To Live Free or To Make Excuses: In Defense of Sartre’s (Revised) Concept of Radical Freedom

Abstract

Is the slave as free as his master? You may recognize this controversial idea from the
philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, who once equated the freedom of ‘the master’ with the freedom
of ‘the slave’ based on a radical conception of human freedom, which has drawn strong criticism
and mockery since then. This paper aims to defend a revised version of Sartre’s characteristic
theory of ‘radical freedom’ by tracing its philosophical evolution and confronting key
sociological and scientific objections. Beginning with Sartre’s early existentialism in Being and
Nothingness and Existentialism is a Humanism, I explore his concept of ‘bad faith’ and his
understanding of ‘authenticity’ as a moral imperative. I then examine Simone de Beauvoir’s
critique of Sartre’s thesis, wherein she presents a more nuanced account of how socialization and
oppression do shape one’s perceived possibilities without negating ontological freedom. Drawing
on Jonathan Webber’s analysis of the two authors, I argue that Sartre’s later works – especially
Saint Genet – reflect his acceptance of Beauvoir’s insights and present a more realistic, socially
grounded existentialism. Finally, I engage with contemporary neuroscience – particularly the
work of Robert Sapolsky and Neil Levy – which challenges the very foundation of
existentialism, i.e., free will. In response, I advocate for preserving a pragmatic belief in human
freedom – not because it is metaphysically certain, but because perceiving ourselves as free
agents opens up the possibility to transcend past and present circumstances that may otherwise
hold us back. Thus, without denying the influence of biological and social factors, we can reject
the harmful defeatism of incompatibilist determinism, which encourages us to see ourselves as
lifelong victims of circumstances outside of our control; in fact, I join Sartre and Beauvoir in
arguing that we have the moral imperative to do so. Given our social tendency to make excuses

and flee into psychological determinism, this paper calls for a radical reaffirmation of our
fundamental capacity to transcend, even when the odds – and the science – suggest otherwise.