

# RADICALIZATION

OF CHINA'S

# UYGHURS

Militant Responses to Chinese

State Repression

By Daniel Fu '21

## ABSTRACT

China's repression of Xinjiang's Muslim minority, the Uyghurs, has made recent international headlines. Preexisting inter-ethnic tensions, in addition to cultural and economic discrimination, have helped cultivate a Uyghur identity rooted in political Islam and strong ethnic pride. This paper explores the process through which Chinese state repression has led to the radicalization of certain elements in Xinjiang's Uyghur minority: claims for secession and independence, the Uyghur exodus, radicalization abroad, ethnic clashes, and the attempted erasure of Uyghur identity are all factors that have increased the potential for future terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and mainland China.



## INTRODUCTION

Until recently, China has been relatively unaffected by terrorism instigated by radical Jihadist groups.. Nonetheless, the western province of Xinjiang— largely populated by Turkic Sunni Muslims called Uyghurs—have cultivated a political identity rooted in resistance against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) because of systematic repression. In fact, perceived attacks on cultural and religious facets of Uyghur life have motivated calls for secession and independence. Through repeated “strike hard” campaigns, direct Chinese repression has fostered an extremist mentality among Chinese Uyghurs living abroad such as in the terrorist East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM), now known as the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), one of many militant groups that have made sizable contributions to the continued perpetration of global Jihad.

The forced internment of over one million ethnic Uyghurs in re-education camps, coupled with a long history of ethnic friction and violence, has undoubtedly contributed to further escalation in inter-ethnic tensions. While pre-existing hostilities have been

evident , continued Chinese-state repression will undoubtedly embolden Jihadist groups seeking recruitment from disalusioned Uyghurs. Similarly, China's authoritarian security tactics have enabled the politicization of Islam and the subsequent creation of a Jihadist ethos among homegrown extremists interested in countering the state. This paper will examine how Chinese-state repression could potentially lead to the empowerment of Jihadist groups such as the TIP. Furthermore, this paper will explore how issues of self-determination and secession impact religious extremism within the context of Xinjiang.

## A BRIEF HISTORY

When discussing Uyghur responses to repression, it is important to note that the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang has cultivated a united ethnic identity over time. After the collapse of the Uyghur empire in 840 CE, waves of migration to areas that compose modern-day Xinjiang became popular.<sup>1</sup> The Uyghurs later converted to Islam en masse after 1200,<sup>2</sup> achieving near religious homogeneity between the 1400s and 1600s.<sup>3</sup> Xinjiang did not



become Chinese territory until 1884; but when it was formally integrated into China's ruling Qing Dynasty,<sup>4</sup> the first efforts for Uyghur independence were made between 1864 and 1888 when a military official was directed by a Khanate to establish a Muslim state in Kashgar.<sup>5</sup>

After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911, Xinjiang was governed by the newly formed republican government, later called the Kuomintang (KMT).<sup>6</sup> In 1933, a short-lived "East Turkestan Islamic State" was founded.<sup>7</sup> Between 1944 and 1949 though, the Soviet Union supported Uyghur efforts to create a national entity in northern Xinjiang called the East Turkistan Republic.<sup>8</sup> Historian Xiaowei Zang argues that this was of paramount importance in the cultivation of a secessionist mindset in the post-Mao Uyghur population.<sup>9</sup> When the KMT was defeated by the CCP, the newly-formed government established the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955. This marked the beginning of a period during which Uyghurs were subjected to unprecedented levels of persecution. While the Qing dynasty and the KMT had allowed the Uyghurs to maintain relative religious autonomy, the CCP

viewed self-identity among Chinese minority groups as a threat to their newly consolidated power.<sup>10</sup> From the CPP's perspective, Islam was an avenue for alternative allegiance to an entity independent and separate from the Chinese state.<sup>11</sup> As such, the CCP proceeded to begin a campaign of religious repression that has lasted to present day. General Wang Zhen of the People's Liberation Army executed Uyghurs who advocated alternative views to that of provincial authorities.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the land on which mosques were built was seized, and Islamic taxation was abolished.<sup>13</sup> As a result of these injustices, the One Hundred Flowers Campaign, which encouraged general criticism of the CCP, brought Uyghurs to forcefully speak-out against government policy, expressing concerns regarding attacks on their identity.

General persecution of Uyghurs during this period, however, was minimal as compared to the repression that occurred during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.<sup>14</sup> Out of the 106,000 minority party cadres in Xinjiang, 99,000 were dismissed.<sup>15</sup> The Uyghur people were forced to witness the burning of mosques and religious

texts, along with relentless persecution of Uyghur intellectuals and religious leaders.<sup>16</sup> Public bazaars were closed, and large-scale religious oppression was instigated in an effort by Mao Ze Dong to rid Xinjiang and the rest of China of its previous historical, cultural, and educational institutions.

## MODERN HISTORY

The advent of the Cultural Revolution motivated the general liberalization of Xinjiang between the late 1970s and early 1990s.<sup>17</sup> By the time Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, concerns were widespread among Chinese central leadership regarding potential rebellion in Xinjiang. Thus, Uyghurs were given special opportunities for job training and preferential consideration for college admissions.<sup>18</sup> One of the most prominent examples of this trend was that the Uyghur intelligentsia was given ample opportunity to explore and propagate Uyghur culture.<sup>19</sup> The CCP also introduced the Great Western Development Policy in 2000 which enabled Xinjiang's GDP per capita to grow from 1,680 RMB in 1997 to 16,820 RMB in 2007.<sup>20</sup>

The CCP hoped that general

liberalization and their efforts to generate economic growth would cultivate a sense of national unity among the Uyghurs. Their policies however, achieved the exact opposite. The Uyghur minority, emboldened by relative liberalization and newfound opportunities for cultural promotion, began to call attention to what they perceived to be structural discrimination implemented by the CCP.<sup>21</sup> The creation of Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union further encouraged Uyghur calls for autonomy and independence.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Chinese authorities observed an increase in Uyghur violence and ethnic unrest targeting the Han Chinese residents of Xinjiang.<sup>23</sup>

The CCP attributed this ethnic unrest and violence to the liberalization of the late 1970s and early 1990s.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the Chinese government began a series of "strike hard" campaigns in 1996 aimed at quashing the Uyghur's separatist idealism. The CCP targeted the perceived "three evils" that existed in Xinjiang, namely separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism.<sup>25</sup> Such campaigns have reinforced the notion that a distinct Uyghur identity will never be accepted by the state. As a

result, a new Uyghur identity—characterized by acts of everyday resistance against Han Chinese and the CCP.<sup>26</sup>—has evolved

The cultivation of this identity was enabled by Uyghur grievances with issues in government management and social policy as well. In 1986, Uyghurs protested on the streets against a myriad of sociopolitical and cultural concerns, including environmental degradation, nuclear testing, increased Han in-migration to Xinjiang, and alleged racism against Uyghur students inside the classrooms of Xinjiang University.<sup>27</sup> Protests in 1989 and 1993 also occurred in response to the publishing of two books that portrayed Muslims and their halal diets as backward.<sup>28</sup> Later in 2004, hundreds of Uyghurs protested the construction of a dam that would displace Uyghur farmers without adequate compensation.<sup>29</sup> Central bank data from 2019 shows that in the midst of China's economic slowdown, credit flows into Xinjiang and Qinghai, home to the Hui Muslim minority, slowed by 70-80% as compared to the previous year.<sup>30</sup> These figures are among China's lowest.

To the Uyghur people, this evidence reinforces the perception that central government policy

in Xinjiang is enacted to exclusively benefit Han-Chinese elsewhere.<sup>31</sup> This perception is exacerbated by the view amongst Uyghurs that their concerns are never addressed by local officials, even if the officials are Uyghur themselves. In 2005, one local official told the Financial Times that “we don't have the power to tell them to do anything—they only listen to [Xinjiang party leadership] in Beijing.”<sup>32</sup> To add on, data shows that local authorities were allotted only \$35 million USD of the \$14.8 billion profit generated from Xinjiang's 2008 petrochemical tax.<sup>33</sup> The lack of a concerted effort among Han government officials to learn the Uyghur language, or familiarize themselves with local Uyghur customs, encourages the view that structural bias to support Han interests is obvious.<sup>34</sup>

Despite success in government-led economic growth, widespread income inequalities persist between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; in fact, most economic growth created by the Great Western Development Plan has gone to Han households: in 2011, the average income for Uyghurs in the city of Urumqi was 892 RMB in contrast to the 1,141 RMB earned

by Han Chinese.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the majority of Han Chinese reside in urban areas where economic opportunity is greater; in contrast, the Uyghurs mostly reside in rural, farming-based areas of Xinjiang. Economic concerns are compounded by the perception that Uyghurs are being outnumbered and overshadowed by Han Chinese in the former's own homeland. In 1949, the Uyghurs composed 75% of Xinjiang's population. This number has since fallen to 46% in 2010 due to Han Chinese migration.<sup>36</sup> In Xinjiang's oil industry, there are practically no Uyghurs in senior management positions despite the existence of affirmative action programs. Reports of ethnic and religious discrimination inside offices are widespread.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, both of these problems can be attributed to the Great Western Development Policy, which demanded the expertise of Han Chinese to implement many of its key goals and strategies.<sup>38</sup>

## A MODERN UYGHUR IDENTITY ROOTED IN ISLAM

It has been clearly established that the Cultural Revolution sparked the beginnings of historical resentment among some Uyghur

communities against the CCP. General space for liberalization allowed Uyghurs the opportunity to bolster cultural and political awareness, generating calls for secession. The CCP, in the late 1990s, returned to repression as a tactic to silence these calls. Issues related to socioeconomic inequality and poor governance since then have disaffected and disenfranchised swaths of the Uyghur population. What role then, does Islam play in forming a modern Uyghur political identity, and how it is asserted? Today, the academic consensus among political scientists, sinologists, and Middle East experts is that Uyghur national and ethnic identity is heavily rooted in Islamic beliefs.<sup>39</sup> Graham E. Fuller, a former CIA station chief in Kabul, and Jonathan Lipman, conclude that Islam is the key factor that distinguishes Uyghurs from their Han Chinese counterparts. Attending religious services and ceremonies is a medium through which Uyghurs derive their own ethnic identity.<sup>40</sup> Arienne M. Dwyer also concludes that the Turkic-Muslim heritage of Uyghurs is integral to their formulation of a modern identity.<sup>41</sup> In further support, Joanne Finley writes that Islam is an important current in

the social, cultural, and psychological life of Uyghurs, noting that Islamic beliefs have become instilled in the political consciousness of some Uyghur communities.<sup>42</sup> Finley also argues that Islam has been utilized to express the sociopolitical frustrations possessed by Uyghurs and directed against the CCP and the Han Chinese population residing in Xinjiang.<sup>43</sup> When Islam permeates every facet of daily life, it is inevitable that its tenets begin to conflate with political goals. It would be plausible to argue, therefore, that Islam has become a significant force in the mindset of a nation which has historically held anti-government and secessionist beliefs. Islamic beliefs thus serve to fuel a nationalist ethos among the Uyghur people, potentially threatening the CCP's grip on power in Xinjiang.

Xiaowei Zang's research corroborates the notion that Islam and nationalism are inherently linked. Using a sample of over one thousand Uyghur households, Zang concluded that those who held a higher degree of "ethnic consciousness" were more committed to Islam.<sup>44</sup> A higher degree of ethnic consciousness meant demonstrated commitment to the promotion

of Uyghur language and culture. Those with higher levels of "ethnic consciousness" were shown to pray daily, identify as religiously pious, and emphasize Islam in their daily routines.<sup>45</sup>


Zang's findings allow us to conclude that fundamentally, the Uyghurs are an overwhelmingly proud people. 72.3% of Uyghur respondents believe that it is integral for their children to learn the Uyghur language, while 66% believe that it is important to promote Uyghur culture.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, Zang's findings suggest that Uyghur consciousness is not related to economic income, social status, or material condition.<sup>47</sup> Uyghur elites are just as likely as low-income social groups to harbor a nationalistic ethos.<sup>48</sup> Uyghur ethnic consciousness is not statistically related to factors such as educational attainment, employment status, professional status, or income.<sup>49</sup> Increased living standards and economic growth, therefore, will not thwart Uyghurs' independence and cultivated mindset.

A hybrid between primordialist and constructivist views of ethnic identity is observable here. Ethnic identity, for the

Uyghurs, is not malleable. Primordial loyalties to their language, religion, and way of life, are the foundational precepts Uyghurs utilize to determine their material and political interests.<sup>50</sup> Thus, the vast majority of Uyghur communities have developed a collective, ethnic conviction that only increases in force when its existence, interests, or integrity is under perceived threat.<sup>51</sup>

## THE COURSE OF UYGHUR UNREST AND HISTORICAL STATE REPRESSION

Prolonged Uyghur violence and unrest



commenced with the Baren incident of April 1990 when 52 around two-hundred armed Uyghurs, under the leadership of Zeydun Yusup of the East Turkistan Islamic Party, stormed the township of Baren and attacked local government offices, managing to hold out against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) units dispatched to combat them for several days.<sup>53</sup> The Uyghurs demanded an end to mass Han migration to Xinjiang, which was perceived as a significant threat to facets of Uyghur culture.<sup>54</sup> They also demanded an end to the practice of forced abortions and sterilizations

utilized by Chinese family planning officials against Uyghurs under the guise of the one child policy. Although the conflict ended in less than a week, twenty-three individuals perished and over two hundred Uyghur fighters were captured.<sup>55</sup>

In February 1997, mass protests in the city of Yining erupted upon the announcement that 30 Uyghur independence activists had been executed.<sup>56</sup> These protests were also a response to crackdowns by the provincial government on traditional Uyghur gatherings known as meshrep.<sup>57</sup> Two days of protests saw Uyghur activists changing slogans such as “Allah is great” and “independence for Xinjiang.”<sup>58</sup> Ultimately, the demonstrations were crushed by the live ammunition of PLA soldiers.<sup>59</sup> While official sources state that only nine Uyghurs died due to the PLA’s crackdown, it is likely that the death toll was substantially higher.<sup>60</sup> In the aftermath of the Yining protests, Amnesty International estimated that over 190 executions took place against Uyghurs who instigated the protests.<sup>61</sup> More than ten years later, the Urumqi riots occurred, exemplifying the ethnic tensions and lack of inter-ethnic understanding between

Uyghur and Han Chinese communities in Xinjiang.<sup>62</sup> Covered extensively in western media, the Uyghur riots left over 160 people dead and over 820 people injured in July 2009.<sup>63</sup> These riots were instigated due to a cultural misunderstanding during the Shaoguan Incident: Uyghur factory workers were accused by Han Chinese workers of assaulting a Han woman in Guangdong.<sup>64</sup> Riots in the factory between Han Chinese and Uyghurs resulted in the deaths of two Uyghur workers, prompting more riots in September instigated by the Han Chinese who were dissatisfied with the authorities’ handling of the Uyghur protests.<sup>65</sup>

From the aforementioned Baren Incident, Yinning Protests, and Urumqi riots, it has become clear that the root causes of Uyghur unrest and violence are Uyghur perceptions of constant encroachment from the CCP, discrimination and cultural misunderstanding, attacks on their culture and religion, and desires for independence. These root causes are exacerbated by social marginalization, perceived social disparities, and persistent economic inequalities despite broad economic growth. When in conversation

with each other, these factors have caused a decline in social cohesion, separating Uyghurs and Han Chinese geographically, linguistically, and religiously. Despite this overwhelming evidence, there has been no effort from authorities to foster a mutual understanding that could bridge these differences. Tong Zhao concludes that these issues have led Uyghurs to pivot towards religion as a means to seek “relief, consolation, and hope.”<sup>66</sup> Zhao attributes rising Islamic fundamentalism and the renewal of Islamic practices in Xinjiang to this lack of social cohesion. He notes that there has been a recent revival of mashrap gatherings throughout Xinjiang during which Muslim males gather in groups to discuss moral and religious etiquette in an Islamic context, causing<sup>67</sup> younger generations to flock to religious services in unprecedented numbers.<sup>68</sup> This general revival of Islamic fundamentalism has also led to radicalization, exemplified by militant attacks and general unrest.

In early 1996, a palpable uptick in violent unrest caught the attention of high-ranking Politburo members in the CCP.<sup>69</sup> In March, President Jiang Zemin chaired a Politburo

meeting which officially designated “ethnic separatism” and “illegal religious activities” as the two main threats to stability in Xinjiang.<sup>70</sup> Subsequently, an unprecedented “strike hard” campaign was implemented.<sup>71</sup> In its immediate aftermath, there was a drastic increase in the number of pre-planned, coordinated attacks that occurred throughout Xinjiang. Barbara Walter and Andrew Kydd write that crackdowns on social insurgency can indeed lead to the creation of additional grievances as those oppressed turn to violence as a means of active resistance. Repression leads to a discontent population, setting the conditions for potential radicalization and recruitment by militant groups.<sup>72</sup>

By mid-1998, however, it appeared as though the Chinese “strike hard” campaigns had succeeded in pushing out Xinjiang’s radical elements. Over the course of two years, the PLA had fielded an astonishing 222,000 soldiers in the Lanzhou military region, which has jurisdiction over Xinjiang.<sup>73</sup> China’s wide-reaching hukou (household registration) system also allowed provincial authorities to effectively track the movements of any suspected Uyghur militants.<sup>74</sup> Widely perceived as a show of force,

these measures formed the backbone of a robust security apparatus designed to thwart any potential grassroots rebellions. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the success of these Chinese measures was short-term. Increasing repression instigated by the state motivated the migration of many Uyghurs, especially those prone to radicalization, to Xinjiang's neighboring Central Asian states. These states include Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all of which have a sizable presence of militant groups.<sup>75</sup>

## RADICALIZATION AND THE UYGHUR EXODUS

Most radical groups in Xinjiang have two objectives: independence and the subsequent implementation of Islam in state doctrine. Among the most prominent radical groups in Xinjiang is the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as founded in 1989 by Ziyauddin Yusuf, which dedicates itself to the ultimate secession of Xinjiang into a theocratic state called East Turkistan which would be governed utilizing Islamic principles.<sup>76</sup> Yusuf was inspired by the victory of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan,

and was an ardent believer in a pan-Turkic ideology that envisioned a Central Asia free from Soviet and Chinese control.<sup>77</sup> Recently, the ETIM has begun rebranding itself as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).<sup>78</sup> From the 2000s onward, it has become clear that Chinese "strike hard" campaigns and Xinjiang's vast security apparatus have made waging Jihad in China an incredibly difficult task. Thus, Uyghur militant groups, such as the TIP, moved into nations such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.<sup>79</sup> Their move abroad was motivated by China's successes in cracking down on the TIP's limited support and resource structure. In neighboring Central Asia, militant groups were able to enjoy favorable conditions such as intra-ethnic solidarity, less restrictions and monitoring, and most importantly, access to Jihadist groups. Although there has been some debate regarding the verity of these links, it is in indisputable that Uyghur groups have received some training and funding from al-Qaeda and the Taliban.<sup>80</sup> In 2009, Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan leader in al-Qaeda, publicly encouraged Chinese Uyghurs to wage Jihad against the CCP.<sup>81</sup> His statement

established that Jihadi groups see Chinese Uyghurs as potential recruits in their concerted effort to wage Jihad worldwide.

Such statements are supported by the fact that the majority of Uyghur militant groups are currently located in North Warzistan in Pakistan—a tribal region where the Pakistani government has little authority<sup>82</sup>—umerous Jihadist groups affiliated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are also located.<sup>83</sup> Key figures in TIP leadership have also shown to be institutionally affiliated with al-Qaeda. For example, the former leader of the TIP, Abdul Shakoor Turkstani, was also a commander in al-Qaeda forces who oversaw training camps throughout Warzistan.<sup>84</sup> As such, it appears, to an extent, that the TIP and al-Qaeda have seen some level of not only cooperation, but also integration. Recently, the TIP released an hour-long propaganda video on a website called "Jihad in Eastern Turkistan,"<sup>85</sup> which, like other propaganda produced by Al-Qaeda, depicts self-identified Uyghur terrorists training with RPG's using 87 September 11 attacks as a source of inspiration.<sup>85, 86, 87</sup>

In July 2008, the TIP released a

statement titled "Why Are We Fighting China?" In the statement, TIP writes that "we are fighting China based ... on the following facts and Shariah evidence: China is an enemy which has invaded Muslim countries and occupied Muslim eastern Turkestan."<sup>88</sup> It continues by arguing that "We are fighting China to rescue those oppressed Muslims and stop their torment ... China has stood against Islam and Muslims, has forced atheist Communism and communist education on them, has prevented them from holding their religious ceremonies, has outlawed religious education and closed schools, institutes, and universities teaching Islam, has prevented them from immigrating to Muslim countries, and has maintained a policy of isolation, population birth control, and ethnic cleansing."<sup>89</sup> They also reference "Muslim prisoners who we are seeking to release," those who were "thrown into the darkness of prison cells without committing any crime, apart from saying 'Our Lord is Allah.'"<sup>90</sup> At the end, TIP called for the mobilization of the Muslim people in Turkistan to "rise together as one for Allah" and "avenge your blood."<sup>91</sup> TIP members, in this statement, aimed to portray themselves

as freedom fighters, motivated by a desire to assist persecuted Muslims in Xinjiang. The TIP has already claimed responsibility for several coordinated, small-scale attacks. Whether the TIP has the capacity to instigate a prolonged campaign of terror in Xinjiang, however, is subject to debate because of its limited organizational capacity, few means to smuggle arms into China, and problems in the sense that an overwhelming majority of Uyghurs do not share their views.<sup>92</sup>

Nonetheless, what is clear is that the TIP has been actively involved abroad in other Jihadist efforts. In Syria, there are currently 1,000 to 5,000 TIP members fighting against the Assad regime alongside affiliates of the Islamic State.<sup>93</sup> In fact, the TIP manifests as one of the largest foreign actors currently embroiled in the Syrian Civil War. In northern Afghanistan, the TIP has also conducted joint attacks with the Taliban against government troops.<sup>94</sup> As recently as 2018, militants from the Taliban and the TIP successfully worked in tandem to engage Afghan soldiers. Propaganda videos show TIP militants beheading soldiers they had taken captive.<sup>95</sup> Recently, the Taliban announced

the appointment of two Uyghurs to senior leadership positions in the Syrian branch of the Taliban.<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, it is important to note that Uyghurs have attempted to join militant groups outside of the TIP and its affiliates. In April 2016, four Uyghurs in Indonesia were arrested when they sought to join the efforts of Santoso, a violent Indonesian Islamic militant who was the leader of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.<sup>97</sup> In 2015, the deadliest bombing in modern Thai history was attributed to Uyghur militants, who were angered by the Thai government's decision to deport 109 Uyghurs back to China.<sup>98</sup>

While Uyghur militancy and terrorism may not be an urgent and problem in China, the fact that terrorism is being perpetrated abroad by Chinese citizens on a routine basis should be worrying. The close geographical proximity of Uyghur radicalization hotspots to China is a threat to its security; radicalization and militancy is breeding within China's neighbors to the immediate west and south.

## CHINESE INTERESTS AND MODERN-DAY REPRESSION

Given the plethora of issues that Xinjiang has generated for China, it is important to examine why the Chinese government does not simply allow Xinjiang autonomy and self-governing capabilities.

Xinjiang's importance for Chinese economic, security, and strategic interests cannot be overstated, especially considering its substantial oil, natural gas, and natural resource reserves.<sup>99</sup> Total oil and gas resources in the Junggar basin, located in northern Xinjiang, amount to 8.68 billion tons of oil and 2.5 trillion cubic meters of gas.<sup>100</sup> Tax revenue from Xinjiang's petrochemical industry alone produced \$2.1 billion USD for the central government in 2005.<sup>101</sup> PetroChina, the country's top oil and gas firm, recently announced plans to raise annual crude oil output in Xinjiang to three million tons by 2021.<sup>102</sup> The Xinjiang operations of the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in 2017 produced 11.45 million tons of crude oil and 17.1 million tons of gas. The CNPC announced in July, 2018 that they would spend \$22 billion USD to replace oil

wells to offset declining output, which amounts to a 75% increase in investment directed toward Xinjiang.<sup>103</sup> Xinjiang also produces 80% of China's reserves in gold, jade, and other precious metals.<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, 40% of China's coal deposits are in Xinjiang.<sup>105</sup>

China's strategic interests in Central Asia also depend on Xinjiang. For example, China is currently attempting to construct gas pipelines through Xinjiang by cooperating with states such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.<sup>106</sup> As there is no geographical alternative, it is integral to note that Central Asia produces two thirds of China's coal supply and one third of its cotton supply, both of which are inextricable from China's manufacturing-based economy.<sup>107</sup> Between 1992 and 2005, trade between China and Central Asian states increased by 1600% and was valued at \$8 billion.<sup>108</sup> China's recent Belt and Road initiative promises to promote such trade even further.

Additionally, the significant amount of foreign investment in Xinjiang ties economic interests there to Beijing's projection of economic stability abroad. The World Bank loans China an estimated \$2 billion USD a year.

In the early 2000s, over \$780.5 million USD in low-interest World Bank loans went to funding over fifteen projects throughout Xinjiang.<sup>109</sup> Recently, the World Bank approved \$102.68 million USD in loans for the Xinjiang Technical and Vocational Education Project.<sup>110</sup> Analysis by ChinaFile researchers show that Fortune 500 energy companies such as ExxonMobil, Halliburton, Danaher, and Peabody Energy have vested interests in Xinjiang's resource economy.<sup>111</sup>

Any threat of economic or political instability threatens to endanger Xinjiang's significant contributions to Chinese economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Chinese responses after post-Mao liberalization have been characterized by brutal suppression. It was not until 2001, however, that the Chinese government saw an opening to escalate its repression with the tacit endorsement from the international community. Seeing the September 11 attacks as a policy opening, the Chinese government branded their attempts to quash Uyghur movements in Xinjiang as a fight against global terrorism and Islamic extremism.<sup>112</sup> The United States, seeking Chinese cooperation

on the War on Terror, became supportive of Chinese endeavors despite initial resistance. In late 2002, the U.S State Department officially designated ETIM, a terrorist organization, and echoed Chinese concerns about Uyghur militancy and separatism.<sup>113</sup> At China's request, the United States even detained 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay. Despite credible proof, including a unanimous court opinion written by Judge Merrick Garland, their detention was based on circumstantial evidence.<sup>114</sup>

Today, cities in Xinjiang are defined by a heavy police presence, ubiquitous CCTV surveillance cameras, checkpoints, and military patrols.<sup>115</sup> Official Chinese sources state that in 2010, the authorities increased Xinjiang's public security budget by 90%.<sup>116</sup> In early 2019, Chinese authorities were accused of detaining more than a million Uyghur Muslims in a coordinated system of "reeducation camps" throughout Xinjiang.<sup>117</sup> These are over 1,200 of these camps, all of which are populated by Chinese citizens arbitrarily detained by the CCP.<sup>118</sup> Within these camps, one will find prison-like conditions in which detainees are coerced into pledging loyalty to the CCP,

renouncing Islam, learning Mandarin, and praising the virtues of communism.<sup>119</sup> There have even been reports of torture and suicides.<sup>120</sup> Despite denial from the CCP evidence shows otherwise. Supply orders from one detention camp show that personnel ordered 2,768 police batons, 550 electric cattle prods, 1,367 pairs of handcuffs, and 2,792 cans of pepper spray.<sup>121</sup>

Official Chinese rationales for the existence of these camps lie in combating the perceived threats posed by Uyghur secessionist movements and Islamic extremism.<sup>122</sup> Chinese officials have argued that these camps are institutions, with the vocational and educational training opportunities necessary for the development of human capital.<sup>123</sup> They were built, Chinese officials also argue, as part of a broader de-radicalization effort being undertaken in Xinjiang. Targeted outcomes, as publicly stated by the CCP, are ideological reform and better employment opportunities for the Uyghur people.

Under the reign of Chinese President Xi Jinping, China has bolstered efforts to "sinicize religion" in the hopes of consolidating the CCP's ideological chokehold on China.<sup>124</sup> China's

crackdown on underground Christian networks and Falun Gong practitioners exemplify China's existential fear that the utilization of organized religion can combat government authority. As such, Chinese rationales could also lie in concerns regarding the CCP's maintenance of power. The role of Xinjiang's Communist Party Secretary, Chen Quanguo, must also not be ignored.<sup>125</sup> Chen is infamous for his stint in Tibet, during which he pushed aggressive measures to consolidate state control over Tibetan monasteries.<sup>126</sup> In Xinjiang, Chen looks to be adopting the same tactics as he did in his previous capacity.

Whether the CCP is genuinely worried about the prospect of Islamic extremism remains undetermined. Ostensibly, it appears that the Chinese have adopted corrective approaches due to what they perceive to be legitimate concerns. In 2017, an anti-extremism law was passed on a provincial level in Xinjiang that outlawed veils and long beards.<sup>127</sup> A systematic campaign to destroy mosques and religious centers has also been undertaken. Satellite imagery has shown that 31 mosques in Xinjiang, along with two prominent shrines,

have undergone significant structural damage since 2018.<sup>128</sup> Fifteen out of those thirty-one Mosques have been completely destroyed.<sup>129</sup> Symbolic religious locales such as the Kargilik Mosque, and sacred pilgrimage sites such as the Jafari Sadiq shrine, have been destroyed beyond recognition.<sup>130</sup> Simply reciting a verse of the Quran is grounds for condemnation to a re-education camp.<sup>131</sup> Abdusalam Muhemet, a Uyghur from Xinjiang, was condemned to such a camp when reciting a verse at a funeral.<sup>132</sup> Muhemet stated that such camps “breed vengeful feelings and erase Uyghur identity.”<sup>133</sup> The CCP’s campaign of persecution against Uyghur intellectuals serves to further support claims that the CCP is seeking to eradicate Uyghur identity. Over members of the Uyghur intelligentsia have been detained, many of them scholars who research Uyghur history, culture, and art.<sup>134</sup> Officials such as Xinjiang religious affairs official Maisumujiang Maimuer have advocated measures on state media to “eliminate separatist disease.” “Break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins,” Maimuer writes, “completely shovel the roots of ‘two-faced people.’ dig them out, and vow to

fight these two-faced people until the end.”<sup>135</sup>

The ramifications of such unprecedented, extensive Chinese state repression has yet to be explored. Muhemet however, puts it quite simply: history has shown that large-scale repression against ethnic groups with a long history of pride, whether it be in Palestine, Korea or Kashmir, will lead to an ultimate surge in nationalist violence. In Xinjiang’s case, nationalist and ethnic violence may very likely manifest itself as broad support for radical, Islamic extremism.

Jillian Schwedler notes that “interactions with the other” facilitates political learning, which is integral to processes such as de-radicalization.<sup>136</sup> Unfortunately, as Tong Zhao notes, a lack of social cohesion has resulted in the absence of positive inter-ethnic relations and interactions.

## THE TRAJECTORY OF UYGHUR- PERPETRATED VIOLENCE

Ultimately, it is important to observe that Uyghur nationalism, separatism, and terrorist cells are being trained and indoctrinated in areas dominated by the presence of groups such as

the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Terrorism perpetrated in Kashgar in 2011 demonstrated a series of unprecedented, coordinated, and complex attacks.<sup>137</sup> These attacks involved a coordinated car bombing, truck hijacking, and stabbings on the first day.<sup>138</sup> On the second day, shootings, stabbings, and bombings occurred in popular Han Chinese sites. These attacks show the dangerous ramifications of terrorism perpetrated by trained, religiously zealous Uyghur militants. The TIP released a video one month following the tragedy showing one of the attackers training in a camp located in Pakistan.<sup>139</sup> In 2014, the TIP claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on the South Railway Station of Urumqi.<sup>140</sup> The TIP recorded a video of militants constructing the bomb used in the attack, demonstrating their expertise and understanding of public scare tactics.<sup>141</sup> The 2014 attacks claimed the lives of more than 35 civilians, and wounded more than 90.<sup>142</sup> This attack was motivated by the sentencing of 39 Uyghurs to prison for crimes related to ethnic hatred, discrimination, and terrorism charges.<sup>143</sup> These sentences were given just two days before the attack, demonstrating the swift efficiency in which groups such as the

TIP can conduct small-scale terror.

These attacks have not been limited to just Xinjiang. In 2013, three Uyghurs drove into a crowd of people in Tiananmen Square, the site where Mao declared the creation of the PRC in 1949.<sup>144</sup> Five people were killed and 40 people were injured as a result.<sup>145</sup> The driver, a Uyghur male, was accompanied by his mother and his wife, demonstrating that anybody, regardless of gender or age, is susceptible to radicalization.<sup>146</sup> When police arrested their accomplices, they found Jihadi flags and a collection of knives.<sup>147</sup> Increasingly coordinated terror attacks are a likely outcome if training offered by terrorist groups in northern Pakistan and now, Syria continues. It is also important to note that the lack of a sophisticated weapons has not dampened the resolve of these terrorists. Uyghur militants are genuine ideologues, ardently devoted to their cause regardless of the resources available to them.

It is inevitable that as the United States minimizes its involvement in Afghanistan and Syria, that some of these fighters will turn their attention to the country that wronged them in the first place. The prospect of trained

fighters, returning home en masse to radicalize more Uyghurs and wage Jihad should be frightening to the CCP. Increased investment in infrastructure that links Xinjiang with other Central Asian states is likely to expose Uyghurs to radical groups eager to capitalize on their mistreatment. More linkages in highways and pipelines is also likely to facilitate weapons smuggling to fuel attacks in Xinjiang and beyond.

China's recent internment of over a million Uyghurs in camps is also bound to create a breeding ground for extremism for groups such as the TIP. Aforementioned TIP rhetoric regarding freeing Muslims "thrown into the darkness of prison cells without committing any crime, apart from saying 'Our Lord is Allah,'" is likely to resonate with those interned for saying precisely that. Rhetoric adopted by the TIP regarding protecting Uyghur culture will ultimately resonate with a proud nation which finds facets of its heritage coming under ever-increasing attack. Solidarity from bodies such as the World Uyghur Congress and Uyghurs abroad is also likely to empower Uyghurs within Xinjiang with powerful, nationalist rhetoric. In

fact, there are 25 international organizations and websites dedicated to the independence of "Eastern Turkestan" abroad, based in cities as far-ranging as Melbourne to Amsterdam.<sup>148</sup>

Albert Ellis, a prominent American psychologist, has noted that the terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks initially thought of themselves as powerless to stop the United States from exporting American cultural beliefs to Muslim countries.<sup>149</sup> To prove their self-worth, they were compelled to punish the United States and what it represented. Largely, the same rationale can be applied to Uyghur militants in Xinjiang. Constant denigration of Uyghur culture by Han Chinese, humiliation in internment camps, and a general feeling of helplessness among the Uyghur populace, is likely to conjure the same feelings of resentment and lead to radical extremism. It should be noted that the phenomenon of extensive homegrown Islamic extremism in France and Belgium has also been attributed to a feeling of alienation lack of belonging sensed by young Muslims in Francophone Europe. Literature on insurgency, security, and terrorism, proposes that conditions for terrorism are emboldened

when an alienated group sees their rights continually violated by an uncompromising state.<sup>150</sup>

Suzanne Ogden, another prominent scholar in Chinese politics, identifies three conditions that will enable the cultivation of terrorism and support for terrorism among the general public. The first condition is when an ethnic, national or religious group perceives a regime is treating it unjustly or exploitatively.<sup>151</sup> The second condition is defined as when a victim group feels oppressed by a majority group and that it has lost land, its language, and its right to religious and ethnic practices.<sup>152</sup> The third becomes clear when the regime does not allow group members to speak freely and often jails or executes its members.<sup>153</sup> The CCP has cultivated an environment for all three of these conditions to be met, painting a bleak picture for the prospect of social stability and peace the CCP has long sought in Xinjiang.

## CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it can be discerned that historical state repression and ethnic tensions have cultivated a Uyghur identity that has

become reliant on political Islam. Considering the fact that the the CCP has long seen Islam as a threat to their chokehold on power, the failure of general liberalization to not deliver results drove the CCP to coercive methods and the creation of vast security apparatus aimed at keeping Xinjiang in check. Pre-existing tensions and state repression led to riots such as those seen in Urumqi in 2009, and other attacks perpetrated by Uyghurs. As a result of this systematic repression, Uyghur identity has been strengthened. Additionally, a Uyghur exodus due to stringent Chinese policies has led to Uyghur militant groups with terrorist organizations such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Unprecedented levels of repression by the Chinese will serve to exacerbate current tensions, creating the conditions for religious extremism at the hands of the CCP.

Whether China will fall victim to the scourge of widespread terrorism remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that persistent socioeconomic inequalities, attacks on Uyghur ethnic identity, and the mass internment of over one million Uyghurs, are modern measures that will only serve to anger a nation of people

who take immense pride in their heritage and traditions. It is critical that authorities in Xinjiang begin to ameliorate inter-ethnic tensions through promoting interfaith dialogue. Measures to accommodate Uyghur concerns are necessary to prevent the complete alienation of Uyghurs in their own homeland. Should the Uyghurs continue to be oppressed so extensively, China risks instigating large-scale homegrown extremism and militancy within its own borders.

## ENDNOTES

1. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2047.
2. *Ibid.*, 2048.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth. "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." *Asian Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2008): 16.
5. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 10.
6. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2048.
7. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 10.
8. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2048.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth. "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." *Asian Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2008): 17.
11. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2049.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, 2050.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, 2051.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, 2052.
21. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth. "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." *Asian Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2008): 17.
22. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2052.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Aris, Stephen. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 3 (2009): 457-82.
26. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2053.
27. Gladney, Dru C. "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?" *The China Quarterly*, no.

- 174 (2003): 461.
28. Ibid.
29. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 20.
30. Sweeney, Pete. "Xinjiang Is an Extreme Case of China's Growth Woes." Reuters. January 30, 2019.
31. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 20.
32. Anderlini, Jamil. "Financial Times Xinjiang Oil Boom Fuels Uighur Resentment." *Financial Times*. August 28, 2008.
33. Ibid.
34. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 20.
35. Liu, Amy H., and Kevin Peters. "The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 17, no. 2 (2017): 269
36. Ibid.
37. Anderlini, Jamil. "Financial Times Xinjiang Oil Boom Fuels Uighur Resentment." *Financial Times*. August 28, 2008.
38. Liu, Amy H., and Kevin Peters. "The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 17, no. 2 (2017): 269
39. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2061.
40. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan Lipman, in S. Frederick Starr's *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland: China's Muslim Motherland*: Routledge, 2004, 339.
41. Dwyer, Arianne M. *The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse*. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2006, 19-22.
42. Finley, Joanne Smith. "Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities among the Uyghurs." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 53 (2007): 630-639.
43. Ibid.
44. Zang, Xiaowei. "Major Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Ürümqi." *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 6 (2013): 2068.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid, 2066.
47. Ibid, 2069.
48. Ibid, 2068.
49. Ibid, 2070.
50. Toft, Monica. "Self-Determination, Secession, and War." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (4): 587.
51. Ibid.
52. Hastings, Justin V. "Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest." *The China Quarterly*, no. 208 (2011): 900.
53. Ibid.

54. Guo, Rongxing. *China's Spatial (Dis)integration: Political Economy of the Interethnic Unrest in Xinjiang*. Elsevier, 44.
55. Ibid, 44-48.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid, 50.
59. Ibid, 45.
60. Ibid, 45-50.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Hastings, Justin V. "Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest." *The China Quarterly*, no. 208 (2011): 911.
64. Branigan, Tania. "Ethnic Violence in China Leaves 140 Dead." *The Guardian*. July 06, 2009. Accessed May 09, 2019.
65. Hastings, Justin V. "Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest." *The China Quarterly*, no. 208 (2011): 911.
66. Ibid, 912.
67. Zhao, Tong. "Social Cohesion and Islamic Radicalization: Implications from the Uighur Insurgency." *Journal of Strategic Security* 3, no. 3 (2010): 45.
68. Ibid, 46.
69. Ibid.
70. Hastings, Justin V. "Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest." *The China Quarterly*, no. 208 (2011): 903.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31, no.1 (2006): 56-80.
74. Hastings, Justin V. "Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest." *The China Quarterly*, no. 208 (2011): 904.
75. Ibid, 905.
76. Ibid.
77. Mumford, Andrew. "Theory-Testing Uyghur Terrorism in China." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 12, no. 5 (2018): 19.
78. Ibid.
79. Potter, Phillip B. K. "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2013): 72.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, 73.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid, 74.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid, 75.
86. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the

- Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 24.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. "Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP): 'Why Are We Fighting China?'" Translated by NEFA Foundation. 2008.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 26-29.
94. Soliev, Nodirbek. "Uyghur Violence and Jihadism in China and Beyond." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 11, no. 1 (2019): 73.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. "Indonesia: 4 Uyghurs Who Joined Santoso Killed, Police Official Says." *Radio Free Asia*. April 12, 2016. Accessed May 09, 2019.
99. Fuller, Thomas, and Edward Wong. "Thailand Blames Uighur Militants for Bombing at Bangkok Shrine." *The New York Times*. September 15, 2015. Accessed May 09, 2019.
100. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 16.
101. "Xinjiang Oil Province." *China National Petroleum Corp*.
102. Anderlini, Jamil. "Financial Times Xinjiang Oil Boom Fuels Uighur Resentment." *Financial Times*. August 28, 2008.
103. "PetroChina Aims to Triple Crude Output at New Xinjiang Oilfield – State Media" *Reuters*. November 29, 2018.
104. "UPDATE 2-In China's Far West, CNPC Vows \$22 Bln Spend to Replace Ageing Oil Wells." *Reuters*. July 25, 2018.
105. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 16.
106. "Xinjiang: Market Profile." *Hong Kong Trade Development Council*. May 20, 2019.
107. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 16.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Gladney, Dru C. "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?" *The China Quarterly*, no. 174 (2003): 459.
111. "Xinjiang Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project." *The World Bank*. May 29, 2015.
112. "Here Are the Fortune 500 Companies Doing Business in Xinjiang." *ChinaFile*. November 05, 2018.
113. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 16.

114. Bernstein, Richard. "When China Convinced the U.S. That Uighurs Were Waging Jihad." *The Atlantic*. March 20, 2019.
115. Ibid.
116. Cunningham, Christopher P. "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs." *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 3 (2012): 12.
117. Potter, Phillip B. K. "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2013): 72-73.
118. Ibid, 73.
119. Maizland, Lindsay. "China's Crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed May 09, 2019.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Campbell, Alexia Fernández. "China's Reeducation Camps for Muslims Are Beginning to Look like Concentration Camps." *Vox*. October 24, 2018. Accessed May 09, 2019.
124. Maizland, Lindsay. "China's Crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed May 09, 2019.
125. Soliev, Nodirbek. "Uyghur Violence and Jihadism in China and Beyond." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 11, no. 1 (2019): 72.
126. Maizland, Lindsay. "China's Crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed May 09, 2019.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Kuo, Lily. "Revealed: New Evidence of China's Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang." *The Guardian*. May 07, 2019. Accessed May 09, 2019.
131. Ibid.
132. Soliev, Nodirbek. "Uyghur Violence and Jihadism in China and Beyond." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 11, no. 1 (2019): 73.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ramzy, Austin. "China Targets Prominent Uighur Intellectuals to Erase an Ethnic Identity." *The New York Times*. January 05, 2019.
136. Ibid.
137. Scwedler, Jillian. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 363.
138. Potter, Phillip B. K. "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2013): 75.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Guo, Rongxing. *China's Spatial (Dis)integration: Political Economy of the Interethnic Unrest in Xinjiang*. Elsevier, 60.
142. Ibid.