uyghurs. Their policies however, achieved the exact opposite. The Uyghur minority, emboldened by relative liberalization and newfound opportunities for cultural promotion, began to call attention to what they perceived to be structural discrimination implemented by the CCP.²¹ The creation of Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union further encouraged Uyghur calls for autonomy and independence.²² Moreover, Chinese authorities observed an increase in Uyghur violence and ethnic unrest targeting the Han Chinese residents of Xinjiang.²³

The CCP attributed this ethnic unrest and violence to the liberalization of the late 1970s and early 1990s.²⁴ Thus, the Chinese government began a series of "strike hard" campaigns in 1996 aimed at quashing the Uyghur's separatist idealism. The CCP targeted the perceived "three evils" that existed in Xinjiang, namely separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism.²⁵ Such campaigns have reinforced the notion that a distinct Uyghur identity will never be accepted by the state. As a

result, a new Uyghur identity—characterized by acts of everyday resistance against Han Chinese and the CCP.²⁶—has evolved

The cultivation of this identity was enabled by Uyghur grievances with issues in government management and social policy as well. In 1986, Uyghurs protested on the streets against a myriad of sociopolitical and cultural concerns, including environmental degradation, nuclear testing, increased Han in-migration to Xinjiang, and alleged racism against Uyghur students inside the classrooms of Xinjiang University.²⁷ Protests in 1989 and 1993 also occurred in response to the publishing of two books that portrayed Muslims and their halal diets as backward.²⁸ Later in 2004, hundreds of Uyghurs protested the construction of a dam that would displace Uyghur farmers without adequate compensation.²⁹ Central bank data from 2019 shows that in the midst of China's economic slowdown, credit flows into Xinjiang and Qinghai, home to the Hui Muslim minority, slowed by 70-80% as compared to the previous year.³⁰ These figures are among China's lowest.

To the Uyghur people, this evidence reinforces the perception that central government policy

in Xinjiang is enacted to exclusively benefit Han-Chinese elsewhere.³¹ This perception is exacerbated by the view amongst Uyghurs that their concerns are never addressed by local officials, even if the officials are Uyghur themselves. In 2005, one local official told the Financial Times that “we don't have the power to tell them to do anything—they only listen to [Xinjiang party leadership] in Beijing.”³² To add on, data shows that local authorities were allotted only \$35 million USD of the \$14.8 billion profit generated from Xinjiang's 2008 petrochemical tax.³³ The lack of a concerted effort among Han government officials to learn the Uyghur language, or familiarize themselves with local Uyghur customs, encourages the view that structural bias to support Han interests is obvious.³⁴

Despite success in government-led economic growth, widespread income inequalities persist between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; in fact, most economic growth created by the Great Western Development Plan has gone to Han households: in 2011, the average income for Uyghurs in the city of Urumqi was 892 RMB in contrast to the 1,141 RMB earned

by Han Chinese.³⁵ Furthermore, the majority of Han Chinese reside in urban areas where economic opportunity is greater; in contrast, the Uyghurs mostly reside in rural, farming-based areas of Xinjiang. Economic concerns are compounded by the perception that Uyghurs are being outnumbered and overshadowed by Han Chinese in the former's own homeland. In 1949, the Uyghurs composed 75% of Xinjiang's population. This number has since fallen to 46% in 2010 due to Han Chinese migration.³⁶ In Xinjiang's oil industry, there are practically no Uyghurs in senior management positions despite the existence of affirmative action programs. Reports of ethnic and religious discrimination inside offices are widespread.³⁷ Ultimately, both of these problems can be attributed to the Great Western Development Policy, which demanded the expertise of Han Chinese to implement many of its key goals and strategies.³⁸

A MODERN UYGHUR IDENTITY ROOTED IN ISLAM

It has been clearly established that the Cultural Revolution sparked the beginnings of historical resentment among some Uyghur

communities against the CCP. General space for liberalization allowed Uyghurs the opportunity to bolster cultural and political awareness, generating calls for secession. The CCP, in the late 1990s, returned to repression as a tactic to silence these calls. Issues related to socioeconomic inequality and poor governance since then have disaffected and disenfranchised swaths of the Uyghur population. What role then, does Islam play in forming a modern Uyghur political identity, and how it is asserted? Today, the academic consensus among political scientists, sinologists, and Middle East experts is that Uyghur national and ethnic identity is heavily rooted in Islamic beliefs.³⁹ Graham E. Fuller, a former CIA station chief in Kabul, and Jonathan Lipman, conclude that Islam is the key factor that distinguishes Uyghurs from their Han Chinese counterparts. Attending religious services and ceremonies is a medium through which Uyghurs derive their own ethnic identity.⁴⁰ Arianne M. Dwyer also concludes that the Turkic-Muslim heritage of Uyghurs is integral to their formulation of a modern identity.⁴¹ In further support, Joanne Finley writes that Islam is an important current in

the social, cultural, and psychological life of Uyghurs, noting that Islamic beliefs have become instilled in the political consciousness of some Uyghur communities.⁴² Finley also argues that Islam has been utilized to express the sociopolitical frustrations possessed by Uyghurs and directed against the CCP and the Han Chinese population residing in Xinjiang.⁴³ When Islam permeates every facet of daily life, it is inevitable that its tenets begin to conflate with political goals. It would be plausible to argue, therefore, that Islam has become a significant force in the mindset of a nation which has historically held anti-government and secessionist beliefs. Islamic beliefs thus serve to fuel a nationalist ethos among the Uyghur people, potentially threatening the CCP's grip on power in Xinjiang.

Xiaowei Zang's research corroborates the notion that Islam and nationalism are inherently linked. Using a sample of over one thousand Uyghur households, Zang concluded that those who held a higher degree of "ethnic consciousness" were more committed to Islam.⁴⁴ A higher degree of ethnic consciousness meant demonstrated commitment to the promotion

of Uyghur language and culture. Those with higher levels of "ethnic consciousness" were shown to pray daily, identify as religiously pious, and emphasize Islam in their daily routines.⁴⁵


Zang's findings allow us to conclude that fundamentally, the Uyghurs are an overwhelmingly proud people. 72.3% of Uyghur respondents believe that it is integral for their children to learn the Uyghur language, while 66% believe that it is important to promote Uyghur culture.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Zang's findings suggest that Uyghur consciousness is not related to economic income, social status, or material condition.⁴⁷ Uyghur elites are just as likely as low-income social groups to harbor a nationalistic ethos.⁴⁸ Uyghur ethnic consciousness is not statistically related to factors such as educational attainment, employment status, professional status, or income.⁴⁹ Increased living standards and economic growth, therefore, will not thwart Uyghurs' independence and cultivated mindset.

A hybrid between primordialist and constructivist views of ethnic identity is observable here. Ethnic identity, for the

Uyghurs, is not malleable. Primordial loyalties to their language, religion, and way of life, are the foundational precepts Uyghurs utilize to determine their material and political interests.⁵⁰ Thus, the vast majority of Uyghur communities have developed a collective, ethnic conviction that only increases in force when its existence, interests, or integrity is under perceived threat.⁵¹

THE COURSE OF UYGHUR UNREST AND HISTORICAL STATE REPRESSION

Prolonged Uyghur violence and unrest



commenced with the Baren incident of April 1990 when 52 around two-hundred armed Uyghurs, under the leadership of Zeydun Yusup of the East Turkistan Islamic Party, stormed the township of Baren and attacked local government offices, managing to hold out against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) units dispatched to combat them for several days.⁵³ The Uyghurs demanded an end to mass Han migration to Xinjiang, which was perceived as a significant threat to facets of Uyghur culture.⁵⁴ They also demanded an end to the practice of forced abortions and sterilizations

utilized by Chinese family planning officials against Uyghurs under the guise of the one child policy. Although the conflict ended in less than a week, twenty-three individuals perished and over two hundred Uyghur fighters were captured.⁵⁵

In February 1997, mass protests in the city of Yining erupted upon the announcement that 30 Uyghur independence activists had been executed.⁵⁶ These protests were also a response to crackdowns by the provincial government on traditional Uyghur gatherings known as meshrep.⁵⁷ Two days of protests saw Uyghur activists changing slogans such as “Allah is great” and “independence for Xinjiang.”⁵⁸ Ultimately, the demonstrations were crushed by the live ammunition of PLA soldiers.⁵⁹ While official sources state that only nine Uyghurs died due to the PLA’s crackdown, it is likely that the death toll was substantially higher.⁶⁰ In the aftermath of the Yining protests, Amnesty International estimated that over 190 executions took place against Uyghurs who instigated the protests.⁶¹ More than ten years later, the Urumqi riots occurred, exemplifying the ethnic tensions and lack of inter-ethnic understanding between

Uyghur and Han Chinese communities in Xinjiang.⁶² Covered extensively in western media, the Uyghur riots left over 160 people dead and over 820 people injured in July 2009.⁶³ These riots were instigated due to a cultural misunderstanding during the Shaoguan Incident: Uyghur factory workers were accused by Han Chinese workers of assaulting a Han woman in Guangdong.⁶⁴ Riots in the factory between Han Chinese and Uyghurs resulted in the deaths of two Uyghur workers, prompting more riots in September instigated by the Han Chinese who were dissatisfied with the authorities’ handling of the Uyghur protests.⁶⁵

From the aforementioned Baren Incident, Yinning Protests, and Urumqi riots, it has become clear that the root causes of Uyghur unrest and violence are Uyghur perceptions of constant encroachment from the CCP, discrimination and cultural misunderstanding, attacks on their culture and religion, and desires for independence. These root causes are exacerbated by social marginalization, perceived social disparities, and persistent economic inequalities despite broad economic growth. When in conversation

with each other, these factors have caused a decline in social cohesion, separating Uyghurs and Han Chinese geographically, linguistically, and religiously. Despite this overwhelming evidence, there has been no effort from authorities to foster a mutual understanding that could bridge these differences. Tong Zhao concludes that these issues have led Uyghurs to pivot towards religion as a means to seek “relief, consolation, and hope.”⁶⁶ Zhao attributes rising Islamic fundamentalism and the renewal of Islamic practices in Xinjiang to this lack of social cohesion. He notes that there has been a recent revival of mashrap gatherings throughout Xinjiang during which Muslim males gather in groups to discuss moral and religious etiquette in an Islamic context, causing⁶⁷ younger generations to flock to religious services in unprecedented numbers.⁶⁸ This general revival of Islamic fundamentalism has also led to radicalization, exemplified by militant attacks and general unrest.

In early 1996, a palpable uptick in violent unrest caught the attention of high-ranking Politburo members in the CCP.⁶⁹ In March, President Jiang Zemin chaired a Politburo

meeting which officially designated “ethnic separatism” and “illegal religious activities” as the two main threats to stability in Xinjiang.⁷⁰ Subsequently, an unprecedented “strike hard” campaign was implemented.⁷¹ In its immediate aftermath, there was a drastic increase in the number of pre-planned, coordinated attacks that occurred throughout Xinjiang. Barbara Walter and Andrew Kydd write that crackdowns on social insurgency can indeed lead to the creation of additional grievances as those oppressed turn to violence as a means of active resistance. Repression leads to a discontent population, setting the conditions for potential radicalization and recruitment by militant groups.⁷²

By mid-1998, however, it appeared as though the Chinese “strike hard” campaigns had succeeded in pushing out Xinjiang’s radical elements. Over the course of two years, the PLA had fielded an astonishing 222,000 soldiers in the Lanzhou military region, which has jurisdiction over Xinjiang.⁷³ China’s wide-reaching hukou (household registration) system also allowed provincial authorities to effectively track the movements of any suspected Uyghur militants.⁷⁴ Widely perceived as a show of force,

these measures formed the backbone of a robust security apparatus designed to thwart any potential grassroots rebellions. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the success of these Chinese measures was short-term. Increasing repression instigated by the state motivated the migration of many Uyghurs, especially those prone to radicalization, to Xinjiang's neighboring Central Asian states. These states include Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all of which have a sizable presence of militant groups.⁷⁵

RADICALIZATION AND THE UYGHUR EXODUS

Most radical groups in Xinjiang have two objectives: independence and the subsequent implementation of Islam in state doctrine. Among the most prominent radical groups in Xinjiang is the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as founded in 1989 by Ziyauddin Yusuf, which dedicates itself to the ultimate secession of Xinjiang into a theocratic state called East Turkistan which would be governed utilizing Islamic principles.⁷⁶ Yusuf was inspired by the victory of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan,

and was an ardent believer in a pan-Turkic ideology that envisioned a Central Asia free from Soviet and Chinese control.⁷⁷ Recently, the ETIM has begun rebranding itself as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).⁷⁸ From the 2000s onward, it has become clear that Chinese "strike hard" campaigns and Xinjiang's vast security apparatus have made waging Jihad in China an incredibly difficult task. Thus, Uyghur militant groups, such as the TIP, moved into nations such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.⁷⁹ Their move abroad was motivated by China's successes in cracking down on the TIP's limited support and resource structure. In neighboring Central Asia, militant groups were able to enjoy favorable conditions such as intra-ethnic solidarity, less restrictions and monitoring, and most importantly, access to Jihadist groups. Although there has been some debate regarding the verity of these links, it is in indisputable that Uyghur groups have received some training and funding from al-Qaeda and the Taliban.⁸⁰ In 2009, Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan leader in al-Qaeda, publicly encouraged Chinese Uyghurs to wage Jihad against the CCP.⁸¹ His statement

established that Jihadi groups see Chinese Uyghurs as potential recruits in their concerted effort to wage Jihad worldwide.

Such statements are supported by the fact that the majority of Uyghur militant groups are currently located in North Warzistan in Pakistan—a tribal region where the Pakistani government has little authority⁸²—umerous Jihadist groups affiliated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are also located.⁸³ Key figures in TIP leadership have also shown to be institutionally affiliated with al-Qaeda. For example, the former leader of the TIP, Abdul Shakoor Turkstani, was also a commander in al-Qaeda forces who oversaw training camps throughout Warzistan.⁸⁴ As such, it appears, to an extent, that the TIP and al-Qaeda have seen some level of not only cooperation, but also integration. Recently, the TIP released an hour-long propaganda video on a website called "Jihad in Eastern Turkistan,"⁸⁵ which, like other propaganda produced by Al-Qaeda, depicts self-identified Uyghur terrorists training with RPG's using 87 September 11 attacks as a source of inspiration.^{85, 86, 87}

In July 2008, the TIP released a

statement titled "Why Are We Fighting China?" In the statement, TIP writes that "we are fighting China based ... on the following facts and Shariah evidence: China is an enemy which has invaded Muslim countries and occupied Muslim eastern Turkestan."⁸⁸ It continues by arguing that "We are fighting China to rescue those oppressed Muslims and stop their torment ... China has stood against Islam and Muslims, has forced atheist Communism and communist education on them, has prevented them from holding their religious ceremonies, has outlawed religious education and closed schools, institutes, and universities teaching Islam, has prevented them from immigrating to Muslim countries, and has maintained a policy of isolation, population birth control, and ethnic cleansing."⁸⁹ They also reference "Muslim prisoners who we are seeking to release," those who were "thrown into the darkness of prison cells without committing any crime, apart from saying 'Our Lord is Allah.'"⁹⁰ At the end, TIP called for the mobilization of the Muslim people in Turkistan to "rise together as one for Allah" and "avenge your blood."⁹¹ TIP members, in this statement, aimed to portray themselves

as freedom fighters, motivated by a desire to assist persecuted Muslims in Xinjiang. The TIP has already claimed responsibility for several coordinated, small-scale attacks. Whether the TIP has the capacity to instigate a prolonged campaign of terror in Xinjiang, however, is subject to debate because of its limited organizational capacity, few means to smuggle arms into China, and problems in the sense that an overwhelming majority of Uyghurs do not share their views.⁹²

Nonetheless, what is clear is that the TIP has been actively involved abroad in other Jihadist efforts. In Syria, there are currently 1,000 to 5,000 TIP members fighting against the Assad regime alongside affiliates of the Islamic State.⁹³ In fact, the TIP manifests as one of the largest foreign actors currently embroiled in the Syrian Civil War. In northern Afghanistan, the TIP has also conducted joint attacks with the Taliban against government troops.⁹⁴ As recently as 2018, militants from the Taliban and the TIP successfully worked in tandem to engage Afghan soldiers. Propaganda videos show TIP militants beheading soldiers they had taken captive.⁹⁵ Recently, the Taliban announced

the appointment of two Uyghurs to senior leadership positions in the Syrian branch of the Taliban.⁹⁶

Furthermore, it is important to note that Uyghurs have attempted to join militant groups outside of the TIP and its affiliates. In April 2016, four Uyghurs in Indonesia were arrested when they sought to join the efforts of Santoso, a violent Indonesian Islamic militant who was the leader of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.⁹⁷ In 2015, the deadliest bombing in modern Thai history was attributed to Uyghur militants, who were angered by the Thai government's decision to deport 109 Uyghurs back to China.⁹⁸

While Uyghur militancy and terrorism may not be an urgent and problem in China, the fact that terrorism is being perpetrated abroad by Chinese citizens on a routine basis should be worrying. The close geographical proximity of Uyghur radicalization hotspots to China is a threat to its security; radicalization and militancy is breeding within China's neighbors to the immediate west and south.

CHINESE INTERESTS AND MODERN-DAY REPRESSION

Given the plethora of issues that Xinjiang has generated for China, it is important to examine why the Chinese government does not simply allow Xinjiang autonomy and self-governing capabilities.

Xinjiang's importance for Chinese economic, security, and strategic interests cannot be overstated, especially considering its substantial oil, natural gas, and natural resource reserves.⁹⁹ Total oil and gas resources in the Junggar basin, located in northern Xinjiang, amount to 8.68 billion tons of oil and 2.5 trillion cubic meters of gas.¹⁰⁰ Tax revenue from Xinjiang's petrochemical industry alone produced \$2.1 billion USD for the central government in 2005.¹⁰¹ PetroChina, the country's top oil and gas firm, recently announced plans to raise annual crude oil output in Xinjiang to three million tons by 2021.¹⁰² The Xinjiang operations of the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in 2017 produced 11.45 million tons of crude oil and 17.1 million tons of gas. The CNPC announced in July, 2018 that they would spend \$22 billion USD to replace oil

wells to offset declining output, which amounts to a 75% increase in investment directed toward Xinjiang.¹⁰³ Xinjiang also produces 80% of China's reserves in gold, jade, and other precious metals.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, 40% of China's coal deposits are in Xinjiang.¹⁰⁵

China's strategic interests in Central Asia also depend on Xinjiang. For example, China is currently attempting to construct gas pipelines through Xinjiang by cooperating with states such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.¹⁰⁶ As there is no geographical alternative, it is integral to note that Central Asia produces two thirds of China's coal supply and one third of its cotton supply, both of which are inextricable from China's manufacturing-based economy.¹⁰⁷ Between 1992 and 2005, trade between China and Central Asian states increased by 1600% and was valued at \$8 billion.¹⁰⁸ China's recent Belt and Road initiative promises to promote such trade even further.

Additionally, the significant amount of foreign investment in Xinjiang ties economic interests there to Beijing's projection of economic stability abroad. The World Bank loans China an estimated \$2 billion USD a year.

In the early 2000s, over \$780.5 million USD in low-interest World Bank loans went to funding over fifteen projects throughout Xinjiang.¹⁰⁹ Recently, the World Bank approved \$102.68 million USD in loans for the Xinjiang Technical and Vocational Education Project.¹¹⁰ Analysis by ChinaFile researchers show that Fortune 500 energy companies such as ExxonMobil, Halliburton, Danaher, and Peabody Energy have vested interests in Xinjiang's resource economy.¹¹¹

Any threat of economic or political instability threatens to endanger Xinjiang's significant contributions to Chinese economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Chinese responses after post-Mao liberalization have been characterized by brutal suppression. It was not until 2001, however, that the Chinese government saw an opening to escalate its repression with the tacit endorsement from the international community. Seeing the September 11 attacks as a policy opening, the Chinese government branded their attempts to quash Uyghur movements in Xinjiang as a fight against global terrorism and Islamic extremism.¹¹² The United States, seeking Chinese cooperation

on the War on Terror, became supportive of Chinese endeavors despite initial resistance. In late 2002, the U.S State Department officially designated ETIM, a terrorist organization, and echoed Chinese concerns about Uyghur militancy and separatism.¹¹³ At China's request, the United States even detained 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay. Despite credible proof, including a unanimous court opinion written by Judge Merrick Garland, their detention was based on circumstantial evidence.¹¹⁴

Today, cities in Xinjiang are defined by a heavy police presence, ubiquitous CCTV surveillance cameras, checkpoints, and military patrols.¹¹⁵ Official Chinese sources state that in 2010, the authorities increased Xinjiang's public security budget by 90%.¹¹⁶ In early 2019, Chinese authorities were accused of detaining more than a million Uyghur Muslims in a coordinated system of "reeducation camps" throughout Xinjiang.¹¹⁷ These are over 1,200 of these camps, all of which are populated by Chinese citizens arbitrarily detained by the CCP.¹¹⁸ Within these camps, one will find prison-like conditions in which detainees are coerced into pledging loyalty to the CCP,

renouncing Islam, learning Mandarin, and praising the virtues of communism.¹¹⁹ There have even been reports of torture and suicides.¹²⁰ Despite denial from the CCP evidence shows otherwise. Supply orders from one detention camp show that personnel ordered 2,768 police batons, 550 electric cattle prods, 1,367 pairs of handcuffs, and 2,792 cans of pepper spray.¹²¹

Official Chinese rationales for the existence of these camps lie in combating the perceived threats posed by Uyghur secessionist movements and Islamic extremism.¹²² Chinese officials have argued that these camps are institutions, with the vocational and educational training opportunities necessary for the development of human capital.¹²³ They were built, Chinese officials also argue, as part of a broader de-radicalization effort being undertaken in Xinjiang. Targeted outcomes, as publicly stated by the CCP, are ideological reform and better employment opportunities for the Uyghur people.

Under the reign of Chinese President Xi Jinping, China has bolstered efforts to "sinicize religion" in the hopes of consolidating the CCP's ideological chokehold on China.¹²⁴ China's

crackdown on underground Christian networks and Falun Gong practitioners exemplify China's existential fear that the utilization of organized religion can combat government authority. As such, Chinese rationales could also lie in concerns regarding the CCP's maintenance of power. The role of Xinjiang's Communist Party Secretary, Chen Quanguo, must also not be ignored.¹²⁵ Chen is infamous for his stint in Tibet, during which he pushed aggressive measures to consolidate state control over Tibetan monasteries.¹²⁶ In Xinjiang, Chen looks to be adopting the same tactics as he did in his previous capacity.

Whether the CCP is genuinely worried about the prospect of Islamic extremism remains undetermined. Ostensibly, it appears that the Chinese have adopted corrective approaches due to what they perceive to be legitimate concerns. In 2017, an anti-extremism law was passed on a provincial level in Xinjiang that outlawed veils and long beards.¹²⁷ A systematic campaign to destroy mosques and religious centers has also been undertaken. Satellite imagery has shown that 31 mosques in Xinjiang, along with two prominent shrines,

have undergone significant structural damage since 2018.¹²⁸ Fifteen out of those thirty-one Mosques have been completely destroyed.¹²⁹ Symbolic religious locales such as the Kargilik Mosque, and sacred pilgrimage sites such as the Jafari Sadiq shrine, have been destroyed beyond recognition.¹³⁰ Simply reciting a verse of the Quran is grounds for condemnation to a re-education camp.¹³¹ Abdusalam Muhemet, a Uyghur from Xinjiang, was condemned to such a camp when reciting a verse at a funeral.¹³² Muhemet stated that such camps “breed vengeful feelings and erase Uyghur identity.”¹³³ The CCP’s campaign of persecution against Uyghur intellectuals serves to further support claims that the CCP is seeking to eradicate Uyghur identity. Over members of the Uyghur intelligentsia have been detained, many of them scholars who research Uyghur history, culture, and art.¹³⁴ Officials such as Xinjiang religious affairs official Maisumujiang Maimuer have advocated measures on state media to “eliminate separatist disease.” “Break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins,” Maimuer writes, “completely shovel the roots of ‘two-faced people.’ dig them out, and vow to

fight these two-faced people until the end.”¹³⁵

The ramifications of such unprecedented, extensive Chinese state repression has yet to be explored. Muhemet however, puts it quite simply: history has shown that large-scale repression against ethnic groups with a long history of pride, whether it be in Palestine, Korea or Kashmir, will lead to an ultimate surge in nationalist violence. In Xinjiang’s case, nationalist and ethnic violence may very likely manifest itself as broad support for radical, Islamic extremism.

Jillian Schwedler notes that “interactions with the other” facilitates political learning, which is integral to processes such as de-radicalization.¹³⁶ Unfortunately, as Tong Zhao notes, a lack of social cohesion has resulted in the absence of positive inter-ethnic relations and interactions.

THE TRAJECTORY OF UYGHUR- PERPETRATED VIOLENCE

Ultimately, it is important to observe that Uyghur nationalism, separatism, and terrorist cells are being trained and indoctrinated in areas dominated by the presence of groups such as

the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Terrorism perpetrated in Kashgar in 2011 demonstrated a series of unprecedented, coordinated, and complex attacks.¹³⁷ These attacks involved a coordinated car bombing, truck hijacking, and stabbings on the first day.¹³⁸ On the second day, shootings, stabbings, and bombings occurred in popular Han Chinese sites. These attacks show the dangerous ramifications of terrorism perpetrated by trained, religiously zealous Uyghur militants. The TIP released a video one month following the tragedy showing one of the attackers training in a camp located in Pakistan.¹³⁹ In 2014, the TIP claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on the South Railway Station of Urumqi.¹⁴⁰ The TIP recorded a video of militants constructing the bomb used in the attack, demonstrating their expertise and understanding of public scare tactics.¹⁴¹ The 2014 attacks claimed the lives of more than 35 civilians, and wounded more than 90.¹⁴² This attack was motivated by the sentencing of 39 Uyghurs to prison for crimes related to ethnic hatred, discrimination, and terrorism charges.¹⁴³ These sentences were given just two days before the attack, demonstrating the swift efficiency in which groups such as the

TIP can conduct small-scale terror.

These attacks have not been limited to just Xinjiang. In 2013, three Uyghurs drove into a crowd of people in Tiananmen Square, the site where Mao declared the creation of the PRC in 1949.¹⁴⁴ Five people were killed and 40 people were injured as a result.¹⁴⁵ The driver, a Uyghur male, was accompanied by his mother and his wife, demonstrating that anybody, regardless of gender or age, is susceptible to radicalization.¹⁴⁶ When police arrested their accomplices, they found Jihadi flags and a collection of knives.¹⁴⁷ Increasingly coordinated terror attacks are a likely outcome if training offered by terrorist groups in northern Pakistan and now, Syria continues. It is also important to note that the lack of a sophisticated weapons has not dampened the resolve of these terrorists. Uyghur militants are genuine ideologues, ardently devoted to their cause regardless of the resources available to them.

It is inevitable that as the United States minimizes its involvement in Afghanistan and Syria, that some of these fighters will turn their attention to the country that wronged them in the first place. The prospect of trained

fighters, returning home en masse to radicalize more Uyghurs and wage Jihad should be frightening to the CCP. Increased investment in infrastructure that links Xinjiang with other Central Asian states is likely to expose Uyghurs to radical groups eager to capitalize on their mistreatment. More linkages in highways and pipelines is also likely to facilitate weapons smuggling to fuel attacks in Xinjiang and beyond.

China's recent internment of over a million Uyghurs in camps is also bound to create a breeding ground for extremism for groups such as the TIP. Aforementioned TIP rhetoric regarding freeing Muslims "thrown into the darkness of prison cells without committing any crime, apart from saying 'Our Lord is Allah,'" is likely to resonate with those interned for saying precisely that. Rhetoric adopted by the TIP regarding protecting Uyghur culture will ultimately resonate with a proud nation which finds facets of its heritage coming under ever-increasing attack. Solidarity from bodies such as the World Uyghur Congress and Uyghurs abroad is also likely to empower Uyghurs within Xinjiang with powerful, nationalist rhetoric. In

fact, there are 25 international organizations and websites dedicated to the independence of "Eastern Turkestan" abroad, based in cities as far-ranging as Melbourne to Amsterdam.¹⁴⁸

Albert Ellis, a prominent American psychologist, has noted that the terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks initially thought of themselves as powerless to stop the United States from exporting American cultural beliefs to Muslim countries.¹⁴⁹ To prove their self-worth, they were compelled to punish the United States and what it represented. Largely, the same rationale can be applied to Uyghur militants in Xinjiang. Constant denigration of Uyghur culture by Han Chinese, humiliation in internment camps, and a general feeling of helplessness among the Uyghur populace, is likely to conjure the same feelings of resentment and lead to radical extremism. It should be noted that the phenomenon of extensive homegrown Islamic extremism in France and Belgium has also been attributed to a feeling of alienation lack of belonging sensed by young Muslims in Francophone Europe. Literature on insurgency, security, and terrorism, proposes that conditions for terrorism are emboldened

when an alienated group sees their rights continually violated by an uncompromising state.¹⁵⁰

Suzanne Ogden, another prominent scholar in Chinese politics, identifies three conditions that will enable the cultivation of terrorism and support for terrorism among the general public. The first condition is when an ethnic, national or religious group perceives a regime is treating it unjustly or exploitatively.¹⁵¹ The second condition is defined as when a victim group feels oppressed by a majority group and that it has lost land, its language, and its right to religious and ethnic practices.¹⁵² The third becomes clear when the regime does not allow group members to speak freely and often jails or executes its members.¹⁵³ The CCP has cultivated an environment for all three of these conditions to be met, painting a bleak picture for the prospect of social stability and peace the CCP has long sought in Xinjiang.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it can be discerned that historical state repression and ethnic tensions have cultivated a Uyghur identity that has

become reliant on political Islam. Considering the fact that the the CCP has long seen Islam as a threat to their chokehold on power, the failure of general liberalization to not deliver results drove the CCP to coercive methods and the creation of vast security apparatus aimed at keeping Xinjiang in check. Pre-existing tensions and state repression led to riots such as those seen in Urumqi in 2009, and other attacks perpetrated by Uyghurs. As a result of this systematic repression, Uyghur identity has been strengthened. Additionally, a Uyghur exodus due to stringent Chinese policies has led to Uyghur militant groups with terrorist organizations such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Unprecedented levels of repression by the Chinese will serve to exacerbate current tensions, creating the conditions for religious extremism at the hands of the CCP.

Whether China will fall victim to the scourge of widespread terrorism remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that persistent socioeconomic inequalities, attacks on Uyghur ethnic identity, and the mass internment of over one million Uyghurs, are modern measures that will only serve to anger a nation of people

who take immense pride in their heritage and traditions. It is critical that authorities in Xinjiang begin to ameliorate inter-ethnic tensions through promoting interfaith dialogue. Measures to accommodate Uyghur concerns are necessary to prevent the complete alienation of Uyghurs in their own homeland. Should the Uyghurs continue to be oppressed so extensively, China risks instigating large-scale homegrown extremism and militancy within its own borders.

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THE CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO A Consequence of Low State Capacity

By McKenzie Stevens '20

ABSTRACT

The enduring conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is rooted in the state's colonial legacy, the predatory rule of its past leaders, and the outbreak of the African World War which has rendered the DRC's eastern regions extremely unstable. The conflict has persisted due to the low state capacity of the DRC government which has failed to mitigate the devastation faced by its people and has even been a perpetrator of violence directed towards civilians. The DRC's ineffective military, rampant poverty, and repression of civil liberties have left the Congolese people in a state of desperation, with some joining rebel groups to gain relief. For a conclusive cessation of the violence in eastern DRC to occur, comprehensive democratic reforms that increase the accountability of the government and enable the people to directly influence politics must be established within the state's political systems.



INTRODUCTION

Within the last few decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced the most devastating humanitarian crisis since World War II. While most of the country has been able to return to a state of relative stability since the end of what is referred to as the “African World War,” ongoing violence in eastern regions of the country continue to threaten national peace and security efforts. This conflict is a result of a weak state apparatus caused by ruling elites who have historically used their positions as a means of personal gain rather than investing in the necessary expansion of state capacity. The primary cause of the violence, the DRC’s failure to act with empirical statehood, is further exacerbated by the citizens’ inability to exert influence over their own government and obtain economic relief from the state. Unrest among the Congolese people has been fueled by feelings of neglect towards the state, which has been unable to provide protection for its people who have been subject to years of severe brutality. An end to the violence in the DRC can only be achieved when significant democratic reforms are enacted. These reforms must

address problems of political representation, participation in the economy, and, most importantly, a substantial increase in the government’s ability to alleviate the suffering of its people.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the conflict holistically, it is important to first consider the historical context in which the DRC became a sovereign state. Prior to its independence, the DRC was governed by the Belgian colonial authority, known for its especially oppressive treatment of the Congolese people. The colonial government employed the Congolese people as forced laborers in the extraction of the DRC’s vast supply of natural resources.¹ Belgium’s sole purpose in its rule over the DRC was to maximize profits through the extraction of these resources with little interest in enhancing the capacity of the State. As a result, effective, formal institutions, such as a strong judiciary, army, and educational system, did not exist prior to the country’s independence.² To maintain its control over the territory, Belgium violently responded to all potential uprisings against the colonial state and actively sought to destroy


the indigenous ties of the Congolese to prevent any potential opposition from forming.³ Thus Belgium’s relationship with its colonial subjects was paternalistic in nature, and the Congolese people had little to no opportunity to participate in society in a meaningful way. A clear example of this lack of integration of the Congolese people in civil society is evident in that “of 5,000 government jobs pre-independence, just three were held by Congolese.”⁴ Furthermore, “not a single Congolese lawyer, doctor, economist, or engineer existed.”⁵ When the DRC achieved independence in 1960, Belgium quickly withdrew its colonial administration, leaving the DRC with no clear political authority and a severely underdeveloped state system. The DRC inherited a state seemingly destined for failure and has since been unable to overcome these challenges and work towards creating an effective government.

Since achieving independence, the two most prominent leaders of the DRC have been Joseph Mobutu and Joseph Kabila, who both heralded an oppressive and rapacious leadership structure at the expense of improving the state and, consequently, the welfare of the Congolese

people. Mobutu’s reign fundamentally undermined what little legitimacy formal institutions in the DRC had been able to gain in the years before his presidency. His use of patronage networks to legitimize his rule excluded the general population from most economic opportunities, and the subsequent economic crisis he caused through his utilization of national banks to sustain these patronage obligations left the people in a state of financial instability. The transition of the presidency to Joseph Kabila several years after Mobutu left office did little to alleviate the hardships of the DRC citizens. Kabila was extremely insecure while in power and lived in constant fear of a coup by other elites in the government.⁶ He chose to avoid offending these elites by proposing reforms for institutions that contained “deeply entrenched interests” while simultaneously focusing on strengthening his business and security ties.⁷ Kabila’s rule was arguably more oppressive and corrupt than Mobutu’s regime in the eyes of the people. One citizen explained that while Mobutu “stole from the people with a fork - crumbs trickling down. Kabila steals with a spoon leaving nothing

for the people.”⁸ While the security situation of the DRC constantly changed throughout the early years of Kabila’s presidency due to the African World War coming to an end, the

people’s feelings of discontentment with the state remained. The corruptness of the DRC government since its inception has been a major factor in the continuation of conflict in the



country’s eastern regions.

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and the resulting African World War laid the foundation for the chaos and violence that has persisted in eastern Congo ever since. During this time, 5.4 million people have died due to this conflict, the majority of this number being civilians.⁹ In addition, 4.5 million people remain internally displaced, unable to return to their homes that have been rampaged by armed forces.¹⁰ It is estimated that over one-hundred armed groups are present in the region.¹¹ In recent years, the size of these groups has been greatly diminished but, despite this, many are still able to operate relatively autonomously, establishing control over villages to terrorize its inhabitants and exploit any resources available.¹² Their ambitions are difficult to ascertain because of the variability in their structure and interests. Theories have been put forth that some groups’ operations are entirely centered around the acquisition of natural resources while others contend that ethnic tensions are the main culprit. While these factors certainly play a role in shaping the rebel group’s pursued objectives, they are secondary to “long-running grievances against the central

government.”¹³ The responsibility then lies with the State to better understand the underlying motives of the rebel’s attacks to more effectively negotiate with them in future peace talks.

WEAK MILITARY

Yet the greatest consequence of the DRC’s abysmally low state capacity has been its ineffective military apparatus. The government has made little progress in combating rebel groups, perhaps because they are unmotivated to do so as most of the group’s actions have been localized and none of them possess the capacity to challenge the State as a whole.¹⁴ The State has not invested the necessary amount of resources into training and funding its soldiers, which has created a dysfunctional conglomeration of security forces lacking a coherent combat strategy to guide them and with waning allegiance to the country they serve.¹⁵ The lack of professionalism within the DRC’s military, the FARDC, has been an issue since the time of Mobutu and is a clear example of the undermining of a key institution of the state.¹⁶ The central government lacks authority and legitimacy in the eyes of soldiers who

have been grossly underpaid and not been held accountable for their often misdirected violent conduct. Members of the official military of the DRC have targeted civilians just as brutally as rebel groups. They too are responsible for the murder, rape, and theft of countless villagers whose regions they have passed through. They attribute their actions to their frustration with their own economic situation and corresponding lack of support from the central government.¹⁷ The illegal acts they commit towards non-combatants often are a result of striving to gain material resources for their own financial well-being, but, in some cases, are merely an outlet for their anger.¹⁸ The pervasive disorder of the entire security system has heightened the chaos in eastern Congo as military forces actively contribute to the exploitation of civilians.¹⁹ The government's credibility among its people has been greatly weakened by the misconduct of its soldiers and its inability to displace rebel groups. Adequate internal leadership and provisioning for military service members has been lacking and has prevented the DRC from being able to re-establish sovereignty over its eastern region.

ECONOMIC ISSUES AND INCENTIVES

DRC's state failure can be further attributed to the ongoing crisis because of the lack of economic opportunities it provides for its people. With 72.5% of its people living in "multidimensional poverty," a more comprehensive measure of poverty that includes malnutrition and lack of access to clean water, and with one of the lowest GNI per capita rates at \$870, it is clear that a vast majority of DRC citizens lack basic, essential provisions.²⁰ Without a reliable government to ensure a minimal level of well-being for its citizens, the Congolese people are faced with a choice of either enduring abject poverty or seeking an alternative means of sustenance. As has been discussed previously, even those who obtain employment in the military are left without a livable wage and often resort to illegal activities to improve their situation.²¹ The impoverished economy of the DRC and lack of adequate earning opportunity makes the expansion of rebel groups and the heightening of the conflict almost inevitable. With such high levels of poverty present in the east, the economic

opportunity costs of the rebellion remain low so those who feel abandoned by the central government are more likely to be drawn to the rebellion.²²

However, the DRC's approach to its citizens in the east is not always hands-off. In some cases, its actions have even taken away financial stability that some have been able to procure for themselves. In an attempt to cut-off financing for rebel groups, Kabila ordered the shutdown of mining in eastern Congo which adversely affected many Congolese citizens reliant on legal mining activities for their livelihood.²³ As one of the miners explains, while some of these people moved to other provinces

to find work or reverted back to subsistence farming for survival, many ultimately joined the local rebel groups.²⁴ The government's incompetence in fulfilling the role of an empirical state has left its people vulnerable to the recruitment of rebel groups, who advertise a comparably higher quality of life than the state. By working to improve the quality of life of their citizens, the DRC has the potential to lessen the appeal of these rebel groups and prevent its citizens from defecting to them.

Although the aggression of insurgent groups in the east can be primarily explained by their resentment towards their ineffective central government, insurgent control over



mineral resources has been a major contributor to the prolongment of the conflict. To gain access to mining sites, rebel groups assert control over nearby villages, often using deadly force and committing unnecessary crimes such as rape and theft in the process. Mineral resources are used by the rebels to finance their activities and for individuals of the group to gain wealth not possible through legal means. Ownership of mining sites has become an integral part of rebel groups' agendas and has evolved into something they are willing to fight for.²⁵ The DRC government has allowed numerous mining sites to fall under the dominion of rebel groups, thus making the payoffs of the conflict more lucrative than peace in the region. Rebels have been given no assurance that by relinquishing their authority over these areas, they will not be forced back into the system of poverty that so many Congolese people are a victim of.²⁶ As long as the payoffs of insurgency outweigh the costs of fighting and recruiting, "combatants will prolong the war to enrich themselves."²⁷

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The Congolese people's inability to

actively influence their own government has become a more critical issue in a time when effective government action is needed most. Citizens lack the ability to hold the government accountable through democratic institutions for their inaction on issues of poverty and violence. Elections held in the DRC are known to be greatly flawed, with their results often not reflecting the majority vote.²⁸ Additionally, elections are often delayed for months or years without adequate justification, as evidenced by the most recent presidential and legislative elections that took place more than two years late.²⁹ As a result, formal institutions of the DRC are subverted through the actions of ruling elites vying to maintain their power base. Outside national elections, the civil liberties of civilians and opposition parties are also severely limited by the state.³⁰ Access to free and independent media is sufficiently lacking.³¹ To further isolate the people from events happening in their own country the government suspended internet access in 2017 during times of protest.³² This worked to incite confusion surrounding the extent and location of protests and prevented photos of the protests from being shared.³³

Through its active repression of political freedoms prior to the recent elections, Kabila's government managed to hold onto its unconstitutional rule. However, Kabila's flouting of democratic institutions built up resentment within the public. In a survey of 1154 Congolese adults, 45% said they would not honor the result of the presidential election if the winner was a member of Kabila's party.³⁴ Additionally, around half of the respondents said that they would participate in demonstrations if the elections were thought to be rigged or were further delayed.³⁵ Impatience with Kabila's presidency certainly stems from his role as the president of a state that has failed to provide a basic level of security and well-being for its people. The political crisis caused by Kabila's suspension of the Constitution, "revived and galvanized armed groups" who directly called on the President to step down.³⁶ Without reliable democratic institutions by which to ensure elected officials perform their duties, citizens of the DRC often have no choice but to voice their grievances through protest. While it cannot be said that all members of rebel groups in eastern DRC use their illegal activities and violence as a means of

protest against the State, some have certainly been motivated to resort to insurgency because the government has not allowed them to enact change through democratic means.

EXTERNAL ACTORS

Although the crisis in eastern Congo resides primarily between the central government and the various rebel groups operating in this region, foreign nations and multinational corporate entities have played a role in both mitigating and exacerbating the conflict.³⁷ Many foreign nations, including the United States, have provided aid to the DRC government and the UN mission for counterinsurgency measures. Some members of the international community have also sought to cripple the rebel's source of funding by reducing their purchasing of "conflict minerals," many of which are sourced from mines controlled by rebel groups.³⁸ Multinational corporations who produce products with minerals found in the DRC have had to find alternative supply sources in order to keep operating in countries with legislation limiting the importation of products containing "conflict minerals."³⁹ However, these

well-intentioned efforts to combat the persistent conflict have in reality resulted in the mass unemployment of miners and, similar to many of Kabila's other measures, have driven some to join armed groups as a source of livelihood.⁴⁰

The present UN mission in the DRC, known as MONUSCO, has been vital to peace and stabilization efforts that have been achieved in the DRC so far but has been unsuccessful in ending the violence and instituting democratic governance conclusively. The express mandate of the mission is to protect civilians under imminent threats of violence and to support the DRC government in its stabilization efforts.⁴¹

With over 16,000 military forces working in the country, it is the most extensive peacekeeping mission the UN has ever undergone.⁴² The presence of UN forces has strengthened the FARDC's missions in the east and has also worked to institute some accountability among soldiers. Prior to the UN's involvement, the FARDC was the main perpetrator of the humanitarian crisis that is still occurring. Of the many human rights violations in the DRC, 61% are committed by state agents.⁴³ With UN peacekeepers in the mix, structure and

professionalism have become integrated into the FARDC's missions and work to mitigate the state's contribution to the violence aimed at civilians. MONUSCO has also been instrumental in peace consolidation efforts including justice reforms and electoral support. Some of the most impactful efforts include the conviction of almost 1000 people for war crimes, a majority of who were state security forces, as well as MONUSCO's work in improving the electoral system by registering millions of voters.⁴⁴ MONUSCO has laid the foundation for significant democratic reform in the DRC and made the idea of permanent peace possible. However, without government support and adherence to MONUSCO's initiatives, the conflict will likely continue for some time.

LOOKING FORWARD

With the recent election of Felix Tshisekedi as President of the DRC and subsequent peaceful transfer of power, many people hope that this presents an opportunity for democratic reform and peace. It remains to be seen, however, how Tshisekedi will decide to use his newfound position of power.

Tshisekedi's leadership has not been vastly different from Kabila's. His election was wrought with allegations of corruption and the general public does not see him as the rightful candidate but has thus far tolerated the result, hoping that he will be able to improve their situation.⁴⁵ The international community has also chosen to recognize Tshisekedi as the new president, likely due to the belief that anyone will be better than Kabila.⁴⁶ However, even if Tshisekedi aims to reform the country, the Senate will most likely prevent him from doing so. Out of the 100 seats in the Senate, 91 are filled by members of the FCC, the coalition Kabila is a part of.⁴⁷ Proposed policies contrary to the agenda of the FCC, including most government reform, will therefore not likely pass and the DRC will remain unable to act effectively. It seems nearly impossible that Tshisekedi will be able to bring about meaningful change in a government still controlled by Kabila's allies. If the legislative makeup were to drastically change so that a party more responsive to the grievances of the people was to gain a majority, only then would change be likely. Reform must be preceded with a change of incentive in government so that the creation of

strong institutions is seen as beneficial and not as a threat to those in power.⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

The multifaceted nature of the conflict in eastern Congo makes it difficult to identify its root cause. Although factors such as control over natural resources can add complex layers to an already expansive issue, the DRC's failure to achieve the standard of empirical statehood is the underlying enabler of the continued fighting. Not only have the State's security forces been unable to retake regions under the authority of insurgent groups, but they have also actively contributed to the violence against civilians that has made this crisis so devastating. The government has been unable to provide basic levels of well-being and security to its citizens which is why many have turned to rebel groups who offer things the state is unable to. The government's unreliability is made worse when people are unable to participate in and hold their own government accountable. Without democratic channels in which people can effect change, frustration grows and incites further conflict. A government made up of the people,

serving the interests of the public is what the DRC desperately needs but has so far been unable to obtain. Without the integration of the people into the political systems of the DRC, lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved and may even heighten as the population's impatience with their government grows.



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LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE

Conflicting Perspectives on Late 19th

Century American Imperialism

By Jaehun Lee '21

ABSTRACT

In an effort to undermine Lockean liberalism, some have argued that it is highly conducive to imperialism, the pursuit of empire, while others have argued that Lockean liberalism delegitimizes imperialistic impulses in response. This paper will examine two important thinkers who represent opposing viewpoints on American imperialism during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge ardently supported America's imperialistic endeavors in the name of Lockean liberalism, Yale sociology professor William Graham Sumner appealed to the same principles to oppose American imperialism. By analyzing their arguments and assessing the compatibility of their ideas to the tenets of Lockean liberalism, the paper demonstrates that Lockean liberalism neither promotes nor opposes imperialism by default. By advancing this viewpoint, the paper offers a critical evaluation of the relationship between imperialism and liberalism and seeks to animate a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between ideology and policy.

The era of American imperialism during the late 19th and early 20th centuries demonstrates a relationship between liberalism and the rise of imperialism in the United States. The nature of that relationship has long been debated amongst politicians and intellectuals. On one hand, pro-imperialists such as Albert Beveridge used liberalism to defend and promote American imperialism, while anti-imperialists such as William Graham Sumner argued that American imperialism goes against the liberal principles it was founded upon. In close analyses of these texts, we realize that each of these thinkers remains faithful to the fundamental principles of Lockean liberalism. Therefore, the observation that liberal thinkers could both support and oppose imperialism suggests that liberalism neither promotes nor opposes imperialism by default, and that different attitudes arose from premises unrelated to the liberal tradition itself.

In order to understand how both Beveridge and Sumner remain faithful to the basic tenets of liberalism, we must first understand the tradition itself. According to Lockean liberalism, the only legitimate

source of political authority comes from the individual himself. Government is created out of the consent of the governed with the purpose of protecting the individuals' rights and liberties. In this way, the freedom offered by a liberal government tends to be negative: the government protects individual rights and liberties by preventing others from restricting or infringing on those rights, rather than exercising its power to force responsibilities onto citizens. For an individual to have his or her rights preserved, the government must be limited by the rule of law agreed upon by the people, rather than having a body with the power to arbitrarily create, destroy, or change law according to its own interests. Locke himself said, "Without law, there is no freedom." In return for this freedom to pursue his self-interest, man has a responsibility to take advantage of that freedom and use the resources available to him to produce something greater. In sum, Lockean liberalism holds a desire for liberty, individual and property rights, and the rule of law.

Albert Beveridge justified imperialism by arguing that not all people are covered

by Lockean principles if they do not satisfy certain prerequisites. In *The March of the Flag*, Beveridge further argued that American imperialism was justified under its promotion of individual rights and liberties, the ideals of liberal political thought that America was founded upon.

Beveridge's argument centered on achieving a liberal ideal for the American people. He argued that imperialism broadened opportunities for white Americans to accrue more wealth and fully pursue their self-interest rather than be restrained by scarcity. In this way, imperialism aided the liberal tenets of individual rights and liberties by expanding the playground in which liberal ideas can be exercised. For example, Beveridge argued that "we must find new markets for our produce, new occupation for our capital, new work for our labor. And so, while we did not need the territory taken during the past century at the time it was acquired, we do need what we have taken in 1898, and we need it now."¹ Here, Beveridge asserted that industrialization in America has rendered the current boundaries insufficient for individuals to pursue their full potential. Imperialism would

afford increased opportunity for Americans, allowing them to realize the liberal goal of achieving their full potential and pursuing their self-interest without restraint from scarcity of resources. For example, Beveridge suggested that imperialism can lead to "an opportunity for the rich man to do something with his money, besides hoarding it or lending it."² Beveridge suggests that limited resources force the rich man to resort to hoarding or lending money instead of pursuing his true self-interest, such as manufacturing or other work. In other words, confinements of America's borders restricted Americans' individual freedoms. In order to enhance the freedom of individuals, Beveridge concluded that it was right and just for America to acquire new properties through the Spanish-American war and other imperialistic endeavors. Beveridge contrasted the pro-imperialist President William McKinley with anti-imperialist politicians—Bryan, Bailey, Bland, and Blackburn—by asking, "Shall it be McKinley, sound money and a world-conquering commerce, or Bryan, Bailey, Bland, and Blackburn, a bastard currency and a policy of commercial retreat?"³ Beveridge

implies that liberal people are free to pursue their self-interest with no restraint, especially when acting upon self-interest may bring America into conflict with illiberal peoples and governments. For example, Beveridge had no objection to going to war against the illiberal Spanish empire to take control over its illiberal territories: the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. By characterizing the anti-imperialist position as a “commercial retreat”—in which America retreats from additional commercial opportunities for individuals to pursue—and contrasting it to the imperialist desire to expand commerce, Beveridge further argues that the anti-imperialist position is fundamentally opposed to the tenets and goals of liberalism because it restricts the individual’s ability to pursue his self-interest. Thus, Beveridge characterized the Democrats’ anti-imperialist stance this way to portray them as opponents of the liberal founding principles of America. Thus, Beveridge emphasizes that imperialism can promote progress toward the ideal of liberalism.

Beveridge also used liberalism to justify American imperialism by basing his argument on the claim that liberal principles and political

thought—such as the idea that government’s authority is contingent on the consent of the people—only apply to those capable of exercising those principles. In doing so, he excluded the indigenous peoples who live in America’s new colonies. When addressing the anti-imperialists, Beveridge said, “the rule of liberty that all just government derives its authority from the consent of the governed, applies only to those who are capable of self-government.”⁴ According to Beveridge, it was important that the United States afford those living in the colonies the benefits of living in a liberal society, but given that these people are incapable of setting up a liberal society and government, the United States must set it up and maintain it for them. Beveridge also assumed that the conquered peoples would welcome those principles of liberalism that they would benefit from as an American colony. When responding to the anti-imperialists, Beveridge asked, “would not the natives of the Philippines prefer the just, humane, civilizing government of this Republic to the savage bloody rule of pillage and extortion from which we have rescued them?”⁵ By referencing the

illiberal Spanish rule the Philippines had been subjected to, Beveridge portrayed America as the Philippines’s “liberal savior”, freeing the peoples of the world from illiberal governments. In short, liberalism’s desirability and the inability of some groups of people to achieve liberalism justified imperialism. Beveridge pointed to America as the bringer of liberalism to illiberal lands and used this characterization to defend and champion America’s imperialistic activities.

That there existed those who believed that America’s liberal tradition supported—or even required—imperialism does not necessitate a conclusion that liberalism as an ideology is conducive to the pursuit of empire. Indeed, some, including William Graham Sumner, concluded just as assertively that America’s imperialist endeavors oppose the liberal framework the country was founded upon.

Sumner’s understanding of liberalism desired a minimal level of government interference. His ideal liberal society was one in which everyone was equal and free to pursue their self-interests. When government gets too big, as he argued in *What Social Classes Owe To Each Other*, it becomes an entity that only

serves the interests of the few and devolves into a plutocracy. In *The Conquest of the United States by Spain*, Sumner lamented that America was becoming ever more distant to its liberal roots by going to war with Spain: “We have beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies... They are delusions, and they will lead us to ruin unless we are hardheaded enough to resist them.”⁶ Sumner saw the Spanish empire as an example of imperialism’s opposition to the Founding principles of liberalism, not as an example to emulate. Sumner’s liberalism opposed imperialism in two key ways.

First, Sumner argued that imperialism was incompatible with the liberal ideals America was founded upon. Sumner pointed to a dichotomy between Americans’ great pride for government by consent of the governed and imperialism’s inherent neglect of this principle. Sumner explained, “[T]he reason why liberty... is a good thing is that it means leaving people to live out their own lives in their own way, while we do the same,”⁷ then called out the hypocrisy of American imperialists by asking, “If we

believe in liberty, as an American principle... [w]hy are we going to throw it away to enter upon a Spanish policy of dominion and regulation?"⁸ In the quote, Sumner implicitly reminded his audience of America under British colonial rule. He pointed out the contradiction between Americans' use of liberal principles to support independence from Britain and Americans' rejection of those same principles to justify its imperialistic endeavors. For Sumner, imperialism simply represented a change in colonizer: the colonized peoples remained without liberty or opportunity to self-govern. In other words, America would simply be succeeding Spain's illiberal state action. In this way, Sumner applied his understanding of the goals of liberalism and concluded that American imperialism was incompatible with America's liberal founding principles.

Second—and more importantly—imperialism would endanger the government's ability to keep its liberal promise to protect individuals' rights and liberties. Consistent with arguments presented in other works that we have read, Sumner believed that the sole responsibility of government was to provide

peace, security and order so that individuals could pursue their objectives according to each's self-interest, and government could only achieve this if it was kept as limited as possible. Imperialism was an impediment to government executing its liberal duty to its people because it increased the amount of government resources necessary to acquire and maintain an empire, transforming government into a plutocracy. Specifically, Sumner outlined 4 ways imperialism would favor a plutocracy: "War and expansion will favor jobbery... take away the attention of the people from what the plutocrats are doing... cause large expenditures of the people's money, the return for which will not go into the treasury, but



into the hands of a few schemers...[and] will call for a large public debt and taxes."⁹ Sumner furthered that these burdens would prevent individuals from pursuing their self-interests by encouraging the government to acquire more resources in the name of maintaining its empire. Under such a government, Sumner argued that individuals are less free because of government's dependence on the individual and vice versa. Every individual was forced to contribute to America's imperialism regardless of whether it was or was not in his interest, and the added costs forced government to become more reliant on its citizens to acquire the resources to meet those costs. Thus, Sumner concluded that "expansion and imperialism are at war with the best traditions, principles, and interests of the American people,"¹⁰ namely, America's liberalism. In sum, Sumner argued that imperialism was wholly opposed to liberalism because it not only contradicted the liberal political thought America was founded upon but also pushed American imperialists further away from liberal ideals.

One of the central conflicts in liberal political thought is determining to whom its

principles apply. Pro-imperialist liberals such as Beveridge did not see those non-Anglo Saxons as being civilized. If they were not civilized, the principles of liberalism do not apply. Liberalism simply expresses the desirability for liberty, individual and property rights, and rule of law. According to liberalism, there is ambiguity on the issues of to whom the principles of liberalism should be applied and to what extent the ideals of liberalism should be pursued. The pro-imperialists deemed that groups of people needed to reach a certain level of civilization to have the principles of liberalism applied on them, and used this assumption to justify an American empire by arguing that the people in areas they were colonizing did not achieve the necessary conditions. However, anti-imperialists just as forcefully opposed imperialism with liberal principles. As Sumner's essay pointed out, they did not view non-civilization and savagery as sufficient justification for America's imperialistic activities. Additionally, they argued that individuals should pursue their self-interests to the extent that they do not impede on others' naturally guaranteed individual rights and liberties. We may have our preferences and

opinions on these issues, but these opinions do not definitively conclude that liberalism favors or rejects imperialism by default. In sum, neither understanding of liberal political thought and its relationship to imperialism is incorrect.

Beveridge did not apply the tenets of liberalism to those he deemed to be uncivilized and illiberal, while Sumner applied the tenets of liberalism to all peoples.

Some pro-imperialists, such as Beveridge, further believed that imperialism enhanced the liberal ideal for the American people by ensuring more resources for individuals to better pursue their self-interests, much like how expanding a playground gives kids more options for play. While we may dismiss this as a narrow-minded view of imperialism, it aligns well with Beveridge's belief that liberal principles did not apply to people whose lands the United States would be colonizing. Thus, it was well and good that America colonized these lands for Americans to use to pursue their self-interests. Contrary to Beveridge's conclusion, Sumner believed that imperialistic activities would, in fact, impede the liberal ideal that American society should be striving for, in which individuals could pursue

their self-interests without restraint from the government. While Beveridge does not seem to oppose the additional resources and government action needed to sustain an American empire, Sumner argued that it was precisely this additional government action which makes imperialism incompatible and opposed to liberal ideals. Neither side is incorrect in his argument. Acquiring resources and property beyond America's borders at the time did allow individuals to pursue their self-interests. For example, the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 allowed James Dole to establish a pineapple company, something he would have been unable to do in the continental United States or Alaska. On the other hand, acquiring these overseas territories cost the United States. For example, acquiring the Philippines required the United States to fight a war against the Filipinos, resulting in thousands of American casualties. Building the Panama Canal cost the United States over \$9.4 billion in today's money and thousands of lives to disease. But at the same time, it enabled ships to cross from the Atlantic to the Pacific without going around the Americas, enhancing the freedom

to do commerce as they as they saw fit. In this way, liberalism does not support or oppose imperialism and imperialist activities in and of itself, and both pro-and anti-imperialists have used liberalism to justify and encourage or critique and oppose an American empire, as observed in a close analysis of each of the writings.

This is not to say that Lockean liberalism was not the driving ideology of American imperialism in the 19th century. American imperialism seemed to be mainly driven by liberalism—in particular, a desire for greater economic profit brought on by industrialization. Industrialization allowed goods to be manufactured at a much higher rate than before, and at a much lower cost, making it much easier for companies to become profitable. Imperialism seemed primarily driven by a desire for America and its businesses to become ever more profitable in light of the new possibilities for profit maximization enabled by industrialization. Beveridge reflected this sentiment in *The March of the Flag*, when he observed, “It means... Americans... will monopolize those resources and that commerce. In Cuba, alone, there are

15,000,000 acres of forest unacquainted with the ax. There are exhaustless mines of iron. There are priceless deposits of manganese. There are millions of acres yet unexplored... [and?][T]heir trade shall be ours.”¹¹ In the quote, Beveridge appealed to all the economic possibilities that new territories would bring for America's economy and commerce, in line with his support for imperialism on its ability to enhance progress toward the ideals of liberalism. Thus, while liberal ideology was certainly not the only ideology driving American imperialism in the late 19th century, it seemed to be the main driver of America's imperialistic pursuits and activities. Some may use this historical observation to conclude that liberalism indeed supports imperialism. However, that liberalism was the primary driver of American imperialism during that time does not mean liberalism ideologically supports empire-building. It merely reflects the success that the pro-imperialists had in gaining support for their opinion, or the resonance their ideas had across the country. Indeed, the fact that liberalism is used today predominantly to oppose imperialism suggests that liberalism as an ideology neither supports

nor opposes imperialism, and the predominance of one side of the debate does not provide insight that supports one side or the other.

To say that liberal thought is conducive or delegitimizing to empire would be a reductive conclusion to make. It is easy to look at both sides of this argument and decide—for one reason or another—that one is correct. However, such a conclusion fails to account for the complexity of the question at hand and the faithfulness of the arguments on both sides to liberalism. While liberal political thought explicitly articulates much of its principles, it also contains certain ambiguities: namely, to whom the principles of liberalism apply and to what extent may the ideal of liberal political thought be pursued. Thus, the use of liberalism to support or oppose imperialism does not come from the ideology itself, but from premises that attempt to answer these ambiguities in liberal political thought.

ENDNOTES

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