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# COLONIAL LEGACIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH:

## A Comparative Analysis of Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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This paper asserts that divergent methods of colonial governance, as exemplified by Britain's liberal imperialism in Hong Kong and Belgium's extractive imperialism in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have ultimately led to contrasting cases of economic growth. In Hong Kong, the British style of rule fostered good governance through the essence of democracy and upheld a successful blend of laissez-faire and intervention-when-necessary market conditions. In turn, from 1960 to 1995, Hong Kong's average annual GDP per capita grew at a rate of approximately 6.3%. On the other hand, Belgium's rule of the DRC only sought the complete control of the colony's people and natural resources for the purpose of financial gain. This resulted in Congo's average annual income per capita declining at a rate of -2.6% from 1953 to 1997. I will ultimately determine the economic impacts of these two colonial histories through a consideration of various models of economic growth.

It is difficult to find histories of long-run economic growth with a greater degree of polarity than that of Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While Hong Kong's average annual GDP per capita grew at a rate of approximately 6.3% from 1960 to 1995, the average annual income per capita of the Democratic Republic of the Congo grew, or rather declined, at a rate of -2.6% from 1953 to 1997. Due to this staggering 8.9% difference in growth, by 1997, GDP per capita was estimated to be a healthy USD 26,600 in Hong Kong, but a meager USD 281 in the DR Congo.<sup>1</sup> What is the explanation for this economic divergence? The answer lies in the fact that despite Hong Kong and Congo's common histories of colonial rule, their colonizers governed on the basis of heavily contrasting ideologies.

Up to the point of Hong Kong's transfer of sovereignty to the People's Republic of China in 1997, Britain's liberal imperialism fostered free trade and maintained the conditions that enabled the market to function, while also providing public goods.<sup>2</sup> Conversely, throughout colonial rule of Congo that ended with Independence in 1960, Belgium's extractive imperialism fully exploited the territory's natural resources for financial gain, providing little for the development of the eventual state. As exemplified by these two distinct imperial attitudes and diverging trends of economic growth, colonial legacies are foundational in determining the long-run economic development of former colonies. It is through a comparative analysis of the contributions, or lack thereof, made by Britain and Belgium to their respective colonies that I will determine the fundamental differences in their periods of dominion. Then, by way of neoclassical growth theory, supplemented with other possible explanations for economic growth, I will establish how the differences in dominion have determined the economic

divergence of Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

As the conflict of the First Opium War persisted, British naval forces seized Hong Kong Island from China in 1841. With the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the issuing of the Letters Patent by Queen Victoria in the year that followed, the island was officially ceded to Britain and placed under the empire's "Crown colony government" system. A governor was established as the local representative of the Crown, wielding among his powers the ability to make laws, bestow land, and appoint the members of the Legislative Council. To assist the governor in the formulation of policies was a colonial administration of unelected civil servants. Throughout the remainder of the 19th century, the final pieces of what would collectively become the territory of Hong Kong were acquired by Britain: Kowloon Peninsula in the 1860 Convention of Peking and the New Territories through China's leasing following its defeat to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.<sup>3</sup> By the early 20th century, Hong Kong had become vital to the British as a regional hub for trade, exchange, and financial services.<sup>4</sup> With the long-term interests of the colony in mind, a simple formula for success was employed for its governance. This combination of "no democracy," *laissez-faire* and selective intervention defined the Crown's rule over Hong Kong.

The practice of "no democracy" was both appropriate to Hong Kong's political situation and successful in maintaining the essence of democracy. Because the colonial government was entirely composed of an unelected governor and administration of civil servants, no popular element existed. In fact, it was not until after the 1984 signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration that representative changes to the system were introduced.

Upon further consideration of the circumstances surrounding the adherence to this form of rule, the no democracy model is justifiable. In 1892, Hong Kong had 83 English taxpayers and 947 Chinese taxpayers.<sup>5</sup> At this time, creating a representative government would have served to either overrule the British or alienate the Chinese. On the basis of numbers or taxation, adequate Chinese representation would have outnumbered British representation and threatened the longevity of the established colonial system. Granting exclusive representation to English subjects, on the other hand, would have isolated the majority of the colony's revenue base. After World War II, the threat of Communism prevented the development of popular government in Hong Kong. The People's Republic of China would have never allowed the colony to become an independent state. Additionally, holding elections might have opened the door to the emergence of internal Communist influence.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the absence of popular rule, the colonial government achieved the essence of democracy through its inclusive civil service and trusted British style of law. The civil service, which could be considered the colony's permanent ruling party, produced the administrative officers who comprised the governing administration. Chinese subjects, initially excluded from joining the ranks of service, were first allowed to become administrative officers following World War II. As long as they met the general requirements of having a university degree, an analytical mind, and leadership potential, they could eventually be responsible as heads of certain departments. These departments served for the creation and implementation of government policies, which relied heavily on consensus building with the public.<sup>7</sup> This inclusivity in the civil service provided quasi-representation in government for the Chinese residents of the colony, even if it could

not be achieved through elections. In conjunction with this representative administrative service, the

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common law system contributed to the creation of democracy in essence by upholding the rule of law and protecting personal freedoms. For example, grievances could be taken to an independent judiciary without fear of punishment and decisions were equally binding for the state and individual.<sup>8</sup> Hong Kong was not a democracy, but it was ultimately still able to deliver good government.


The laissez-faire ethos upheld by the Crown in Hong Kong flourished in practice as a result of the colonial government's combined hands-off and intervention-when-necessary approach to the market. Since the colony's inception, the prevailing policy of the government was to put the economy above all else. This meant exercising tight fiscal discipline. Taxes were able to be kept low, while unemployment benefits, minimum wage legislation, and pension schemes guaranteeing a basic standard of living were non-existent.<sup>9</sup> The rudimentary nature of medical services and public education in the colony before the 1960s further reflects this preference.<sup>10</sup> People were forced to work hard if they hoped to survive, as the government was providing them with no financial security. Due to a lack of welfare spending, Hong Kong's poor relied on

economic growth and the accompanying dividends paid to individuals and the community to alleviate poverty.<sup>11</sup> On the commercial side, absent trade controls meant industries were forced to compete with the free arrival of goods from all over the world. If they could not keep up, the government would do nothing to save them.<sup>12</sup> In the late 1950s, for example, it was the ability of the textile industry to increase the quality and prices of its goods that allowed it to survive foreign pressure to reduce the quantity of its exports. Individual companies emerged from these competing industries with sound structures and the ability to diversify.<sup>13</sup>

Although the colonial government sought to limit its expenditures to the greatest extent possible, post-war demands and deteriorating social conditions could not be ignored. After the destruction caused by the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong from 1941 to 1945, the revival of the colony as a trade hub necessitated government intervention. First on the task list was the immediate provi-

sion of food and fuel for the surviving inhabitants, which was accompanied by the undertaking of a wide housing reconstruction project.<sup>14</sup> Then, having fully backed the Hong Kong dollar to foreign exchange in 1935, the administration sought to get the currency back into circulation by making numerous loans to firms in 1945.<sup>15</sup> This willingness to intervene and make improvements brought about increased confidence in the government's abilities. Due to the government's larger, but still limited, role in the economy during this period, it did not take long for traders and manufacturers to reestablish their businesses. By 1947 the harbor was once again handling a considerable amount of cargo.<sup>16</sup>

Following a decade where despite Hong Kong's booming economy, the areas of transportation, housing and education remained in dire need of reform, the 1970s ushered in a more interventionist era meant to pave the way for the colony's future. Under the leadership of Governor Sir Murray MacLehose, government resources were funneled



British Hong Kong's Bustling Port (1905). *Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.*

to social services in order to improve the overall economic well being of the territory. From 1970 to 1972 government expenditures increased by 50% and continued to rise steadily.<sup>17</sup> In 1971, free primary education was introduced and secondary education became heavily subsidized. All children were required to complete nine years of primary education beginning in 1979 and over 90% of these students were able to complete their secondary education.<sup>18</sup> The government also undertook an urban development project that provided public housing for residents and built a vast network of satellite towns along the coast. By 1997, 40% of the population was living in public rental housing.<sup>19</sup> This development was closely linked to Hong Kong's industrialization scheme. Entrepreneurs were encouraged to buy land for their factories near these areas of public housing so the close proximity of living and working quarters would result in greater productivity.<sup>20</sup> In addition to these efforts for the improvement of social services, the colonial government took an active role towards the elimination of corruption. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was established in 1974 to investigate wrongdoings in the police force. Throughout the 1980s the ICAC then worked to root out illegal activity in the financial system and went on to prosecute heads of companies for manipulating share prices.<sup>21</sup> In total these aforementioned reforms showed Hong Kong as having a responsible government that was willing to uphold high standards of living for its workers and completely reject the persistence of corruption.

While liberal imperialism in Hong Kong resulted in a fundamentally responsible government, the fostering of conditions conducive to free trade and the disbursement of public goods, the imperial rule of Belgium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo left behind a heavily contrasting colonial

legacy. Instead of being founded with constitutional ties to a national body, the Congo Free State (later known as Belgian Congo and DRC) was created through the personal ambition of Belgian King Leopold II. In 1885, as a result of Leopold's promises to uphold free trade and commercial freedom within the Congo basin and estuary, the Congress of Berlin recognized the Free State's international legitimacy.<sup>22</sup> Then, in March of the same year, the Parliament of Belgium ratified the Berlin Act which empowered Leopold alone to assume sovereignty of the new state. Having first pledged to bear all the financial responsibilities of the colony, Leopold also ensured the Belgian Parliament that his Free State would benefit the purse of the nation.<sup>23</sup> As time passed and the King successively reneged on his made promises, the one of financial gain would not be tossed to the wayside. In fact, through an ethos of extractive imperialism in complete opposition to that of liberalism, the colony proved immensely profitable to both Leopold and Belgium. Its governing administration was designed for the sole purpose of exploiting natural resources for revenue, while treating the indigenous peoples as nothing more than units of labor for the advancement of this objective. When Belgium assumed direct control of what became the Belgian Congo amidst public denouncement of the extractive system in 1908, again little was done toward the advancement of the eventual state. As described by Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Imperialists don't realize what they can do, what they can create! They've robbed this continent [Africa] of billions, and all because they are too short-sighted to understand that their billions were pennies, compared to the possibilities! Possibilities that must include a better life for the people who inhabit this land."<sup>24</sup>

In contrast to the colonial government of Hong Kong that was structured to provide the essence

of democracy for its subjects, Leopold's administration in the Free State according to Roger Casement was, "... above all a commercial trust, [with] everything oriented towards commercial gain..."<sup>25</sup> Through its involvement in the ivory trade beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, the Free State administration set a precedent of exploitation and resource destruction. As the demand for ivory, needed in items such as billiard balls and piano keys, increased, administrators sought to expand their spheres of influence. They went to war with African middlemen who for years had maintained a monopoly in the trade and applied brutal methods to enforce the collection of tusks by the indigenous peoples.<sup>26</sup> Although from 1889 to 1895 ivo-

ry formed more than half of the colony's exports, by the late 1890s most of the territory's elephant herds had been wiped out.<sup>27</sup>

Attention was then turned to the extraction of rubber, demand for which was rapidly growing due to the invention of the pneumatic tire. To ensure maximum profits the administrators were charged with surveying the population surrounding their posts and determining the size of rubber quotas to be applied. The institutional advancement and commission payments of these individuals depended on the amount of production they achieved, so quotas were raised or expanded to other villages whenever necessary. Women and children were often forced to get involved in order to meet the pressures of these quotas, leaving no time for the care of villages or growing of food.<sup>28</sup> If rubber numbers were not met, the administration did not hesitate to hold women, children and tribal chiefs hostage until production was adequate. The only semblance of representation in this system was the hiring of African supervisors to ensure the delivery of goods. However, these individuals turned out to be the most brutal of all, often cutting off hands to force compliance.<sup>29</sup> Without a judicial system willing to protect the Congolese, they were left to work for Belgian profit. By 1904, the value of rubber exports was at 43,478,451 francs.<sup>30</sup>

Contrasting the laissez-faire market conditions upheld in Hong Kong throughout the period of colonial rule, the administration in the Free State, despite King Leopold's promises, moved quickly to remove indigenous traders and establish monopolies. Immediately after realizing the value of the trade the Congolese were involved in, the administration began to push inland past the hostile Africans. This was possible by way of the Force Publique, which was established in 1888 to go to war against inhabitants in rebellion against the State.<sup>31</sup>



IN THE RUBBER COILS.

Source—The Congo "Free" State.

Cartoon Depicting Belgian King Leopold II As A Snake Coiled Around A Congolese Rubber Collector (1906). By Edward Linley Sambourne, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

In addition, decrees and orders issued by the colonial government made it illegal for Africans to sell to private bodies, which simultaneously limited the scope of their trade and eliminated outside companies that had joined on the basis of commercial freedom.<sup>32</sup> In turn, the trading of the Congolese with foreign merchants was rapidly constrained, largely coming to an end after 1891.<sup>33</sup>

In response to foreign pressures condemning his breaking away from promises of free trade and no monopolies, King Leopold was forced to divide the State's territories vacant of African inhabitants into two main zones of trade. In the *Domaine Privé*, which covered most of the country's center, concessions were given to the Anglo-Belgian Rubber Company and the *Société Anversoise du Commerce du Congo*. Despite this portrayed image of open trade, these companies were nothing more than extensions of the Free State. The administration founded their posts and supplied them with arms, while their heads remained close to Leopold. In the second zone of the Kasai Valley, private companies were allowed to engage in trade, but in practice were severely restricted and interfered with by the State. The King managed to amalgamate the companies that survived these pressures into the single *Compagnie du Kasai* by 1901, which was then placed under his effective control<sup>34</sup>. Leopold managed to get directly into the action by laying claim to a personal area of land ten times the size of Belgium.<sup>35</sup> Here he established quotas and levied taxes that earned him about 70 million francs by 1905.<sup>36</sup> While the government in Hong Kong sought to strengthen the local economy, it seems the Free State administration did all it could to destroy it.

Contrary to the eventual efforts of the Crown government to provide public goods for the well being of Hong Kong's residents, the Belgian ad-

ministration did next to nothing to develop the Free State and the later Belgian Congo. Rather than directing the massive amounts of wealth acquired from the extractive industries toward the benefit of the Free State or its inhabitants, a vast building program throughout Brussels was undertaken. It is estimated that throughout the existence of the Free State 60 million francs were used for public buildings and other works in the capital city.<sup>37</sup> Also, what little infrastructure was built was only for the purpose of more efficient resource extraction. The completion of a railway in the territory for the transportation of product cost 10 million francs and about 1,800 African lives.<sup>38</sup> The colonial administration itself lacked the resources and experienced individuals to even govern a landmass of over 900,000 square miles, let alone be involved in development projects. This lack of investment in local infrastructure and the administration is best illustrated by the fact that exports exceeded imports in the colony well into the 1920s. Early on in other colonies the opposite was to be expected as contributions were made to these slow return areas.<sup>39</sup>

Like the golden era of public spending in Hong Kong throughout the 1970s, the period following Belgium's annexation of the Belgian Congo in 1908 was expected to involve extensive reform throughout the colony. What actually developed, however, was still an extractive and oppressive system, minus the widespread brutalities. Before his Free State was taken, King Leopold attempted to consolidate his financial endeavors in the territory by creating a system of joint venture companies to exploit minerals such as diamonds, cobalt and radium. By 1911 these industries had become highly profitable, and were therefore allowed to remain in place. The policy of vacant land appropriation continued to be used as well, granting land to emerging agricultural enterprises.<sup>40</sup> To provide these sectors with the

necessary supply of labor, a poll tax was instituted in 1914 to force individuals into paid employment. Some one million Congolese were forced into labor in the agriculture sector alone by 1938.<sup>41</sup> Wages also remained unequivocally discriminatory. In 1958, white salaries in the Belgian Congo were thirty times greater than that of the African average.<sup>42</sup>

The greatest contribution made by the Belgian administration in the realm of social services was to primary education, which by 1958 had put 94% of the school population at the primary level.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, this education was generally low quality

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and short in length as it was left to the missions, taught in local languages and normally lasted only two years. Accompanied by a strong bias to avoid the cultivation of a disaffected elite, the result was that at the time of Independence there were only 17 African college graduates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and no doctors, lawyers or engineers.<sup>44</sup> The fact of the matter is that in general the Belgians did not look forward to a time of self-rule for the Congolese. When they gained independence in 1960, they had completed a period of colonial rule without making any significant progress in preparing their African subjects for self-governance.

What have Britain and Belgium’s vastly differing colonial legacies meant for the long-run economic growth of Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo? A partial answer to this question can be achieved through a consideration of neo-classical growth theory. According to this model of long-run economic growth, an equilibrium level of output is determined by variance in the labor and capital inputs of the production function. Once at this equilibrium, a steady state level of growth is accomplished through population growth and technological progress. This theory works well when studied in a classroom setting, but ultimately falls short when applied to a tangible example of economic divergence like that of Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The problem is there is no way to quantify when a country has reached its steady state level. Even so, the first part of this model is still quite useful for our purpose. Holding labor constant to facilitate this analysis, growth in the capital stock becomes the sole determinant of long run economic growth to the point of equilibrium. Level of investment, which is expenditure on new plants and equipment, is what causes the capital stock to rise.<sup>45</sup> By considering differences in investment we are therefore able to in part explain the economic growth rates of Hong Kong and Congo and understand why they differ. To supplement the limitations of this approach, it will also be crucial to consider other possible determinants such as education and trade structures.

From 1953 to 1997 Congo’s average investment share, as a percentage of GDP was 5.8%, which in 1997 would have been valued at approximately USD 353 million.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the value of loans and advances for use inside Hong Kong in 1995 was about USD 128.2 billion.<sup>47</sup> How do the colonial legacies of Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo account for this ex-




treme contrast in investment? First, it is important to remember that individuals invest for the purpose of ultimately making a profit. The possibility of losing this invested wealth would therefore run counter to the objective of financial gain and dissuade people from investing. Throughout Hong Kong's time under colonial rule, the British maintained a fundamentally representative government and upheld the rule of law. With the existence of an independent judiciary on the basis of common law, subjects knew their rights were being protected. As a result of the government's anti-corruption campaigns, it became clear the administration would not stand for illegal activity. This combined to create an environment people felt safe putting their money into. There was no risk of suddenly losing investments or having them be used to fund illegal activities. Such confidence is highlighted by the increase in the employment of foreign-owned factories from 56,519 in 1971 to 108,000 in 1988.<sup>48</sup> Conversely, Belgian rule in the Democratic Republic of the Congo relied on an administration with little regard for personal freedoms and the progression of its subjects. When Congolese independence was achieved, no institutional apparatus to uphold the rule of law existed and there were few suitable leaders to choose from. This resulted in the coming to power of Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who engaged in rampant corruption throughout his presidency. In 1973, foreign businesses valued at USD 1 billion were seized by the state.<sup>49</sup> Unlike the case of Hong Kong, this was clearly not an environment conducive to investment.

The Crown government in Hong Kong sought to encourage economic growth by maintaining its laissez-faire ethos and practicing selective intervention in the market. This made the colony an ideal investment location for two reasons. First, the determination of the government to cultivate the


economy meant to investors a potential for greater returns. Second, public spending projects by the colonial administration called for large amounts of investment in capital. Throughout 1991 and 1992, more than HKD 15 billion poured into the real estate sector alone.<sup>50</sup> Because the administrators of the Free State and the Belgian Congo did not allocate funds towards the development of the colony, few public services and little infrastructure existed at the time of Independence. When Mobutu took control shortly after, this trend continued. In 1993, government consumption not associated with public investment and schooling peaked at over 40%.<sup>51</sup> Few outlets for investment existed throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

“As a result of the government’s anti-corruption campaigns, it became clear the administration would not stand for illegal activity.”

Due to the opposite conditions for investment that emerged from these colonial legacies, the capital stock of Hong Kong rose at a much more rapid rate than that of the Congo. On the basis of the neoclassical growth model, it therefore makes sense that GDP per capita in Hong Kong grew at a rate of approximately 6.3% from 1960 to 1995, while the income per capita of the Democratic Republic of the Congo grew at a rate of -2.6% from 1953 to 1997. What other factors might have contributed to this economic divergence? For one, level of education has been thought to have a significant impact on the future economic prospects of nations.



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According to another model of economic growth known as the two-sector model, knowledge produced by universities determines the efficiency of labor and therefore the manufacturing output of firms.<sup>52</sup> If this holds true, it should be the case that the fostering of high levels of education will result in greater rates of long run growth. In Hong Kong, where educational attainment was a priority for the colonial government, economic growth has been robust. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, the virtual nonexistence of higher education at the time of Independence has greatly constrained the nation's growth. Furthermore, differences in trade structures must be considered when analyzing the economic growth disparities of Hong Kong and the Congo. While Hong Kong flourished on the basis of free trade, the DRC throughout its history solely relied on the wealth of its natural resources. The economy of Hong Kong was built to be flexible and sustainable, allowing it to avoid extended periods of decline. Conversely, the Democratic Republic of the Congo's abundance of minerals made the entirety of its economy dependent on a single industry, leading to the neglect of broad economic development. Needless to say, those who could gain control of this source of wealth were ultimately able to control the future of the country. The term "conflict minerals" is now used to describe the wars and chaos these resources have brought about within the DRC.


As displayed by the contrasting imperial ideologies of the British and Belgians in Hong Kong and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, colonies were not all treated equally by their rulers. The longest-lasting contribution of these colonial legacies, other than to economic growth, has been to show how impactful nation building can be in molding the present and future conditions of countries. While the liberalism of the British Empire fostered

a responsible government, free market conditions and public services in Hong Kong, the exploitation of the Belgian Empire took everything it could out of the Congo for the purpose of financial gain. Due to these differing colonial legacies, Hong Kong and the DRC have experienced divergent histories of economic growth. In the grand scheme of things, these differing stories are quite telling of the profound impact nation building can have on the futures of countries.



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## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Lau, Chi K. 1997. *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy: A Hong Kong Chinese's View of the British Heritage*.  
<sup>2</sup>Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 58; Garner, Phillip. 2008. "Congo and Korea: A Study in Divergence." *Journal of International Development* 20: 326-346, 326.  
<sup>3</sup>Ferguson, Niall. 2004. *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*. New York: The Penguin Press, 198.  
<sup>4</sup>Lau, *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy*, 23.  
<sup>5</sup>Buckley, Roger. 1997. *Hong Kong: The Road to 1997*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3.  
<sup>6</sup>Lau, *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy*, 26.  
<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.  
<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 28-30.  
<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 129.  
<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 59.  
<sup>11</sup>Buckley, *Hong Kong: The Road to 1997*, 11.  
<sup>12</sup>Lau, *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy*, 66.  
<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 58.  
<sup>14</sup>Buckley, *Hong Kong: The Road to 1997*, 71.  
<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 32.  
<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 25.  
<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 32.  
<sup>18</sup>Kennedy, Christopher. 2011. *The Evolution of Great World Cities: Urban Wealth and Economic Growth*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 57.  
<sup>19</sup>Lau, *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy*, 66.  
<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 67-68.  
<sup>21</sup>Buckley, *Hong Kong: The Road to 1997*, 57.  
<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 89-90.  
<sup>23</sup>Gann, L. H. and Peter Duignan. 1979. *The Rulers of Belgian Africa 1884-1914*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 35.  
<sup>24</sup>Ewans, Martin. 2002. *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State and its Aftermath*. London: Routledge Curzon, 104-105.  
<sup>25</sup>Ferguson, *Colossus*, 169.  
<sup>26</sup>Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe*, 193.  
<sup>27</sup>Gann and Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 117-119.  
<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 120-121.  
<sup>29</sup>Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe*, 161-163.  
<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 164.  
<sup>31</sup>Gann and Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 122.  
<sup>32</sup>Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe*, 116.  
<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 157-158.  
<sup>34</sup>Gann and Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 125-126.
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<sup>35</sup>Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe*, 159.

<sup>36</sup>Gann and Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 125.

<sup>37</sup>Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe*, 170.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 171-172.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 243.

<sup>44</sup>Brausch, Georges. 1961. *Belgian Administration in the Congo*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 11.

<sup>45</sup>Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe*, 241.

<sup>46</sup>Mankiw, Gregory N. 2012. *Macroeconomics*. 8th ed. New York: Worth Publishers, 209.

<sup>47</sup>Garner, *Congo and Korea*, 335.

<sup>48</sup>Meyer, David R. 2000. *Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 204.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 169.

<sup>50</sup>Garner, *Congo and Korea*, 342.

<sup>51</sup>Kennedy, *The Evolution of Great World Cities*, 60.

<sup>52</sup>Garner, *Congo and Korea*, 339.

<sup>53</sup>Mankiw, *Macroeconomics*, 255.