

# THE INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

## PART I

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### 1. THE NATURAL PRESENCE OF GOD IN CREATURES

ALL things, God apart, are composite beings. As such, they require an efficient cause outside themselves for the union of act and potency involved in the very notion of composite being. Furthermore, since all creatures are, and forever remain, contingent beings, they demand outside themselves an ever-active efficient cause that they may continue in existence. This is God, who must, as St. Thomas says,<sup>1</sup> be intimately in all things as the cause of their being.

Since the being of all that exists is the most intimate and deep reality in every entity,<sup>2</sup> and since the being of all creatures depends upon God, He must be continually present in all things, just as a cause is ever present to its effect when the latter depends upon that cause for its very being.<sup>3</sup> Let the cause be once removed and the

<sup>1</sup> *Su. Theol.* I, Q. 8, a. 2, c: "est in omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse, et virtutem, et operationem." *Ibid.*, ad. 3: "Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, in quantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in omnibus, in quantum omnia nuda sunt, et aperta oculis ejus. Est in omnibus per essentiam, in quantum adest omnibus, ut causa essendi . . . ."

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*: "Esse autem est illud, quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium, quae in re sunt." cf. *De Pot.*, q. 3, a 5 c, and a 6 c; *C. Gent.* II 15 et 16.

<sup>3</sup> I, q. 8, a. 1 c: ". . . Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei, in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens conjungi ei, in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud contingere, unde. . . . probatur, quod motum, et movens oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet, quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus ejus. . . . Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt sed quamdiu in esse conservantur, . . . . Quamdiu igitur res habet esse, tamdiu oportet, quod Deus adsit ei secundum modum, . . . quo esse habet."

latter will cease to be, or at least suffer diminution of being in the precise way that it is dependent upon its cause.<sup>4</sup>

This natural presence of God, taken passively from the side of the creature, results in a real relation to God. Actively, on the part of God, there is, of course, only a relation of reason. This relation to God in the creature does not enter into the definition of the creature but is rather consequent upon its definition,<sup>5</sup> that is to say, insofar as it is a contingent entity, not however inasmuch as it is a real being. On the contrary, in the supernatural order of grace, the relation to God of all supernatural effects is of their very essence and necessarily enters into their definition, also. St. Thomas, as we know, speaks of God's being in creatures according to His power, essence, and presence.<sup>6</sup>

B. Froget<sup>7</sup> devotes many pages to showing that God is present in all things after the manner of an all-perfect efficient Cause. Since in God there are no passive potencies, there is no kind of intermediary between Him and the passive subjects upon which He acts. Therefore, we speak analogously when we say that God is present in creatures after the manner of an efficient cause.<sup>8</sup> For, as all must admit, God does not act by an *actio* different from His very substance.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Loc. cit.; cf. In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1 sol.: ". . . movens, et motum, agens, et patiens, operans, et operatum, oportet simul esse . . . . Creare autem est dare esse . . . . Illud quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset."

<sup>5</sup> I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1m: ". . . licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis, quod est causatum; tamen sequitur ad ea, quae sunt de ejus ratione; quia ex hoc, quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio." De Pot. q. 3, a. 3 ad 2m: "Si vero nomen creaturae accipiam magis stricte pro eo tantum quod subsistit (quod proprie fit et creatur, sicut proprie habet esse), tunc relatio praedicta non est quoddam creatum, sed concreatum, sicut nec est ens proprie loquendo, sed inhaerens."

<sup>6</sup> (1) *supra*.

<sup>7</sup> De l'habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les âmes justes. (4th ed., Paris: Lethielleux. 1900), p. 10 ff., 29 f.

<sup>8</sup> I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m et 4m.

<sup>9</sup> I, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m: ". . . actio secundum quod est praedicamentum, dicit aliquid fluens ab agente, et cum motu; sed in Deo non est aliquid medium secundum rem inter ipsum et opus suum, et ideo non dicitur agens actione quae est praedicamentum; sed actio sua est substantia." cf. II, d. 1, q. unica, a. 2.

Hence, we may call this natural presence of God a substantial presence in creatures.

2. THE SUPERNATURAL PRESENCE OF GOD IN CREATURES

What accounts for the difference of presence in the supernatural order? Following St. Thomas,<sup>10</sup> a difference in presence is conditioned and brought about by a difference in effects in creatures. Since there can be no change in God, all the newness must be on the side of the creature.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, if the Holy Spirit (and Father and Son) dwells in a new way within the creature, this must be on account of a new effect produced in the creature and because of the new resultant relationship to God.<sup>12</sup> Upon this new effect which refers the creature to God in a new way will depend the new presence.<sup>13</sup>

Let it be noted that, in the natural order of creation, God gives creatures their own proper being only, a creaturely essence that is cut to the measure of the creature, patterned after the creature's own proper essence, not upon the inner divine nature. But, in the supernatural presence through grace, the proper relations of the divine Persons Themselves are represented in the new effect, for this

<sup>10</sup> I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1: "Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sed amor increatus, qui est Spiritus Sanctus, participatur in creatura. Ergo secundum modum ipsius creaturae. Sed modus ejus est finitus. Ergo oportet quod recipiatur in creatura aliquis amor finitus. Sed omne finitum est creatum. Ergo in anima habente Spiritum Sanctum, est aliqua caritas creata."

<sup>11</sup> I, q. 43, a. 1, ad 2m; cf. I, d. 15, a. 1, ad 1m: ". . . quamvis Spiritus Sanctus, qui ubique est, non possit esse ubi non fuerat, loci mutatione circa ipsum intellecta: tamen potest esse aliquo modo quo prius non fuerit, mutatione facta circa illud in quo esse dicitur . . ."

<sup>12</sup> I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1m: ". . . Cum dicitur Deus esse ubique, importatur quaedam relatio Dei ad creaturam: quae quidem realiter non est in ipso, sed in creatura. Contingit autem ex parte creaturae istas relationes multipliciter etiam diversificari secundum diversos effectus quibus Deo assimilatur: et inde est quod significatur ut aliter se habens ad creaturam quam prius. Et propter hoc Spiritus Sanctus, qui ubique est secundum relationem creaturae ad ipsum, potest dici de novo esse in aliquo, secundum novam relationem ipsius creaturae ad ipsum."

<sup>13</sup> I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2; cf. John of St. Thomas, T. IV, d. 17, a. 3, n. 4.

new supernatural effect in the soul is modeled after and takes its origin from the very hypostatic property of the eternal relations. Such language is bold, but it is that of St. Thomas.<sup>14</sup>

Going again to the substantial presence of God in creatures, we should note that it is effected not by God's giving to creatures a share in His very own life and being, but only by the communication of a remotely analogous and participated similitude of His absolute perfection. Also, the created efficient cause "applies itself" to the passive subject, not through itself, but through its action: "agens agendo agit, seu actione sua." The efficient cause is not itself in the passive subject, but only according to a similitude which the same efficient cause educes from the subjective potency of the passive subject. Hence, "actio est in passo."

Analogously, this is true of God, also. For, although He does not act by an "actio" that is different from His substance, nevertheless He is present in creatures in the natural order only insofar as He produces in them a similitude of His own absolute perfections. The creature does not attain to God according to His substance.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> I, d. 15, a. 4, a. 1: ". . . Sicut in exitu rerum a principio dicitur bonitas divina in creaturas procedere, in quantum repraesentatur in creatura per similitudinem bonitas divina in ipsa recepta: ita in reductione rationalis creaturae in Deum intelligitur processio divinae personae, quae et missio dicitur, *in quantum propria relatio ipsius personae divinae* repraesentatur in anima per similitudinem aliquam receptam, quae est exemplata, et originata ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae: . . ."

<sup>15</sup> I, d. 37, a. 1, a. 2: ". . . Distinctio istorum modorum partim sumitur ex parte creaturae, partim ex parte Dei. Ex parte creaturae, in quantum diverso modo ordinatur in Deum, et coniungitur ei, non diversitate rationis tantum, sed realiter. Cum enim Deus in rebus esse dicatur, secundum quod eis aliquo modo applicatur, oportet ut ubi est diversus coniunctionis, vel applicationis modus, ibi sit diversus modus essendi. Coniungitur autem creatura Deo tripliciter. Primo modo secundum similitudinem tantum, in quantum invenitur in creatura aliqua similitudo divinae bonitatis, non quod attingat ipsum Deum *secundum substantiam*: et ista coniunctio invenitur in omnibus creaturis divinam bonitatem assimilantibus: et sic erit modus communis, quo Deus est in omnibus creaturis per essentiam, praesentiam, et potentiam. Secundo, creatura attingit ad ipsum Deum secundum substantiam consideratum, et non secundum similitudinem tantum. . . ."

In St. Thomas' expressive saying, though God be in them, they are nevertheless not with God.<sup>16</sup>

If, as is surely true, the supernatural presence of God is radically different from the merely natural presence, the new effect accounting for the new presence must be *toto coelo* different from any merely created effect. For a presence that is *novae speciei*, an effect of a new kind is required. It is very difficult to see how an effect of *merely* efficient causality could account for such a new presence; for a relationship to God, founded on an effect of purely efficient causality, would not be essentially different from that which springs from merely natural created effects in creatures. Hence, the presence arising from this effect (of merely efficient causality) would not be different from the ordinary, natural substantial presence of God in creatures.<sup>17</sup>

### 3. SUPERNATURAL PRESENCE AND THE DIVINE MISSIONS

Just as all rational creatures come forth from God, so, too, will they return to Him. And as the divine processions are the *ratio* of creatures going forth from God,<sup>18</sup> so similarly the same processions are the *ratio*, according to which creatures will return to God their final end. And just as through the Son and Holy Spirit we have been created, so, also, through Them will we be united with our final end, God the Father, the eternal source of all being within and without the Godhead.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> I, d. 37, "Expositio primae partis textus": . . . aliae creaturae, quamvis consequuntur divinam similitudinem per operationem ipsius Dei, non tamen attingunt ad ipsum Deum secundum suppositum et ideo quamvis Deus in eis sit, non tamen ipsae cum Deo sunt."

<sup>17</sup> *Loc. cit.*: "Sed creatura rationalis per gratiam attingit ad ipsum Deum . . ." I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, contra: "Constat quod Deus aliquo modo est in sanctis quo non est in creaturis. Sed ista diversitas non potest poni ex parte ipsius Dei, qui eodem modo se habet ad omnia. Ergo videtur quod sit ex parte creaturae, scilicet quod ipsa creatura habet aliquid quod alia non habent."

<sup>18</sup> I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>19</sup> I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, sol.: ". . . in exitu creaturarum a primo principio attenditur quaedam circulatio, vel regiratio, eo quod omnia revertuntur sicut in finem in id a quo sicut a principio prodierunt. Et ideo oportet ut per eadem quibus est exitus a principio, et reditus in finem attendatur. Sicut igitur dictum

As in the natural order the substantial presence of God is necessary for the attainment of a natural end, so a supernatural presence of God is necessary in the supernatural order for the attainment of our supernatural end. This new presence is founded in supernatural gifts, namely grace and the virtues, but goes beyond the created gifts to the divine Persons Themselves.<sup>20</sup>

Grace, which for St. Thomas is a perfect image of God, not *simpliciter*, but only with reference to the natural similitude to God,<sup>21</sup>

est (d. 13, q. 1, a. 1) quod processio personarum est ratio productionis creaturarum a primo principio; ita etiam est eadem processio ratio redeundi in finem: qui per Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum sicut et conditi sumus, ita etiam et fini ultimo coniungimur, . . .” cf. omnino, I, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, sol.: “. . . sicut proprius modus quo Spiritus Sanctus refertur ad Patrem, est amor, et proprius modus referendi Filium in Patrem est sapientia, quia est verbum ipsius manifestans ipsum. Unde sicut Spiritus Sanctus invisibiliter procedit in mentem per donum amoris, ita Filius per donum sapientiae: *in quo est manifestatio ipsius Patris, qui est ultimum ad quod recurrimus.*

<sup>20</sup> I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, sol.: “Respondeo dicendum, quod ipsemet Spiritus Sanctus procedit temporali processione, vel datur, et non solum dona eius. Si enim consideremus processionem Spiritus Sancti ex parte eius a quo procedit, non est dubium quin secundum illum respectum ipsemet Spiritus Sanctus procedat. Si autem consideremus processionem secundum respectum ad id in quo procedit, tunc . . . respectus iste in Spiritu Sancto ponitur, non quia ipse realiter referatur, sed quia alterum refertur ad ipsum. Cum igitur in acceptione donorum ipsius non solum relatio nostra terminetur ad dona, ut ipsa tantum habeamus, sed etiam ad Spiritum, quia aliter ipsum habemus quam prius; non tantum dicentur dona ipsius procedere in nos, sed etiam ipsemet: secundum hoc enim ipse dicitur referri ad nos, secundum quod nos referimur in ipsum. Et ideo procedit ipse in nos, et dona ipsius: quia et dona eius recipimus, et per eadem ad ipsum nos aliter habemus, in quantum per dona eius ipsi Spiritui Sancto coniungimur, vel ille nobis, per donum nos sibi assimilans.”

*Ibid.*, ad 1m: “Contingit autem ex parte creaturae istas relationes multipliciter etiam diversificari secundum diversos effectus quibus Deo assimilatur: et inde est quod significatur ut aliter se habens ad creaturam quam prius. Et propter hoc Spiritus Sanctus, qui ubique est secundum relationem creaturae ad ipsum, potest dici de novo esse in aliquo, secundum novam relationem ipsius creaturae ad ipsum.” Cf. Galtier, *L'habitation*, p. 231, n.

<sup>21</sup> I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m: “. . . gratia gratum faciens, secundum id quod addit aliis creaturis, dicitur perfecta similitudo, non quidem simpliciter, sed respectu aliarum creaturarum similitudinem; sed secundum id in quo communicat cum aliis creaturis habet rationem vestigii.”

is a disposition for future glory.<sup>22</sup> In the present life, grace is a disposition in the soul by which we are conformed to the Holy Spirit<sup>23</sup> and immediately united to God.<sup>24</sup> Habitual grace is necessary for the inhabitation. Since everything is received according to the nature of the recipient, therefore, the Holy Spirit must be received through a created form.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, from St. Thomas it follows that grace is had through the Persons, not through the divine essence *in abstracto*. For grace comes through the missions of the divine Persons which are based on the processions. Since, then, the divine essence does not proceed, grace is had through the Persons directly.<sup>26</sup> This new presence, though it presupposes the presence of immensity and substance, goes far beyond it, in that this presence is intimately connected with the eternal processions themselves.<sup>27</sup> It should be clear that, when we speak of grace coming from the divine Persons, we do not use the word Person only *in sensu reduplicativo*, but also *in sensu specificativo*. That is to say, grace is had from the divine essence as existing in the Persons, as the divine essence is determined by the relations of opposition; and, on the other hand, grace is had from the divine Personae as distinct Possessors of the one, common, indivisible, divine essence.

The temporal processions of the divine Persons, upon which the

<sup>22</sup> I, d. 17, a. 1, a. 3, ad 3m: ". . . ipsa gratia est dispositio naturae ad gloriam."

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 1, sol.: "Unde non est intelligere quod sit operatio perfecta voluntatis, per quam uniatur Spiritui Sancto, nisi sit ibi habitus perficiens potentiam operativam: nec potest esse similitudo actus voluntatis ad Spiritum Sanctum, nisi sit *similitudo Spiritus Sancti in anima per aliquam formam, quae est principium actus, quo Spiritui Sancto conformetur . . .*"

<sup>24</sup> I, d. 14, q. 3, a. unica, in c. et sol.: "Gratia autem habet quamdam virtutem infinitam, in quantum scilicet *ipsi Deo*, qui est infinitus, *coniungit*." "Et qui *per gratiam efficitur ipsi Deo coniuncti*, et non mediante aliqua creatura, ideo oportet quod gratia immediate a Deo in nos procedat."

<sup>25</sup> I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>26</sup> I, d. 18, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2m.: ". . . essentia divina non accipit novum esse in Spiritu Santo per processionem, cum unum et idem sit esse trium personarum; et ideo non procedit neque per se, neque per accidens; neque etiam processionem consequitur; . . ."

<sup>27</sup> I, d. 37, a. 1, a. 2, ad 3m.

supernatural order depends, are temporal because of the new effect produced in the creature and because of the new relation to God which follows upon this effect so different from all other created entities.<sup>28</sup> The eternal procession is really in the Holy Spirit, the temporal procession, precisely under this temporal aspect, only according to reason. For the procession is temporal only from the standpoint of the temporal created effect, in virtue of which alone the procession is called temporal. Yet, the eternal procession is included in the temporal as its *ratio* and cause.<sup>29</sup>

St. Thomas holds that the purpose of the missions is to recall the rational creature back to God.<sup>30</sup> With regard to the Persons sent, only the Son and Holy Spirit are involved. For every mission presupposes some authority over the Persons sent. In regard to the divine Persons sent, this authority can only be that of origin.<sup>31</sup>

If one compare the mission of the Son and Holy Spirit, one must say that these two missions are distinct *secundum rem*. This is true both from the point of view of their eternal origins and with regard to the *effect*, according to which the two divine Persons are said to be in the creature in a new way.

This contention is important, for, according to St. Thomas, it is the effect which controls the supernatural presence. The effect is the mode of the indwelling of the divine Persons. If it be true, as St. Thomas contends, that the two missions are distinct according

<sup>28</sup> I, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m: "Processio autem Spiritus Sancti . . . non solum dicit respectum ad principium a quo procedit, secundum quod aeterna tantummodo est, . . . sed etiam importat respectum ad eum in quem procedit, secundum quem temporalis dici potest." *Ibid.*, ad 2m: "Et ideo ille temporalis respectus non ponitur circa Spiritum Sanctum realiter, sed solum secundum rationem; realiter autem in creatura, quae mutatur: . . ." *Ibid.*, sol.: ". . . et sic dicitur processio temporalis, ex eo quod ex novitate effectus consurgit nova relatio creaturae ad Deum, ratione cuius oportet Deum sub nova habitudine ad creaturam significari, . . ."

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 2, sol.: "Horum tamen respectuum primus includitur in secundo, sicut ratio, et causa eius: unde secundus se habet ex additione ad primum."

<sup>30</sup> I, d. 15, q. 5, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2: "Missio personae fit ad revocandum rationalem creaturam, . . ."

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 2, sol.: ". . . in omni missione oportet quod ponatur aliqua auctoritas alicuius ad ipsum missum. In divinis autem personis non est auctoritas nisi secundum originem: . . ."

to the effect and if this effect is the mode of their particular indwelling, then, from St. Thomas' principles, seemingly, at least, one may probably conclude that the mode of the inhabitation is not *exactly* the same for all three Persons. In fact, St. Thomas says just that in so many words: the proper mode by which the Son is said to be in a creature is not the proper mode by which the Holy Spirit is in the same creature.<sup>32</sup>

We do not, of course, maintain that St. Thomas held the theory of the inhabitation which we shall expose in the latter part of this paper. For, in the steps of St. Albert and St. Augustine, St. Thomas holds that the effect, according to which the Son proceeds temporally is *sapientia*; that according to which the Holy Spirit is sent is *caritas*. (Note: for a fuller discussion of this, cf. Dom Lucien Chambat, O.S.B., *Présence et union: les missions divines des personnes divines de la Sainte Trinité*. Editions de Fontenelle, Abbaye S. Wandrille, 1943).

In the mission of the Holy Spirit, the very Person of the Spirit ("ipsetmet Spiritus Sanctus") proceeds temporally.<sup>33</sup> He is the *nexus*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2, sol.: "... de distinctione missionum Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, tripliciter contingit loqui: aut quantum ad ipsarum diversitatem realem; aut quantum ad rationem missionis; aut quantum ad earum separationem. Si primo modo, cum in missione duo considerentur, scilicet exitus personae missae ab alia, et effectus secundum quem novo modo in creatura, persona divina esse dicitur; *utroque modo missio Filii est alia a missione Spiritus Sancti, secundum rem*: quia et generatio qua Filius exit a Patre, est alia a processione Spiritus Sancti qua exit ab utroque. Similiter donum, secundum quod perficit intellectum, scilicet sapientia, secundum quod attenditur missio Filii, est aliud a dono quod perficit affectum, vel voluntatem, secundum quod missio Spiritus Sancti. Si autem secundo modo de earum distinctione loquamur, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum rationem propriam utriusque aut secundum communem. Si secundum communem, tunc eadem ratio est missionis Filii, et Spiritus Sancti quantum ad utrumque: quia et esse ab alio commune est utrique, et similiter esse novo modo in creatura. Sed secundum propriam rationem utrumque differt: quia et propria ratio processionis Filii non est propria ratio processionis Spiritus Sancti, cum ille procedat ut amor, et hic ut Filius, vel Verbum: et similiter *proprius modus quo Filius dicitur esse in creatura*, non est proprius modus quo Spiritus Sanctus est; . . ."

<sup>33</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 43, a. 3: "Sed tamen in ipso dono gratiae gratum facientis Spiritus Sanctus habetur, et inhabitat hominem. Unde ipsetmet Spiritus Sanctus datur, et mittitur." I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, sol.: "... ipsetmet Spiritus Sanctus procedit temporali processione, vel datur, et non solum donum ejus."

between the other two Persons,<sup>34</sup> and, as a distinct Person, unites us with God.<sup>35</sup> From the point of view of efficient causality, the Holy Spirit, in that He (together with Father and Son) produces the effect according to which the Son is sent, may even be said to give the Son to the grace-adorned soul.<sup>36</sup>

The inherent form in the soul, according to which the Holy Spirit is sent, is *efficienter* from the entire Trinity, but *exemplariter* from the Holy Spirit alone.<sup>37</sup> It is significant that, in the passages where St. Thomas reduces God's presence in us to that of efficient and exemplary Cause, he eliminates anything that savors of information ("non autem in ratione formae inhaerentis").<sup>38</sup> It is also interesting (though I admit no strong argument can be deduced from this text) that, with regard to the words "missus" and "incarnatus," St. Thomas holds that they establish two relationships to God, as to principle and to term. Under the first aspect, these concepts bear a relation to the entire Trinity as to their efficient cause; but, in the second, "missus" and "incarnatus" must be referred to some *definite* Person ("alicui personae *determinatae*").<sup>39</sup>

In an earlier passage, St. Thomas uses language that recalls Scheeben's own words. He says that our sanctification comes through

<sup>34</sup> I, d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1m: ". . . ex ipsa processione Spiritus Sanctus habet quod procedat ut persona, sed ex modo processionis habet quod sit vinculum, vel unio amantis, et amati." *Ibid.*, ad 2m: ". . . in quantum procedit a duobus, habet quod sit tertia in Trinitate persona; sed ex modo procedendi, quod sit unio utriusque personae." *Ibid.*, ad 3m: "Pater et Filius dicuntur uniri Spiritu Sancto, non effective, sed quasi formaliter."

<sup>35</sup> I, d. 31, q. 3, a. 1, sol.: "Ita etiam nexus convenit Spiritui ex modo suae processionis, in quantum est amor Patris, et Filii, quo uniuntur: et etiam est connectens nos Deo, in quantum est donum."

<sup>36</sup> I, d. 19, a. 1, a. 3, ad 3m: ". . . quamvis Spiritus Sanctus non sit principium Filii, est tamen principium effectus, secundum quem Filius dicitur dari, vel mitti; et ideo etiam ipse Filius est datus per donum quod est Spiritus Sanctus, . . ."

<sup>37</sup> I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

<sup>38</sup> I, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, sol.: ". . . se habet ad nos in ratione . . . formae exemplaris, non autem in ratione formae inhaerentis."

<sup>39</sup> I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3m.

the Persons as possessing the divine essence.<sup>40</sup> And again, that our union is not with the divine essence *in abstracto*, but with the Persons *in concreto*.<sup>41</sup> And this is a passage which should be considered in more detail.

St. Thomas holds that there are two kinds of unity among the divine Persons: (1) essential unity had through community of essence, and (2) unity of love and harmony had through the Holy Spirit. The first kind of unity does not consider the distinction of Persons, but rather the unity of essence. The second type, on the contrary, stresses the distinction of Persons, not the unity of essence. For the Holy Spirit, as the bond of union between the Father and Son, is precisely such a uniting bond because He is a Person distinct from the other two divine Persons. Obviously, He can unite them only in that they also are distinct Persons.

St. Thomas says that we are not united with the divine Persons according to the unity which they have through community of essence ("quia illo modo Deo non unimur"), but rather we are united with them according to that unity of love which they have, that is, through the Holy Spirit ("unitas consonantiae vel amoris"). Therefore, we conclude: (1) the Holy Spirit, precisely as a distinct Person, is the bond uniting God and us; (2) we are united with the other two divine Persons precisely as they are distinct Persons.

<sup>40</sup> I, d. 18, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2m: ". . . Sed hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus habet Deitatem, convenit ei ex sua processione." *Ibid.*, sol.: "Dico igitur quod processio potest dicere emanationem Spiritus Sancti, vel relationem, sive proprietatem ejus. Si relationem, vel proprietatem, sic Spiritus Sanctus proprietate sua, formaliter loquendo, est Spiritus Sanctus et donum, et amor, non autem Deus; sicut nec Filius filiatione esset Deus formaliter loquendo, sed filiatione est Filius, et Deitate Deus, et sapientia sapiens. Si dicat emanationem; tunc potest dici: quod Spiritus Sanctus sua processione est Deus, et donum, sicut etiam Filius sua nativitate est Filius, et Deus; sed diversimodo; quia Deitas se habet ad generationem solum ut accepta per generationem, sed filiatio, secundum rationem intelligendi, est consequens generationem. Et simili ratione conceditur quod Filius nascendo accipiat Divinitatem: Et similiter de processione Spiritus Sancti."

<sup>41</sup> I, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, "contra": "Contra est quod dicitur Joann. XVII: 22. "Ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus." "Non enim loquitur ibi de unitate essentiali tantum: quia illo modo Deo non unimur: sed de unitate consonantiae, vel amoris, quod est Spiritus Sanctus."

With regard to divine generation (and, hence, also, adoptive sonship), St. Thomas considers as formal constituent elements, not only the perfect similitude resulting formally from the generative process, but also the communication of the nature (in all its comprehension) of the begetter to the one generated.<sup>42</sup> And in our adoptive sonship the Holy Spirit is more its *ratio* than the Son, because our generation, unlike the natural generation of the divine Son, is not through nature, but through the divine will and love.<sup>43</sup>

As we have seen, St. Thomas holds that the mission of the Son and Holy Spirit are different *secundum rem*, both with regard to their eternal procession and the temporal effect, according to which the two divine Persons are sent to rational creatures. With respect to the Holy Spirit, he says that "Amor," when taken essentially is *appropriated*, but according as it is personal, it is *proper* to the Holy Spirit.<sup>44</sup> On the contrary, "Sapientia" is so appropriated to the Son that it can never be proper to Him.<sup>45</sup>

In connection with his teaching on the divine missions, St. Thomas makes use of the same arguments as did the Greek Fathers for proving the divinity of the Holy Spirit. It is the Holy Spirit who sanctifies us,<sup>46</sup> who dwells within our souls,<sup>47</sup> and who adopts us unto sons of God.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the Spirit is truly God.

<sup>42</sup> I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

<sup>43</sup> I, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3m: "Generatio autem qua nos regenerat, non est per naturam, sed per voluntatem: et ideo ex parte nostra accipiendo, Spiritus Sanctus est ratio talis generationis magis quam Filius, qui procedit per modum naturae."

<sup>44</sup> I, d. 10, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: ". . . quando autem dicitur personaliter, tunc importatur processio, et relatio realis, et significatur ipsa persona, sive res procedens, sicut amor est quoddam procedens."

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 5m: ". . . amor, secundum quod est proprium, non est appropriatum. Sapientia autem ita est appropriata quo numquam potest esse proprium."

<sup>46</sup> *C. Gent.*, IV, 17, n. 3: "Adhuc, sanctificare homines proprium Dei opus est; . . . Oportet igitur Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse."

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 15: "Amplius, inhabitare mentes sanctorum proprium Dei est; . . . Est ergo Spiritus Sanctus Deus."

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 21: "Amplius, adoptare in filios Dei non potest esse opus alterius nisi Dei; nulla enim creatura spiritualis dicitur filius Dei per naturam, sed per adoptionis gratiam; . . . Spiritus autem Sanctus est adoptionis causa; . . . Ergo Spiritus Sanctus non est creatura, sed Deus."

Furthermore, that charity which is in us, although it be the *effect* of the entire Trinity (as its common efficient cause), nevertheless is, in a certain special way ("quadam speciali ratione"), found in us through the Holy Spirit Himself.<sup>49</sup> Hence it is necessary that through the Holy Spirit not only is God in us, but we also are in God.<sup>50</sup> This follows, because love has of its very nature the tendency to unite beloved and lover. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the hypostatic Love of the Godhead, will result in a union between us and God. Union means mutual inner communication of being, a mutual indwelling, our being with and in God. St. Thomas' final conclusion is that the Holy Spirit dwells within our souls and that according to His very substance.<sup>51</sup>

#### 4. MORE LIGHT FROM ST. THOMAS ON THE INHABITATION

As is evident, the proponents of the theory of pure appropriation must hold that the "more of the indwelling" is exactly the same in every respect for all three divine Persons. We must admit that they are not at one in reducing all activity of the Trinity in the soul to merely efficient causality. Obviously, there must be efficient causality in the production of the grace-state and the inhabitation. But is there only efficient causality? And, although one must attribute the indwelling equally to the entire Trinity (under *one* aspect), is there no possibility for each divine Person's dwelling within the soul in a way that is, in *some* manner, different from the mode of indwelling proper to each of the other two Persons, with the result that the just soul would have three distinct relations, one to each of the divine Persons?

St. Thomas does not clearly solve this problem, but he does give us some "leads" helpful to a solution. He rejects absolutely anything

<sup>49</sup> *C. Gent.*, IV, 21, n. 2: "Et sic, charitas quae in nobis est, licet sit effectus Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, tamen quadam speciali ratione dicitur esse in nobis per Spiritum Sanctum."

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 4: "Omne autem amatum in amante. Necessè est igitur quod per Spiritum Sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo."

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 18, ultim. n. 2: "Spiritus autem Sanctus, quum Deus sit, per suam substantiam mentem inhabitat et sui participatione bonos facit; . . ."

suggesting that the divine Persons act as an *inherent* principle of form of our sanctification;<sup>52</sup> and he avoids any union between the just soul and God which would be a union exclusive to any one divine Person.<sup>53</sup> Hence he speaks of the union as being common to the Trinity.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, in a certain manner, it is proper to the Holy Spirit.<sup>55</sup> In rejecting the possibility of God's being a "causa formalis *inhaerens*," St. Thomas several times maintains that God is not a light received (by way of information, of course) into the soul, but rather a light, luminous *in se*, one which illumines without informing the subject to which it gives light.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>52</sup> I, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, sol.

<sup>53</sup> I, d. 19, q. 3, a. 2, sol.: Here St. Thomas says that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, both according to their common essence and according to their proper relations. His words are: ". . . in divinis personis est duo considerare, scilicet essentiam quae est una et eadem, et relationes, quibus distinguuntur; et secundum utrumque Pater dicitur esse in Filio, et converso, . . ." And in the same place, *ad 1m*, St. Thomas says: "Si autem accipiatur (i.e., the way the Father is in the Son, and *vice versa*), tunc reducetur ad illum modum, quo aliquid est in aliquo sicut in principio movente, et efficiente: quamvis enim Pater non sit principium efficiens Filii, tamen est originans ipsum. Unde Filius est in Patre, sicut originatum in originante, et e converso Pater in Filio, sicut originans in originato. Sed adhuc magis proprie dicitur in divinis Filius in Patre, etiam ex parte relationis, quam in humanis: quia Filius ex ipsa relatione est persona subsistens: sua enim relatio est sua personalitas; quod in aliis rebus non contingit." This is the basis of the union between the soul and the Blessed Trinity being common to all three Persons, because where one Person is, there are also the other two. But this is not enough. For the union is had with *each* Person, and not merely on account of circumincession.

<sup>54</sup> I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, sol.

<sup>55</sup> *C. Gentes*, IV, 21, 2; cf. I, d. 31, q. 3, a. 1, sol., and I, d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3m.; I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, sol.; I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

<sup>56</sup> I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m: ". . . anima comparatur ad corpus, non tantum ut causa agens, secundum quod est motrix corporis, sed etiam ut forma: unde formaliter seipsa facit vivere corpus, secundum quod vivere dicitur esse viventium. Deus autem non est forma ipsius animae, vel voluntatis, qua formaliter vivere possit; sed dicitur vita animae, sicut principium exemplariter influens vitam gratiae ipsi. Similiter dicendum de luce, quod lux potest dupliciter considerari. Vel prout est in ipso corpore lucido; et sic se habet ad illuminationem aeris, ut principium efficiens, nec illuminat nisi per formam luminis influxam ipsi diaphano illuminato: vel prout est in diaphano illuminato;

In speaking of the mission, or temporal procession, of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas states that the Holy Spirit is not only that Love by which the Father loves the Son, but He is also that Love by which the Father loves creatures and confers upon them a new quality. From this new effect or quality in creatures there springs forth a new relation to God.<sup>57</sup> Is this a relation to God, taken "indeterminate ut unus," or is it a relation to Him "determinate ut trinus reduplicative sumptus?" Since this new quality in the creatures is completely different from the ordinary created effects in the natural order which relate the creature to *Deus unus*, one would, at least, be prone to say that such an utterly new type of quality would relate the soul to the Blessed Trinity as such.

The temporal procession of the Holy Spirit is not essentially different from His eternal procession. Since a procession signifies the relation of one proceeding to Him from whom He proceeds, and since the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father only in virtue of His eternal procession and relation, it follows necessarily that no procession of the Holy Spirit can be essentially different ("alia essentialiter") from His eternal procession. True, there can enter into that temporal procession another relation on the part of the creature into which, as into one loved, the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally. It is because of this new relation on the part of the creature that the procession is called a temporal procession.<sup>58</sup>

We conclude from this: the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally *in exactly the same way* as He proceeds eternally, with the exception of an intrinsic difference on account of the new relation to Him on the part of the creature into whom the Holy Spirit proceeds. But, the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally as a distinct Person. Since His temporal procession is brought about by the new effect, or perhaps

et sic forma ipsius, qua formaliter est lucidum. *Deus autem dicitur esse illuminans lux per modum lucis, quae est in ipso corpore lucenti per se et non per modum quo illuminatum formaliter illuminatur a forma lucis in ipso recepta. Sed illi lumini recepto assimilatur caritas, vel gratia recepta in anima.*"

<sup>57</sup> I, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, sol.: ". . . et inde est quod Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor quo Pater amat Filium, est etiam amor quo amat creaturam, impertiendo sibi suam perfectionem."

<sup>58</sup> *Loc. cit.*, et ff. *passim*.

rather gives rise to it, in the creature, it would seem that the creature is referred to the Holy Spirit precisely as He proceeds temporally, that is to say, as a distinct Person.

Again, St. Thomas says that "*ipsetem* Spiritus Sanctus procedit temporali processione vel datur, et non solum dona eius."<sup>59</sup> And if we consider the procession of the Holy Spirit from the side of the Father and the Son from Whom He proceeds, there is no doubt, St. Thomas maintains, that according to this respect, "*ipsetem* Spiritus Sanctus procedat." But, if we take the procession from the point of view of the creature into whom the procession is directed, then this respect is placed in the Holy Spirit, not because He is really referred to the creature, but because the creature is referred to the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, since in receiving of His gifts our relation does not terminate at these gifts alone, but also "ad Spiritum Sanctum," because we possess Him in a new way—therefore, we must hold that, not only His gifts, but He Himself (*ipsetem*) enters into our soul. And in this way He Himself (*ipsetem*) is said to be referred to us, in that we are referred to Him. And, hence, there enters into our souls the Holy Spirit Himself (*ipse*) together with the gifts of the same Holy Spirit. Through His gifts we are linked together in a bond of union with the very Spirit of God ("ipsi Spiritui Sancto coniungimur") and He with us. And all this through His gifts which render us like unto Him.<sup>60</sup>

If there is any possibility that *mere* appropriation is to be understood here, perhaps the following may aid in clearing up the question. With regard to the temporal procession, St. Thomas holds that it seems to be principally a notional concept ("processio temporalis videtur esse *principaliter notionale*") and only consequently, by reason of the created effect, signifies the divine essence ("et ex consequenti significare essentiam ratione connotati effectus").<sup>61</sup> The

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1; cf. *Sum Theol.*, I q. 43, a. 3, ad 1m.

<sup>60</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>61</sup> I, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, sol.: ". . . quaedam nomina sunt in divinis quae significant tantum personam, ut *Pater*, et *Filius*; quaedam quae tantum significant essentiam, sicut hoc nomen *essentia*; quaedam quae significant utrumque, si sicut dictum est (dist. VII, q. 1, a. 1) de potentia generandi, et spirandi. Et ita dico, quod missio est et essentiale et notionale, secundum aliud et aliud.

temporal procession involves, therefore, principally a notional concept, i.e., the Person sent comes as a distinct Person. And since all the newness of the procession is in our souls, there must be a reality, or a mode of indwelling, in our souls which relates the soul to the Person *just as He comes*, i.e., to the Person as a *distinct* Person.

As we have already seen, St. Thomas teaches that the divine processions are the *ratio* of the return of the rational creature to God and, for the attainment of this supernatural end, a supernatural presence of God is necessary. In this new presence, the *proper relation* of the divine Person Himself will be represented in the soul ("*propria relatio ipsius personae divinae*"). This created similitude in the soul (namely, grace) is modeled after and takes its origin from the very hypostatic character of the eternal relation ("*quae est exemplate et originate ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae*"). The modeled image, therefore, which we have in our souls must refer us back to the prototypes in the precise way that the model is fashioned. But, this model is patterned after the Persons as distinct from one another ("*ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae*") and according to their proper relations ("*propria relatio ipsius personae divinae*"). Hence, it is not too bold to conclude that, by the modeled image of the Trinity in our souls, we are referred to the Persons precisely as *distinct* Persons.

But, a relation must have a corresponding foundation; hence, there would be, seemingly, a mode of reference, i.e., of indwelling, in the soul which would be in some way different for each Person to whom this mode of reference relates us. Might not one, then, conclude that the mode of indwelling for each Person is different, at least, in some way for each Person? This conclusion seems to follow from St. Thomas' saying that this created similitude is fashioned after the eternal relations and properties of the divine Persons. And, since these are surely really distinct, one should be justified in conclusion that the *res exemplata*, habitual grace, has three facets or modes of reference, one for each distinct Person.

Secundum enim respectum quem importat missio ad suum principium, est notionale; secundum autem respectum quem importat ad effectum in creatura, est essenziale . . . . Et ideo processio temporalis videtur esse principaliter notionale, et ex consequenti significare essentiam ratione connotati effectus."

Continuing, St. Thomas says that, just as the Holy Spirit proceeds invisibly into the soul through the gift of love, so, too, the Son through the gift of wisdom. The proper way by which the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father is love, and the proper way of referring the Son to the Father is that He is the "Verbum ipsius manifestans ipsum." And because of the reception of these two gifts (love and wisdom) there is effected in us a similitude to the hypostatic characters of the two divine Persons ("similitudo ad propria personarum"), so, too, may we say that the two divine Persons are thus in us in a new way. In this new presence there is a manifestation of the Father, who is the last to whom we are related ("qui est *ultimum* ad quod recurrimus"). Without stressing unduly this text, is there not, perhaps, a resemblance to Scheeben's inverted order in the inhabitation: in the Spirit, through the Son, to the Father?

Our journey back to God, from the dynamic point of view, is effected by the power of the divine Persons ("virtute divinarum personarum").<sup>62</sup> This involves, of course, common efficient causality. But more than efficient causality enters in. For, in the grace-state viewed statically, so to speak, or ontologically, there is represented the hypostatic character of the divine Person ("representatur proprium divinae personae").<sup>63</sup> If, therefore, the hypostatic character of the individual divine Persons are modeled and represented in created grace, and if it is precisely through this new effect in the soul that the divine Persons dwell therein, then the divine Persons inhabit the soul as truly distinct from one another.

<sup>62</sup> I, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, sol.: (After pointing out that a mission is had because the "Propria relatio ipsius personae divinae representatur in anima per similitudinem aliquam receptam, quae est exemplata et originata ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae," St. Thomas then proceeds to the dynamic aspect of the grace-state.) "Sicut praedicta originantur ex propriis personarum; ita etiam effectum suum non consequuntur, ut coniungantur fini, nisi virtute divinarum personarum: quia in forma impressa ab aliquo agente, est virtus imprimantis. Unde in receptione huiusmodi donorum habentur personae divinae novo modo, quasi ductrices in finem, vel coniungentes. Et ideo ut utraque processio dicitur datio, in quantum est ibi novus modus habendi." In this latter case, he means actual graces, by which the Persons are had in a new way, i.e., as conducting us toward eternal life.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1m.

It is for this reason that St. Thomas says that the mission of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit are different (1) both from the point of view of their manner of proceeding, and (2) with regard to the created effect according to which the divine Person is said to dwell in the creature in a new way. Under each aspect the mission of the Son is different from ("*alia a*") the mission of the Holy Spirit. This is hardly a difference explainable by mere appropriation, for it is a difference that is real and actual *secundum rem*.<sup>64</sup> The reason for this difference is that the proper manner of the procession of the Son is not the proper manner of the procession of the Holy Spirit ("*quia propria ratio processionis Filii non est propria ratio processionis Spiritus Sancti*").<sup>65</sup>

But, one may ask, could not these texts be understood only of the difference in the eternal processions? I do not think so for the following reasons. First, for St. Thomas, the temporal processions are not essentially different from the eternal processions. And, secondly, the eternal procession is the *ratio* of the temporal procession in which it is contained. Hence, if the "*ratio processionis Filii*" is different from the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, this must also apply to the temporal. But all the newness of the temporal procession is in the creature, in the human soul. May one not, perhaps, then conclude that in the soul there is a reality justifying one's saying that the temporal procession of the Son is different from the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit? In my opinion this is possible only if one allows that the temporal effect, according to which the Son proceeds temporally, is in some way different from the temporal effect, according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally. This is equivalent to saying that the entry of the Son into our souls is different from the entry of the Holy Spirit. And all this is the same as saying that the *mode* of the indwelling of the Son is in some way different from the mode of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. As we shall see, this is the precise point in which the solution of the "how" of the inhabitation, which I shall later suggest, differs from the more commonly accepted doctrine of theologians, as for example, the explanation of Galtier.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2, sol.

<sup>65</sup> *Loc. cit.*

One may, in my opinion, draw this conclusion from a consideration of St. Thomas: in the grace-state the *mode* of the inhabitation is *in some way* different for each divine Person. For the mode of the indwelling is found in created grace, which is modeled after the hypostatic character of each divine Person. I do not see how this is possible unless created grace, as the *mode* of the indwelling, refers and relates us to each divine Person in a manner that is in some way different for each Person. All three Persons come and dwell in the soul.<sup>66</sup> Yet, it is precisely through the temporal missions of the Son and Holy Spirit that we are united with the Father, the ultimate term of our union through grace ("qui est ultimum ad quod recurrimus").<sup>67</sup> Just as through Son and Spirit we were created, so also through them will we again be joined to our final end, the Father, source of all being and life ("ita etiam et fini ultimo conjungimur . . . principium ad quod recurrimus, scilicet Patrem").<sup>68</sup>

## PART II

### TOWARD AN EXPLANATION OF THE INHABITATION

#### 1. SOME IDEAS FROM M. DE LA TAILLE

Even the proponents of pure appropriation readily admit that Scripture and the Fathers speak of a personal indwelling of the divine Persons in the just soul, and this with special emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit.<sup>69</sup> Galtier, however, holds that no form of the *proprium* theory can be reconciled with solidly established theological principles ("avec les conclusions les plus averées de la théologie trinitaire.")<sup>70</sup>

On the other hand, there are not a few theologians who maintain that an explanation of the inhabitation according to pure appropriation would logically lead to a denial of a radical difference between

<sup>66</sup> I, d. 15, q. 2, a. unic., ad 4m.

<sup>67</sup> I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, sol.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 2, sol.

<sup>69</sup> Galtier, *L'Habitation*, p. 3 ff.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii, and pp. 36 ff.

the ordinary substantial presence of God in all creatures and the special inhabitation of God in the just soul. In the natural order, creatures by remote analogy participate in the perfections of the God of creation and conservation; as a result, they are related to *Deus unus* alone. Contrariwise, in the supernatural order, the grace-filled soul shares in the inner trinitarian life of God; consequently, such a soul is related to *Deus trinus*. And, since all the newness of this presence and relation is on the side of the creature alone, it is indeed difficult to see how such an utterly new kind of presence and relation can exist without some kind of difference being postulated in the mode of presence by which each divine Person is present to and in the just soul.

J. Beumer maintains that, although in the popular literature on the subject much is said that is indeed very inspiring and beautiful concerning this immediate presence of the three divine Persons, on the other hand, the technical terminology of the theologians greatly weakens all this through their insistence on explaining the inhabitation according to pure appropriation.<sup>71</sup>

Since most of these theologians who reject the *proprium* theory in all its forms do so on metaphysical grounds, we shall suggest a tentative metaphysical explanation of the non-exclusively *proprium* theory of the inhabitation. This explanation, in our opinion, does not violate in any way the solidly established principles of trinitarian metaphysics. And, nevertheless, this explanation will require *some* kind of difference in the manner of presence according to which each distinct divine Person is present to, and united with, the just soul.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, such a solution will demand three distinct relations to the Blessed Trinity, a relation to, and union with, each divine Person.

The fact of the indwelling of the three divine Persons in the soul

<sup>71</sup> "Die Einwohnung der drei göttlichen Personen in der Seele des begnadeten Menschen," *Theologie und Glaube*, XXX (1938), 504; cf. P. Gächter, "Unsere Einheit mit Christus nach dem hl. Irenaeus," *ZKT*, LVIII (1934), 527 ff.

<sup>72</sup> Let it be clear from the beginning that the "difference" in the manner of presence for each divine Person will be, according to the theory which I shall suggest, not an absolute difference, but one that is strictly relative.

of the just man is clearly stated in Scripture and Tradition. From grace and the inhabitation of the divine Persons there arises a most intimate union between God and the just soul.<sup>73</sup> Any metaphysical solution of the inhabitation and the grace-state must, therefore, show, if possible, how the three divine Persons communicate in a finite and participated manner their nature to the just soul, and this through created grace. At the same time, such a solution must also explain the union resultant upon the presence of the indwelling Persons.<sup>74</sup>

The various theories concerning all this are well known: the "sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante," as one aspect of St. Thomas' own teaching;<sup>75</sup> the so-called "friendship theory" of Suarez;<sup>76</sup> the conception of grace as a bond of union between the soul and God according to Lessius;<sup>77</sup> the dynamic theory of Vasquez;<sup>78</sup> the experimental knowledge view of John of St. Thomas;<sup>79</sup> and, finally, the twofold formal causality doctrine of Cornelius à

<sup>73</sup> It is interesting to note that H. du Manoir de Juaye maintains that there is no distinction allowable between the *operation* of the divine Persons and their union with the just soul (*Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandria* [Paris, 1944], 241). This attitude is explainable, perhaps, by the author's acknowledged indebtedness to Galtier (*Ibid.*, p. 237, n. 2).

<sup>74</sup> With regard to the relationship between, and the relative priority of created and uncreated grace, the following essays will be found enlightening: J. Martínez Gómez, "Relación entre la inhabitación del Espíritu Santo y los dones creados de la justificación," *Estudios Ecclesiasticos*, XIV (1935), 20-50; K. Rahner, "Zur scholastischen Begrifflichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade," *ZKT*, LXIII (1939), 137-56; P. Dumont, "Le caractère divin de la grâce d'après la théologie scholastique," *Revue des sciences religieuses*, XIV (1934), 62-95.

<sup>75</sup> I, q. 43, a. 3; *In I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2; *Comp. Theo.*, 44, 45.

<sup>76</sup> *De Trinitate*, XIII, c. V; *De Gratia*, VII, c. 11.

<sup>77</sup> *De Summo Bono*, II, disp. 1; *De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis*, XII, c. 11 and *Appendix*.

<sup>78</sup> *Comment. ac Disp. in Iam Partem Sancti Thomae*, I, q. 8, a. 3, disp. 30, c. 3.

<sup>79</sup> *Cursus Theologicus*, IV, d. 17; cf. A. Gardeil, *La structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique* (Paris, 1927); cf. E. Delay, *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LIII (1926), 561-68; 641-56; and 721-33 for a further development of the doctrine of John of St. Thomas.

Lapide.<sup>80</sup> But in all these various explanations we find the same difficulties. How can a created, physical accident make us truly sharers of the divine nature, and how can uncreated grace, which surely does not inform the soul, truly sanctify? Or, again, how can one say that the three divine Persons dwell within the soul without there being the slightest difference in the manner of their presence?

Though the problem of the inhabitation be extremely difficult, nevertheless, in the words of Vatican and of Pope Pius XII, we may perhaps, by comparing this marvel of the indwelling with that other august mystery of our faith, the Incarnation, discover new light that will aid us in arriving at a solution of this problem.<sup>81</sup>

In the Incarnation of the Son of God, we have the most perfect union between a creature and God. There is in Jesus Christ the highest possible communication of the divinity to a creature; yet, the human nature truly retains its creaturely quality. But the human nature in the God-man is not that of a mere man. It is God's humanity; united in substantial union with the Word of God, it exists by sharing in His very own being. The humanity of Jesus is impregnated, filled to overflowing with the very being of God, but precisely as this being is *proper* to the Word.

For M. de la Taille, this union between the humanity and the Person of the Word is effected by the actuation of the obediential potency in the human nature.<sup>82</sup> This is not a case of actuation through information, but of actuation by an act, a divine act, which actuates, but does not inform. In order to elevate the humanity to a level where it bears some proportion for union with the Word, a change of some kind must take place in the humanity; for, according to St. Thomas,<sup>83</sup> nothing can receive a higher form, unless it be

<sup>80</sup> *Commentaria in Scripturam Sacram*, esp. *In Osee*, 1:10, *In II Epist. S. Petri*, 1:24; and *In Epist. Divi Pauli*, Rom. 8:1-15.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *Mystici Corporis*, AAS, XXXV (1943), 232; Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 4 (DB 1796).

<sup>82</sup> For the teaching of de la Taille on this subject, cf. "Actuation créée par acte incrée," *Rech. de sc. rel.*, XVIII (1928), 253-68; "Entretien amical d'Eudoxe et de Palamède," *Rev. apol.*, XLVIII (1929), 5-26, 129-45; also, my article, "The Theory of R. P. Maurice de la Taille, S.J., on the Hypostatic Union," *Theological Studies*, II (1941), 510-26.

<sup>83</sup> *C. Gentes*, IV, 53.

raised to this capacity by some disposition. When two terms unite, change must take place in one or other of these terms. In the hypostatic union this elevation of the subjective obediential potency to the level for union with the Word is called by de la Taille created actuation by uncreated act.

This will not be a disposition that is antecedent to the union; rather, will it be the grace of union in all its reality, newness, considered in its very foundation. In the language of de la Taille, this will be an *amélioration, disposition infuse, perfectionnement, adaptation*, etc., by which the humanity, through the actuation of the obediential potency, is raised to the necessary level of the hypostatic union. At the same time, it is the union taken passively; for it is but the reception of the actuation into the potency: it is union with the act which actuates, but does not inform.

And it must be noted that this created actuation is not a mode of union, a sort of *trait-d'union*, which the humanity would touch on one side and the Person of the Word on the other. This is in accord with the statement of St. Thomas: ". . . sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo non fit mediate aliquo habitu."<sup>84</sup> And in another place St. Thomas stresses the immediacy of the union between the humanity and the Person of the Word:

. . . in unione humanae naturae ad divinam nihil potest cadere medium formaliter unionem causans, cui per prius humana natura conjungatur quam divinae personae: sicut enim inter materiam et formam nihil cadit medium in esse quod per prius sit in materia quam forma substantialis; alias esse accidentale esset prius substantiali, quod est impossibile; ita inter naturam et suppositum non potest aliquid dicto modo meium cadere, cum utraque conjunctio sit ad esse substantiale.<sup>85</sup>

The intermediary to be rejected, as de la Taille insists on many occasions, is any kind of mode which would in any way affect the humanity antecedently to the union with the Person of the Word. This does not mean that a modification is not admitted which would be consequent upon, or better concomitant with, the very union it-

<sup>84</sup> III, q. 2, a. 10.

<sup>85</sup> III, d. 2, a. 2, sol. 1.

self. Such a modification of the humanity would, in reality, be nothing else than the hypostatic union itself taken *qua* union in the passive sense. For the modification of the humanity, considered as a formal substantial perfecting of this humanity, is that by which the human nature is elevated to the proper level for union with the Word; as an actuation of the humanity, this modification is introduced into it by the Word and refers the human nature to the Word with whom it is united in substantial union.

Now we come to the precise point, indeed fundamental to the solution which we are suggesting. For de la Taille, that which in the last analysis endows a divine gift with its strictly supernatural character is not the causal relation (efficient causality) to God. Rather it is, in a manner that is either immediate or remote, a relation of union between created passive potency—nature or faculty—and the uncreated act.

This passive potency will not be an ordinary subjective potency, one connatural to the creature; rather, will it be, in the strictest sense of the word, obediential, consisting in the non-repugnance of the assumption of a human nature to personal union with a divine Person. But, in order that the humanity may be rendered apt for such a union, a divinely infused disposition is necessary. In the hypostatic union this will be of the substantial order, while in the beatific vision and in justifying grace the infused disposition will be in the accidental order.

Such a disposition must not, as we have already indicated, be thought to exist in the humanity prior to union with the Word. No, this modification of the human nature is introduced therein by the Word and is indissolubly dependent upon the divine act for its very existence. Consequently, in that the infused disposition is in very truth the union itself (taken passively) with the Word and again, since such a union is in the strictest sense wholly supernatural, it is clear that the infused disposition is entirely and absolutely supernatural. Most truly, then, it is called the grace of union, a grace that is indeed supernatural in the highest possible degree.

The theological reasoning that led de la Taille to his thesis on the supernatural seems, at least to a degree, to parallel that of St.

Thomas himself. If one holds that the supernatural is absolutely transcendent to creatures, whether they be human or angelic, then it seems that only a presence of God that is *novae speciei* is required. This calls for a presence of God by union or by quasi-formal causality. For, were God to be present only through an effect of merely efficient causality, it would be very difficult to show that such a presence is radically different from His merely natural presence in creatures. If His presence were due only to an effect of His divine efficiency, then such a presence would not go beyond the relation of creature to Creator, of effect to cause. On the other hand, through a presence effected by the union of the uncreated divine act with a created potency, there springs up a relation of the creature to God that is truly *novae speciei* and different from every natural relation of men and angels to God. For in such a case there will be true participation by the creature in the inner life of the Godhead. Of course, efficiency is necessary, but the *ratio* of the efficient cause does not as such enter formally into such a union *qua* union.

In the hypostatic union, for example, this created actuation, in so far as it results from divine efficiency, has a relation to the entire Trinity, as to *unum principium indistinctum* of the actuation's very existence.<sup>86</sup> Yet, since this created actuation is also the reception of the actuation into the potency, and is therefore union with the act which is not received but nevertheless actuates, this created actuation has a relation to the Person of the Word; and under the *ratio* of a formal communication of divine being as proper to the Word, the actuation produces in the humanity a relationship terminating at the Word alone.

The relation of the humanity to the Second Person involves a mutation on the human side of the union, because all the newness of the union comes from the created element. Now, as St. Thomas teaches,<sup>87</sup> every mutation consists of *actio* and *passio*. Since in the hypostatic union only the human element changes, the entire *mutatio* will consist in the *passio*, this will be the foundation of the relation of the human nature to the Word.

<sup>86</sup> I, q. 36, a. 4, ad 7m; cf. *ibid.*, q. 8, a. 1.

<sup>87</sup> III, q. 2, a. 7.

The human nature assumed by the Second Person is similar to a garment worn by a man. The garment is changed, conformed to the figure of the man; nevertheless, the man himself undergoes no change. Analogously, the human nature is changed, conformed substantially (not accidentally, as in the case of the garment—and, as we shall see, in the case of sanctifying grace) to the Person of the Word. This *mutatio, passio*, and, as St. Thomas adds, this *tractio* of the human nature to the divine Person of the Word is something real in the human nature. It is created actuation by uncreated act.

The Person of the Word, then, actuates, yet does not inform, because of the imperfection involved in the information (act-dependence and act-limitation). The actuation alone is received by way of information. The point to be stressed in all this is that the Word, precisely as *distinct* from Father and Holy Spirit, does communicate something intrinsically to the humanity, namely, a created participation in the divine being as this same being is properly possessed by the Word. He alone gives the humanity its actuation, considering, of course, this actuation under its formal aspect, as flowing from the Word into the humanity by quasi-formal causality. Otherwise, there would be no true sufficient reason for the humanity's being referred to, and united with, the Person of the Word alone.

Furthermore, since an essentially intrinsic note, such as existence is not received at all unless it be received intrinsically, it follows that, unless the Word alone gives or communicates His own divine being to His humanity, and that intrinsically, He does not communicate being at all.<sup>88</sup> Seemingly, then, one must hold that the Second Person, in His distinction from Father and Holy Spirit, does communicate a reality intrinsically to the humanity which He assumes. Since this communication cannot be the result of merely efficient causality, it must come from some kind of formal causality, namely, quasi-formal causality, or created actuation by uncreated act. And precisely because this communication of divine being, this *mutatio, passio* and *tractio* of the humanity to the Person of the Word comes from the Word alone, for this reason it is that the

<sup>88</sup> Cf. John of St. Thomas' commentary, *In Sum. Theol.*, III, disp. 18, n. 20.

humanity is referred to the Word alone and with Him alone is so intimately united in a truly substantial union.

## 2. A SUPPOSITION FROM ST. THOMAS

Let us go further and suppose that we have three human natures which are hypostatically united with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively.<sup>89</sup> Each of these human natures will have within it a created actuation, a *passio, mutatio*, by which it is elevated to a level proportionate to the union. This will be a passive communication of divine being precisely as this being is proper to the divine Person with whom the particular humanity is hypostatically united. At the same time, this created actuation will be the union between the humanity and the divine Person; that is to say, it will be the union taken passively in its very foundation, which gives rise to the relation to a particular divine Person.

And here we ask the crucial question of the problem: is this created actuation, this *mutatio*, this *passio*, and passive communication of divine being exactly and under every respect the same for each of the three humanities which is assumed unto a personal hypostatic union with a particular and distinct divine Person?

Our answer is in the negative, and that for the following reasons. If what each humanity receives were the same *under every respect*, then why will the first humanity be united with and referred to the Father alone, and the same hold true respectively with regard to the second and third humanities being directed toward and united with the Son and Holy Spirit alone? In our opinion, the reason why each particular human nature is directed toward and united with a separate and distinct divine Person is that the created actuation of the human potency is not only the result of efficient causality on the part of the "indistinct" *Deus unus*, but this created actuation is also *tota quanta* the result of a formal communication of divine being as this being is proper to the Father (or Son or Holy Spirit) and proper to Him alone.

Otherwise, as far as we can see, the only sufficient reason for the humanity's being referred to the Person with whom it is sub-

<sup>89</sup> III, q. 3, a. 5; q. 2, aa. 7, 8, and a. 6, ad 2m.

stantially united and to Him *alone*, would be the divine Will. Secondly, such a theory (one holding that what each humanity receives from the divine Person possessing the humanity is exactly the same for each of the three humanities) would seemingly result in a mere "extrinsécisme," for thus the humanity would receive nothing into itself which would be a created substantial participation of the divine being as *proper* to the Person to whom *alone* the humanity is related and with whom *alone* it is hypostatically united. Hence, in the case of three hypostatic unions, we hold that each of the three humanities so united would receive an actuation that is really, not absolutely but merely relatively, different from that received by either of the other two humanities. The actuation is channeled through the hypostatic character of the divine Person; it is a created, finite, analogous participation in divine being, but as this divine being is proper to the particular Person and as it exists under the particular hypostasis of the divine Possessor. If the actuation, in all three cases, were, *under every respect*, the same, it could not found a relation more to one Person than to either of the others.

Each communication of divine being is to be considered as qualified, determined, and colored (if one may thus speak) by the proper hypostatic character of the particular and distinct Person who actively communicates this divine being by quasi-formal causality, by actuating without informing. In brief, we hold that this reality (a created, finite, and passive communication of divine being) which each of the three humanities receives would be, from the absolute point of view, exactly the same for each humanity. Nevertheless, from the relative side and when this communication of divine being is considered as an essentially unitive substantial modification of the humanity, there is a real difference in each of the three communications of divine being. For the one simple reality communicated is, in each supposed hypostatic union, conferred upon each humanity in a relatively different manner determined by the relative distinction and hypostatic character of each divine Person. Because of its particular and special origin, each actuation, or passive communication of divine being, is essentially a unitive entity. However, it is not essentially unitive, in the sense that it unites the humanity, receiving this substantial modification, with any divine

Person without distinction. Nevertheless, the actuation must be said to be unitive in that it is essentially destined to bring about a substantial union between the humanity and that particular divine Person from whom the communication flows into the humanity by quasi-formal causality. And because the communication of divine being is in each case determined by the particular hypostatic character of the divine Person who confers it upon His humanity, this clearly provides a foundation for a relation that terminates at one divine Person and at Him alone.

### 3. A SECOND SUPPOSITION

Let us now imagine that all three divine Persons are hypostatically united with the very one and same human nature.<sup>90</sup> The question arises: is the passive communication of divine being which each divine Person confers upon the common humanity *in every way* identical with that communicated by the other two divine Persons? And again, why is it that this particular humanity would be referred to and united with all three divine Persons, whereas in the hypostatic union there is only one divine Person who enters into union with the sacred humanity?

In this supposition of three divine Persons being united with the same humanity we suggest the following. This created actuation is one physical, simple, undivided, utterly supernatural entity in the substantial order. It is not an *ens quod*, but an *ens quo*, substantially modifying the humanity and immediately uniting it with the three divine Persons. It is the union itself (taken passively). It is communicated by all three Persons by quasi-formal causality, or by actuating, yet without informing the humanity. Nevertheless, although this substantial actuation of the one and same humanity comes from all three divine Persons, each Person communicates this substantial participation in divine being precisely as He possesses the divine being, namely, in a manner which is relatively, yet most really, different (in accordance with the difference of each Person's personal and proper hypostatic character) from the manner in which the other two divine Persons communicate this substantial actuation, or created and finite passive participation in trinitarian being.

<sup>90</sup> III, q. 3, a. 6.

Hence, this substantial created actuation of the one humanity would be the formal result of a formal communication of divine being from three distinct Persons conferring this one divine being in three *relatively* distinct and different manners according to the proper hypostatic character of each divine Person. Accordingly, as a result, there would spring up from this one created actuation, as from a single reality, three distinct relations of three distinct Persons. This created reality in the assumed humanity is both one and threefold: it is absolutely one, considered as a substantial mutation of the humanity; it is relatively threefold, if considered as a *passio* (and an essentially unitive substantial modification) brought into being in a threefold relatively different manner through each Person's impressing upon, i.e., communicating to, the humanity the divine being as each divine Person possesses this being in a proper manner determined by His hypostatic character.

By the three distinct relations which spring forth, as it were, or well up, from this one created actuation, the humanity is referred to the three distinct divine Persons, with each of whom the humanity is substantially united in hypostatic union. And all this, because the created actuation is in its entirety the formal result of the formal communication of divine being by each divine Person according to His relative distinction from the other two Persons.

To repeat: the reality communicated to the humanity, i.e., the substantial created actuation, is one and simple as a substantial modification of the humanity. Yet, at the same time, this created actuation is stamped with a threefold relativity. For it has been communicated in its entirety by each divine Person in a relatively different manner determined by each Person's relative distinction and proper hypostatic character. Hence, from the one created actuation, as from a miniature divine essence, there springs forth a miniature trinity, so to speak, of three distinct relations to three distinct divine Persons. And the human nature assumed belongs to all three distinct Persons, so that one could say in all truth: this Man is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

There is no pantheism involved here, no removal of the creature from its creaturely sphere. For the created actuation is received into a created, finite humanity; and, as such, it is limited to the

created order in which revolves the being of every creature. Nevertheless, as Scheeben has indicated often,<sup>91</sup> this created actuation, this *mutatio* and *passio*, this passive communication of divine being, and this passive union has its roots, not in the creature, but in God Himself, and not in God considered as *Deus unus*, but as *Deus trinus qua trinus*.

#### 4. APPLICATION TO THE INHABITATION

Theologians, in general, hold as certain that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are present, as such, in the souls of the just. And they add "tels qu'ils sont" and "avec les rapports qui les distinguent et les unissent."<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, few are the theologians who will admit that the "mode" of the inhabitation is in any way different for any, or all, of the three divine Persons. Yet, as F. de Lanversin has said, it is essential to the concept of presence that there be a communication between the beings which are said to be present to one another. And to the one who receives from the other being that is present to him there should be communicated something that is *specific* to the being of the one communicating. This is necessary for true presence.<sup>93</sup>

For example, a man in a room is not truly present to the four surrounding walls nor is the handkerchief in my pocket present to me, although the man and the handkerchief may communicate something such as bodily heat or electric radiation. Yet there is not a communication on the part of the man, of anything *specifically* human to the four walls of the room. On the contrary, a child with its mother is present to mother and the mother to the child. For they

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen Gnade*, II, c. 9; *Natur und Gnade*, p. 205 ff. (Grabmann's edition); *Die Mysterien des Christentums*, n. 28, p. 149 ff.; *Dogmatik*, III, n. 841; *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, I), 151 f.

<sup>92</sup> P. Joret, "Les missions divines," *Vie spirituelle*, XXVI (1931), 117; E. Mersch, "Filii in Filio," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXV (1938), 811 s.; Galtier, *L'Habitation*, p. 208 ss.

<sup>93</sup> "Le concept de présence et quelquesunes de ses applications théologiques," *Rech. de sc. rel.*, XXIII (1933), 58-80 (esp. p. 61, where he says pointedly: "C'est sans doute que, de façon générale, on ne dira guère qu'un être est présent, s'il ne communique quelque chose au moins de son être spécifique.").

each surely communicate something to each other that is specifically human. One could not, however, say the same of the child with reference to its newly acquired Christmas toys.

Hence, a supernatural presence of God implies that the Blessed Trinity communicate something specifically trinitarian to the just soul. St. Thomas saw this when he said: “. . . ipsae personae divinae quadam sui sigillatione in animabus nostris relinquunt quaedam dona.”<sup>94</sup> Namely, the conferring of created grace takes place by the impression on the soul of the divine seal of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Thus created grace becomes, so to speak, the concave impression of the convex divine seal on the soul. Thus in St. Thomas’ words,<sup>95</sup> the just soul possesses God “per quemdam modum passionis.”

In the inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity and in the union with the divine Persons through created grace we have a condition which, though quite different from, is nevertheless analogous to, the supposed case of a single humanity’s being assumed to substantial union with all three divine Persons. In the first place, as all will agree, in the inhabitation through grace there is much more than a merely external juxtaposition of the divine Persons and the human soul. The union is not a merely moral union, i.e., one based only on external relationships or upon a special activity of God in the soul. No, here there is a real entering of the divine Persons into, and a real ontological union of these same Persons with, the grace-filled soul. This presence of the divine Persons in the just soul is entirely new in kind, *novae speciei*, from the ordinary presence of God in all creatures. Yet the divine Persons cannot be within the soul by way of information; nevertheless, in the soul They definitely are. And, if They are in the soul, the soul surely receives Them intrinsically within its very bosom. But this can only be *creato modo*, according to the finite capacity of the soul. In other words, the soul will receive the Blessed Trinity as the divine threefold act which actuates the soul without informing it. Keeping well in mind, therefore, what we have said about created actuation, we offer some suggestions, which

<sup>94</sup> I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, *ad ultimum*.

possibly may cast some additional light upon the problem of the "how" in the inhabitation of the divine Persons in the just soul.

In the grace-state, since there is question of an already existing human person, there will be only an accidental communication of divine trinitarian life, a communication of the divine nature and being as it is properly possessed by each of the three divine Persons. Each divine Person will communicate "*quadam sui sigillatione*" an accidental share of the divine being and nature to the human soul. Through its obediencial potency the soul is laid open to the divine threefold act which will actuate the soul without informing it. And thus, via the potency, there will flow into the soul "*per quemdam modum passionis*," a stream of that divine being which, though utterly one and undivided, is nonetheless distinguished, so to speak, by the threefold relative channels through which it courses lovingly, a surging flood of divine life, the life of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, pulsating, as it were, in infinite urge for gracious self-communication.

Therefore, since each Person communicates *tota quanta* this finite sharing in trinitarian life, there will be in the soul a passive communication of this life, a created actuation, a *passio* corresponding to the active communication of the particular divine Person. This *passio* will relate the soul to and unite it with a particular divine Person, not because this definite Person communicates to the soul an absolute reality which is not conferred upon the soul equally by the other two divine Persons. But this *passio* will truly unite the soul with, and refer it to, a distinct Person because each Person communicates the one reality in a relatively different manner. This relatively different manner of communicating the very same created participation in trinitarian life suffices for saying that the soul is united with, and related to, the divine Persons in their mutual distinctions.

Under this aspect, created habitual grace, as an accidental communication of divine life and being (communicated by each divine Person *modo relative diverso*), appears as a current, or flame, or light-flood of divine being flowing from the one Godhead, but distinguished relatively by its passage through the three divine and distinct Persons. The reality communicated by each Person is,

absolutely speaking, the one, indivisible, finite, accidental, created communication of their common trinitarian life. Nevertheless, each Person communicates this one reality wholly and entirely, and that as a Person distinct from the other two divine Persons.

Created grace, therefore, may be considered as the passive reception, in an accidental, finite, analogous, and created manner of proper trinitarian life. Its roots are not in the human soul, but rather in the divine nature itself, yet in this divine nature as properly possessed by the three distinct Persons, each of whom communicates the divine life in a relatively different manner determined by His proper hypostatic character. And just as the three divine Persons have the same divine life and nature through identity with their very Persons, so analogously and *finito et creato modo* the human soul will have by accidental and finite participation the same divine life, and this divine life precisely as it is communicated in a relatively different and proper manner by each distinct Person.

Moreover, just as the three divine Persons can be three only because each Person is this one Being, and just as the relations by which these three divine Persons are distinguished, well up and spring forth, so to speak, with natural necessity from the *una quaedam summa res* which is both One and Three, so, analogously, from the one and indivisible, created, and finite communication of divine life to the soul will there arise three relations, one to each divine Person who, by quasi-formal causality, communicates the divine life to the soul.

Created grace thus takes on the aspect of a finite, miniature, and (if such language be not too venturesome) facsimile-imitated trinity. Father and Son will breathe forth the Holy Spirit into the soul. And the same Holy Spirit, "per quemdam modum passionis," which results from "quadam sigillatione sui" in the just soul, will be received therein *finito modo*, as the created nature of the soul demands. But, it is not the Holy Spirit alone that the soul receives. The Father Himself will give to the soul His only begotten Son and a true share in the divine life and being precisely as possessed by His Son, a real share in that filiation of His only Son, of that filiation upon which our own adoptive filiation is modeled. Finally, the Father Himself, as principle and source of all intra- and extra-

trinitarian life and being will come to the soul and give Himself to it, in St. Thomas' words, as "ultimum principium ad quod recurrimus."

In this light, created grace will be but the passive reception of the divine Persons within the soul. Moreover, it will be the union itself (taken passively) with the same divine Persons. And finally, it will be the inhabitation itself (in the passive, created, and finite sense) of these very same Persons within the just soul. For the only way in which these divine Persons can be received *within* the soul is in a created manner, according to the finite capacity of the soul itself. Truly, thus considered, created grace will be a rich sharing in God's own nature, not in the nature precisely of the God of creation and conservation, of *Deus unus*, but rather in the intimate trinitarian life of the triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, whom Jesus Christ has revealed to men.

#### 5. WHY DISAGREE WITH GALTIER?

Some, at least, among those whom we teach in our schools, may say that there may be involved here just another case of "much ado about nothing." What difference can it make if one hold Galtier's theory or the one outlined above? May I be pardoned a rather long quotation? It will be to the point. G. Philips in his review of Galtier's book, *Le saint Esprit en nous d'après les Pères grecs* (Analecta Gregoriana; Romae, apud aedes Univ. greg., 1946) says the following:

Il (Galtier) admet que cachune des trois personnes vient et habit en nous à sa manière propre, l'une comme Père, l'autre comme Fils, l'autre comme Esprit des deux (p. 244) . . . . Mais la réalité qui fonde cette attribution serait *toute* dans les relations intratrinitaires des personnes elles-mêmes et il n'en résulterait aucun "titre special" pour des attributions particulières. Autant dire que les relations intratrinitaires ne transparaissent point du tout dans l'union de la grâce, alors que les texts scripturaires et patristiques nous décrivent la vie divine des âmes comme une participation et une assimilation progressive à cette meme vie intratrinitaire. Ce ne seront pas là, pour les personnes divines, de pure relations *avec le dehors* (p. 245), puisque aussi bien la grâce nous fait pénétrer réellement *ad intra*

*Dei.* Voilà précisément la différence entre l'ordre purement naturel et l'élévation qui nous unit Dieu *tel qu'il est en lui-même*.<sup>96</sup>

Galtier, time out of number, denies the possibility of any kind of "influence" that might be in any way proper to a particular divine Person. As is clear from his writings, he consciously or otherwise can not see in this "influence" a violation of the certain principle of "omnia ad extra sunt communia toti Trinitati." Again, he is overly impressed with the "fact" of what he calls, with regard to the individual Persons of the Blessed Trinity, "la Pauvreté de leur être particulier." With regard to his first objection, one may simply remark that the "omnia ad extra" truth can be understood to apply to efficient causality alone. It is difficult to see how one may insist that it applies also to quasi-formal causality. And concerning the difficulty of the "pauvreté" of the individual Persons, one will readily admit his contention, if one looks only to the "esse ad" and does not consider the Persons *in concreto*.

Galtier will allow that all the newness of the inhabitation must be found on the side of the human soul. Further, he admits that each Person dwells in and is united with the soul as a distinct Person. Yet, the "mode de reference" is exactly the same in every respect for each divine Person. The only difference lies within the trinitarian relations themselves. With this position I can not agree: for, with G. Philips, I believe Galtier's position does not allow for the indwelling of the Trinity as *distinct* Persons.

If the three distinct Persons dwell within us, then in our soul there must be a created foundation or mode of indwelling that justifies our saying that three distinct Persons, not just *Deus unus* inhabits the soul. In my opinion, such a foundation or mode of indwelling must have a threefold aspect to account for three Persons being present. As an absolute accidental modification of the soul, it has as its principle the one infinite creative Cause. But, viewed as an essentially relative and unitive accident, it comes from the

<sup>96</sup> "Le Saint Esprit en nous," *Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses*, XXIV (1948), 127-135; citation from pp. 133-34.

divine Persons' communicating, by quasi-formal causality, or created actuation by uncreated Act, a finite, created, analogous participation of their own *trinitarian* life.

In this theory there is no question of an exclusively proper union with the Holy Spirit. At the most, there is merely question of the order of the Persons in the indwelling. As Scheeben so boldly yet reverently explains, the union between the soul and the divine Persons is like unto a *matrimonium ratum et consummatum* between two human persons. In the supernatural union with the divine Persons, there will be an insertion of the *semen spirituale divinum* into the human soul. The Holy Spirit stands forth as the "first" to enter into the temple; but He only enters therein because Father and Son breathe Him forth into the soul as their *semen spirituale divinum*. They, too, are united immediately with the human soul, though the union be in and through the Holy Spirit. Just as the Holy Spirit is immediately "united" with the divine essence (through identity with His Person), even though He receives the divine essence through His procession from Father and Son, so, in analogous fashion the soul is immediately united with Father and Son, even though this union takes place through and in the Holy Spirit Whom Father and Son breathe forth into the soul.

#### 6. FINAL CONCLUSION

In my opinion, then, grace is one, simple, created *absolute* reality, if taken as a mere modification of the human soul. However, considered as a bond of union (and, in very fact, as the union itself, taken passively), created grace is essentially relative and unitive in a threefold way. For, under this aspect, it is but the passive communication in a threefold relatively different manner of divine trinitarian life as properly possessed by each Person. From this one reality of grace (which each Person communicates in its fulness) there spring up three relations terminating at each divine Person with whom the soul is intimately and immediately united, though it be true that the order of the union observes the inverted order of the divine Processions. Though the substance of the soul be united with the substance of God, there is no question here, obviously, of a substantial union. And though it is an intimate union of Persons and

person, there is not involved a hypostatic union of any kind. The union takes place through an accident, grace; and it is a union between *already* constituted persons. All this, to be sure, is in the accidental order. Viewed thus, created grace will be the inhabitation of the three divine Persons, taking inhabitation in the passive sense, as that which is received (by way of information) into the soul. This can only be the created actuation itself, hence, created grace.

It is possible that, in this rough sketch of the "how" of the non-exclusively *proprium* theory of the inhabitation, a better understanding of the relation of created and uncreated grace may be found. At least, in my opinion, this theory better safeguards the absolutely supernatural character of created grace, rooting it inextricably in the very nature of God Himself.

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### **Discussion of *The Inhabitation of the Holy Spirit***

THE non-exclusively *proprium* theory of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just, which we have just heard, finds in Father de la Taille's teaching on the hypostatic union principles to guide it in its own special problem. It is necessary to make some sort of evaluation of Father de la Taille's views on the hypostatic union before we can pass judgment upon the application of these views by Father Donnelly to the case of the indwelling.

Father de la Taille takes as a principle the teaching of St. Thomas in *Contra Gentiles*, III, 53: "*Nihil est susceptivum formae sublimioris nisi per aliquam dispositionem ad illius capacitatem elevetur. . . . Essentia autem divina est forma altior omni intellectu creato. Ad hoc igitur quod essentia divina fiat intelligibilis species alicujus intellectus creati, quod requiritur ad hoc quod divina substantia videatur, necesse est quod intellectus creatus aliqua dispositione sublimiori ad hoc elevetur.*"<sup>1</sup> The disposition of which St. Thomas is speaking is called the *lumen gloriae*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Maurice de la Taille, S.J., "Actuation créée par acte incréé," *Recherches de science religieuse*, 18 (1928), 253-68. On p. 255 the quotation from *Contra Gentiles*, III, 53, appears in a French translation.

It is important to see exactly what St. Thomas is saying. A disposition is required whenever a higher *form* is to be received. In the case contemplated in *Contra Gentiles*, III, 53, he names the higher form—the *essentia divina*. Before this can become the *intelligibilis species* (a term equivalent to *intelligibilis forma*) of a created intellect, the intellect must be elevated by a created disposition—the *lumen gloriae*. How the divine essence becomes analogously the intelligible species or form of the created intellect is not our problem: the point is that for St. Thomas Aquinas a disposition must be introduced into the intellect if this higher form is to be received.

Father de la Taille took this doctrine of St. Thomas on the need of a created disposition in the beatific vision and applied it first of all to the case of our sanctification by habitual grace. In this application we find something corresponding closely with the disposition called *lumen gloriae* of the beatific vision: it is sanctifying grace itself. Is there something corresponding with the divine essence as the intelligible species or form of the intellect? For Father de la Taille there is: it is the same divine essence regarded now as "*un Principe Vital incréé*" for the soul.<sup>2</sup> Is this a justifiable extension of the principle laid down in *Contra Gentiles*, III, 53? I think it is not only justified but proper and apt. Sanctifying grace is certainly a created habit or disposition and it prepares the soul for immediate union with God and for the functions of a new, divine life. Sanctifying grace and the *lumen gloriae* are closely parallel in nature and function.

The second application of St. Thomas' principle by Father de la Taille was to the hypostatic union. Here is where trouble begins. When the human nature of Christ was actuated by the person of the Word, it was not receiving a higher *form*, as in the other two cases. Father de la Taille himself tells us what it received: the substantial act of existence of the Word.<sup>3</sup> In no sense is the act of existence a form. Among creatures existence comes from form and is the most formal act, but it is not to be identified with form. It may be regarded as a form by neo-platonic essentialism, but never

<sup>2</sup> *Art. cit.*, 257.

<sup>3</sup> *Art. cit.*, 260.

by St. Thomas Aquinas. Form for the latter is on the side of nature and essence, whose coprinciple, really distinct from it among creatures, is the act of existence. For St. Thomas, as Father Donnelly reminds us, nothing intervenes by way of a *habitus* between nature and the substantial act of existence. In saying this St. Thomas is rejecting not merely an *ens quod* but an *ens quo* as a medium between nature and the substantial act of existence.

In his *Commentary* on the third book of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard St. Thomas teaches that dispositions are required in *matter* to render it fit for the reception of *form*. In the case of an ordinary supposit once matter suitably disposed receives its form, no further habit or disposition is required in the created nature in order to receive the act of existence. The only things St. Thomas speaks of as "superadded" in the human nature of Christ by which it was rendered becoming (*decens*) to be assumed by a divine person are *scientiae* and *virtutes* and other things of this kind, which in a certain fashion can be called a medium of congruence.<sup>4</sup> Obviously these are not the dispositions we are speaking of, since they refer to the suitability of assuming a completely *human* nature and they can be called a means only of congruence, not of necessity.

Once the human nature is complete, no further disposition is needed even when it is to be terminated by the infinite act of existence of the Word. St. Thomas expressly rules out the need of anything that would formally elevate the human nature for the assumption. No amount of created dispositions can bridge the gap between a finite nature and the infinite act of existence. After the last disposition is added, the same infinite distance is there; showing that no disposition is needed in the human nature of Christ to enable it to be terminated by the *esse divinum Verbi*.<sup>5</sup> Only when a new and higher *form* is to be received, or what corresponds analogously with

<sup>4</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1. In *ad 1* St. Thomas adds perfection of body to the list of things which it was becoming (*deciuit*) to be present in the assumed nature.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3: "Quamvis assumi in unitatem divinae personae sit supra facultatem humanae naturae, non tamen exigitur aliquid formaliter humanam naturam elevans ad talem assumptionem: tum quia, quocumque addito, talis natura a persona divina in infinitum distaret. . . ."

a form, must the *matter* or receptive potency be elevated and prepared to receive it by a disposition, habit, or modification of some kind. The human nature of Christ, however, is not a subjective potency that receives the *esse divinum Verbi*.

In the natural order divine influence is constantly required in order to keep essence and existence together. When the human nature of Christ was actuated by the substantial act of existence of the Word, the divine influence or *virtus* was acting wholly on the created human nature: it drew it up to the *Verbum*, as it were, and kept it terminated by the *esse* that is proper to the Word. The act or activity of assuming, or drawing, or elevating, is an essential act of divinity that is common to the three persons. The *terminus* of this act is the *esse Verbi* alone.

It is impossible for the infinite act to be received by any potency. This is why the *esse Verbi*, although penetrating the human nature of Christ intrinsically, is yet unreceived by it. This is the precise location of the mystery of the hypostatic union, as Billot remarks.<sup>6</sup> Over and above the act of assuming and drawing the human nature to this infinite act of existence there is no need for any change or modification or elevation *within* the human nature that is so drawn and terminated. When, therefore, we speak of a change on the side of the human nature in the incarnation, with no change taking place on the side of the Word, Billot aptly explains what this change means: "The change (*mutatio*) of which we are speaking is not to be understood in regard to any previous state of the assumed humanity, as if the humanity existed prior to the union and after the union was different from what it was before. No, but the change in the human nature is to be understood by comparison with the mode in which it would have been if it had been produced under its own act of existence. Now it exists in a far other way than it would have existed by its own *esse*, under which it would constitute a distinct hypostasis and consequently a man other than the man who is Jesus Christ."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *De Verbo incarnato*, Rome, 1927, p. 144: ". . . non assequimur quo pacto actus existentiae possit actuare aliquam naturam *citra receptionem in illa*."

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

On page 12 of his paper<sup>8</sup> Father Donnelly states: "For M. de la Taille, this union between the humanity and the Person of the Word is effected by the actuation of the obediencial potency in the human nature. This is not a case of actuation through information, but of actuation by an act, a divine act, which actuates, but does not inform." No fault can be found with this statement. Yet what immediately follows is this: "In order to elevate the humanity to a level where it bears some proportion for union with the Word, a change of some kind must take place in the humanity; for, according to St. Thomas [a reference to *Contra Gentiles*, III, 53, follows], nothing can receive a higher form, unless it be raised to this capacity by some disposition."

Here we are at the root of the confusion in the teaching of Father de la Taille on the hypostatic union. St. Thomas is speaking of the reception of a higher *form*; in particular, he is showing why the *lumen gloriae* is necessary in the beatific vision. Father de la Taille too quickly sees a parallel to this in the hypostatic union, as if this, too, meant the reception of a higher form; which it does not. On page 14 of Father Donnelly's paper the same parallel is asserted: "But, in order that the humanity may be rendered apt for such a union, a divinely infused disposition is necessary. In the hypostatic union this will be of the substantial order, while in the beatific vision and in justifying grace the infused disposition will be in the accidental order." In these three cases a divinely infused disposition is necessary to render the humanity apt or fit for the union. The only difference is that God infuses a disposition of the accidental order in the beatific vision and in our union with Him through sanctifying grace, while He infuses a disposition of the substantial order into the humanity of Christ to render it fit for the hypostatic union. This means that in the humanity of Christ is a disposition that is a genuine supernatural substance! Equivalent terms for this infused disposition are found on page 13: *amelioration, perfectionment, adaptation*.

The infusion of a disposition like sanctifying grace or the *lumen gloriae* is an essential act of divine *virtus*, and as such it is common

<sup>8</sup> These page references are to the mimeographed sheets distributed before the lecture.

to the three persons of the Trinity. It is definitely not a notional or personal act. Notional acts are not common but, because they make known the origins of the persons, they are proper to one person or, at most, to two. The notional acts are these alone: active generation in the Father; passive generation in the Son; active spiration in the Father and Son together as one principle; passive spiration in the Holy Spirit. Both Father de la Taille and Father Donnelly speak of a divinely infused disposition not only in the two cases just mentioned but also in the hypostatic union. Yet on page 14 of Father Donnelly's notes we are told: "This modification of the human nature is introduced therein by the Word and is indissolubly dependent upon the divine act for its very existence." To *introduce* a disposition or modification into the humanity of Christ is the same as to *infuse* it. Yet, while we were told before that the infusion takes place by God, now we meet this close restriction: it is introduced by the Word and, as we see immediately, by the Word alone. On page 15 we read: "This *mutatio*, *passio*, and, as St. Thomas adds, this *tractio* of the human nature to the divine Person of the Word is something real in the human nature. It is created actuation by uncreated act . . . this *mutatio*, *passio*, and *tractio* of the humanity to the Person of the Word comes from the Word alone. . . ." "He [the Word] alone gives the humanity its actuation, considering, of course, this actuation under its formal aspect, as flowing from the Word into the humanity by quasi-formal causality." At the same time, "this created actuation, in so far as it results from divine efficiency, has a relation to the entire Trinity, as to *unam principium indistinctum* of the actuation's very existence" (p. 14).

For Father de la Taille, the *tractio* of the humanity to the *esse Verbi*, which for St. Thomas is an act that is common to the three persons,<sup>9</sup> becomes a divinely infused disposition, mutation, or modification that is introduced into the humanity by the Word alone, and it is of the substantial order. The same reality is efficiently caused by the entire Trinity, although it flows from the Word alone

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Summa theologica*, III, q. 3, a. 4: "Actus autem assumptis procedit ex divina virtute, quae communis est tribus personis; sed terminus assumptionis est persona."

by quasi-formal causality. What is this disposition? It cannot be the act of existence of the Word, for this is not efficiency caused by the Trinity nor is it subject to infusion or introduction into a created nature. It cannot be an accident, because it is of the substantial order—it is a supernatural substance. It cannot be the action of the Godhead in assuming the humanity to the person of the Word, because it is something introduced by the Word alone and it is divinely infused. It cannot be the human nature of Christ, for it is something that is received into and by this nature. We have a name for the divinely infused disposition in the other two cases: *lumen gloriae* and sanctifying grace respectively. What name have we for this elusive disposition in the case of the hypostatic union? Father de la Taille, we fear, falsely saw a parallel between this union and the other two unions. A disposition is required in the latter two unions because a form, or what analogously corresponds with a form, is being received. No such disposition is needed in the hypostatic union because this union does not consist in the reception of a higher form.

Father Donnelly finds in Father de la Taille's explanation of the hypostatic union a clue for the understanding of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just. In the hypostatic union, according to de la Taille, we find a created disposition or actuation in the human nature of Christ, divinely infused, of the substantial order, caused efficiently by the Trinity, yet flowing from the Word alone by quasi-formal causality. In a parallel fashion, in the case of the indwelling, sanctifying grace is the created disposition or actuation of the soul efficiently caused by the whole Trinity. Yet habitual grace is only an accidental and not a substantial communication of divine life and being: "created habitual grace . . . appears as a current, or flame, or light-flood of divine being flowing from the one Godhead, but distinguished relatively by its passage through the three divine and distinct Persons. The reality communicated by each Person is, absolutely speaking, the same: . . . Nevertheless, each Person communicates this one reality wholly and entirely, and that as a Person distinct from the other two divine Persons" (p. 20). Each divine person "actively communicates this divine being by quasi-formal causality, by actuating without informing" (p. 17).

"Each divine Person will communicate 'quodam sui sigillatione' an accidental share of the divine being and nature to the human soul. Through its obediential potency the soul is laid open to the divine threefold act which will actuate the soul without informing it" (p. 20). The three divine persons communicate "by quasi-formal causality, or created actuation by uncreated Act, a finite, created, analogous participation of their own trinitarian life" (p. 22).

According to this teaching, each divine person by quasi-formal causality gives a separate and distinct actuation to the soul in the state of grace. The soul is immediately linked to each divine person by these three distinct, accidental, finite actuations. To actuate, in Father de la Taille's own terms, means the communication of itself by the act to the potency that is capable of receiving it.<sup>10</sup> This communication of itself by the act as such involves not efficient but formal causality. When the infinite act communicates itself to a creature, it does so by quasi-formal causality because in actuating it does not inform.

The question arises: what kind of actuation can the infinite act give to a creature by quasi-formal causality? An accident can be caused or produced efficiently by God, either naturally, such as quantity, or supernaturally, such as grace. The infinite act of divine existence, even as it is peculiar to one person, can be communicated to a creature in the sense that it is the *terminus* of a created nature as the existence of the Word terminates the human nature of Christ. This does not involve any repugnance because a created human nature postulates substantial existence as its coprinciple, and the infinite act of existence of the Word is a substantial act of existence that actuates the humanity of Christ without being received by it. It is absolutely impossible, however, for the infinite act to give an accidental actuation by quasi-formal causality. Actuation in this manner of causality is the giving of itself by the act; and the infinite act is substantial and not accidental. Yet according to Father Donnelly each divine person by quasi-formal causality gives an accidental, finite actuation to the soul in the state of grace. The soul is actuated by the threefold hypostatic act of the three persons; accidentally, however, and in a finite way.

<sup>10</sup> *Art. cit.*, 261.

It is surprising to hear this explanation of the indwelling called a solution "according to" Father de la Taille or his ideas (pp. 10-11). Father de la Taille took a principle which St. Thomas used to explain the need of the *lumen gloriae* in the beatific vision and extended it successfully, I think, to the case of sanctifying grace; but not so successfully, again in my opinion, to the case of the hypostatic union. Father Donnelly now takes Father de la Taille's explanation of the hypostatic union as the basis for his explanation of the indwelling. It is strange, however, that Father de la Taille himself never attempted to explain sanctifying grace or the indwelling in the way Father Donnelly does. For the latter, the indwelling means an immediate union of the soul in the state of grace with each divine person, who communicates to it a share in his own divine life by an accidental, finite actuation taking place by means of quasi-formal causality. This is a mere appropriation of the indwelling to the Holy Spirit, but an accidental actuation that is proper to each person. It is not exclusively proper to the Holy Spirit.

When we turn to Father de la Taille's explanation of what happens to the soul in sanctifying grace, we find him telling us: "Il y a dès à présent chez les justes une actuation de leur âme, comme substance préalablement existante et vivante de sa vie rationnelle, mais en puissance à un surcroît de vie divine, par un Principe Vital incréé, qui, en se communiquant à elle (lui aussi sans l'informer), l'habilite radicalement aux fonctions de cette vie nouvelle dont la vision béatifique est le plein épanouissement."<sup>11</sup> "Or, au-dessous des facultés, intelligence et volonté, il n'y a que l'essence de l'âme; et par conséquent c'est elle, l'essence, existant déjà pour son propre compte et vivant a part soi, qui va se trouver unie, mariée désormais à l'Essence divine, associée à la Vie divine, bénéficiaire de la Nature divine. Cette union d'essence à essence s'appelle la grâce sanctifiante. . . . Il faut que l'Acte de vie divine vienne Lui-même actuer la capacité réceptive de l'âme, pour que surgisse dans l'âme l'actuation correspondante."<sup>12</sup> "La grâce sanctifiante est la communication

<sup>11</sup> *Art. cit.*, 257-8.

<sup>12</sup> *Art. cit.*, 259.

créée de l'Esprit de vie à l'essence de l'âme, . . . elle fait habiter Dieu en nous. . . ." <sup>13</sup> Sanctifying grace inaugurates eternal life which "a son principe dans Dieu possédé par essence au sein même de notre essence. Cette communion habituelle des essences est surnaturelle pour la même raison que la lumière de gloire." <sup>14</sup>

Unquestionably for Father de la Taille the indwelling of God in the souls of the just is an essential act of divinity, common to the three persons, and not a notional act that would be proper to a person as such. It is a direct and immediate union of the essence of our soul with the essence of God considered as the principle of supernatural life. The union, though immediate, is accidental and supernatural, taking place through sanctifying grace. For Father Donnelly the indwelling from the standpoint of quasi-formal causality would be a notional act, since each person would give a distinct actuation to the soul in keeping with the hypostatic character peculiar to each. This is not the teaching of Father de la Taille.

The only actuation of a creature through quasi-formal causality by the uncreated act is, so far as revelation makes known, the termination of the human nature of Christ by the *esse Verbi*. This is a substantial actuation because the human nature of Christ was actively drawn by the *virtus divina*, common to the three persons, to share in the act of existence of the Word of God without receiving or limiting this act in any way. This is the only instance of actuation by quasi-formal causality of a creature by God. It is repugnant that an accidental, finite actuation proceed from the infinite act by way of this quasi-formal causality since the infinite act has no accidental *esse* that it can communicate to creatures. The only way in which an accidental actuation can proceed from God is by way of efficient causality, which is common to the three persons. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the termination of the human nature of Christ by the *esse hypostaticum Verbi* is the only termination of a creature by the divine *esse*: "terminatio secundum esse est singularis in incarnatione, per quam humana natura assumpta est ad esse et unitatem divinae personae." <sup>15</sup> This teaching is echoed in

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Art. cit.*, 263.

<sup>15</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, sol.

our textbooks; for example: "Quaevis unio inter Deum et creaturam, praeter unionem hypostaticam, omnino communis est tribus personis." <sup>16</sup>

Finally, the appeal Father de la Taille makes to the teaching of St. Thomas on the *duplex esse* in Christ which is found in the *Quaestione unica de unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, is by no means conclusive or satisfactory.<sup>17</sup> According to this teaching, there is in Christ besides the *esse principale aeterni suppositi* another secondary *esse* which is the *esse humanae naturae*. Granting the genuine character of this *Disputed Question*, and leaving to one side the problems it has raised in Thomistic exegesis, this much seems clear: whether the secondary *esse* is to be understood in the sense of the exercise of the act of existence or, as it seems much more probable, in the sense of specification alone, it is at least an *esse* that is natural and due to the human nature of Christ. The created actuation or disposition, however, taught by Father de la Taille and Father Donnelly is essentially supernatural. Father Donnelly himself admits this: "it is clear that the infused disposition is entirely and absolutely supernatural" (p. 14). It is impossible for this reason alone to see in the *esse secundarium humanae naturae* of St. Thomas the infused disposition or created actuation of Father de la Taille and of Father Donnelly.

The difficulties in the non-exclusively *proprium* theory of the indwelling can, in the main, be reduced to these two:

(1) In Father de la Taille's explanation of the hypostatic union, which is the basis of the theory, just what is the supernatural disposition of the substantial order that the Word alone introduces into the humanity of Christ?

(2) In Father Donnelly's theory of the indwelling, how can the *esse hypostaticum* of each person give a finite, accidental actuation to the soul by quasi-formal causality?

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<sup>16</sup> J. M. Herve, *Manuale theologiae dogmaticae*, III, ed. 14, p. 60.

<sup>17</sup> *Art. cit.*, 266.

***Digest of General Discussion***

Father William O'Connor was inclined to deny the parallel supposed by Father Donnelly between the essential potency of our intellects to the beatific vision and the accidental potency of the human essence assumed by the Divine Word to existence. In the beatific vision the divine essence functions as species or formal cause; but existence is not a formal cause.

Further, Father O'Connor believed that accidental actuation could occur only by efficient causality; to support accidental actuation by formal causality seemed repugnant to him.

Father Donnelly replied positively, recalling his position, and stressing the necessity of an *ens quo* to make the Indwelling real.

Father Connell, C.S.S.R., asked what was the further reality given to the humanity of Christ, whether it was at once supernatural, substantial, and created, whether it was prior to the union.

Father Donnelly admitted that it was supernatural, substantial, and created. He pointed out that it was like the ultimate disposition to a form resulting from the form.

Father Coyle, C.S.S.R., noted that existence, though substantial, is not essence nor substance in the sense of essence. The repugnance of a finite supernatural substance is the repugnance of a finite supernatural essence.

Father Donnelly agreed that the point was relevant to Father Connell's difficulty.

Father Lonergan, S.J., objected to the distinction between act and actuation applied to the human soul and its formation of the body: in man considered substantially there are matter, form, existence and nothing else; the alleged actuation supposes a metaphysical position such as developed by Scotus in his formal distinction or by Suarez in his modal distinction. With regard to the statement, "The soul is immortal, the body is transitory," Father Lonergan asked: "What is the body?"

Father Donnelly stated that by "body" he understood prime matter and the accidents.

Father Brophy, S.J., argued from the principle "omnia sunt unum nisi obviat relationis oppositio"; but *ad extra* that is no rela-

tive opposition; therefore *ad extra* all are one; hence, an appeal to formal causality could take one no further than an appeal to efficient causality.

Father Donnelly retorted with the fact of the Incarnation; only the Son became man.

Father Owens, C.S.S.R., believed that an ontological, temporal effect must regard all three Divine Persons equally. He advanced a plea for the position of John of St. Thomas.

Father Donnelly stated that his difficulty with the position of John of St. Thomas was the incoherence of claiming that (1) the temporal effect in the soul was common, and bore no special relation to the distinct Persons, yet (2) the knowledge of God resulting from this effect was proper.