AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERLOOKED VALUE OF GREATNESS

Greatness is a prevalent topic within philosophy of which many interpretations are offered, ranging from Aristotle's virtue-driven megalopsychos to Nietzsche’s power-hungry übermensch. Humanity’s persisting interest in the idea of greatness is undeniable– the desire for achievement can become obsessive, overwhelming and, for many, anxiety inducing. While there have been innumerable attempts to explain what greatness is, there is little to no scholarship on why we burden ourselves with the pursuit of greatness, consequently and uncharacteristically placing ourselves in a position of angst and vulnerability. The risk of failure and embarrassment loom menacingly behind displays of ambition, seemingly incompatible with the visceral desire for achievement many of us find so familiar. 
This paper attempts to primarily fill this absence and explore greatness’ value (why we feel the need to strive) while simultaneously remedying errors in prevalent philosophical concepts of greatness. Ideally, an understanding of greatness and its value will offer solace and encouragement for those facing the anxiety and detriment that is all too often concomitant with the human desire for achievement. A coherent conception of greatness and its value will perhaps create an entry point to easing the variety of stresses and pressures that come with the pursuit of greatness. To accomplish this, the paper introduces multiple perspectives from prominent philosophers both of old (Plato, Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas) and more contemporary (Nietzsche, Amy Allen, Virginia Held) through a critical lens. Using relatable, real-world examples that promote interaction from a wide readership, a logical analysis and structural critique of each philosophy is conducted. Finally, a concept is offered that finds both power and virtue are critical, even intrinsic, characteristics of greatness and its value.


INTRODUCTION
G reatness is a concept ubiquitous throughout human history; amorphous, unde ned, yet tauntingly and irresistibly alluring. 1 Humanity's interest in achievement is demonstrated by philosophy's many attempts at distilling the concept, with concessions ranging from Aristotle's virtue-oriented megalopsychos to Nietzsche's power-hungry Übermensch.
ese two dichotomously opposed gures (the megalopsychos and Übermensch) both, in the minds of the philosophers who created them, embody human greatness. Contextualized by the obsessive, overwhelming, and often anxiety-inducing human aspiration to greatness, the dissimilarities between them become somewhat disconcerting, and we must ask: what exactly is greatness?
is essay aims to shed additional light on this question from the space between prevalent philosophical interpretations of greatness.
Generally, it seems that attempts to de ne greatness t within one of two categories. e rst of these prioritizes a link to virtue and morality, while the second understands power to be the measure of greatness. Aristotle, Plato, and Saint omas Aquinas understand greatness in terms of virtue, while Nietzsche and certain feminist philosophers understand it to emerge out of an exercise of power.
Essentially, the virtue-oriented thinkers purport that greatness is achieved by a life of virtuous acts conducive to happiness and honor. Megalopsychia is "a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them." 2 Adversely, with a conspicuous disdain for the "whole virtuous dirtiness" of the rst category, Nietzsche's Will to Power purports that the concept of greatness is intrinsically linked to personal power. 3 Valuing only the conquering of obstacles and expansion of strength, status, wealth, and in uence, the Übermensch is an eagle amongst lambs, yielding only to its own will to power.

IS GREATNESS IN 'POWER TO' OR 'POWER OVER'?
Nietzsche's de nition of power that prioritizes strength and force, however, is challenged by certain feminist perspectives on power. Amy Allen, for instance, notes the predominantly masculine and oppressive form of power, described by Robert Dahl, as a scenario in which " [person] A has power over [person] B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do," has come to be known as the 'power-over' understanding of power. 4 is understanding of power is similar to Nietzsche's philosophy: it values physical strength, in uence, and social status. Historically, the mistreatment of women has led to the interpretation of this notion of power as a tool of the patriarchy. e feminist perspective, in an attempt to remediate this oppressive and misogynistic concept, has instead promoted conceptions of power that empowerment of action -'power-to' rather than 'power-over.' A 'power-to' perspective focuses on a more positive relationship with others, noting facets of power as the ability to empower and inspire transformation in oneself and others; put simply, it is the ability to enact change. is perspective places few, if any, restrictions who can potentially be counted among the powerful. As Johanna Oksala notes, women have impacted immeasurable change, even when consigned to the roles of mothers and caretakers, through the upbringing and nurturing of others. 5 She further summarizes the feminist response to power, "In other words, the fact that women are often reluctant to take or exercise power over others does not indicate that women have a problem; it indicates that there is a problem with our understanding of power, as well as in our relationships with each other in patriarchal societies," a problem the 'power-to' concept attempts to remediate. 6 2 Understood as 'greatness of soul'; Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics,7.3. 3  GREATNESS AND ITS VALUE AS POWER: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE e feminist perspective, with a de nition of power vastly di erent than Nietzsche's, still supports the idea that greatness is reliant upon the expression of power. An excellent example of speci c feminine greatness is discussed in Alison Booth's Greatness Engendered: George Eliot and Virginia Woolf, in which Booth discusses the in uence the two authors held over their patriarchal Victorian-era society, exemplifying 'power-to' through literature. Booth suggests their greatness results from their persuasiveness; their ability to describe through their writing a society of inclusion and progress elicited reactions from readers that broke the strongly enforced gender roles of the late 19th century. Persuasion, of course, is an expression of 'power-to,' speci cally power to in uence others and incite change.
Woolf and Eliot displayed a visceral expression of power through their persuasive literature, an achievement magni ed by the oppressive, damaging gender norms to which they were constrained. T. S. Elliot even "a rms that Woolf became 'the centre . . . of the literary life of London,' 'the symbol' of the 'Victorian upper middleclass' cultural tradition," despite her womanhood being a social disadvantage. 7 eir ability to in uence their readership with notions of "a shared, progressive life beyond individuality" is certainly reason to deem these two authors great wordsmiths, and while the ability to persuade and in uence is an important component of the feminist assessment of greatness, it is not the only one. 8 Equally as important to the concept is the predominantly feminist ethic of care.

Care and Power
is ethic of care is not exactly the naive, benevolent depiction the connotation of 'care' may evoke. Virginia Held addresses the presence of violence, particularly against women, and how the ethics of care has been designed to handle such stark possibilities. Rather than negatively attempting to suppress or harm those who may be violent, the ethic of care searches for a more positive, peaceful resolution. "Within practices of care, as we have seen, rights should be recognized, including rights to peace and security of the [violent] person. Force may sometimes be needed to assure respect for such rights. is does not mean that the background of care can be forgotten." 9 is 'background of care' and, in fact, the general term 'care,' has been given various de nitions by numerous thinkers; Joan Tronto focuses on the work of caring for someone, and Nel Noddings on the attitude with which one is willing to care.
After sifting through the many o ered de nitions, Held provides and seems to prioritize the de nition o ered by Diemut Bubeck, who believes "Caring for is the meeting of the needs of one person by another person, where face-to-face interaction between carer and cared-for is a crucial element of the overall activity and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself." 10 Bubeck's de nition simultaneously separates care from being a service for one capable to complete an act themselves, and allows care to be universally o ered without a prerequisite of emotional attachment. However, there are, at risk of dramatization, fatal aws in Bubeck's contender that desecrate its validity in Held's eyes. She notes that Bubeck does not pay mind to the intent of the caregiver; a nurse may utterly hate a patient, wishing them death, but still o er them services. Is this truly care? Bubeck says yes; Held is less certain. She adjusts the original de nition to form her own: Care is both a practice and a value…it shows us how to respond to needs and why we should. It builds trust and mutual concern and connectedness between persons….along with its appropriate attitudes…Practices of care should express the caring relations that bring persons together, and they should do so in ways that are progressively more morally satisfactory. Caring practices should gradually transform children and others into human beings who are increasingly morally admirable…In addition to being a practice, care is also a value. Caring persons and caring attitudes should be valued… We can ask if persons are attentive and responsive to each other's needs or indi erent and self-absorbed. Care is…more the characterization of a social relation than the description of an individual disposition, and social relations are not reducible to individual states. 11 Held's description of care recti es the aws found in Bubeck's de nition while maintaining the universality and distinctiveness of acts of service originally proposed.
Care plays an important role in the feminist assessment of greatness, as it is through care that empowerment and in uence must be a ected. While moral value seems to permeate this understanding of care and empowerment, it is important to recognize that the feminist analysis of greatness credits the power, the ability to in uence positive change as the variable pertinent to greatness, rather than the morality intrinsically present in care and empowerment. e ethics of care certainly t into the feminist perspective of 'power-to' as a necessary condition for empowerment, which in turn leads to the nal value of greatness-per this assessment, that is the power to incite change. Interestingly, these characteristics-care, empowerment, and social progressiveness-seem to be the antithesis of the Nietzschean power characteristics of wealth, status, and strength. However, despite their di erences in understanding of the term, both the feminist perspective and Nietzsche contend that expression of power is the ultimate value of greatness.

POWER? OR VIRTUE?
Now that the proponents for each set have been introduced, and their arguments described, who do we believe? Is the reason humanity strives for greatness tied to morality and virtue? Or is greatness simply an expression of human power, with no tie to morality? It seems evident that the much more likely and correct answer is a third option; morality and power are both required to achieve greatness. More speci cally, expressions of power that are consistent with morality and exhibit virtue are the only actions that mirror the characteristic of greatness. Analyses of the reasoning provided by both the virtue-centric and power-centric proponents will now be conducted in order to determine the validity of each-are they self-su cient and satisfactory? Or do they support this essay's contention?

An Analysis of 'Power-Over' Greatness
Nietzsche's argument against the idea of virtue as having any role in the value of greatness, and thus his argument against this paper's contention, are quite unconvincing. He asserts that the achievement of great acts, through all the pain and su ering they bring, grows personal power in accordance with the innate will to power living beings experience; this growth of power is the ultimate good along with the expression of personal power over opposition. In this view, either power-over is a su cient condition for greatness, meaning those with power have a correlated claim to greatness, or that power is a necessary condition for greatness, meaning that if one is great one must possess power.
Both of these logical avenues struggle in defending Nietzsche's contentions. Firstly, let's assess power-over as a su cient condition for greatness. e existence of tyrants and oppressive power, the likes of Hitler and Stalin, discredit this avenue for (what should be) an overwhelming majority. e power and in uence these two men speci cally possessed was immense, yet without morality to guide them, such power lent itself to atrocities rather than greatness. eir growth in power did not ultimately lead them to happiness, rather, their thirst for power and conquest was insatiable and unsatisfying. ese two tyrants exemplify the Übermensch, possessing power, in uence, strength, and wealth. Yet they are lacking the result expected from this Nietzschean equation: greatness of character is certainly not associated with these dictators. us, Nietzschean power is not a su cient condition for greatness. e conclusion that strength, in uence, and, in general, 'power-over' is not necessary for greatness rests upon the assumption mentioned in the introduction-humanity is able to intuitively identify greatness of character. Without this assumption, a ridiculous conclusion and counter may conceivably be o ered by the ercest and most adamant subscribers of Nietzschean philosophy: that such horri c tyrants are great. In this context, the assumption that those engaging with this discussion are reasonable enough to denounce vehemently this conclusion is necessary, and benign to the analysis. However, Nietzsche's philosophy does play a supportive role in the concept of greatness and its value this discussion proposes.
Although certainly not su cient, it seems to be the case that power is instead a necessary condition for greatness. If this is indeed the case, no examples of greatness without power exist. In this aspect, Nietzsche appears to be somewhat correct. Harriet Tubman's incredible life provides an equally inspiring and fascinating example to explore through a Nietzschean lens. Tubman embodies the opposite of the aforementioned Übermensch and tyrants: a woman widely (and rightly) regarded as great (again, relying on the precursory assumption), who had little, if any, social power. As an escaped slave, she possessed no in uence, no wealth, and no particular physical strength. As the victim of a head injury that left her susceptible to seizures, blurred vision, and headaches, it seems quite the opposite was true. 12 Despite having no resemblance to the typically described Übermensch, Tubman does, in fact, demonstrate a will to power.
Tubman's will was not expressed in grandiose displays of power or in uence, rather, it was expressed both in her daring escape from slavery and through the thirteen acts that earned her a place amongst the great; the thirteen sel ess and daunting journeys that delivered emancipation to over seventy people. Simply, Tubman willed to free herself and others, and enacted that will through her power. Defying the racial oppression-perhaps more appropriately, the racially motivated abuse-she and countless others were subjected to, Tubman's story exempli es the human desire to "overcome the world" against them that Nietzsche describes. 13 Tubman's story, although certainly incredible, is just one example of power's intricate relationship with greatness. Syntactically, Each choice demonstrates an expression of power (the power to choose one outcome or another).
Agential actions require the choice to act.
Great acts that elucidate greatness of character must be agential. 14 12 Harriet Tubman Byway, "About Harriet Tubman." Accessed July 23, 2022, harriettubmanbyway.or g/harriettubman/#about. 14 (c) serves as a defense against technicality. If one is theoretically forced to do a great action against their will, the action does not elucidate greatness of its actor's character, and is thus out of this discussion's intended scope. erefore, great actions (actions denoting greatness of character) must be a result of power.
In this notation, power is necessary for greatness. However, since power is not su cient for greatness, as we deduced earlier, then a second characteristic in cooperation with power must also be responsible for greatness. is second characteristic reveals itself to be morality, as Tubman's life exempli es.
Along with expressing her will to power against an oppressive society, the morality Tubman's actions displayed was perhaps equally, if not more, responsible in warranting her the recognition of greatness. e actions through which she expressed virtue were plentiful, as her thirteen journeys liberating slaves through the Underground Railroad were simply precursors to her serv[ing] as a spy and scout; provid[ing] extensive assistance to soldiers including nursing, cooking, and laundering, and even help[ing] lead a major attack on Confederate property called the Combahee River raid…yield[ing] new union enlistments and over 700 "contrabands" (freed slaves). 15 ese heroic and sel ess expressions of will exempli ed courage, ambition, sel essness, and certainly several other virtues-all of which elucidated the greatness of her character. While Nietzsche's argument of the will to power is unsatisfactory as a su cient condition of greatness, Harriet Tubman's life demonstrates its conceivable role as a necessary condition illuminates the rst evidence of this essay's contentiongreatness' value lies in the crossroads of expressing power and morality.

An Analysis of 'Power-To' Greatness
To further support the argument that both power and virtue play a role in greatness and its value, we will once again use the su cient and necessary logical avenues to analyze the validity of the 'power-to' argument o ered by the feminist perspective, which states that displays of greatness-de ned as acts that empower and in uence change through ethics of care-are valuable in the social change they e ect. Again, either 'power-to' is a su cient condition, suggesting that no 'power-to' is expressed without greatness, or it is a necessary condition, meaning no greatness is evident without the expression of 'power-to.' e ultimate value prescribed by the feminist perspective of 'power-to,' and thus greatness, is the instigation of social change.
is expression of power as it is understood by the feminist perspective, upon logical analysis, appears to contain variables necessary for greatness but o ers none su cient for greatness. While many examples of vicious leaders lacking the distinction of greatness certainly possessed and demonstrated characteristics of the feminist assessment, speci cally in uence, the morality required for care and empowerment seems to be the lter such tyrants and dictators cannot percolate. Hitler, for example, achieved immense in uence over Germany through his oration. Daniel Binchy recalls listening to him speak at a meeting that took place in 1921, at the University of Munich. "Here was a born natural orator," he describes, "He began slowly, almost hesitatingly, stumbling over the construction of his sentences, correcting his dialect pronunciation. en all at once he seemed to take re. His voice rose victorious over falterings, his eyes blazed with conviction, his whole body became an instrument of rude eloquence." 16 e speech ends with a response from the audience, "a scene of hysterical enthusiasm which ba es description," Binchy recalls. 17 e captivation Hitler commanded over a listening audience demonstrates a similar degree of persuasiveness that Woolf and Eliot possessed through their literature. Unlike these two great authors, however, Hitler used this persuasion to persecute, oppress, and breed hatred, rather than empower positive social change.
He did, however, empower himself. Allen's understanding of Held's concept of 'power-to' clari es that the "capacity to transform and empower oneself " is compliant with the sickening expression of power Hitler demonstrated. 18 rough propaganda, manipulation, and fear, Hitler empowered himself and his political party, posing as a moral crusader while victimizing millions throughout his cynical rampage. 19 While he was undeniably lacking care as described by Held, the evidence that such a terrible man displayed both empowerment and in uence characterizes where this assessment of power is subject to dispute and provides evidence against 'power-to' as a su cient condition for greatness.
It appears that without morality, the abilities of empowerment, in uence, and ultimately, the means to produce societal change, do not warrant the distinction of greatness. e unique aspect of care, though, and the virtue intrinsically woven within care undoubtedly t into our concept of power with virtue. Care certainly demonstrates characteristics representative of the expression of will; an enactment of personal power. Held notes that "An important aspect of care is how it expresses our attitudes and relationships," meaning that the intentions of a caregiver must match their actions to be genuine care. 20 is acting upon one's desire is compatible with the Nietzschean concept of Will to Power; the caregiver expresses their personal power, (i.e. ability to care) in response to their will (i.e. their desire to care). While they may not necessarily be facing the social opposition Nietzsche posits, they are certainly attempting to overcome an obstacle; they are attempting to alleviate whatever the cared-for may be facing, an obstacle that, through relationship, becomes personal. While the feminist perspective is unsatisfactory alone in its assessment of greatness, the understanding of care as the expression of one's will and power, partnered with the intrinsic morality present in care, appears to further support the conclusion that both power and virtue are essential in greatness and its value.

THE VIRTUE CENTRIC CONTENTION
Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Aquinas each believe that greatness and its value are closely related and dependent upon moral standards and displays of virtue. Aristotle particularly argues that greatness of soul, megalopsychia, is a crown that indicates the metaphorical wearer as one who possesses and appropriately practices each virtue. Greatness, as argued by these essentially eudaemonistic philosophers, holds value as the practice of virtue required for greatness is also the path to happiness. Similarly, great acts are valuable in that they reveal greatness of character.
Contrary to the Aristotelian theory of unity, which unconvincingly describes that one cannot possess a single virtue if they do not possess all of them, -a theory that has been discredited by numerous scholars-it appears that greatness does not require the display of each virtue. Referring again to the moon landing, the undeniable act of greatness certainly lacked some of the twelve virtues Aristotle notes-humorous wit was likely not a large factor in the endeavor-but appropriate temperance, courage, ambition, and liberality undeniably were. 21 e appropriate practice of these four virtues required to complete the mission still demonstrated the greatness of character the astronauts on board possessed, and further, seem to entail a correlation with honor.
As virtuous actions are valued by and rewarded with honor, the more virtues represented in an action, the more honor and greatness they seem to elicit. While greatness may not require every virtue, it is important to note that great acts must always be compatible with morality and all twelve virtues. For example, one may harbor ambition for an act of evil that directly opposes friendliness or justice. Ambition, one of the twelve virtues, does not make this potential act great; the lack of morality necessary for compatibility with virtue transforms ambition from a virtue into a vice. Acts of greatness, then, must show compatibility with the twelve virtues while demonstrating an appropriate practice of at least one virtue worth honoring. 22 An analysis of this argument, as stated, will reveal whether virtue and morality are necessary, su cient, or both in regard to achieving greatness. It appears that a display of virtue that is morally compatible with each virtue is necessary for acts of greatness. An action incompatible with virtue-an action incompatible with justice, friendliness, or truthfulness-simply fails to be great. For example, winning an Olympic gold medal for one's country certainly seems like a great action. By Saint Aquinas' de nition that explains "one mak[ing] a very good use of [an item or action]" is proportional greatness, it certainly is. 23 As such, any athlete capable of this feat inarguably demonstrates ambition, courage, temperance, and many other virtues both in their training and performance. Such an achievement is great unless of course, the athlete was cheating. Using banned performance enhancers, for instance, is incompatible with the virtues of justice and truthfulnessthe action is both unfair to the other competitors and is untruthful of the athlete, and thus, fails to be great. e incompatibility of the twelve virtues perverts what would be an honorable and great action into a dishonorable act. It is the only aspect of this athlete's conduct that excludes them from the designation of greatness.
is particular distinction between moral compatibility and incompatibility demonstrates quite well the necessity of morality: an action that would, by all other accounts, be great, marred by an act incompatible with virtue, fails to be great. Logically, then, virtue compatibility is necessary for great achievement. Additionally, excellent displays of virtue seem to be a requirement for greatness; an act is not great simply because they are compatible with virtue, it must display something worthy of honor. Which, as previously discussed, excellent demonstrations of virtue are worthy of honor. With a simple example, we have demonstrated the necessary roles of both virtue compatibility and displaying virtue in the achievement of great acts, through which greatness of character is represented.

POWER LED BY VIRTUE
When determining whether demonstrations of honorable virtue and virtue compatibility are su cient for greatness, a dilemma requiring further attention appears. Our conclusion, upon logical analyses of both Nietzsche's and the feminist perspective's arguments, revealed the false dichotomy between the virtue and power assessments of greatness; both power and virtue seem necessary for greatness. When taken as two separate variables, virtue could not, then, be a su cient condition, as the presence of an expression of power is required to achieve greatness. However, a di erent perspective reveals that they are not distinct variables, rather, expressions of power and morality are so closely intertwined that the two variables act as onethrough one's will and expression of personal power, virtues signifying greatness may be performed.
An important aspect of virtue ethics as Aristotle describes them is the intention behind an action. He explains that we, as humans, deliberate amongst ourselves over choices we can control, including both virtue and vice. Whether one expresses virtuous acts depends, for the most part, upon their own choice and internal deliberation. Aristotle describes this ability by explaining, "For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power;" our personal will, most often decided upon by our reasoning, determine whether we express virtues or 'base' actions in any given scenario. 24 is description of internal con ict and expressions of power seems quite reminiscent of the Nietzschean description of a being's expression of their will to power, as well as the 'power-to' contention; indulging one's will in an expression of power based solely on their whims and the ability to act upon one's choice and in uence change. "How does one become stronger?" Nietzsche asks before answering, "By coming to decisions slowly; and by clinging tenaciously to what one has decided." 25 e permeating undertones of intention and choice are not unique to Aristotle and Nietzsche, as evidenced by the feminist contention. e opposite distinction of power also understands choice as a crucial element, a power even described by Sarah Lucia Hoagland as "power of ability, of choice and engagement." 26 e presence of deliberation and decision followed by the expression of power required to enact that decision in Will to Power, a 'power-to' approach, and Nicomachean Ethics supports the conclusion that both power and virtue are required for greatness. Saint Aquinas strengthens this notion, stating " e word 'choice' implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will…choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will… of the appetitive power" within us. 27 One must possess the will and power required to choose and act upon their decision to display virtue, thus displays of virtue are intrinsically woven with an expression of power. 28 Rather than interpreting these as separate variables, it seems that, due to their inseparable nature, the more appropriate route would be to conclude that power is an essential part of the practice 24 of virtues. erefore, the expression of virtues, through acts compatible with every virtue, is su cient for the acts of greatness required in the demonstration of greatness of character.

CONCLUSION
In our attempt to construct a clearer understanding of greatness, the concepts once held to be diametrically opposed have become amalgam, enmeshed by the shared aspect of choice. It does not appear, through our analysis, that power alone is su cient for a claim to greatness: as stand-alone contentions, both the Nietzschean and feminist perspectives of power encounter rather problematic implications that are incompatible with the notion of human excellence. 29 Nietzsche's perspective, termed 'power-over,' accommodates tyranny, oppression, and systemic violence in a concept of human excellence-a conclusion we must vehemently refute. While the progressive notion of 'power-to' as o ered by the feminist perspective is an alternative account that resists the historically marginalizing patriarchal tones of 'power-over,' it too falls victim to similar unacceptable implications. Recounts of Hitler's in uence, persuasion, and vicious self-empowerment re ect rather eerily the pillars upon which a 'power-to' perspective lies. e apparent 'saving grace' of these power-centric concepts of greatness seems to be the necessary infusion of virtue, whether purely Aristotelian or mediated by Held's ethic of care. is formulation immediately excludes the preposterous notion of tyrants qualifying as great and adds to greatness a value as conducive to happiness and honor (in proportion to the virtue displayed). e example of the dishonest Olympian demonstrates the necessity of virtue for greatness; actions normally worthy of honor, marred by an act incompatible with morality, simply fail to demonstrate greatness. Additionally, Harriet Tubman's incredible life exempli es the integral role of personal power (speci cally, the personal power to choose) in expressing virtue, a notion which is supported by both the virtue-centric and powercentric perspectives. us, it appears that what began as two seemingly dichotomous understandings of greatness have emerged from our analysis as one, with virtue acting as a link between power (choice) and human greatness. 29 People seem to be capable of identifying greatness of character, albeit without necessarily articulating what characteristic is being recognized. Simply, people can discern a gure as great without understanding why that gure is great. is notion can be more familiarly described by (imperfectly but e ectively) analogizing the assumption that people are able to identify pieces of art as art, without having a distinct or articulable notion of what makes such a piece art-asking someone to describe the distinct characteristics that denote both Anish Kapoor's Cloud Gate and Andy Warhol's Brillo Box as art may prove this point.