A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion

I am a person, and you too are no doubt a person. It is more than likely that you are a human as
well, as am I. One’s dignity and worth are not reliant on their biological species, but rather their
status as persons and members of one moral community. Their worth is not derived from their
parentage, either born a male or a female, or even born at all. The default position that
personhood is decided by one belonging to the human species is no doubt enticing, but still
inadequate to address cases in which this metric is tested. The case of abortion could not be a
better example, requiring a thorough examination of personhood. This paper not only seeks to
outline a metric by which personhood begins and ends, but also provide a staunch defense of
abortion up until 20 to 24 weeks of gestation. I argue that a human ceases to be a person after
future conscious experiences are no longer possible. Inversely, a person comes into being once
the first instance of a conscious experience is possible. Since a self-conscious experience
emerges in a human once key regions of the brain are adequately developed and biologically
unified, they lack moral consideration before this period, 20-24 gestational weeks. For these
reasons, the fetus should not be considered a person until conscious experiences are first
possible, and abortion prior to this point is morally permissible.