MISSION STATEMENT

*Elements*, the undergraduate research journal of Boston College, showcases the varied research endeavors of fellow undergraduates to the greater academic community. By fostering intellectual curiosity and discussion, the journal strengthens and affirms the community of undergraduate students at Boston College.
THANKS

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QUESTIONS & CONTRIBUTIONS

If you have any questions, please contact the journal at elements@bc.edu. The next deadline is Wednesday, April 10, 2013. All submissions can be sent to elements.submissions@gmail.com. Visit our website at www.bc.edu/elements for updates and further information.

COVER

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EDITOR’S NOTE

Conflict is considered by many to be an inherent part of human existence. As far back as long as we have been considered Homo sapiens — “wise men” — there is evidence of conflict. The Bible begins with Creation. Second comes the Fall from Grace, and thirdly, in Gen 4, violent conflict begins. Cain slays his brother Abel in the first violent death in human history. From that act, humanity grew in violence, swelling in its depravity until God became so displeased that he opened the firmament and allowed the waters to sweep over the Earth, purging evil with chaos.

Our world today faces conflict and violence at every turn. In the last year, we have witnessed conflicts in Mali and Syria as well as repeated acts of horrific violence at home in the United States. In the selection process, we received a flood of submissions analyzing a great variety of conflicts. The Elements staff chose to pick the strongest of those articles and present a, albeit unintentionally, themed issue.

I am proud to present articles that approach conflict in a number of ways. On the cover, we have the excellent work of Brendon Anderson in “With Heart and Hand and Sword and Shield: Coping With Tragedy in Northern Ireland Through Song.” As the name describes, this piece addresses some of the atrocities of Northern Ireland and approaches the tremendous body of music that has been inspired as a result. Sean Keeley looked at Vichy France, to some of the great works of cinema that came to exist under the thumb of Nazi censorship.

From censorship to propaganda, the media is universally understood to be critical in conflicts. “In The Fine Details of Broad Brushstrokes,” Zachary Herhold analyzes the role of the BBC in World War Two propaganda.

Many have heard the song “Christmas in the Trenches” a folk ballad to the miraculous night December 24, 1914 when soldiers of both sides of the Great War played football (soccer) before trading “chocolates, cigarettes, and photographs from home.” Matt Farnum recounts a less heartwarming tale, of Captain Neville of the East Surrey Regiment kicking his football into no man’s land, beginning a suicide charge with a punt. This story, and the culture behind it, are the subject of Farnum’s excellent: “Playing the Greater Game”.

With all of these wonderful articles, I am proud to present this, the first issue of Volume 9 of Elements.

Sincerely,

NICHOLAS C. COCHRAN-CAGGIANO

Editor-in-chief

[Signature]
“WITH HEART AND HAND AND SWORD AND SHIELD”: COPING WITH TRAGEDY IN NORTHERN IRELAND THROUGH SONG

Brendon Anderson

Analyzing the music of the Troubles to understand its power and place in this dark and difficult period of Irish history.

“WHAT PREYED ON GATSBY”: FEMININE SENTIMENTALITY IN A HETERONORMATIVE SOCIETY

Emily Simon

Performing a queer theory reading of the social environment and narrative techniques at work in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby.

A POSSIBLE CURE: REVIEWING THE EFFICACY OF THE GABA$_B$ AGONIST BACLOFEN FOR SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE DISORDERS

Andrew Abbate

Assessing the ability of the GABA$_B$ agonist baclofen to treat substance dependence disorders.

PLAYING THE GREATER GAME: THE INFLUENCE OF SPORT ON THE PSYCHE OF THE BOYS OF BRITAIN DURING THE GREAT WAR

Matt Farnum

Considering the relationship between England’s sporting culture and British perceptions of World War I.
AN OBSOLETE PARADOX: THE SELF-DEFEATING FLAW OF SOUTH KOREA’S “CATCH-UP” ECONOMIC MODEL
Han-sam Lee
Examining the past successes of South Korea’s “catch-up” economic model and its possible hindrance to future economic growth.

THE FINE DETAILS OF BROAD BRUSHSTROKES: PROPAGANDA AND THE BBC IN WORLD WAR II
Zachary Herhold
Challenging the British Broadcasting Corporation’s reputation as an autonomous and unbiased news source during World War II.

AN OCCUPIED CINEMA: POLITICAL INTIMATIONS IN THREE POPULAR FILMS OF VICHY FRANCE
Sean Keeley
Probing possible political undercurrents in the creation and reception of three popular films of the Vichy period.

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BIASED? “IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING”

_by Corleone Delaveris_

The sheer volume and variety of news and information available today is staggering. While this is a benefit, it also poses a challenge to anyone attempting to sift through the bulk of the information to find what is relevant or important. However, mainstream media outlets remain the most prevalent source of information for those citizens want to be well-informed. As a result, it is crucial that all information that is received be put into a larger perspective because of possible bias. For example, in the 2012 US presidential election, vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan was quoted as saying that, “it goes without saying there is definitely media bias.” Ryan was referring to the perceived liberal media bias in American society, and his assessment is likely correct.¹ In this same New York Times article, the author, David Carr, discussed an open letter to the left-wing media from the right-wing media signed by the “conservative royalty.” The word choice hardly paints conservatives in a flattering light.² However, in An Open Letter to the Biased News Media, many well-known media conservatives stated that the liberal media is “rigging the election and taking sides in order to predetermine the outcome”: evidence that biased allegations also exist in the conservative media.³ Thus, regardless of which view holds more of the truth, bias is undoubtedly present in media.

But what happens when the state is the entity controlling the media? The bias of the state would logically be towards the state, and thus it often spawns propaganda machines, such as in modern day North Korea, or historically, in Nazi Germany. During World War II, Dr. Joseph Goebbels was infamously hired to propagate the ideals of the Third Reich amidst the populace. However, it is not only the infamous that employed propaganda. Even the American government, which did not control wartime media, produced propaganda such as Why We Fight series of films directed by Frank Capra. However, in the midst of the Second World War, one of the only news sources to emerge with a clean slate in the public view, was actually state-run: the BBC. Still, even the pristine reputation of the BBC can be called into question, perhaps demonstrating that bias will persist. The true issue, then, is how it is handled: it can be reigned back, as in the case of the BBC, or it will flourish like an unculled disease as it did in Nazi Germany.

PITCH-ED BATTLE

_by Frank DiRenno_

War and sport are not often discussed together in serious academic frameworks. Popular media may often discuss certain sporting events with terms used most often in contexts of war. Yet, when discussing the impact of war on the psychological mindset of the soldiers on the ground, factors such as stress, hostility, and combat are most often considered. However, what is often overlooked is the role that sport plays in the lives of the troops on the ground. Sport has served as a coping mechanism, a morale booster, and even a recruiting theme through many war periods. While it is difficult to compare war with something as entertaining as sport, the similarities are striking. The adrenaline, teamwork, and camaraderie demonstrated on the soccer field mirrors that on the battlefield. The role sport plays in the everyday life of a soldier is crucial, and it is no different today than it was in World War I almost a century ago. In World War I, football helped the soldiers to cope and achieve a sense of normalcy whilst in the trenches. While the same may be true today, football is taking on an even greater role for the British in the current war in Afghanistan. Since February 2002, UK forces and NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have used football matches between the ISAF and the Afghan National Army (ANA) to help foster teamwork and cooperation between the two sides. A number of matches between both sides have marked increases in cooperation, even amongst female soldiers and Afghan women. While football may not hold the same recruitment power that it did in World War I, the role it plays in modern warfare is as crucial as ever.

“A BEAUTIFUL LITTLE FOOL”: FITZGERALD’S FEMALES

by Patty Owens

F. Scott Fitzgerald is often seen as the “chronicler of the Jazz Age”, an era identified with the growing societal and sexual liberation of women. In one of the most famous passages of his novel The Great Gatsby, Daisy Buchanan tells Nick Carraway that upon the birth of her daughter, she wept and hoped for her to be a fool, for “that’s the best thing a girl can be in this world, a beautiful little fool.” Consider the green luminescent tear streaming out of the hypnotic female eyes in Francis Cugart’s original cover design in contrast with Gatsby’s enchantment with the green light representing Daisy. These two seem to represent the way Fitzgerald illustrates the tensions faced by modern female between freedom and expectation. Fitzgerald’s novel, which is steeped in gender driven themes, invokes the question of a female identity in this world.

Each principle female character embodies a different category of Fitzgerald’s modern woman: Daisy Buchanan the golden girl, Myrtle Wilson, the lower-class sexualized woman and Jordan Baker, the modern androgynous woman. Fitzgerald is often credited with popularizing the carefree, sexually liberated image of “flappers” of the 1920s, however the women in the Great Gatsby are not simply stock depictions of this persona. While they are not given great narrative depth, neither are they rendered as flat characters. Rather, they are presented twice removed by male narrative perspective, that of Nick Carraway and Fitzgerald himself. Critics have often discussed Fitzgerald’s works as autobiographical in nature. The mystical seductive nature of woman and the shifting gender binary of a new age creates a tension throughout the novel that seems to be reflected from Fitzgerald’s own life. He wrote, “I am half feminine—at least my mind is... Even my feminine characters are feminine Scott Fitzgeralds.” Even through male narration, Fitzgerald creates female characters that symbolize the tension between the masculine expectations and modern liberation.

This tension for all three is resolved in tragedy. The romantic Daisy never escapes her unhappy marriage; Myrtle, seeking to live through sexual liberation, only receives redemption in death; the rather passive pairing of Jordan Baker and Nick Carraway results in nothing. The tragic story of the Jazz Age is not a didactic commentary on changing gender roles, but rather a complex illustration of the experience of fluid and shifting distinction between sexes. Fitzgerald seems to be strongly present in Carraway’s voice when he muses, “I was within and without, simultaneous enchanted and repelled by the inexhaustible variety of life.” The women of the Great Gatsby question if the only escape from the “simultaneous enchantment and repulsion” of the female experience in society is to be born a beautiful little fool.

6. Fitzgerald, 35.
WHEN VIOLENCE CONSUMES A COUNTRY, IT IS EASY AND PERHAPS PREFERABLE TO FOCUS
ON THE IMAGES OF TANKS, GUNS, AND COVERED CORPSES. IN TIMES OF SUCH BRUTAL WARFARE
THOUGH, SOME OF THE MOST MOVING WORKS ART ARE CREATED. ELIE WEISEL’S NIGHT, PABLO
PICASSO’S GUERNICA, AND STEVE MCCURRY’S “AFGHAN GIRL” ARE JUST THREE EXAMPLES OF THE
INCREDIBLE ARTWORK RESULTING FROM THE HORRORS OF WAR. OFTEN DESCRIBED AS A
FUNDAMENTALLY MUSICAL PEOPLE, IT SEEMS ALMOST NATURAL THAT DURING THE DECADES LONG
SPAN OF THE TROUBLES, THE IRISH WOULD USE MUSIC TO TELL OF THEIR EXPERIENCES. FROM U2
TO VAN MORRISON, MUSICIANS HELPED TO CAPTURE THE TRULY HUMAN SIDE OF A VICIOUS,
PROLONGED STRUGGLE.
Lasting from 1968 to 1998, the Troubles may have stripped the people of Northern Ireland of almost everything they had, but music remained one of the most critical components of the Irish experience in both the Catholic and Protestant communities. Faced with overwhelming violence, many turned to music to voice their ambitions, angers, and regrets. Some used marching songs and anthems to fuel the rage and pride of the sectarian violence, while others sang songs like “Sunday Bloody Sunday” by U2 to lament the death and hatred caused by the fighting. Hurting through the twentieth century, Ireland faced sweeping social changes and disastrous political and religious warfare. Throughout this upheaval, music, whether in the form of Republican hymns or rock anthems, provided a voice for the incredible range of the human experience during the Troubles.

Music has consistently played a key role in the Protestant community, particularly during its summer marching season, which centered around the July 12 celebration of the Protestant victory at the Battle of the Boyne. Protestants used song to “recall the constitutional fidelity of their fathers of glorious memory” and to commemorate its history, including events such as the Siege of Derry, the Battle of the Boyne, and the establishment of the Orange Order. These songs like “The Sash” and “Orange Standard” often focused on a limited number of events and ideas, drilling them into the listener’s head. Phrases like “Orange heroes,” “Popish idolaters,” “no surrender,” and “Derry’s deathless glory” are consistently repeated, indicating the Protestant community’s sense of their own righteousness, heroism, and historical importance. Easily memorable, the tunes were often fiercely anti-Catholic and used as Protestant displays of power during the marching season. When passing through Catholic communities the drumming, flute playing, and singing would grow to a powerful roar, and it often elicited violent reactions from the Catholic observers. Consequently, the months of the marching season were often the most violent times in the Troubles.

An excellent example of an Orange Order parade song is “Derry’s Walls,” commemorating the Siege of Derry and the Apprentice Boys’ closing the Derry gates on the Catholic King James. As the tune tells the story, it relates three central Loyalist ideas: a history of blood sacrifice, “no popery,” and “no surrender.” Since their plantation in Ireland, many English, Welsh, and especially Scottish Protestants remained connected to the English crown and felt that they must give their lives to defend it against the Gaels and Catholics. The lines “When blood it flow in crimson streams / Through many a winter’s night / They knew the Lord was on their side” play directly into this idea, recalling past bloodshed while bringing attention to the sanctity of giving up one’s life for the faith. While this song is less explicit in its anti-Catholic sentiments, it does celebrate the defeat of the Catholic faith and the Protestant Ascendancy, the socioeconomic dominance of Protestants resulting from the restrictive laws against Catholics. During a march the message would be clear: Catholics were and continue to be the enemy. The final idea of “no surrender” is most apparent in the chorus, which claims, “We’ll fight and won’t surrender / But come when duty calls.” This uncompromising belief in their rightness becomes problematic when considering the Troubles. If the Protestants vow to fight until they have won, it seems unlikely that there can ever be complete peace. As long as the songs, parades, and unbending beliefs continue to be a part of the Unionist culture, followers will be ready to take up the sword and shield to guard against whatever new adversaries attack old Derry’s walls.

Although less focused on parades and celebrations, music factored crucially into the Republican tradition as well. Celebrating their Gaelic musical heritage and bringing specific attention to their own telling of history, Nationalists would sing songs of protest at meetings, in pubs, and in jail. These Republican tunes focused on particular ideas and events such as the 1916 uprising, Ireland’s traditional cultural legacy, and a long history of anti-Catholic discrimination and cruelty. Interestingly, the predominantly Cath-
olic songs concentrated mainly on abuses at the hands of the British Empire, rather than blindly hating Protestants simply based on religious differences. The Republican songs often told a much more personal and specific story of English cruelty. The “Songs from the Barricades” collection provides an excellent example of these kinds of intensely stirring tales like “The Battle of Inglis’ Bakery,” “The Ballad of Billy Reid,” and “The Wind That Shakes the Barley.” Much like the Orange songs, the Nationalist hymns were a kind of polarizing propaganda: initiating the listener into a cult of Republican folklore, history, and dogma.

A prime model of this type of song is “James Connolly,” memorializing the life of the famous revolutionary of the same name. When performed by the Dublin City Ramblers it gives a good idea of the Republican movement’s emphasis on Ireland’s time-honored musical heritage, with an easily accessible tune for all to sing. The song details the Nationalist focus on sacrifice for country and freedom. It celebrates Connolly because “His life for his country had vowed to lay down / he went to death like a true son of Ireland.” This demonizes the English firing squad, while raising Connolly to a heroic, godlike status. For many, it was the bold IRA who maintained this honorable tradition of rebellion, sacrificing their lives for a free, united Ireland, “as blood from their bodies flowed down Sackville Street.” These seditious words give an accurate picture of how history never died during the Troubles. Although the British may have killed Connolly years ago, his spirit of rebellion, liberty, and determination will remain while revolutionaries like the IRA continue to cry “no surrender” in face of continued abuse. In much the same way “Derry Walls” vowed to carry on fighting for Unionism, this song suggests a continually violent future as long as grievances against the English and the ghosts of men like Connolly remain fresh in people’s mind.

While paramilitary organizations and Republican sympathizers may have used the songs of their history, during the 1960s a different kind of revival of traditional Irish music occurred. Acting in response to the rapidly changing modern music scene and a lack of popular interest in Ireland’s undeniable musical roots, bands like The Chieftains revitalized traditional music while at the same time moving towards hybridity and experimentation. These ideas seem to resonate particularly with the civil rights demonstrators who demanded progress in the face of crippling strict traditions. The revival shifted “trad” music from “a primarily past-oriented practice” to more “present-oriented practices associated with discourses of authenticity and technical expertise.” This shift becomes spectacularly important when considering the combatants’ focus on their distinct senses of history. The revival points to the idea that only when focusing on the present and future can change and peace ever become options. Two examples of the use of folk and traditional music as means of change are that of Phil Coulter’s “The Town I Loved So Well” and Tommy Makem’s “Four Green Fields.”

Born and raised in Derry, musician Phil Coulter wrote perhaps his most emotional song about his boyhood home, and the destruction that came to it with the Troubles. Written in a melodic B flat minor, “The Town I Loved So Well” features a kind of dreamy, reminiscent flowing of notes that calls the listener back in time. For Coulter, that time was his childhood, spent in Derry in the 1950s. Coulter sings about the happiness of playing ball, the iconic images of men on the dole, and the sadness with which he left it all. Upon his return to Derry in the midst of the Troubles, his heart broke at the sight of the town that was destroyed by the violence of barbed wire, guns, armored cars, and bombs. Coulter’s last verse brings the message of the song home in the most powerful of ways:

They will not forget, but their hearts are set
On tomorrow and peace once again
For what’s done is done, and what’s won is won
And what’s lost is lost and gone forever:
I can only pray for a bright, brand new day
In the town I love so well

Coulter’s song becomes so moving because of its intensely personal account of the Troubles, and its avoidance of assigning blame. The town he loved so well, is simply a town, not an exclusively Catholic or Protestant neighborhood. Fingers are not pointed at the IRA or the B-Specials; rather, what matters is that fighting has destroyed a city and its common language: music. Just as Coulter helped revive the Irish “trad” movement, “The Town I Loved So Well” revives a city torn apart by violence. It shows the world as a resilient, hopeful, and peaceful people, rather than the brutal, divided city broadcasted by television and news reports. In this way, Coulter beautifully shows that only in accepting that “what’s done is done” and understanding the actions past can his brighter future be made a reality.
Although more Republican in its sympathies than “The Town I Loved So Well,” Tommy Makem’s “Four Green Fields” is another critical Troubles song in the traditional revival. An allegory for the divisions in Ireland resulting from imperial, religious, and political conflicts, each field symbolizes one of the four provinces of Ireland. In the spirit of the traditional revival, the song calls upon the brutal imagery of the past to construct a hopeful future for Ireland. The tune uses the familiar beautiful, pastoral image of Ireland to contrast with the murder and pillaging of the Irish people at the hands of the British. In this way, Makem’s song becomes reminiscent of a Republican anthem, blaming the English occupation for Ireland’s problems, and calling upon the idea of Republican’s continued sacrifice with the inciting words, “And my four green fields ran red with their blood.” While it is certainly anti-Unionist, the focus of the last verse shifts to the present and future oriented traditional revival. Makem expertly changes the focus from the predominantly nationalist historical perspective to a more peaceful vision of the future. Perhaps the most crucial moment in the song is during the lines “But my sons had sons, as brave as were their fathers / My fourth green field will bloom once again said she.” This resounding moment brings forward an image of a future of unity, peace, and a strong, national Ireland to be established by Ireland’s youth. This idea of peace is arguably different from that of Coulter’s. Makem’s Ireland is one that is strictly republican, and seems to require continued sacrifice to achieve an end to the Troubles. With this idea, “Four Green Fields” was even more of an adherent to a traditional structure in its continued reliance upon a national Ireland with past full of abuses, even when discussing a nonviolent future.

The long years of the Troubles were not simply politically turbulent times for the Irish, but were also a period of complex religious, social, and musical change. The story of Irish rock and roll is often said to have begun with the arrival of the Beatles in Dublin in 1963, which served to crystallize the different factors that led to the rock revolution. Many young Irish felt that they were oppressed by a staunchly conservative, overly religious, and downright boring culture, and the new musical styles brought a “kind of liberating hedonism.” After The Beatles, rock began to take its own course, dealing with difficult issues presented by the period’s critical social and political movements. Irish rock musicians also needed to reconcile the genre’s inherently foreign nature with their own Irish musical heritage. Rock music’s relationship with the Troubles is then understandably complex, but the songs of U2, The Cranberries, The Pogues, and Van Morrison can give at least some picture of their deep connection.

Releasing his seminal work Astral Weeks in Ireland only a month after the violence of the Troubles began to ravage Belfast, Van Morrison beautifully captures the dreamy, imaginative Belfast of his adolescence. The song that perhaps best conveys Morrison’s Belfast is the long, bluesy ballad “Cyprus Avenue.” The song drags him back to his life in the city with its coming-of-age, frustrated loves, working class life, and sense of mysticism.

The sheer ordinariness of the street—its tree-lined vista, the schoolgirls rhyming songs on their way home, the leaves falling in autumn—is conjured. However, this ordinariness then sparks a mediation on love and an evocation of the transcendent power of nature, the ability of a few trees, and falling leaves, or the snatch of a rhyme to lift the young Morrison out of the back streets and onto a higher level.14

In this way, Astral Weeks is indirectly one of the most powerful collections of songs of peace in the musical tradition of Troubles. The Belfast of Morrison’s memory was one of music, routine, transcendence, and love. The Belfast of the Troubles was one of silence, violence, and
death. Since the conflict, Morrison distanced himself from his home city, but he is consistently “caught up one more time on Cyprus Avenue.” Van Morrison’s self-imposed exile is telling of the North as it moves on from the Troubles: it must distance itself from its past, while finding meaning in the times when it is returned to its history. Accordingly, the beautifully poetic and remarkably banal life of the young Morrison is one of memory rather than history, an important distinction for the Troubles. While this dreamy, innocent Belfast lifestyle of *Astral Weeks* may never be recreated, the album provides a showcase of the potential present-day for Belfast to become a place of passion, dreams, and nostalgia for the young artists once more.

Van Morrison may have written of a dreamlike past of peace, but The Pogues wrote about the harsh reality of the frighteningly brutal present. Living as mainly second generation Irishmen in London, the band, led by Shane MacGowan, blended English punk styles with a distinctly Irish folk sound that was reminiscent of the Republican songs. The Pogues provided a voice for young, marginalized Irishmen both at home and abroad, “no small achievement in Thatcher’s Britain, where anti-Irish prejudice had become a routine response to the Provos vicious bombing campaign.” As a result, they were often proudly nationalist in their perspective, unlike many other rock acts during the time who denounced violence of any kind.

This is best evidenced in 1988’s “Streets of Sorrow / Birmingham Six”: a song divided into two movements connected by a single message, an idea that certainly resonated with the group’s Republican, anti-partition fans. The “Streets of Sorrow” section is a quiet, slow ballad lamenting how the streets of Belfast have been forever darkened by terror and killings. This movement simply decries the violence, without bridging the issue of politics, but it makes a quick transition into a fast-paced anti-British anthem. Even with its elements of a punked-up stereotypical Irish drinking song, “Birmingham Six” is a shockingly biting condemnation of the English justice system that wrongly imprisoned six Irishmen accused of setting off a bomb in a Birmingham pub. The song perhaps justly highlights the manipulation of English courts that framed men for “being Irish in the wrong place at the wrong time.” The most resounding condemnation comes with the verse:

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May the whores of the empire lie awake in their beds
And sweat as they count out the sins on their heads
While over in Ireland eight more men lie dead
Kicked down and shot in the back of the head.
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The song quite accurately questions the violent anti-Republican bias of the British courts and military, and suggests that nonviolence, while certainly attractive, is ineffective in the face of such abuses. It does an powerful job of capturing the very real and honest anger felt by many IRA and nationalist supporters against the British system of “justice” that went mostly unnoticed by other popular artists.

Any discussion of Irish rock would be incomplete without mentioning the legendary Dublin—based U2. Called “Ireland’s best known export in any field,” U2 has achieved an extraordinary level of worldwide stardom, performing everywhere from LiveAid to the inauguration of Barack Obama. Playing off this incredible success, the band was able to break across what seemed to be a silent boundary in rock music and release an overt Troubles song, “Sunday Bloody Sunday,” in 1983. The track has become nearly synonymous with the shocking events of January 20, 1972 in Derry, and contains a still-potent message about the nature of violence.
“Sunday Bloody Sunday” creates a tense, grating atmosphere from the start with its militaristic drumbeat, continuing guitar riff, and Bono’s soaring, pained vocals. This martial feel is starkly contrasted with the message within the lyrics that staunchly condemn the sectarian killings. If anything, Bono becomes a warrior for peace, singing “But I won’t heed the battle call / It puts my back up, puts my back up against the wall.” In doing this, U2 creates a message for peace that is both specific to the Troubles as well as universal in its appeal. In response to some criticisms about its “universalizing,” McLaughlin and McLoone argue that its mournful chant of the eponymous chorus and wordless opening invoke the Irish tradition of lament, while the drumming brings up the British war machine and the Republican and Unionist marches. In its both specific and universal demands for peace, the song reaches its height. The deaths due to the Troubles in Derry and in any conflict are an atrocity, and the true battle is to “claim the victory Jesus won” through nonviolence and love. Only by removing the “trench [that] is dug within our hearts” can we ever fulfill Bono’s vision of living as one.

One of the later entries into the Troubles’ musical canon is “Zombie” by the Limerick-based band The Cranberries. Although the band achieved commercial and critical success, “Zombie” has come under fire from a variety of sources. As the song’s release coincided with the emerging peace process in 1994, some claimed the song attempted to greedily cash in on the violence. Noel McLaughlin and Martin McLoone classified it as “arguably more conservative than British media representations of the Troubles at their height.” The song’s incredible success is still worth noting. It helped draw attention to the cost of violence and brought the struggles of the Troubles to the world stage once more.

“Zombie’s” success as a Troubles song lies in a few key components: its female voice, surprising aggression, and earnest lyrics and music video. Dolores O’Riordan’s role as a powerful woman’s voice is significant because it gives a uniquely female perspective on the affairs in a country that was still grappling with traditional gender roles. The track’s startling heaviness and grunge elements provide insights into the incalculable drain the killings and arrests of the Troubles had on a largely silent generation of women. The lyrics create an intense plea for peace, focusing only on the wrongness of violence of any kind. The Cranberries quite accurately blame the struggle on the “same old theme since 1916,” the lengthy history of brutality, discrimination, and destruction set off by the Easter Uprising. The song paints the paramilitaries as zombies: mindless individuals who got swept up by ideologies and propaganda, and participated in the beatings, bombings, and gun battles without realizing the uselessness of violence. Peace is only viable if both sides lay down their tanks, bombs, and guns, as well as their unfounded beliefs in their own righteousness. The accompanying music video is suitably dramatic, with images of soldiers, children playing, and most notably, O’Riordan painted completely in gold on a crucifix surrounded by silver angelic boys. This striking image sums up the song quite accurately: who and how many must be sacrificed for one side to be able to claim victory?

With the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland has worked to move on from its dark past in order to establish itself as a modern, trusted player on the world stage. Cer-
tainly one of the most effective means for renewed growth is for Belfast to revitalize its storied musical past. Indeed, with the success of events like the 2012 MTV European Video Music Awards, which earned Belfast $32 million, the government has found it increasingly profitable to support artists who have the power to bring life (and money) to Northern Ireland. One band indicative of Belfast’s re-emergence as a music center is Snow Patrol, which solidified its reputation as a world-famous band with the release of its smash hit “Chasing Cars” in 2006. Still, the band’s greatest song, at least when put in the context of the Troubles, is “Chocolate.”

With a series of simple chords and a driving beat, “Chocolate” gets its emotive power from lead singer and guitarist Gary Lightbody’s earnest vocals. At its best it is an honestly simple song about mistakes, regrets, and reconciliation. Despite its obviously personal subject, with Snow Patrol’s Belfast roots, it is difficult not to view the song through the lens of the Troubles. At the heart of the peace process is the idea that both parties involved have made terrible mistakes and must somehow learn to live through them, however hard that is to do. For Ireland’s generation coming of age in the aftermath of the Troubles, riddled with unemployment and teenage pregnancy, this is a promising idea. It is the message at the heart of Lightbody’s words: “With a name I’d never chosen I can make my first steps as a child of twenty-five.” The youth may have had no choice in the history they inherited, but they are given a remarkable chance to move forward. With a renewed interest in music and a general spirit of progress, Northern Ireland’s youth can realize at any moment that they’re aware they’re alive.

The Troubles continue to be one of the darkest periods of Ireland’s history, yet the country maintained an extensive and beautiful tradition of song through the violence. The era’s musical canon describes a culture on the edge of oblivion and the painfully human lives that were caught up in the madness: Catholic, Protestant, woman, soldier, child, and peaceful demonstrator. Indeed, it seems that the music permeated every facet of society, both causing violence and helping to bring it to an end. As with everything in the Troubles, it unavoidably comes down to history: the Irish have always used their distinct musical form to weave the tales of their past and present. Yet as Northern Ireland moves away from the clash of two irreconcilable senses of history, music provides an avenue for creating a singular, peaceful, and prosperous future.
Derry’s Walls
Unknown
The time has scarce gone round boys
Three hundred years ago
When rebels on old Derry’s walls
Their faces dare not show
When James and all his rebel band
Came up to Bishop’s Gate
With heart and hand and sword and shield
We forced him to retreat

We’ll fight and don’t surrender
But come when duty calls
With heart and hand and sword and shield
We’ll guard old Derry’s walls

When blood did flow in crimson streams
Through many a winter’s night
They knew the Lord was on their side
To help them in their fight
They nobly stood up on the walls
Determined for to fight
Or fight and gain the victory
And raise the crimson high

We’ll fight and don’t surrender
But come when duty calls
With heart and hand and sword and shield
We’ll guard old Derry’s walls

At last, at last with one broadside
Kind heaven sent them aid
The boom that crossed the Foyle was broke
And James he was dismayed
The banner boys that floated
Was run aloft with joy
God bless the hands that broke the boom
And saved the apprentice boys

James Connolly
Unknown
A great crowd had gathered outside of Kilmainham,
With their heads uncovered they knelt on the ground.

From inside that grim prison lay a brave Irish soldier,
His life for his country about to lay down.
He went to his death like a true son of Ireland,
The firing party he bravely did face,
Then the order rang out: “Present Arms, Fire!”
James Connolly fell into a ready-made grave.
The black flag they hoisted the cruel deed was over,
Gone was the man who loved Ireland so well.
There was many a sad heart in Dublin that morning,
When they murdered James Connolly, the Irish Rebel!

God’s curse on you, England, you cruel-hearted monster
Your deeds they would shame all the devils in hell.
There are no flowers blooming but the shamrock is growing
On the grave of James Connolly, the Irish Rebel!

Many years have rolled by since that Irish rebellion,
When the guns of Britannia they loudly did speak.
The bold I.R.A. they stood shoulder to shoulder,
And the blood from their bodies flowed down Sackville Street.
The Four Courts of Dublin the English bombarded,
The spirit of Freedom they tried hard to quell.
For above all the din rose the cry “No Surrender,”
’Twas the voice of James Connolly, the Irish Rebel.

The Town I Loved So Well

By: Phil Coulter
In my memory I will always see
the town that I have loved so well
Where our school played ball by the gasyard wall
and we laughed through the smoke and the smell
Going home in the rain, running up the dark lane
Past the jail and down behind the fountain
Those were happy days in so many, many ways
In the town I loved so well

In the early morning the shirt factory horn
called women from Creggan, the moor and the bog
While the men on the dole played a mother’s role,
Fed the children and then trained the dogs
And when times got tough there was just about enough
But they saw it through without complaining
For deep inside was a burning pride
in the town I loved so well

There was music there in the Derry air
like a language that we all could understand
I remember the day when I earned my first pay
And I played in a small pick-up band
There I spent my youth and to tell you the truth
I was sad to leave it all behind me
For I learned about life and I’d found a wife
In the town I loved so well

But when I returned how my eyes have burned
To see how a town could be brought to its knees
By the armoured cars and the bombed—out bars
And the gas that hangs on to every tree
Now the army’s installed by that old gasyard wall
And the damned barbed wire gets higher and higher
With their tanks and their guns, oh my God, what have they done
To the town I loved so well

Now the music’s gone but they carry on
For their spirit’s been bruised, never broken
They will not forget but their hearts are set
On tomorrow and peace once again
For what’s done is done and what’s won is won
And what’s lost is lost and gone forever
I can only pray for a bright, brand new day
In the town I loved so well

Four Green Fields
By: Tommy Makem
What did I have, said the fine old woman
What did I have, this proud old woman did say
I had four green fields, each one was a jewel
But strangers came and tried to take them from me
I had fine strong sons, who fought to save my jewels
They fought and they died, and that was my grief said she

Long time ago, said the fine old woman
Long time ago, this proud old woman did say
There was war and death, plundering and pillage
My children starved, by mountain, valley and sea
And their wailing cries, they shook the very heavens
My four green fields ran red with their blood, said she

What have I now, said the fine old woman
What have I now, this proud old woman did say
I have four green fields, one of them’s in bondage
In stranger’s hands, that tried to take it from me
But my sons had sons, as brave as were their fathers

My fourth green field will bloom once again
said she

Cyprus Avenue
By: Van Morrison
Well, I’m caught one more time
Up on Cyprus Avenue
Caught one more time
Up on Cyprus Avenue
And I’m conquered in a car seat
But my heart keeps beating faster
And my feet can’t keep still
And all the little girls rhyme something
On the way back home from school
And all the little girls rhyme something
On the way back home from school
And I may go crazy
Before that mansion on the hill
I may go crazy
Before that mansion on the hill
But my heart keeps beating faster
And my feet can’t keep still
And then to walk down
In the wind and the rain, darling
You keep walking down when the sun shone through the trees
Nobody, no, no, no, no, nobody stops me from loving you baby
So young and bold, fourteen-year old
Baby, baby, baby

Streets of Sorrow/Birmingham Six
By: The Pogues
Oh farewell you streets of sorrow
And farewell you streets of pain
I’ll not return to feel more sorrow
Nor to see more young men slain
Through the last six years I’ve lived through terror
And in the darkened streets the pain
Oh how I long to find some solace
In my mind I curse the strain
So farewell you streets of sorrow
And farewell you streets of pain
No I’ll not return to feel more sorrow
Nor to see more young men slain

There were six men in Birmingham
In Guildford there’s four
That were picked up and tortured
And framed by the law
And the filth got promotion
But they’re still doing time
For being Irish in the wrong place
And at the wrong time
In Ireland they’ll put you away in the Maze
In England they’ll keep you for seven long days
God help you if ever you’re caught on these shores
The coppers need someone
And they walk through that door
You’ll be counting years
First five, then ten
Growing old in a lonely hell
Round the yard and the stinking cell
From wall to wall, and back again
A curse on the judges, the coppers and screws
Who tortured the innocent, wrongly accused
For the price of promotion
And justice to sell
May the judged be their judges when they rot down in hell
You’ll be counting years
First five, then ten
Growing old in a lonely hell
Round the yard and the lousy cell
From wall to wall, and back again
May the whores of the empire lie awake in their beds
And sweat as they count out the sins on their heads
While over in Ireland eight more men lie dead
Kicked down and shot in the back of the head
You’ll be counting years
First five, then ten
Growing old in a freezing hell
Round the yard and the lousy cell
From wall to wall, and back again
You’ll be counting years
First five, then ten
Growing old in a lonely hell
Round the yard and the lousy cell
From wall to wall, and back again
Sunday Bloody Sunday
By: U2

I can’t believe the news today
Oh, I can’t close my eyes and make it go away
How long, how long must we sing this song?
‘Cause tonight we can be as one, tonight
Broken bottles under children’s feet
Bodies strewn across the dead end streets
But I won’t heed the battle call
It puts my back up, puts my back up against the wall
A curse on the judges, the coppers and screws
Who tortured the innocent, wrongly accused
For the price of promotion
And justice to sell
May the judged be their judges when they rot down in hell
You’ll be counting years
First five, then ten
Growing old in a lonely hell
Round the yard and the lousy cell
From wall to wall, and back again
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May the judged be their judges when they rot down in hell
You’ll be counting years
First five, then ten
Growing old in a lonely hell
Round the yard and the lousy cell
From wall to wall, and back again

Jesus won on Sunday Bloody Sunday
Sunday Bloody Sunday
Sunday Bloody Sunday

Zombie
By: The Cranberries
Another head hangs lowly,
Child is slowly taken.
And the violence caused such silence,
Who are we mistaken?
But you see, it’s not me, it’s not my family.
In your head, in your head they are fighting,
With their tanks and their bombs,
And their bombs and their guns.
In your head, in your head, they are crying...
In your head, in your head,
Zombie, zombie, zombie,
Hey, hey, hey. What’s in your head,
In your head,
Zombie, zombie, zombie?
Hey, hey, hey, oh, dou, dou, dou, dou,

Another mother’s breakin’,
Heart is taking over.
When the violence causes silence,
We must be mistaken.
It’s the same old theme since nineteen-sixteen.
In your head, in your head they’re still fighting,
With their tanks and their bombs,
And their bombs and their guns.
In your head, in your head, they are dying...
In your head, in your head,
Zombie, zombie, zombie,
Hey, hey, hey, What’s in your head,
In your head,
Zombie, zombie, zombie?
Hey, hey, hey, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh,
Oh, oh, oh, hey, oh, oh, ya, ya-a

Sunday Bloody Sunday
By: U2

“WITH HEART AND HAND AND SWORD AND SHIELD”
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“With heart and hand and sword and shield”
“WHAT PREYED ON GATSBY”

Feminine Sympathy in a Heternormative Society

Emily Simon

F. Scott Fitzgerald’s modern American classic The Great Gatsby is a novel often consigned to high school reading lists and reductive appraisals, which ignore the complexities underlying the text. Informed by the theory of Judith Butler, this article performs a queer theory reading of Gatsby: a theoretical approach that assesses the changeability of the self by analyzing narrative cues suggestive of variable gender and sexual identities. If queer theory identifies strains that run counter to an accepted, constructed norm, then the norm of Fitzgerald’s Jazz Age is what gender theorists term “heteronormativity,” which privileges heterosexuality as the organized, dominant sexuality. Jay Gatsby is postured as anti-normative by virtue of his purportedly feminine “extraordinary gift for hope,” so “What Preyed on Gatsby” becomes his failure to conform to the performative sexual binary of his time. Narrator Nick Carraway is both repulsed by and sympathetic to Gatsby’s “femininity,” and this complex response results in an equally complex narrative style, characterized by the mainstays of modernism: fragmentation, omission, and unreliability.
Critic H.L. Mencken, in his scathing 1925 review of the now-classic *The Great Gatsby*, condemns the eponymous character as possessing “the simple sentimentality of a somewhat sclerotic fat woman.”

The severity of Mencken’s attack may be attributable to his office as book critic, but the questions of gender identity raised by his pejorative assessment are integral to this seminal text of a society predicated upon the importance of public persona. That Mencken aligns sentimentality with femininity, and that he does so critically, suggests societal perception of this disposition as anti-masculine, and thus implicates traditional gender identity as socially constructed. Gender, in an era characterized as glittering and meretricious, augments societal performativity, in the sense of Judith Butler’s definition of gender as “a kind of imitation for which there is no original . . . a kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of the imitation itself.”

Jay Gatsby, by virtue of his “sentimentality,” and his “extraordinary gift for hope,” challenges the heterosexual “norm”—and especially the hypermasculine standard of the day—made a matter of fashion by Jazz Age society.

Gatsby, if one is to cautiously assent to Mencken’s assessment, is thus posited as a “queer” character—not for any homosexual tendencies, but for the manner in which his sentimental proclivities are anti-normative. Through the queer theory lens, in which such details advocate a reading that “criticiz[es] the dominant heterosexual binary, masculine/feminine, which enthrones ‘the’ two sexes and which casts other sexualities as abnormal, illicit, or criminal,” Gatsby’s character emphasizes the invalidity of this heterosexual binary through the very way in which he strives to match it.

An entirely self-made “man,” Gatsby vainly endeavors to achieve “heteronormativity”—to satisfy, through his performative public persona:

> the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent—that is, organized as a sexuality—but also privileged.

Couched in the importance of public perception, this gender identity is complicated by the subjective narration of Nick Carraway, who, as an unreliable narrator similarly striving for heteronormativity, is both repulsed by and sympathetic to Gatsby’s “femininity.”

It is thus that the “queer” details of Nick’s narration reenter the reader’s consciousness as deliberate Modernist techniques. Of his last night in New York, Nick recounts:

> I went over and looked at that huge incoherent failure of a house once more. On the white steps an obscene word, scrawled out by some boy with a piece of brick, stood out clearly in the moonlight, and I erased it.

For Nick, the act of narrating embodies this seemingly random action: the erasure of Gatsby’s “queer” behavior—denounced as “obscene” in the milieu—through narrative imbrication, to the point that Gatsby is superficially presented as heteronormative. The “interior rules” under which Nick Carraway operates aid Gatsby in his act of gender passing, though they are incommensurate to the task of forging an identity capable of withstanding traditional society’s strict binary.

Fitzgerald’s narrative omission and fragmentation, through employment of disruptive punctuation and the coding of Gatsby’s feminine characteristics in extended, “masculine” metaphors, ultimately betray the fallacy of socially-mandated gender performativity. Gatsby’s self entirely vanishes behind this narrative, beaten back into the private sphere by literary techniques that portend the dissolution of his persona at the hands of societal expectations. “What preyed on Gatsby” is ultimately his anti-normative sentimentality, and the way in which the heterosexual binary arrests it, threatening societal stagnation in the face of a rigid division.

Enforcement of this binary is embodied in the character of Tom Buchanan, who is presented as the paragon of heteronormative behavior by Nick’s coevally enchanted and cowed description. His physicality indicates the “privilege” bestowed upon this societal norm: its capacity for “enormous leverage” evokes his hypermasculinity as a vehicle of economic ascent. This ascent is predicated upon the subjugation of queer behavior, with which Nick’s narrative tone suggests solidarity; his fears are evident in his perception of Tom’s body as “cruel.” That Tom’s “shining arrogant eyes had established dominance over his face” mirrors the elected, but now-long entrenched, sovereignty of heteronormativity in society.

Tom’s presentation as “sturdy,” “established,” and “paternal” acknowledges the now compulsory nature of subjugation to the traditional gender norm, and the consequent fiscal success that it has ensured him. Gender roles have thus become delineated and performative in the manner defined by Butler: “Heterosexuality only constitutes itself as the original through a convincing act of repetition.”

Tom’s masculinity is figuratively realized in a recurring symbol within Gatsby: his home—itself synecdoche for the traditional, albeit illusory, American dream. So secure in his perennial American identity, Tom can afford “a sunken Italian garden,” while the “snub-
nosed motor-boat” haughtily personifies the assumed superiority which Nick imagines for Tom: that he is irrevocably right on the hollow grounds of simply being “stronger and more of a man than you are.”

With this same symbol, Fitzgerald disparately establishes Gatsby’s insufficient striving to appear similarly heteronormative. That same house that appears an “incoherent failure” at the novel’s end embodies the performative and forced nature of Gatsby’s public persona. Inasmuch as the West Egg figures as an imitation of East Egg, Gatsby’s mansion is “a factual imitation of some Hôtel de Ville in Normandy”—a hollow attempt to project established wealth. Gatsby’s performativity is betrayed by “the thin beard of raw ivy” incongruently enmeshing the “spanking new” building. Nick, sympathetically attributing to Gatsby the masculine seniority suggested by the modifier “beard,” only underscores its failings. The “tower on one side,” with its symbolically phallic over-compensation for Gatsby’s feminine qualities, reads as ungainly rather than authentic. Furthermore, in making the uninformed distinction that he was not yet aware that this mansion was Gatsby’s, but merely one “inhabited by a gentleman of that name,” Nick symbolically constructs Gatsby’s public identity as inhabited by a separate, unknown and private self. While Nick strives simply to vanish altogether, as his modest house “had been overlooked,” Gatsby paradoxically enterprises to divert attention by vanishing behind something so outrageously public. Through these literal constructs, both Gatsby’s actions and Nick’s narration project Gatsby’s heteronormative identity. To successfully pass as acceptably masculine means to “vanish”—a word effectively repeated throughout the novel—which accounts for the incompleteness of the narrative style.

It is thus fitting that, in Nick’s first interaction with Gatsby, Nick does not immediately recognize him. What follows Gatsby’s nominal introduction is Nick’s description of Gatsby’s smile, metonymically intimating Gatsby’s privately feminine self. Traditionally feminine sympathy is implicit in Gatsby’s “eternal reassurance” and “irresistible prejudice in your favor,” which suggests, moreover, Nick’s narrative sympathy for such tendencies. However, the employment of the characteristically Modern dash following the significant verb “vanished” divides the passage’s tone in two, consequently delineating the dichotomy between Gatsby’s private identity and his heteronormative performance. This narrative interruption suggests Nick’s revision of Gatsby’s character, just as Gatsby revises his own social persona, “picking his words with care.” This smile, of remarkably interior warmth, is set in direct opposition to the “exterior world” that Gatsby briefly opposes, but with which he ultimately strives to align himself. With the same caution that Nick’s corrective narration undertakes, Gatsby vanishes behind the outwardly heteronormative persona of an “elegant young roughneck” in the public eye.

It is within the conflation of public and private realms that this self-corrective performativity begins to attenuate. The act behind Gatsby’s identity is suggested in the confines of his closet, a word already rife with significance for gender theorists.
“the closet is a man’s collective words and actions that confirm his social alliance with heterosexual men while effectively hiding from public view—and sometimes from his own full consciousness—his potential femininity.”

then when Gatsby opens his closet to the outside world, he admits his heteronormative inauthenticity. His shirts represent masculinity and material prosperity, but that he has so many, and in a “many-colored disarray,” suggests a multiplicitous identity bordering on gender-schizophrenia. “Piled like bricks,” they form a protectively male wall around his private self, constructing an image of suppressive containment by society’s restrictive heterosexual binary. The shirts become Gatsby’s costume upon the stage of gender performativity, for which Daisy, in her own feminine sympathy, “began to cry stormily.” This hysteria perhaps acknowledges that it is Gatsby’s exclusion from the “rather distinguished society to which she and Tom belonged” that impels his perpetually histrionic life.

The shirts become Gatsby’s costume upon the stage of gender performativity, for which Daisy, in her own feminine sympathy, “began to cry stormily.” This hysteria perhaps acknowledges that it is Gatsby’s exclusion from the “rather distinguished society to which she and Tom belonged” that impels his perpetually histrionic life.

Permanent exclusion from this “society,” and thus the sexually polarized Jazz Age society as a whole, plays out figuratively within the peculiar dialogue that unfolds before the climactic trip to the Plaza Hotel. Nick again codes Gatsby’s anti-normative reservations in irrevocably masculine, suggestively phallic, metaphors: cars. Following Nick’s romantic musings on Daisy as “the golden girl,” ellipses dissolve this lyricism into Tom and Gatsby’s debate over transportation to the city, and more urgently, a polemic over the potency of their manhood. While Tom’s car is a hyper-masculine, stream-lined coupé, Gatsby’s is condemned as anti-normative, as an ungainly, showy “circus wagon.” Pitted against this privileged norm, Gatsby realizes the inevitable breakdown of his gender passing, in his dually significant objection, “I don’t think there’s much gas.” Tom counters with a condemnation of Gatsby’s performativity with the slight, “You can buy anything at a drug-store nowadays,” insinuating that Gatsby has purchased his projected identity. His public persona threatened, Gatsby belies his mysterious, private self with a look to which Nick ambiguously refers as “an undefinable expression, at once definitely unfamiliar and vaguely recognizable, as if I had only heard it described in words.” That it defies tangible expression suggests the suppression of anti-normativity from national consciousness, further realized in Fitzgerald’s Modern, stylistic omission. The dashes in Tom’s dialogue betray his inability to recognize existence outside of the heteronormative sphere; to disavow the insecurity of the heterosexual binary is to preserve the false sense of stability predicated upon this performative divide. In response to Tom’s “tentative” interaction with the car’s “unfamiliar gears”—suggestive of Gatsby’s illusory and dissentient manhood—Tom is unable to voice what it is that he finds queer about Gatsby, resisting any such challenge to the normative standard upon which his authority is founded. “Maybe you don’t believe that,” Tom consents, as he expresses his reservations to Nick and Jordan, “but science—” he protests before his own speciously theoretical existence halts him. For Tom, a man based in “ivory tower,” scientific theory, anything that dares to upset the societal balance becomes unmentionable: “obscene,” even. That the image of an Oxford man is, to Tom, incompatible with Gatsby’s “pink suit,” evokes a society couched in unchallenged and incontrovertible gender spheres. In the hands of this paragon of traditional heteronormativity, Gatsby’s identity proves to be anything but. The car, literally the agent of death for Myrtle, becomes the figurative agent of death for Gatsby’s projected identity. Thus, Gatsby fails because the heterosexual binary underlying the world of the novel does not allow for his “queer” attributes, suggesting the way in which society perpetuates sexual identity as a performance, and sexual norms as intractable, for “like all identity, sexual identity is a social construct subject to regulations and norms set against instabilities.” Gatsby’s femininity, embodied in the unstable character of Daisy, commandeers and crashes his last barrier of manhood, irrevocably preventing complete realization of his social aspirations. Instead, he careens into the “theoretical abyss” that had initially impelled his performativity.

“WHAT PREYED ON GATSBY”
The tragedy of Gatsby’s character, then, lies in the irreconciliability of his transgressive self with a genteel society entrenched in obsolete, and increasingly non-normal, “normalcy.” Fitzgerald, self-classified as “half-feminine” for the subjectivity and androgyny of his writing, leaves the novel’s ending narratively ambiguous. But it is the details that betray him, and the way in which identity is a social construct subject to the heterosexual norm. In his lyrical meditation on the American dream, Nick makes mention of “an aesthetic contemplation [man] neither understood nor desired.” It is this nebulous inking of feminine sympathy that is repressed by the social construction of heteronormativity, and it is this same proclivity that is quashed by Fitzgerald’s style. Just as the disruptive punctuation and fragmentation interrupt cogent and enduring thought, Gatsby’s public heterosexuality founders upon the smaller details, prey to the incompleteness of character imposed by societal standards. The sexual connotation of Nick’s progressive aspirations, in “the orgastic future” embodied by Gatsby’s romantic hopes, is cut off before its climax by the disruptive dash. This omissive punctuation figures as a barrier, embodying the binary that its literally linear nature signifies. The dash separates Nick from this dream’s fulfillment, for his understanding that this narrative will be read inhibits him from complete alignment with Gatsby’s alienated self. The “one fine morning” of authentic gender identity is unrealizable in a society in which this dichotomy is an enduring presence, manifest in the regressive statement succeeding this dash: “So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.” The progressive current, then, moves forward, but society reverts due to the heterosexual binary charged by Nick’s narration as contrived, and perhaps even unnatural.

That Nick incorporates the universal “we” into his conclusion suggests the social implications of Gatsby’s tragedy. “Whatever it was that kept [Tom and Daisy] together” is their careless, selfish concern for order: order manifested in a heterosexual binary that, through stagnating progression, reinforces their position in the social hierarchy. Bound by this stringent social construction, Gatsby must disappear behind a heteronormative projection of himself, until the reader’s true sense of Gatsby becomes as incoherent and fragmented as the narrative style. This Modern narrative suggests the very way in which society is “borne back ceaselessly” towards the “redemptive pastoralism of sex” framed by heteronormative institutions. If, national heterosexuality is the mechanism by which a core national culture can be imagined as a sanitized space of sentimental feeling and immaculate behavior, a space of pure citizenship, then it is regressive, fundamentally, by the fault of its imaginative foundations. Insofar as gender, like the act of Nick’s writing itself, is performative, it contributes to a societal ideal as illusory and caustic as the American dream to which Jay Gatsby, in his heteronormative aspirations, fell prey. If gender theorist Eve Sedgwick is valid in her claim that “our society could not cease to be homophobic and have its economic and political structures remain unchanged,” then Fitzgerald suggests that gender identity must return to a state predating performativity—if one exists—in which the territory of “normativity” is as uncharted as “the fresh green breast of the new world.”

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A POSSIBLE CURE

Reviewing the Efficacy of GABA Agonist Baclofen for Substance Dependence Disorders

ANDREW ABBATE

This article assesses the efficacy of the GABA agonist Baclofen as a treatment option for substance dependence disorders including alcohol, cocaine, and opioid dependencies. A systematic literature review synthesizes material from studies examining the effects of Baclofen on substance craving, abstinence promotion, self-administration rates, depression, and anxiety. Upon studied consideration of nine double-blind randomized controlled trials, it appears that Baclofen is an applicable pharmacotherapeutic agent for various substance disorders, as it lowers self-administration rates and craving and promotes self-abstinence. However, further long-term research investigating the relationship between Baclofen and psychotherapy is necessary before any conclusive results may be reached.
Introduction

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2002, there were over two billion alcohol users, one billion smokers, and 180,000,000 illicit drug users worldwide. These problematic statistics are said to account for over 10% of all deaths worldwide every year. In 2008, seven million people in the United States over the age of twelve were considered substance dependent. Thus, more research on intervention methods for substance use disorders is imperative.

While D2 dopamine receptor antagonists such as haloperidol and olanzepine may result in decreased release of dopamine and subsequent decline in rewarding behavior associated with drug use, usage of D2 receptor antagonists has been observed to result in Parkinson’s like symptoms in patients. As a result, the use of D2 antagonists has decreased, and alternative systems have been investigated for the treatment of substance use disorders.

This review will discuss the effectiveness of the GABA_B agonist baclofen in the treatment of substance use disorders related to the use of alcohol, cocaine, and opioids. The effectiveness of baclofen will also be compared to traditional pharmacotherapies traditionally employed in clinical settings, with mention of baclofen’s potential side-effect. The link between pathophysiology implicated in substance use disorders and the baclofen will also be discussed.

Data sources

A comprehensive literature search was performed using MEDLINE (01-01-1960 to 05-01-2011), Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (01-01-1960 to 05-01-2011), and the WorldCat library system (01-01-1960 to 05-01-2011). Search terms included: GABA_B agonist, addiction, and baclofen. Articles published in English reporting on animal and human data with specific methodological designs were used for this review. The inclusive experimental design criteria were that the experiment had to contain a sample size of at least ten participants, that the researchers included a placebo control, and that the administration of baclofen be double-blinded. Studies using a positive control were also included. This review discusses the findings of 9 randomized, double-blind controlled trials (n=429) that examined the effects of baclofen relating to factors such as substance craving, abstinence promotion, self-administration rates, and secondary substance related factors such as trait anxiety.

Addiction

Substance use disorders as defined by the DSM-IV TR

The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV TR) states that patients diagnosed with a substance use disorder can have one of two disorders: substance abuse or substance dependence. Substances such as alcohol, opioids, and cocaine all have similar diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV TR for substance use disorders, with the differences between the substances being accounted for by varying symptoms required for withdrawal to be established. The focus of this report will be substance dependence disorders.

Neurobiology of addiction

Research on substance use disorders and addiction traditionally focuses on the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, which consists of the ventral tegmental area (VTA), the nucleus accumbens, and the fibers connecting them. This system is implicated with the mechanisms behind reward behavior and motivation. Although dopaminergic drugs may differ in their mechanisms on this system, all known drugs of abuse have been observed to result in an elevation of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens. Of importance in this system are the receptors associated with the D2 like family of dopamine metabotropic G protein-coupled receptors, with the D2 receptor being of most importance.

GABA and addiction

GABA mediates its effects in GABAergic neurons by binding to and activating receptor types GABA_A and GABA_B. Both receptors elicit an inhibitory response, but they are ionotropic and metabotropic respectively.

GABA_B agonists are of particular interest, relating to their neurobiology influence in the brain areas involved in addiction. GABA_B receptors are distributed in various areas of the brain, where they are involved in both the excitatory and inhibitory processes involved in addiction via their presynaptic and postsynaptic mechanisms. GABA_B receptors are present as heteroreceptors on dopaminergic and glutamatergic neurons in the VTA, and as presynaptic autoreceptors on GABA interneurons.
Baclofen

Overview of baclofen

(RS)-4-amino-3-(4-chlorophenyl)butanoic acid (baclofen) is a lipophilic derivative of GABA, first synthesized in 1962 to improve the lipophilicity of GABA in order to achieve penetration of the blood brain barrier that administration of GABA would not normally achieve.\textsuperscript{15, 18} Baclofen was found to have two stereoisomers present, with a (R)-(-)-enantiomer and a (S)-(+) -enantiomer observed.\textsuperscript{19} Bowery et al. found that the (R)-(-)-enantiomer was over 100 times more active than the (S)-(+) -enantiomer with regards to reducing transmitter output, and that baclofen in general was as active as GABA with regards to reduction of transmitter output.\textsuperscript{19} Baclofen therefore acts as a selective agonist for GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} receptors.\textsuperscript{20} The GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} receptor agonist baclofen has been traditionally prescribed as a muscle relaxant for patients with spastic movement disorders\textsuperscript{20}, and appears to have promising results relating to the treatment of a variety of disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder and trait anxiety.\textsuperscript{21, 22}

Pharmacology of Baclofen

Baclofen is able to penetrate the blood-brain barrier because it is a butanoic acid derivative with a lipophilic phenyl ring.\textsuperscript{23} Baclofen selectively binds to and activates metabotropic GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} receptors, mediating inhibitory effects in the central and peripheral nervous systems. Baclofen can exhibit both anticonvulsant and pro-convulsant actions in a dose-dependent manner,\textsuperscript{20} likely because baclofen is not only observed to act as an agonist at GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} receptors, but has also been found to inhibit GABA release in the rat model by activating presynaptic GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} autoreceptors.\textsuperscript{24}

Pharmacodynamics of baclofen in addiction

Baclofen acts on a variety of systems in the nervous system areas related to addiction, most notably the dopaminergic and glutamatergic related systems. The use of iontophoretically administrated baclofen has demonstrated that baclofen peripherally blocked dopaminergic neuronal activity in the VTA, and that this inhibitory effect was reversed by administration of the GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} antagonist CGP 35348.\textsuperscript{25}

Results from studies using local injections of baclofen have also found that baclofen suppressed extracellular dopamine levels in the nucleus accumbens, and the prefrontal cortex.\textsuperscript{26-29} Studies have also shown that baclofen administration resulted in inhibitory effects on dopaminergic neuronal activity in the substantia nigra, the striatum, the nucleus accumbens, and the frontal cortex, and that these effects were reversed by the administration of the GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} antagonist SCH 50911.\textsuperscript{29, 30-32} The proposed mechanism of action for these effects is that baclofen may inhibit dopaminergic activity in the VTA via stimulation of the GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} receptors. These dopaminergic cell bodies are thought to project into the nucleus accumbens, and when baclofen hyperpolarizes these dopaminergic cell bodies, this potentially leads to the inhibition of dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens.\textsuperscript{13, 14, 16}

In alcohol dependence, it is likely that baclofen attenuates the reinforcing effects of alcohol by altering dopamine transmission in the mesolimbic system. VTA interneurons tonically inhibit dopamine release from dopamine containing neurons in the VTA.\textsuperscript{43, 46-51} Another possible mechanism is this metabotropic cAMP—PKA pathway in GABAergic neurons, which increases GABA\textsubscript{\textalpha} inhibitory postsynaptic potentials.\textsuperscript{52}

Concerning cocaine dependence, neuroimaging studies on cocaine use suggest that both cue and drug induced activation of the mesolimbic system correlate with drug craving in cocaine dependent subjects, and that a larger dopaminergic response to acute stimulant drug administration predicts more rapid acquisition of drug self-administration.\textsuperscript{55-56} Neuroimaging has also shown that the orbitofrontal cortex was hyperactive in proportion to the intensity of the craving following cocaine use.\textsuperscript{9, 10} This result reveals that chronic cocaine use leads to a reduction in dopamine D2 receptors and the amount of dopamine released by receptors.\textsuperscript{53, 54} These findings may explain why compulsive self-administration is observed even though there is a reduction in the amount of D2 dopamine receptors and the amount of dopamine they release in the brains of chronic cocaine users.\textsuperscript{57}

Further, baclofen’s actions on the glutamatergic and dopaminergic systems are involved in its application to treatment in cocaine abuse. Baclofen has been observed to attenuate the increase of extracellular glutamate levels in the nucleus accumbens that occurs during the process of conditioning locomotion to cues associated with cocaine.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, microdialysis experiments have demonstrated that baclofen attenuates non-contingent cocaine induced
increases in dopamine levels in the nucleus accumbens.\textsuperscript{26, 62} GABA\textsubscript{B} receptors are also localized on the presynaptic terminals of glutamatergic cell bodies in the prefrontal cortex, where they can attenuate extracellular glutamatergic levels associated with cue-induced conditioning of locomotion.\textsuperscript{33, 34}

**Clinical implications of baclofen**

*Alcohol dependence*

According to the WHO, there were over 76.3 million individuals worldwide with diagnosable alcohol use disorders in 2004.\textsuperscript{35} A major concern with the abuse of alcohol is that for most illicit drugs, alcohol is used in a simultaneous drug use context, but the DSM-IV TR only defines substance dependence disorders in a singular manner. This does not allow for comorbidity of substance use disorders, and clinical research normally only focuses on one specific substance even though participants are likely to be using multiple drugs.\textsuperscript{37} The concurrent use of alcohol with other substances has been shown to be synergistically more dangerous than the additive effects of the substances involved.\textsuperscript{38}

Current treatments for alcohol dependence include disulfiram, naltrexone, acamprosate, and topiramate. The two most used in clinical practice are disulfiram, used to block the metabolism of acetaldehyde in order to cause a conditioned association of nausea with alcohol use, and naltrexone, an opioid antagonist that decreases the pleasurable effects of alcohol. These treatments have had varying rates of success, with studies indicating that by three months post-treatment, over 40% of individuals have relapsed, and this statistic jumps to over 70% after twelve months post-treatment, indicating the need for alternatives.\textsuperscript{39} Conrod et al. found that the effects of the ascending limb of the blood alcohol concentration curve (BACC) were tied to increased release of dopamine, and the effects of the decaying limb of the BACC were tied to the effects of increased GABA release (which in turn also inhibits dopamine release); hence, baclofen may be applicable in treating alcohol dependence.\textsuperscript{36}

Another randomized, double-blind controlled trial (n=84) conducted by Addolorato et al. (2007) examined the effects of baclofen as an alcohol abstinence-promoting agent in alcohol dependent patients with liver cirrhosis over the course of twelve weeks. Administering 5 mg t.i.d for days 1-3 followed by 10 mg t.i.d for the remainder of the trial, they found that baclofen had a significant effect in promoting alcohol abstinence after thirty, sixty, and eighty-four days of use (p<0.0001). After thirty days of use, only six patients from the baclofen group (n=42) had relapsed, compared to sixteen in the placebo group (n=42). After sixty days, only eight from the baclofen group had relapsed, compared to nineteen in the placebo group (p<0.05). By the end of the trial, thirty individuals in the baclofen group were totally abstinent throughout the whole trial, compared to twelve in the placebo group.
They also found that baclofen use resulted in significant decreases in self-reported alcohol craving \((p<0.0001)\), and that the difference in alcohol abstinence observed was enough to observe significant reductions in clinical markers of liver injury, such as serum bilirubin and albumin.\(^6\)

In a four week randomized double-blind controlled study of ninety alcohol dependent patients with comorbid secondary anxiety or depression, the use of baclofen at 12.5mg t.i.d displayed the same anxiolytic effects as the 15mg per day diazepam and 75mg per day amitriptyline, without the sedation noticed by the latter two.\(^4\) Baclofen has also been shown to reverse the anxiogenic response induced by withdrawal from alcohol treatment.\(^4\) These results indicate that baclofen can also be useful in treating anxiety disorders for those diagnosed with alcohol dependence.

Cocaine dependence

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, cocaine is the fourth most used substance from the illicit substance category.\(^4\) Cocaine acts as a dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin re-uptake inhibitor by occupying a receptor on the transporter molecule correlated with each respective neurotransmitter.\(^5\)

Robbins et al. observed in their clinical trial that the average craving ratings during the cocaine use intervals were double the ratings given during intervals of abstinence, and that cocaine use was four times more likely to occur during a period of elevated craving than during comparison intervals, making any treatment that can reduce cocaine related craving essential to treating cocaine dependence.\(^6\)

Naltrexone, an opioid antagonist which was earlier discussed for alcohol dependence is also a commonly used pharmacotherapy for reducing cocaine craving, although relapse is quite high, with over 70% of patients relapsing within twelve months of substance abstinence.\(^7\) Thus, an alternative to naltrexone for cocaine dependence would be of use to the medical community.

Childress et al. found that cocaine video cues triggered craving and differential limbic system activation in cocaine patients not seen in control subjects. In a sample of seventeen patients with cocaine dependence, patients who were given baclofen (10-20mg BID) for seven to ten days prior to the PET session as a pre-treatment showed a substantial reduction in cue-induced craving compared to control subjects who received placebo, and did not show the same limbic system activation that the control subjects did. The regions that were activated in the subjects who did not receive baclofen were the anterior cingulate, right inferior parietal lobe, and the caudate nucleus.\(^8\)

A sixteen week randomized, double-blind controlled trial \((n=70)\) conducted by Shoptaw et al. found that subjects in the baclofen group \((n=35)\), who received baclofen 20mg t.i.d were less likely to test positive on a urinalysis \((p=0.001)\) for substance use than subjects in the placebo group \((n=35)\), which showed no significant effect, indicating baclofen promoted self-abstinence.\(^9\) This study was similar to the findings of a preliminary open label clinical trial conducted by Ling et al.\(^10\)

An experiment \((n=17)\) conducted in an in-patient unit using a mixed factorial design examined the differences in baclofen-induced responses following cocaine use on various factors such as self-administration and self-craving to cocaine relating to individuals who were either dependent on cocaine \((n=10)\), or individuals who were dependent on both cocaine and opioids \((n=7)\). This is the first such study examining the effects of baclofen on individuals diagnosed with more than one substance dependence disorder. The main difference between these two groups is that the cocaine and opioid dependent group (methadone group) were also receiving methadone for their opioid dependence, while the cocaine dependent group (non-methadone group) only received baclofen.\(^11\)

Over the course of twenty-one days, individuals were maintained on each of the baclofen dosages \((0 \text{ mg}, 30 \text{ mg}, 60 \text{ mg})\) for a period of seven days, and throughout these seven days, they were all exposed to each of the different cocaine conditions \((0, 12, 25, 50 \text{ mg})\). The baclofen conditions were administrated in a double-blind manner, while only the patients were blinded to the cocaine conditions, and subjects were blinded to the cocaine condition.

In the non-methadone group, only the 60mg per day baclofen maintenance condition displayed statistically significant decreases in 12mg cocaine self-administration compared to placebo, resulting in a 25% reduction of self-administration \([\text{three times compared to four observed in the placebo group, } (p<0.05)]\). The use of baclofen did not have statistically significant effect relating to self-adminis-
tation for the other 2 cocaine doses (25mg and 50mg). Baclofen did not alter cocaine self-administration in the group receiving methadone. This study also found that the 60mg per day baclofen condition in the methadone group significantly decreases self-reported cocaine craving following all active cocaine doses (p<0.0002).61

Opioid dependence

The opioid class of substances includes drugs such as morphine and heroin. Opioids have several receptors, which differ in their distribution in the CNS and their affinity for opioids. Opioids may be the third most used class of illicit substances, but they are the most dangerous group of illicit substances in the world, rated as the most addictive and as most notorious for reported overdoses.65

Opiate-related treatments have recently exhibited a large increase in North America, from 10% (2006) to 23% (2008), indicating a rise in prevalence use.2

Research conducted in transgenic animal models has suggested that opposing activity of the μ and κ opioid receptors form the basis for the dual euphoric-dysphoric activity of various addictive substances, along with the mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway projecting from the VTA to the nucleus accumbens, which is seen as a critical site for the initiation of psychological dependence on opioids.64-66

The more recent treatment of opioid dependence has focused on buprenorphine, naltrexone, and methadone. Buprenorphine is a partial agonist on the μ-opioid receptor found to be effective for reduction of opioid use, and promoting abstinence.67 Buprenorphine treatment is becoming as popular as methadone maintenance therapy,68 and may be a viable alternative to methadone outpatient treatment with respect to effectiveness and cost.59-71 As is the case with alcohol and cocaine dependence, studies using naltrexone for opioid dependence found that after a twelve month follow up, there was no difference observed between the naltrexone and placebo groups,72-73 along with the potential for naltrexone to display dose-related hepatotoxicity.74

A two week randomized, double-blind controlled trial (n=30) was conducted on opioid dependent patients to compare the effectiveness of baclofen to clonidine. They found that while both medications were equally effective in treating the physical symptoms of opioid withdrawal, the baclofen group (n=15) displayed significantly more effective results compared to the clonidine group (n=15) in treating mental symptoms associated with withdrawal (p=0.001), and that this difference was significant on the total scores recorded at the end of the trial (p<0.029).75

Assadi et al. performed a twelve week randomized, double-blind controlled trial study (n=40) to assess the effectiveness of baclofen as an opioid maintenance therapy on opioid dependent subjects. The subjects in their study received either 60mg of baclofen per day (20mg t.i.d) or placebo. They found that the baclofen group (n=20) had a significant effect in treatment retention (p<0.05) and opiate withdrawal syndrome (p<0.05) compared to the placebo group (n=20), and a non-significant effect on opioid craving (p=0.23).76

Assadi et al. also observed that attrition rates in their baclofen study were nearly twice the rates reported by studies on methadone and buprenorphine maintenance treatments that included psychological interventions along with the pharmaceutical intervention.77-80 These attrition rates are similar to these types of treatments when they do not include psychological interventions with the pharmacotherapy.76, 81

Limitations

A critical limitation of baclofen administration for substance use disorders is that the amount of research from clinical trials in human subjects is lacking, and although the results of trials seem to be positive, more clinical trials are required. There is a severe lack of clinical trials on the use of baclofen for substance use disorders compared to the other pharmacotherapies discussed in this report. There is also a lack of long-term studies on the efficacy of baclofen for substance use disorders compared to the FDA-approved pharmacotherapies discussed in this report. Due to these limitations, more research is required before baclofen should be recommended as a treatment for a substance use disorder.

Summary

Baclofen appears potentially applicable in treating various substance use disorders, as it elicits comparable results to current intervention methods utilized in clinical practices. Baclofen has been observed to have significant treatment effects in varying aspects of alcohol, cocaine, and opioid dependence such as lowering self-administration rates,
craving, and promoting self-abstinence. It is possible that baclofen attenuates the reinforcing effects of these substance use disorders involved in self-administration and craving by attenuating levels of extracellular dopamine and glutamate in brain areas involved in addiction.

Future studies should investigate the relationship between the effectiveness of baclofen administration when implemented alongside some form of psychotherapy, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, compared to the use of baclofen alone on outcomes such as self-abstinence, relapse rates, self-administration, and craving. Due to the low risk of serious adverse events from the dosages of baclofen utilized in clinical research (shown in table 1), and the lack of trials examining the long-term effects of baclofen administration relating to substance use disorders, it is imperative that more research on this topic be conducted to determine reliable rates of relapse following discontinuation of medication and benefit from baclofen use.

ENDNOTES

71. Simoens S, Matheson C, Bond C, Inkster K, Ludbrook A. The effectiveness of community maintenance with methadone or bu-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance Use Disorder</th>
<th>Study Design</th>
<th>Number of Subjects</th>
<th>Study Length (weeks)</th>
<th>Primary Results</th>
<th>Baclofen dose (mg)</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alcohol Dependence</td>
<td>DB*, RCT †</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Promoted self-abstinence, lowered trait anxiety, lowered daily drink intake</td>
<td>10 (t.i.d.)</td>
<td>Addolorato et al.⁴⁰</td>
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<td>DB, RCT</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reduction in daily drink intake</td>
<td>10-20 (t.i.d.)</td>
<td>Addolorato et al.⁴¹</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Promoted self-abstinence, lowered reported craving</td>
<td>20 (t.i.d.)</td>
<td>Addolorato et al.⁴²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcohol Dependence</td>
<td>DB, RCT</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anxiolytic effects without sedation</td>
<td>12.5 (t.i.d.)</td>
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<td>Cocaine Dependence</td>
<td>DB, RCT</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reduced cue-induced craving</td>
<td>10-20 (twice a day)</td>
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<td>DB, RCT</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Promoted self-abstinence</td>
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<td>Shoptaw et al.⁵⁹</td>
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<td>Cocaine Dependence</td>
<td>DB, RCT</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Decreased self-administration, decreased reported craving</td>
<td>20 (t.i.d.)</td>
<td>Haney et al.⁶¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opioid Dependence</td>
<td>DB, RCT</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>As effective as clonidine in treating physical symptoms of opiate withdrawal syndrome, more effect than clonidine in treating mental withdrawal symptoms</td>
<td>12.5 (t.i.d.)</td>
<td>Ahmadi-Abhari et al.⁷¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opioid Dependence</td>
<td>DB, RCT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Higher rates of treatment retention and lowered effects of opiate withdrawal syndrome</td>
<td>20 (t.i.d.)</td>
<td>Assadi et al.⁷⁶</td>
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Table 1. Summary of Clinical Trials
* = double blind; † = randomized controlled trial; ‡ = three times in a day
ON THE SURFACE, RECREATIONAL SPORT AND WARTIME SERVICE SEEM WORLDS AWAY. HOWEVER, IN
TIMES OF WAR, WHEN INCOMPREHENSIBLE HORRORS BECOME COMMONPLACE, SPORT CAN OFFER
A DIVERSION TO COUNTER THE FOMENTATION OF DESPAIR IN THE RANKS. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RICH BRITISH SPORTING CULTURE—ESPECIALLY THAT OF FOOT-
BALL—AND A SOLDIER’S DUTY ON THE FRONT. DURING WORLD WAR I, BRITISH SOLDIERS IN BAT-
TLE, AND THEIR FAMILIES BACK HOME, VIEWED WAR THROUGH THE LENS OF SPORT IN ORDER TO
COPE WITH THE STRUGGLES AND DISILLUSIONMENT ENGENDERED BY CONFLICT. TOGETHER, THEY
FACED THE “GREAT MATCH” OF WORLD WAR I WITH A MINDSET THAT MADE THEIR TOILS MORE
FAMILIAR TO THEM, AND SERVED AS A REMINDER OF THE GREAT CAUSE FOR WHICH THEY FOUGHT.
The assiduous and organized cultivation of sport, and what is more important the spirit of sport, has become one of the most distinctive marks of the British Army, and it will be a task worthy of the greatest historians to record what this sporting spirit has done . . . for the British army . . . for the British Empire.¹

—Field Magazine, 16 March 1918

Introduction

It was 7:30 AM on July 1, 1916 when Captain Nevill of the East Surrey Regiment kicked a football into no man’s land, signaling the start of a battle that would claim 57,470 lives by nightfall.² An observing soldier noted:

as the gun-fire died away I saw an infantryman climb into no man’s land, beckoning others to follow. As he did so he kicked off a football; a good kick, the ball rose and travelled well towards the German line. That seemed to be the signal to advance.³

Traversing three hundred yards to the German trenches, British soldiers dribbled the four footballs provided by Nevill as a reassuringly familiar symbol to rationalize the lunacy of their charge.

Captain Nevill’s kick into no man’s land at the Battle of the Somme encapsulates, in miniature characteristic, features of the British sporting culture that pervaded World War I. The historian Colin Veitch writes:

it has passed into British folklore as illustrative of the national sporting character; an act of bravado that was shared by a group of men united in their devotion to sport.⁴

England’s sporting culture had a profound impact on how the British soldier perceived World War I. This study is confined to the front, where British anxiety and sporting culture was most pronounced, and focuses largely on football: the most popular sport both in England and on the front.

As far back as the Middle Ages, England’s sporting culture transcends its history as a nation. This is best illustrated by Victorian and Edwardian “public schools” where sport was introduced for didactic purposes. Much literature is emerging on this important topic, such as J.A. Mangan’s book Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology. Henry Allingham, in his biography Kitchener’s Last Volunteer: The Life of Henry Allingham, affirmed the undeniable existence of a sporting-curriculum in British public schools. For the privileged products of the public schools sport was an opportunity to participate in a group activity. According to a number of secondary sources, it is evident that Victorian and Edwardian public schools built the framework for a perdurable sporting mindset that evolved into a national characteristic.

With the inclusion of blue-collar laborers, sport in Great Britain was rapidly popularized. For the working classes, access to cheap sport was a relief from the drudgery and toils of the factories, coal mines, and mills. Colin Veitch’s work, “‘Play Up! Play Up!‘ the Nation and the First World War,” effectively argues that football was popularized by the working class before the Great War. Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi’s book Sport and the Military: the British Armed Forces 1880-1960 has been an excellent source regarding the influx of sport enthusiasts in England.

The popularization of sport coincided with British involvement in World War I. The historian Peter Simkins argues in his book Kitchener’s New Army: The Raising of New Armies, 1914-1916 that it was a wave of patriotism that created the excitement for war. I contend that the pre-war sporting boom generated the wartime fervour. This is evidenced by an increase in sport recruitment propaganda. With war looming, recruiters exploited the sporting culture in Great Britain. Wartime propaganda took many forms throughout this period. I will focus on wartime recruitment poetry and posters to show that recruiters framed their strategy around the sporting boom in England. I rely on war recruitment propaganda found in The Times as a reliable source, but also James Walvin’s The People’s Game: A Social History of British Football.

British soldiers entered the war expecting a “great match.” Captain Nevill’s notorious kick at the Somme is symbolic of this prevalent sporting mindset. The tragic irony of Nevill’s kick is that he was shortly cut down by German bullets, a sharp contrast between sport and war, fantasy and reality. Paul Fussell contends in his book The Great War and Modern Memory that war is innately ironic, calling the Great War a “satire of circumstance.” This irony would inevitably lead to disillusionment, a position argued by Colin Veitch in “‘Play Up! Play Up! and Win the War!’ Football, the Nation and the First World War.” I support positions taken by Fussell and Veitch, and have referred to John Lewis’s collection of firsthand accounts The Mammoth Book of Eyewitness World War I to show that soldiers’ visions of the war were thoroughly shattered by the realities of industrialized warfare.

PLAYING THE GREATER GAME
I will expand on Fussell and Veitch’s position and argue that the British sporting-war philosophy paradoxically disillusioned soldiers while simultaneously functioning as a coping mechanism. To cope with their disillusionment, troops reverted to their roots in British sporting culture. John Fuller’s book *Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918* and numerous wartime journal entries indicate that under duress, soldiers used sport to rationalize and humanize the horrors of the front. Sport functioned in this way as a familiar point of contact in an otherwise indistinguishable world.

As a recreational activity and memory of the past, British soldiers used sport to create a sphere separate from the horrors of the front. Richard Tawney, in *The Attack, and Other Papers*, and John Fuller suggest that soldiers created a “New England” in the trenches, transposing activities and values characteristic of their motherland to the front.

Mason and Riedi write:

> If sport, despite the assertions of its enthusiasts, did not quite win the war, it nonetheless played an important part in the experiences of many soldiers between 1914 and 1918. As a distraction from the horrors of the conflict, as much-needed amusement and diversion, and as a link with home and civilian life, sport helped to make war bearable.¹

Though the value of sport in wartime is implied by numerous scholars, little has been written explicitly on this subject. An extensive study of the works of these scholars supplemented original primary source research will reveal the profound impact of the sporting spirit on England’s World War I experience.

**England’s Sporting War**

The British sporting culture dates back as early as the Middle Ages. This is evidenced by “The English Bowman’s Glory,” a hymn written in 1415 commemorating Henry V’s victory in Northern France:

> Agincourt, Agincourt!  
> Know ye not Agincourt?  
> Oh, it was noble sport!  
> Then did we owe men;  
> Men, who a victory won us  
> ’Gainst any odds among us:  
> Such were our bowmen.⁶

As an early example of the British sporting culture, the hymn pays homage to:

> the games and field-sports in which [the author] acquired the basal elements of all true discipline - confidence in his companions and readiness to sacrifice the desire for personal distinction to the common interest of his team, which is, of course, a mimic army in being.⁷

Educationalists realized that team sports fostered discipline and self-control while simultaneously contributing to the character development of the British youth. British public schools introduced sport to better prepare those who would form the elite of the British empire.⁸ After defeating Napoleon Bonaparte, the famous English general Lord Wellington reportedly said “the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.”⁹ The authenticity of the source is challenged, but the point is valid. Eton is the best known of the elite public schools located down the road from Windsor Castle, and we may surmise that football was popular as early as 1519 from a sentence written for translation: “We will play with a bag full of wynde.”¹⁰

The notion that sport imparted important life skills was strengthened in Victorian and Edwardian public schools. Colin Veitch notes:

> private educational establishments known as “public schools” . . . began to encourage the introduction of games into the curriculum for distinct moral and educational purposes.¹¹

Sport was so important in communicating life skills that some headmasters, like Hely Hutchinson Almond of the
Loretto School, considered it the lifeblood of the public school system. The headmaster of Harrow School said in 1906, “the spirit of subordination and cooperation, the complete authority, the ready obedience, the self-respect and self-sacrifice of the playing field enter largely into life.”

In his autobiography, Rigger Aero Henry Allingham, the last survivor of Kitchener’s New Army, who died in 2009 at the age of 113, acknowledged the prominent role sport played in his adolescent life. A product of the Fourth Avenue School in Manor Park, Allingham learned sport at a young age. “It was at this school that I discovered sport. I loved playing football and cricket.”

Heralding the rise of a sporting culture in Great Britain, Allingham’s early childhood, like that of many British youths, was ridden with sport.

Usually I played in the streets after school was over with friends who were always keen for a game. When we played football we used coats for goalposts. But I preferred cricket, had my own bat and used lampposts for wickets.

Using coats for goalposts and lampposts for wickets portrays the British youth as an ardent sport lover, ready to play at the drop of a hat.

Lessons taught to British youths transcended public schools and exerted their influence over the populace. Fee-paying public school students embraced football as a civilized sport that taught the importance of teamwork and sportsmanship. These privileged products of the public schools imparted lessons learned through sport on their communities. Veitch writes:

the belief in the simple linear equation “games build character” blossomed. In the following years, it became self-supporting and self-generating as the influential products of the public school system left their “alma maters,” taking with them their enthusiasm for games.

When the working class embraced football in the late nineteenth century, England experienced a sporting “boom.” Several mid-nineteenth century Factory Acts afforded workers more recreational time, which they spent playing football. Veitch comments:
football, or “soccer” as it had become known, had been rapturously embraced by the working class, and the teams emerging from the industrial heartlands of England . . . began to gain ascendency.\footnote{18}

Mason and Riedi acknowledge football’s rapid increase in popularity:

between 1875 and 1884 the average attendance at FA [Football Association] Cup finals in England was 4,900; by 1905-14, it had risen to 79,300.\footnote{19}

An increase of almost 75,000 fans in just twenty years is testament to the rising popularity of football in British society. With the inclusion of the working class, sport had become part of the social and ideological make-up of the British.\footnote{20}

When Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated on June 28, 1914, the wheels of war were set in motion. Following declarations of war made by Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany, and France, Great Britain issued its declaration on August 4, 1914. Influenced by a relatively peaceful time period and a sporting boom, many Englishmen anticipated the war with sporting optimism. Osbert Sitwell has remarked that before the war,

\begin{quote}
We were still in the trough of peace that had lasted a hundred years between two great conflicts. In it, such wars as arose were not general, but only a brief armed version of the Olympic games. You won a round; the enemy won the next. There was no talk of extermination, or of Fights to a Finish, than would occur in a boxing match.\footnote{21}
\end{quote}

As a distinct national characteristic, the notion of fighting as the greatest of all games transcended early British history and revealed itself in attitudes towards the Great War. It was not long before the British began linking success in sport to success in warfare. This was particularly true in public schools. Mason and Riedi comment:

\begin{quote}
the belief that sport and war were in some sense the same, that sport was “mimic war” and war only the “greater game,” was certainly firmly held in the late Victorian and Edwardian public schools.\footnote{22}
\end{quote}

It was commonly maintained that British public schools groomed officers, and, as British military influence spread throughout the globe, there developed a familiar stereotype of the schoolboy-sportsman-soldier, patriotically doing his duty throughout the empire.\footnote{23}

War recruitment propaganda recognized this undercurrent of sporting enthusiasm and successfully implemented it as a strategy. Glorifying the war as the most noble and honourable game to play, newspapers, literary works, posters, and other forms of propaganda reinforced the sporting-war mentality in enlistees. Two weeks after the war began in 1914, \textit{The Times} published Robert E. Vernede’s “The Call”:

\begin{quote}
Lad with the merry smile and the eyes,
Quick as hawk’s and clear as the day,
You, who have counted the game the prize,
Here is the game of games to play.
Never a goal—the captains say—
Matches the one that’s needed now:
Put the old blazer and cap away,
England’s colours await your brow.\footnote{24}
\end{quote}

This blatant call to arms played on the powerful analogy between sport and war to attract youths to the fray. “Put the old blazer and cap away” was a direct reference to public school students, which emphasizes their important contribution to the sporting-war mentality.

Recruiters transferred the concept of teamwork in sport to teamwork in war. The call to participate in the “greater game” effectively likened a player’s duty to his team to a civilian’s duty to his country. Poet A. Lochhead’s first stanza of “The Game” declares:

\begin{quote}
Take your place in a greater game
Where worthier deeds are done . . .
But rally all! if you’re men at all,
there’s room in the team for you.\footnote{25}
\end{quote}

His second stanza:

\begin{quote}
You may find your place in the battle-front
If you’d play the forward game,
To carry the trench and man the guns
With dash and deadly aim.
O, the field is wide, and the foe is strong,
And it’s far from wing to wing,
But we’ll carry through, and it’s there that you
May shoot for your flag and King.\footnote{26}
\end{quote}
Curiously, the Germans used British sporting-enthusiasm in their own propaganda. Claiming that the British were too occupied with sport to participate in war, German propaganda underscored the prominent sporting culture in England. In response to this German claim, a British poster encouraged soldiers to “Give them the Lie! Play the Greater Game and Join the Football Battalion.”

Recruiters emphasized that soldiers were similar to footballers. The publicity department of the Central London Recruiting Depot issued a poster in November 1914 which read, “Men of Millwall. Hundreds of football enthusiasts are joining the army daily. Don’t be left behind. Let the enemy hear the ‘Lions roar.’” Appealing to British sport enthusiasts, the football recruiting drive implied that sport and war walked hand-in-hand. The Football Association reinforced the analogy with its own recruitment tactics, using matches and tournaments as recruiting drives. In stadiums throughout England, football clubs appealed to the crowd to take up the war effort. James Walvin writes, “footballers often set the example for their followers by joining the forces in front of the assembled crowd.”

Glorified athletes championing the war effort in front of their devoted fans reinforced the sportsmanlike emphasis to enlisting. A poster displayed at a London football ground read:

Do you want to be a Chelsea Die-Hard?
If so
Join the 17th Battalion
Middlesex Regiment
“The Old Die-Hards”
And follow the lead given
by your Favourite Football Players.

The Football Association estimated that its recruitment tactic contributed more than 500,000 men to the war effort by the end of 1914, almost half of the 1,186,337 volunteers of that year.

Convinced that the war would be a great match, British citizens voluntarily enlisted by the thousands. British enthusiasm was marked by recruitment queues up to a mile long. The Times noted:

Fueled by a sporting boom and encouraged through wartime propaganda, the British entered the war with sportsmanlike enthusiasm. This is especially true for citizens with a background in sport, like the alums of the Victorian and Edwardian public school system. Veitch writes “the public school and university men responded to the nation’s plight with alacrity.” Pam Salzmann’s picture shows a long line of men ready for battle, an indication of successful recruiting and British enthusiasm.

British sporting culture, which was influential in the recruitment process, retained its prominence on the front. Describing the British in World War I, Richard Tawney writes:

when, as has happened in the present war, men have taken up arms under the influence of some emotion or principle, they tend to be ruled by the idea which compelled them to enlist.

Nevill’s kick at the Somme reinforces the notion that the British thought they were “playing the game.” Caton Woodville’s elegy commemorating the event provides an apt summary of the British sporting mentality:

On through the heart of slaughter
Where gallant comrades fall
Where blood is poured like water
They drive the trickling ball
The fear of death before them
Is but an empty name
True to the land that bore them
The SURREYS play the game.

The elegy pays homage to England’s sporting culture and the impact it had on the British perception of the war.

Soldiers confidently bragged that they would be home for Christmas. More importantly, soldiers earnestly believed that they would be. British hubris is further evidenced by the quixotic vision of going “home to tea.” Donald Hankey of the first Royal Warwickshire Regiment wrote:
Battle! Battle, murder and sudden death. Maiming, slaughter, blood, extremities of fear and discomfort and pain! How incredibly remote all that seems. We don’t believe in it really. It is just a great game we are learning. It is part of the game to make little short rushes in extended order, to lie on our bellies and keep our heads down, snap our rifles and fix our bayonets. Just a game, that’s all, and then home to tea.48

The mantra “home to tea” expressed similar confidence that the war would be a series of quickly decided matches. Conditioned to see war as analogous to sport, soldiers became disillusioned once they reached the front. The horrors of industrialized warfare were inconceivable, and British soldiers, with lofty expectations of a swift, sporting victory, had difficulty transitioning. One British soldier in the 17th Battalion Highland Light Infantry noted his first experience:

nothing we had ever seen or heard of could prepare us for that terrible initiation period, when we encountered more difficulties and hardships than we had ever dreamt of in our philosophy.49

“Our philosophy” refers to the British mindset molded by a prevalent sporting culture. Many soldiers were utterly confused once they reached the front.

A similar disillusionment permeated the home front. The surge of enthusiasm leading up to the war conditioned the British public to think like the soldiers. Also expecting a quickly decided war, handled in a sporting fashion, the public was stunned when they learned of the horrors of the front. Michael MacDonagh, a Times journalist, wrote in October 1914:

A large section of the public continue to suffer from the first bewildering shock of being at war. Their nerves are still jangling, and they are subject to hallucinations. They seem to be enveloped in a mysterious darkness . . .46

The great American cultural and literary historian Paul Fussell notes that the war seemed to develop into a satire of circumstance. British naïveté manifested itself in “the universal commitment to the sporting spirit,” as he writes.50 Seen in this light, Nevill’s kick reinforces Fussell’s satire of circumstance. Contrary to British expectations, the Great War lasted four years and resulted in more than 887,000 casualties.42 Landscapes bombed to oblivion, towns pulverized and vacant, homes exploded to pieces, families grieving and confused, bodies rendered useless: this was the reality soldiers faced during the Great War. Constant mental and physical anguish pushed the soldier to the limits and challenged his semblance of humanity. How did soldiers deal with this “satire of circumstance”?

If Nevill’s kick reveals a level of absurdity in the British sporting mindset, it may also reinforce the notion that sport functioned as a coping mechanism in times of duress. Kicking the ball through no man’s land may have been Nevill’s method for rationalizing the lunacy of charging head on into enemy fire. By simplifying the attack to something accessible, he was able to make sense of the situation. Arnaud Waquet aptly describes football “as an analogy of the ‘Great Match’ played in the trenches.”43 Many British soldiers viewed it the same way—as a competition between two nations. John G. Fuller writes:

the idea of such a contest, in which lives were forfeit for no larger reason than rivalry, was sufficiently absurd, but it was as
just such a mad contest of nations, arranged and staged by the politicians, that the war appeared to many men.\textsuperscript{44}

Reducing war to a game helped soldiers to understand why they were fighting.

The tendency to compare war to sport is not altogether irrational. The similarities between trench raids and football matches are clear even to the non-participant. After careful deliberation, the invading party devised a plan of attack and advanced into no man’s land. This is similar to a coach drawing up a play and testing it on the pitch. Making the initial climb over the parapet required a distraction. A \textit{New York Times} article likened this to “an ‘interference,’ as they say in football.”\textsuperscript{45} Dodging bullets and explosions as if they were defenders, soldiers advanced towards the enemy like players dribbling and passing the football while the defending team protected their territory, or goal if you will. Trenches were, in effect, the sidelines filled with “substitutes” to replace injured (or dead) players. Soldiers were the players, generals the coaches, and the objective was to win. Nevill’s kick into no man’s land signaled the start of the game.

Soldiers came equipped with a built-in coping mechanism that helped them humanize the front and overcome their disillusionment. Mason and Riedi write “the realities of mass warfare did not immediately curb the Edwardian tendency to see sport and war as versions of each other.”\textsuperscript{46} This is suggestive of a paradox. Soldiers entered the fray with sporting enthusiasm, leading to disillusionment once exposed to the harsh realities of the front. To overcome this disillusionment, soldiers reverted back to their sporting enthusiasm as a coping mechanism. A soldier wrote in \textit{The Outpost}:

\begin{quote}
There is no doubt about it, life out here is pretty much what we make it, and we, who always make the best of everything, never let the thought of war interfere with our enjoyment.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

Even death, the most overwhelming source of disillusionment, was streamlined. To cope with the inescapable

A perdurable method of rationalization, soldiers belittled death and thereby suspended the gripping realities of warfare. A poem composed for the 23rd Royal Fusiliers’ exploits on July 27, 1916 honored the men who lost their lives at Delville Wood:

\begin{quote}
Aye, and the game was good,
A game for a man to play,
though there’s many that lie in Delville Wood
Awaiting the Judgement Day.
But living and dead are made
One till the final call
When we meet once more on the Last Parade,
Soldiers and Sportsmen all!\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

Testament to the intensity of the fighting, soldiers aptly referred to the struggle as the battle at “The Devil’s Wood,” a revealing title exposing the nature and severity of the fight. Yet, soldiers disparaged the war by calling it a “game for a man to play,” a cognitive attempt to downplay the extremities of the perturbing battle.

A prominent characteristic of British culture, the sporting mindset prevailed in times of turmoil. The overwhelming presence of death in the trenches necessitated coping strategies, lest the soldiers lose their sanity. Fuller writes that British soldiers “carried over from civilian life many institutions and attitudes which helped them to adjust to, and humanize, the new world in which they found themselves.”\textsuperscript{49} Part of sport’s value in the Great War may have been that it provided a familiar point of contact for soldiers.\textsuperscript{50} This “familiar point of contact” was utilized as an analogy. Pammm Kellett writes that the analogy “assist[ed] in general understanding of complex terms and situations.”\textsuperscript{51}

Private Frank Richards of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers compared his near-death experience to a horse race:

\begin{quote}
“Battle! Battle, murder and sudden death. Maiming, slaughter, blood, extremities of fear and discomfort and pain! . . . It is just a game we are learning . . . Just a game, that’s all, and then home to tea.”
\end{quote}
He passed word up the trench for the whole platoon to open out with rapid fire which would make the enemy keep their heads down and give us a decent chance to get home without being hit. We got back safely; I never knew how well I could jump until that morning. I was out of the ditch and into the trench in the twinkling of an eye: Duffy said that I clared the parapet like a Grand National winner.

Metaphorically speaking, Private Richards’s race against death through obstacle-ridden no man’s land was like a National Hunt horse race, where horses traversed obstacles and jumped trenches and fences. His survival meant that he was the “Grand National winner.” During the Battle of Aubers Ridge in 1915, Lionel Sotheby, a junior officer in France, simplified the horrors of the battlefield to something comprehensible: cricket.

Enemy started shelling us with pip squeaks & high explosive shrapnel, an awful deadly weapon. Each ball of which when the shell bursts 30 feet up, will make a hole in the ground big enough to place a cricket ball in. Its radius of death is about 100 by 50 yards or more according to height of burst.

It is no coincidence that his analogy follows a description of the shrapnel as “an awful deadly weapon” and is preceded by a description of “its radius of death.” The soldier-poet Ivor Gurney similarly used sport as a humanizing medium when he noted in his war diary: “shrapnel makes a horrid clatter. Trench mortars at a little distance sound like footballs well blown up bouncing hard.”

Sporting culture on the home front similarly functioned as a coping mechanism. True to their roots, British civilians viewed the October 8, 1915 German zeppelin raid on London as a form of entertainment. The Londoner Beatrice Webb wrote:

There was apparently no panic, even in the crowded Strand. The Londoner persists in taking Zeppelin raids as an entertainment—a risky entertainment—but no more risky than some forms of sport. “Did you see the Zeppelins?” was the first question, in the most cheerful voice, which every man, woman and child asked each other for at least four and twenty hours afterwards.

Viewing the zeppelin raids on London as a form of entertainment affirms the undeniable existence of a sporting culture that shaped the way the British understood and coped with the war both on and off the front.

Preserving a link with home was essential in safeguarding a soldier’s identity. Many Englishmen maintained this link through sport. Soldiers were uprooted from their homes and cast into a world filled with death and destruction. The front was different from anything they had ever known, the landscape rendered indistinguishable through mechanized warfare. Trees were leveled, trenches gouged out of the earth, artillery shells pounded the ground, and dust, debris, and gas choked the air. Unable to familiarize themselves with the environment on the front, soldiers related it to what they could comprehend. Brandon Luedtke notes:

To manage the horrors and unfamiliarity of these places, soldiers worked to transform them both materially and imaginatively into a distinctly recognisable space — the football pitch. By refracting an unfamiliar landscape through a more familiar one, English servicemen forged, however fleeting, some token of normalcy with which to make sense of the ‘rougher’ fields of the war front.

General James Jack wrote on July 21, 1916:

The peaceful countryside is far behind . . . The military targets ahead are subject to periodical bombardments. Tonight we must bivouac, and there seems to be scarcely a bit of vacant ground the size of a football pitch.

This entry is significant because it reveals an attempt to relate the foreign territory to something Jack could understand. After leaving the peaceful countryside, Jack traversed into hostile territory, the sound of artillery pounding the ground ahead. His anxiety is noted in his next entry: “What with this noise, the all-night rumble of transport and the reverberations of our cannon in the vicinity, sleep is elusive; one’s nerves are a little “on edge.” By relating his immediate surroundings to a football pitch, Jack forges a semblance of home that helps him retain his composure.

Recalling the pre-war freedom that allowed for playing sport provided an important link with home and was a reminder of civilian life and identity. After receiving a book full of descriptions of sport, Ivor Gurney wrote: “‘Pip’ is a jolly book, and full of descriptions of sport, which I always liked. (O, what would a clean hit for four feel like now?)”

John Fuller notes one instance when men from the 17th Battalion Highland Light Infantry, while on leave, took buses to the semi-final of their Divisional Cup competition: “Traveling by ‘Motor’ in the early hours of a Saturday
afternoon to a football match is one of the nearest approaches we have had to the old days before the war.66

Perhaps the greatest demonstration of the pervasiveness of British sporting culture throughout the war, soldiers actively played sports behind the front. The caption of a photo of British soldiers playing football in The Chicago Daily Tribune noted in 1914:

From appearances, it is not all work for the British trooper in France. The wearying hardships of the fighting line are quickly forgotten if the opportunity presents itself for a game of their favorite sport—football. They may be facing death at any moment, but their interest in the game apparently is not dimmed by any dreaded forebodings.67

Testament to the importance of sport to the British, Mason and Riedi note how through sport, soldiers felt alive.68

Soldiers used sport to retreat to an inner sanctum and create their own sphere separate from the reality and horror of the war: they were effectively transported from their wartime situation to their pre-war identity. Jan Tolleneer writes “in the middle of acts of war and the spilling of blood, these sports offered the soldiers . . . an oasis of peace.”69 Soldiers used sport to displace war anxiety with play stress, yielding escape and excitement innocent of fear.70 The military historian F. C. Grimwade writes:

Sport allowed above all a brief mental escape from stress and horror: the longer the War continued the more obvious it became that if “rest” periods were to do any good to the men at all there must be a period of mental as well as physical rest, and games of all sorts provided the required relaxation more than anything else.71

Sport was acknowledged as an undeniable mental alleviant by officers. Bombardier Cornfoot, serving in France, told his girlfriend in a letter “we are arranging football matches and boxing to keep our minds off this terrible war as much as possible.”72 Officers encouraged troops to play sport to take their minds off the war, thereby improving morale. General Jack wrote in his war journal: “I am engaged in arranging a football cup tie for one team from every platoon.”73 Taking the initiative to organize games, officers made it clear that they valued sport as a mental alleviant and morale booster. “Anything to keep the men going” was the mantra echoed by officers. An unidentified officer in 1915 wrote:

Our last football will be in use Monday, and I dread to think of it bursting in this dreary hole. I suppose I shall have to improvise a ball or two from pigs’ bladders—anything to keep the game and the boys going.74

Sport was the dominant form of recreation among the British soldiers, or “Tommies.” Activities like reading, poetry, music, and cards were second rate as a result of the prevalent sporting culture on the front. General Jack noted how British soldiers were almost always playing a sport: “little as is the time for recreation, games have to be sandwiched in somehow, since no British troops ever travel without football or the energy to kick them.” Ernest Brooks’ photo of the first Battalion Wiltshire Regiment shows men kicking a football through a clearing behind the front. (see previous page)

The British played sports in all conditions, irrespective of the danger close to the front or the lousy weather. One soldier wrote:

The slush on our football “pitch” is awful. Shall recommend in the future all football matches be postponed until the mud is knee-deep. We were called the mudlarkers at home and truly we’ve sustained the reputation since coming to France.75

Tourist Jack Robinson noted in March 1915 how British soldiers played football as bombs were dropping from overhead:

our boys out yonder will have their game of football under all sorts of conditions. It comes as a tonic and relaxation from trench duty and I cannot understand anybody in England ever questioning the advisability of the game.76

It did not matter that bombs were dropping left and right, artillery shells exploding within sight. When British soldiers played sport, they forged a fleeting image of a safe haven.

The strong presence of sport on the front was reminiscent of England’s sporting culture. Fuller noted how many soldiers believed they had brought the English sporting culture with them to the front:

to find the real England, you have to come to France; that the real England was not an island or an empire, but a wet populous dyke stretching from Flanders to the Somme.77
Indeed, the “real England” could be found on the front, where sport persisted amongst the Tommies. Soldiers on the Western Front encapsulated values characteristic of their motherland. As Tawney noted, “the war acted in this way precisely to reinforce certain values and to foster a cultural conservatism.”

As the war drew to a close in 1918, England was widely considered a nation of sportsmen. The periodical *Field* noted on March 16, 1918, the assiduous and organized cultivation of sport, and what is more important the spirit of sport, has become one of the most distinctive marks of the British army.

Through their interactions with soldiers from the world over, the Tommies fostered an international image of England as a sporting nation. An Australian on the front wrote: “I really do believe that they are the best sportsmen in the world.” With its early roots in British public schools the sporting culture was brought to the front and profoundly impacted the way soldiers viewed the war. As a cause of disillusionment, a coping mechanism, and source of recreation, sport on the front proves the pervasiveness of the British sporting culture and its influence on the experience of the war. For many Tommies, sport served as a reminder of the way of life for which they were fighting.

**ENDNOTES**

1. Mason (80)
2. Veitch (363)
3. Fussell (27)
4. Veitch (363)
5. Mason (109)
6. Osborn (ix)
7. Ibid.
8. Veitch (364)
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31. Holland (78)
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36. Tawney (22-3)
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38. Lewis (81)
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54. Gurney (83)
55. Lewis (126)
56. Luedtke (107)
57. Jack (230)
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60. Fuller (89)
62. Mason (125)
63. Tolleneer (330)
64. Fuller (94)
65. Grimwade (293)
66. Fuller (92)
67. Jack (118)
68. Collins (14)
69. Jack (226-27)
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Young Men of Britain! The Germans Said You Were Not in Ear-nest. “We Knew You’d Come - and Give Them the Lie!” Play the
IN THE WAKE OF TERRIBLE WAR, SOUTH KOREA WAS ONE OF THE WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES IN THE MID 20TH CENTURY. WHEN PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG-HEE ROSE TO POWER IN 1962, SOUTH KOREA’S ECONOMY WITNESSED A SIGNIFICANT TURNAROUND. REVIVED BY THE “CATCH-UP” ECONOMIC MODEL AND THE PRESENCE OF JAEBOELS IN THE COUNTRY’S FINANCIAL PROCEEDINGS, SOUTH KOREA EFFECTIVELY BECAME ONE OF THE WORLD’S WEALTHIEST NATIONS IN A MATTER OF DECADES. HOWEVER, AS THIS ARTICLE ELUCIDATES, A PARADOX UNDERLIES THIS IMPROVED ECONOMIC STATUS: THE VERY SAME GROWTH MODEL THAT CATALYZED SOUTH KOREA’S METEORIC ECONOMIC SUCCESS ALSO THREATENS TO PRECLUDE ANY FURTHER PROGRESS. THE CURRENT SYSTEM MUST BE REPLACED IF SOUTH KOREA IS TO DO MORE THAN “CATCH-UP” WITH OTHER WORLD ECONOMIES.
Reeling in the repercussions of a devastating war, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in 1957, with a per capita GDP comparable to that of Ghana. Between 1953 and 1961, the economy subsisted on international assistance, mainly in the form of US grants. With President Park Chung-hee’s rise to military dictatorship in 1962, the economy quickly began to improve. By 1995, South Korea’s rapid growth facilitated its removal from the World Bank’s lending-list to its addition as an OECD country by 1996. In 2009 South Korea joined the G20 and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Since 2011, South Korea has been richer than the European Union average, with a per capita GDP of 31,750 USD. The only nation in the world thus far to transition from being the recipient of development aid to acting as a donor within a working life, South Korea is considered to be the model for the developing world. Moreover, the country boasts developments in democracy and equity, which have complemented its growth. South Korea’s Gini coefficient stands at 31.0, again, proximate to the EU average of 30.4.

South Korea was arguably one of the countries that suffered the most heavily in the 1997 East Asian Crisis. However, in the current aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, it has proven itself to be the most resilient of the OECD countries: a feat that should not be understated. Its export-centered economy and open financial system leaves it highly vulnerable to external shocks and volatility. Between June 2008 and February 2009, South Korea lost 1.2 million jobs, in addition to 1.1 billion USD in stock market losses and a subsequent 10 percent drop in currency. But by 2010 the GDP grew by 6 percent and the unemployment rate dropped back down to 3 percent. Growth continued in 2011 at 4.5 percent and the IMF projects a similar growth of 4.2 percent in 2012. Permitted that the present growth trend continues, South Korea is projected to overtake America in PPP within the next couple years.

Since the early 1960s, South Korea has consistently developed at an impressive rate, keeping in line with the export-model initiated by President Park (albeit adjustmented accordingly in the 1980s and after the 1997 Asian crisis).
South Korea’s economic model, centered on a “Renaissance State”, will continue to promote growth, thereby facilitating the “catch-up” in developing countries. However, South Korea has already completed this first step, it has caught-up and joined the ranks of rich-countries. Its policies must change accordingly to encourage innovation using a different model. In fact, the mechanisms that once spurred its economic success are the same ones obstructing its potential for innovation and threatening its current growth projectile. Powerful, self-sufficient jaebeols, still supported by state policies, crowd out small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). This overcrowding exacerbates the prospects of South Korea’s SMEs already suffering from inefficient policies and the resulting lack of competition and incentives. The rigorous traditional education system and “one-shot” testing prioritize rote learning (stifling innovative thinking), while further constricting limited routes to success. This educational system—against a system of vocational education—also exhausts household incomes, further increasing their already high percentage of debt.

Furthermore, the robust workforce is swiftly ageing, while low fertility stagnates at a rate of 1.2: the lowest in the OECD. A disproportionately poor elderly population exacerbates daunting public spending implications of the low birth rate: 45 percent are mired in poverty. Worse still, according to The Economist, the weak social safety net will become exceedingly problematic, when “by 2050, there will be seven over 65’s for every ten working-age adults.” This foundation paved the way for subsequent growth, which was sustained and accelerated by President Park’s ambitious catch-up agenda in the 1960s. North and South Korea’s divergent economic paths, following their exogenous separation into radically different political and economic institutions, testify to Park’s integral role in the South’s prosperity. The difference in growth, in comparison to that experienced under the leadership of prior President Sungman Rhee, reinforces evidence of this relationship.

During Park’s eighteen-year rule, South Korea embarked on its economic ascent with an impressive average annual GDP of 10 percent. Under the “Five-year Economic Development Plan,” Park promoted economic nationalism, stamping South Korea as an “export-led country.” Foremost, Park implemented policies providing incentives to increase domestic savings; which were used to finance heavy investment demands. While foreign savings persisted at 10 percent of the GDP, economic nationalism pushed for domestic ownership, which called for domestic

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<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>7345.6</td>
<td>1999.0</td>
<td>759.4</td>
<td>1202.5</td>
<td>6977.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1942.0</td>
<td>764.0</td>
<td>1023.7</td>
<td>5777.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ODA</td>
<td>3077.9 (100%)</td>
<td>3941.0 (100%)</td>
<td>3510.0 (100%)</td>
<td>2226.2 (100%)</td>
<td>12776.3 (100%)</td>
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financial mobilization. By increasing the interest rate from 15 percent to 30 percent on one-year fixed deposits, the domestic savings supply rose from 3.2 percent to 15.5 percent between 1962 and 1971. This allowed domestic savings to supplant foreign capital’s dominant role in financing investments by 1972 (close to 75 percent from 20 percent in 1960). The considerable increase in income, almost five fold for the average manufacturing wage and complementing a similar increase for the average farm income, significantly augmented the domestic savings increase. More importantly, tax reforms introduced in 1964 eliminated the chronic budgetary deficit and boosted government revenue to more than 16 percent of GDP by 1971. In eight years, Park’s policies succeeded in more than tripling South Korea’s domestic savings supply. Due to South Korea’s limited supply of capital—again typical of catch-up economies in the initial stages of industrialization—it was tightly controlled by the state-owned banking system. The state’s advantageous ability to analyze both positive externals and the public good nature of investments was maximized by the repressed financial sector. Werlin refers to this model as “corporatism,” in which the government is the “script-writer” to actors primarily from the private sector. For example, in the mid-1970s, the state identified the IT industry as a highly profitable export, and banks subsequently awarded exceedingly low interest rates accordingly to a few chosen domestic enterprises (jaebeols). Over 38 different policy tools sustaining market incentives and disincentives optimally mobilized tight capital supply towards promising export-sectors. For example, a firm successful in meeting export targets enjoyed reductions in tax rates, and entrepreneurs successful in exports were showered with public recognitions and honors by the President and high-ranking officials. The banking system played an integral role in allocating and supplying 80 percent of funds. This approach allowed successful investments in heavy industry, including shipbuilding, steel, machinery, petrochemicals, and automobiles. These two sectors are still South Korea’s most competitive industries today.

Part of the benign high-debt financial policy constituted low interest rates directed towards specified “national champion.” Access to the state’s supply of “unlimited” capital allowed firms to quickly assimilate to existing technologies. This concentrated policy laid the groundwork for the high-debt jaebeol business model and their eventual monopoly of the economy. But in order for jaebeols to successfully compete in the international markets, they also had to improve upon on existing technologies. A high-debt and high-volume production strategy was selected in order to maximize on the state’s supportive high-debt financial policies. jaebeols then zeroed in on single products using economies of scale to boost competitiveness. As Wade better articulates, “by mass-producing a less diversified product, they succeeded in taking advantage of the economies of scale in dealing with large volume orders and devoting resources to the technological improvement of single products.” Between 1983 and 1986, and buttressed by the state’s financial support, the four leading jaebeols (Hyundai, Samsung, Goldstar, and Daewoo) invested more than 1.2 billion USD in the mass-production of chips. This was ten times the scale of the investment made by Taiwan’s semiconductor industry over the same three years. With this high-volume production strategy, the jaebeols could compete with Japanese productions by providing the standardized commodity product at a lower cost. The devotion of extensive resources to single products paid off. By the late 1980s, jaebeols had the capacity for innovation, developing their own products such as the 4M DRAM.
The highly supportive state-owned banking system meant that the jaebeols were capable of financing a high proportion of their investments with bank debts. The vast sunk costs involved in foundational research were undertaken by state funding.50 The state’s tight financial control indicates a closed capital account that buffered the highly leveraged jaebeols from systemic shocks. Furthermore, high domestic savings allowed domestic financing and evasion from prudential debt-limits of western banks.51 These factors explain the jaebeols’ ability to carry a large amount of debt relative to retained earnings or equity. While this expedited economic development, it also meant the economy was highly vulnerable to external shocks; this was especially problematic considering that the jaebeols’ business model subsists on the export of a single-product.

Expansion into the global market

With the ascent of President Kim Young-Sam, South Korea solidified its political democratization process, which had been taking place since the 1980s. Kim’s “New Economic Plan” (1993-1997) promoted liberalization based on a neoliberal approach in order bring the country up to par with developed advanced economies.52 This was to the advantage of jaebeols, whose ambitious globalization efforts resulting from their scale economies model could no longer subsist on finances from the domestic market. In order to stay competitive, as the cost of technological developments increased, they needed massive investments that could only be satisfied by access to global capital supply.

Kim’s program ushered in South Korea’s new period of greater freedom and liberalized financial systems, and particularly access to external capital accounts. This was accomplished by relinquishing state control of the financial markets, including policy loans that allowed state “script-writing,” dating back to President Park in the early 1960s.53 The Economic Plan Board was eliminated—a domestic safeguard capable of providing full convertibility of the South Korean won for the foreign currency on demand through a sufficient supply of international reserves. Essentially, the government had completely surrendered its capacity to coordinate foreign private borrowing. Democratization that pushed greater autonomy from the state simultaneously increased jaebeols’ political power to freely pursue their expansionist agenda. Accordingly, foreign agents had access to South Korea’s budding domestic financial market. This double transition initiated the country’s progressive accumulation of foreign liabilities, propelling the trajectory to its fate in the 1997 East Asian Crisis.54,55 Swift liberalization proved overwhelming for South Korea’s juvenile financial sector, having just left the state’s tight grip without the support of complementary safeguards in bank regulation and supervision. The expected challenges of tackling a novel international financial market as a nascent entity were compounded by sharp increases in inflows and outflows by non-conventional actors (non-bank jaebeols borrowing abroad), and the jaebeols’ high debt-to-equity model—exceedingly dependent on bank-based financing. Further increasing liabilities, these conditions propagated under a pegged currency exchange rate.16 The president’s previous financial system was completely undermined by a novel order that South Korea’s (and the rest of Asia’s) embryonic structures could not manage.

The spike in inflows was partly energized by South Korea’s pegged currency exchange rate tied to the US dollar. Although the government made no guarantees about the stability of the exchange rate, its long-standing constancy signaled permanence to eager foreign markets. Due to savings excess in Japan and a post-Mexican crisis (1994-1995) flight in Europe, the Japanese and European central banks held large volumes of capital. Looking to stimulate their domestic economies and to disseminate their abundant capital, both lent liberally to South Korean banks and firms. Foreign creditors exploited their ability to borrow at low rates while subsequently lending back at higher rates in short-term loans to South Korean banks and firms.

South Korean markets played the perfect counterpart; the new foreign capital finally indulged the jaebeols’ insatiable investments beyond domestic saving capacity.57 Withal, the costs of borrowing abroad (albeit in short-term loans) halved the costs of borrowing domestically, and the jaebeols indulged. Their globalist model thrived, accelerating for-
eign inflows.\textsuperscript{58} Existing risks of moral hazard and adverse selection as state protectorates were exacerbated by their renewed “too-big-to-fail” mentality.\textsuperscript{59} The immature financial institutions also lacked the capacity to restrain and balance excessive risk-taking ventures. The banks’ acceptance of bad loans from jaebeols jeopardized balance sheets and their own viability; this reflects the implicit reliance on the government to bail them out. Their inability is only exacerbated during a credit growth leading to a lending boom, as regulatory resources are stretched.\textsuperscript{60} In fact, the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD all acknowledged the need for a parallel strengthening of regulatory systems. However, they overrode the alarming imbalances, prioritizing liberalization. The protraction continued by a naïve confidence of US dollar pegged won. At its crest, mid-1997, short-term foreign borrowing constituted 67 percent of all foreign debt, 300 percent of foreign reserves, and the top 10 jaebeols’ debt-to-equity ratio escalated to 622 percent.\textsuperscript{61}

However, it is possible to have too much of a good thing. The hike in inflows under the fixed currency regime meant an upward pressure on the rate and a consequent appreciation of the South Korean won (also increasing domestic costs). The jaebeols failed to combat the trade shock rising domestic costs with faster productivity. As a result, they lost competitiveness in semiconductors: South Korea’s biggest single export item.\textsuperscript{62} Trade of its other major export goods involving heavy industry (steel, chemical products) also fell during the same period. The following decrease in IT exports was especially detrimental to the “export-led country,” driving up its deficits and precipitating the deterioration of its current account.\textsuperscript{63}

The excessive risks taken by the jaebeols then came to fruition. The thin profit margins did not allow the highly vulnerable jaebeols to adjust to the trade shocks; in early 1997, five of the thirty top jaebeols went bankrupt, and 1,431 promissory notes defaulted on average each month.\textsuperscript{54,63} Their defaults were especially detrimental to the unsupervised non-bank financial industry financing jaebeols loans.\textsuperscript{64,67} Asymmetric information problems increased as the South Korean stock market index began to decline. Once the attacks and panic spread from Thailand reached South Korea, European, Japanese, and US bankers demanded immediate full repayments of short-term loans. The foreign short-term liabilities hinged on now indefensible long-term high-yield assets. South Korea’s level of foreign exchange reserves proved insufficient. The foreign creditor’s run to collect, followed by a decline in South Korea’s sovereign credit rating, drove their exit from the South Korean market; these factors contributed to the drastic depreciation of the South Korean won, the country’s full blown crisis, and their inevitable turn to the IMF for a 57$\textsuperscript{68} billion USD rescue package in December, 1997\textsuperscript{69,70}. By 1998, the real GDP shrunk to a rate of negative 5.8 percent, and unemployment peaked at 8.1 percent.\textsuperscript{71}

### Post-1997 reforms

In 1998, Kim Dae-Jung’s new administration pushed through two major policy reforms, instrumental to dispelling asymmetric information and stabilizing South Korea’s financial system. Hahm and Mishkin cite evolution with prudential supervision and change in monetary policy strategy.\textsuperscript{72}

Various policies contributed to an increased supervision of the financial sector, in addition to a general message conveying government authority over reckless, pre-protectorate jaebeols. Breaking the “too-big-to-fail” mentality by allowing the bankruptcy of top jaebeols made this stance clear. Restructuring pressures to reduce debt-to-equity ratios followed for the surviving jaebeols.\textsuperscript{73} The reversal of previous restrictive FDI policy (thereby favoring foreign
loans), allowed the entry of foreign banks and foreigners access to purchase bankrupt domestic banks. Not only does the diversified nature of foreign banking limit exposure to risk; they also bring expertise in risk management practices. The stock market also opened up to foreign agents; according to SERI, the ratio of stock owned by foreigners increased from 12.3 percent in 1997 to 21.9 percent in 1999 and 40.1 percent at the end of 2003.

Although the dollar-linked pegged exchange rate regime was released, confidence was restored in prioritizing price stability through an inflation-targeting regime in the Bank of South Korea Act and transparent, independent policy making. The central back was established as independent from politics in removed election and appointment policies. The inflation-targeting regime replaced the currency peg as an explicit nominal anchor. Similar to the previous exchange-rate peg, the institutional commitment to meeting targets communicated transparency and increased accountability to both the public and the markets. South Korea’s ability to cap inflation to stable rates of 2 to 3 percent by 1999 has been praised as laudable monetary policy.

Initially, the situation was protracted by poor policies derived from faulty rationales. The interest rate was hiked up from 16.4 percent to 23.9 percent 1997Q4 to 1998Q1, in a desperate, futile attempt to salvage the value of the South Korean won. The IMF pushed for domestic austerity and fundamental structural reforms (providing bailout funds in return). The underlying rationale was that high interest rates would keep domestic capital at home while encourage foreign lending, ultimately boosting the depreciating currency, limiting rising inflation, and combatting instability from dollarized balance sheets. In practice, the domestic austerity package (involving higher interest rates, higher taxes, cuts in government expenditure) produced opposite results. Adding salt to the wound, the IMF required a guarantee of foreign debts. This safeguard insured foreign creditors from default and reduced their incentive to lend, worsening the hard currency squeeze on local agents. The jaebeols’ cash depressed while their short-term loans obligations continued to rise. Their insolvency was perpetuated; outflows gushing out, while inflows ebbed. Furthermore, the cyclical nature of private capital flows guaranteed that while the economy was in a state of depression and instability, foreign capital flows would not return.

Fortunately, by July of 1998, South Korea had reversed austerity measures and was back on track to continuing its financial neo-liberalization. In addition, they had adopted expansionary policy, which lowered interest rates, expanded the monetary base, and ran bigger fiscal deficits. Moreover, the enacted IT regime allowed a significant amount of flexibility in providing both a ceiling and floor in its central target. This provided an opportunity for advantage, in which the central bank could mitigate the effects of negative and positive shocks to aggregate demand. The successes and progress of South Korean authorities in monitoring financial institutions and following prudent policies is most pronounced in reflecting on South Korea’s contrasting experience and impressive resilience in the 2008 global financial crisis.
Pressing financial and fiscal reforms

Holding 304 billion USD in foreign reserves, South Korea claims the seventh largest in the world, and benefits are pronounced in the current account surplus. The growing momentum of confidence in South Korea’s economic prospects has led to large portfolio inflows, boosting equity prices. The external foreign short-term debt has been maintained at around 30 percent, and the trend resumes. The fiscal policy consolidation strategy is humming along, and efforts to reduce budget deficit are producing substantial results. In line with the rest of South Korea’s overall progress, the commercial banking system is sound, with a capital adequacy ratio at 14.3 percent. Nonperforming loan ratio stands at an impressively low level of 1.3 percent.

The current sound economic fundamentals disguise the perpetuation of the South Korean economy’s greatest vice: jaebols. The government continues to give leverage to the jaebols, most overtly in the allocation of its ambitious R&D expenditures. The state’s growing R&D expenditure is concentrated in the IT sector, which feeds into the mouths of top jaebols. The lack of equity is further distorted by a concentration to the upper tier within the jaebols. Already profitable with capabilities to invest in independent R&D expenditures, they continue to receive R&D subsidies from the public. The convergence of bureaucratic and corporate interests, a characteristic result of high state intervention in addition to interchanges between careers, perpetuates the jaebols’ disproportionate influence and overcrowding effects, pronounced in stagnant SMEs and growing social polarities. The government’s interventionist policies, once successful in prioritizing the creation and protection of new knowledge; in gathering and analyzing data to pinpoint the most productive, promising sectors; and in choosing “national champions,” is now captive to the very same policies. The policies have nurtured and catapulted jaebols to great heights, as they have maximized their capabilities by locking the system in an inertia that protects their interests and neglects ever pressing reforms.

The economic monopoly held by jaebols has vast consequences, firstly affecting their own livelihood. As an advanced economy, competitiveness in the global market is dependent on ample innovation. Jaebols disproportionately lack human capital, only employing 10 percent of total workforce. Given that innovation is grounded in human capital, this is disconcerting. Further cause for alarm: the SMEs who dominate the services sector, employing 6.6 million people, face a growing productivity gap against jaebols. The table in footnote 96 clearly illustrates the severe difference in R&D spending, which translates to the same levels of disparities all throughout: “Value added per worker in small firms is less than half that in large ones. SMEs’ operating profits were 4.5% of sales in 2007, compared with about 7% for large firms. Small firms spend about half as much on research and development as large ones per unit of sales and borrow far more relative to assets.” This has been a prolonged trend as the performance of South Korean SMEs continues to deteriorate.

Weak SMEs not only translates to an underdeveloped services sector, signaling the lack of diversification in a promising non-tradable sector, but more importantly, it exposes a failure in honing in potential innovation capital stemming from the entrepreneurial spirit. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, opportunity for entrepreneurship is perceived by South Koreans to be the lowest (after Japan). Again, this stems from the jaebols’ ability to propagate their own venture capital businesses, finding and feeding the best into their own companies. Those individuals who do choose the harrowing path of South Korean entrepreneurship must compete with jaebols. Inevitably, jaebols have effectively crowded out small start-ups, whose subordination is only reinforced by the weak social safety net and a “captive” employment system that favor jaebols.

As state subsidies continue for jaebol-dominated sectors, the question of increased risks of adverse selection returns. Its excessive investment in HClIs, while neglecting the rising high-tech industries, serves as a prime example. Although jaebols take credit for spear-heading South Korea’s economic growth with their export focus
and unignorable revenues, the SMEs dominated services sector employs 70 percent of the total workforce and a turnover accounting for 51 percent of GDP. The deepening productivity gap testifies to its neglect by government initiatives and funding. As of 2011, the South Korea Institute of Design Promotion (KIDP) still does not offer design support to the continuously growing private service industry, while jaebeol-dominated sectors have been receiving subsidies since the 1980s. Increasing demand for services (mainly in advanced countries) and the SMEs’ inability to compete any further exposes the state’s gaffe in its neglect.

Increased risk of moral hazard naturally follows adverse selection. The notorious corruption in jaebeols has reached such levels that its crippling effect on the KOSPI 200 has been nicknamed the “South Korean discount.” Price-fixing is rampant, with over 3,500 cases of price-fixing detected in 2010 (only 66 ending up with minor fines). Both Samsung and LG have been caught for price-fixing three times in the past two years. Tongyang Securities, a broker, has pinpointed routine practices of “tunneling” and “propping” as perpetrating KOSPI’s low price-to-earnings ratio. The successes of these methods expose poor corporate governance, allowing family-run jaebeols to maintain their tight grip over the economy. This same lack of jaebeol supervision left gaping schisms that were detrimental in South Korea’s 1997 collapse.

The rigidity of South Korea’s current economic system, like its “one-shot” education system, only allows one route to success. The talents of avant-garde individuals, late bloomers that did not perform well in their exams, and the growing older population are shut out of the narrow, traditional system. The grave consequences of neglecting the ballooning older population (especially in relation to the shrinking overall population) will be felt as they begin to burden the social services. Necessary fiscal expansion needs to compensate for the ageing population, but once again, the trade priorities of jaebeols dominate. Total tax revenues have been stagnant around 22 percent since 2007 and are even lower for labor. To the jaebeols’ benefit, the low rate is meant to increase work and foreign investment. In return, the social safety net has been compromised. At 11 percent, the social spending is exceptionally low, explaining the exceptionally high household debt.

Once embryonic and highly dependent on the South Korean government, jaebeols have flourished into worldwide establishments leading the world in IT and HCI. With their exceptional rise, they lifted up a war-ravaged, destitute citizenry to catch-up and to join the ranks of the richest. However, they must not forget that it was, and still is, the government that revived and sustains their prosperity by efficient allocation of public funds. In order for South Korea to continue its current trajectory of economic fortune, it must detach itself from the formula that served it so well. The symbiotic relationship between the jaebeols and state authorities must be severed. The “Renaissance State” must return, it must restore equity with effective regulations, and it must enact policy reforms to blaze new trails for dynamic, domestic innovation.

ENDNOTES
1. In 1957 Ghana’s per capita income was at 491 USD, against South Korea’s 490 USD (in 1980 dollars). Herbert Werlin, 1991 (245)
2. Between 1945 and the early 1990’s South Korea received total assistance of 12.8 billion USD. These funds were used to curb post-war hyperinflation, to secure financial stability and to invest in new industrial facilities. Hong-Min Chun, et al 2010 (789-790)
3. President Park held his post for 18 years until his assassination in 1979. He is accredited with South Korea’s industrialization and export-oriented economic successes, but also widely criticized for his military authoritarian leadership.
4. Chun (790)
5. Both memberships bolster a world recognized standing as an advanced, high-tech, developed country.
6. Compared with 31,550 USD for the EU—the figures are calculated on the basis on purchasing-power parity (PPP). “What Do You Do When You Reach the Top?” The Economist, 12 Nov. 2011.
7. Although China, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are richer, each have qualities too unique to serve as models; China is too vast to copy, Singapore and Hon Kong are city-states, and Taiwan’s sovereignty is contested. South Korea, as a mid-sized country, combined with its recent history of state initiated growth, serves as the medium-model attracting emissaries from around the globe (This opinion is debated as evidenced by the positions of Frank, et al. (1975)). Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have all recently flocked to the country’s development institutes. “This Year’s Model,” The Economist, 18 Feb. 2012.

8. Although this subject is outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that since President Park’s assassination, the country’s parliamentary system is on par with Japan in the democracy assessment by Freedom House (a Washington D.C. think-tank). Furthermore, democracy provided the first stepping-stone to liberalization of the economy. “What Do You Do When You Reach the Top?” The Economist, 12 Nov. 2011. This is especially true in the 1970s and 1980’s when farm and industrial income disparity grew (as the export focus was heavily pushed). However, the industrial sector focusing on low value-added, labor-intensive products began losing competitiveness from other developing countries. This spurred the government-led transition from products like textiles, clothing and shoes to an exporter of technology and knowledge-intensive goods in the IT and heavy industry sectors. The rapid inflation was also brought under control by cutting the growth of the money supply by half. Imports were liberalized improving competition, investments in public projects and farm mechanization allowed economic restructuring. By 1982 the average inflation fell to 7.32 percent from 28.60 percent in 1980—a continued trend. “Inflation South Korea 1985.” CPI Inflation South Korea 1985.


10. For relativity, a Scandinavian country is better off with an index of 25.0, Canada a little worse off at 32.1. “The World Factbook: Gini Index,” CIA.

11. South Korea suffered a 36 percent fall in exchange rates, 34 percent in stock prices. Only Thailand and Indonesia had declines on a similar level (36:17, 72:24 respectively). Robert Wade, “From ‘Miracle’ to ‘Cronyism’ Explaining the Great Asian Slump” 1998 (694)


14. Reinert’s paper concerns the fundamental role of the State in Western growth since the Renaissance. He draws many parallels to South Korea’s economic development today, whose development is in line with the preceding 500 years of development projectiles. Erik Reinert, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth” 1999

15. This term is taken from Reinert’s paper that defines it as an “activistic and idealistic State” part of the “production-centered and activistic-idealistic Renaissance tradition.” He argues the strong State is in fact an “obligatory passage point” for a country to become developed country. Reinert (271)

16. The specific sectors are often dictated by the Renaissance State, explicitly coerced or through incentives. In the 1980s, Samsung was coerced into changing sectors: from trading activities to manufacturing semi-conductors. But the State has used other means: premiums, cheap credit, and temporary protection of local markets, among others. Reinert explains these investments made by Renaissance States create new learning feedback systems—“new learning is the basis for economic development, and new learning is able to create development.” He argues “development” is essentially “dynamic rent” where labor, capital, and the government collect from the feedback system. Reinert (297)


18. Each year, students take a single set of multiple-choice sets that essentially determines their future. High scorers enter one of South Korea’s best universities, which usually guarantees a job-for-life at a prestigious jaebeol or in the government. Ibid.

19. South Korean schools top international comparisons of educational standards, and its students ranked second (right behind Shanghai, which again is more of a city than a state) in the latest Pisa study by the OECD. “PISA 2009 Results,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

20. Its jaebeols have surpassed competition of Japanese companies- Samsung Electronics even leads Apple in smartphone sales, while accounting for 26 percent of the iPhone’s component costs. The Economist, 12 Nov. 2011.


22. Household debt is 125 percent of household disposable income. Republic of South Korea 2011 Article IV. Rep. IMF, 2011 (2)

24. In fact, its tax-benefit system to reduce inequality and poverty is the weakest of the OECD countries. The Economist, 12 Nov. 2011.
25. Ibid.
26. The South Korean government has committed to an increase from the current 0.15 percent of ODA/GNI ratio to 0.25 percent by 2015. To put into perspective, the current contribution exceeds the total ODA of four DAC member countries: Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Portugal. Chun et al. (791)
27. This is largely due to not only the rising demands from emerging market countries, but also the shift of the richest countries to services produced by South Korea’s uncompetitive SMEs. Since the drop in demand after the 2008 global crisis from its then main exporters of the developed markets, South Korea has shifted its export model towards emerging markets. As of May 2011, 12 South Korean FTAs with emerging markets have been in effect. There are presently 9 FTAs under negotiation and 14 others in review. An alternative problematic could have considered the viability of South Korea’s perpetual export-model. Bun-Soon Park, “South Korea’s New Growth Engine: FTAs with Emerging Market Economies,” 2011 (39)
28. Jaebeols account for more than half the country’s output. The Economist, 12 Nov. 2011.
29. The average annual growth rate was 4.9 percent of GDP between 1954 and 1960, which has been largely attributed to the flowing foreign aid. Chun, et al 2010, (789-790)
30. The foreign aid curbed hyperinflation, restored financial stability and allowed for investments in industrial facilities. Chun, 31. The South Korean experiment is the prime case illustrating the natural experiment model. At the drawing of the 38th parallel latitude, they shared all possible variables attributing to growth (economics, culture, demographics, geography). Their radically different economic projectiles after the split into the pro-communist North and the pro-US South support the hypothesis that institutions are the ultimate cause of instigating and promoting growth. Roberto Galbiati, Class Lecture, “Law and Economics.” Sciences Po, Paris, April 2012.
32. Due to the overvalued currency, Rhee’s policy of import substitution of non-durable consumer and intermediate goods through high taxes and restrictive quotas, exports only contributed 1 percent of the GDP. By 1961, GDP per capita stagnated at 85 USD. Werlin (250)
33. Ibid.
34. The vigorous investments resulted from high rates of return on capital. This is characteristic of an undeveloped country with a large workforce (from the demographic bulge see footnote 18 and 24) and scarce capital.
35. Their nature changed as South Korea gradually weaned off foreign grants and transitioned into foreign commercial loans. By 1961-1975, loans and grants were at equilibrium. Refer to table of footnote 33.
36. Werlin (250)
37. Frank et al. (106)
38. From -18.02 billion won in 1964 to 99.73 billion won in 1972. Frank (229)
39. An annual manufacturing wage household income from 46,560 won in 1964 to 208,128 won in 1971, farm household income from 36,618 won to 179,990. Ibid., 224. The equity in rural and urban income distribution is worth noting - Wade argues it explains net saving tendencies. Wade (695)
40. Wade (230)
42. Werlin (251)
43. Wang (1090)
44. Werlin (251)
45. Frank et al. (233)
46. Improvements on chips (R&D and DRAM) by Samsung accounts for much of its success as the world’s largest player in 1993—also see footnote 21. Wang (1090)
47. The HCI investments faced criticisms of excess in the 1980s, when South Korea’s exports faced a crisis. But the inefficiencies were quickly clamped down reviving the sector. This would repeat in the 1997 Asian crisis, when once again the exports began to lose competitiveness. Unlike the first time around, when the government was able to prevent a full-blown currency and financial crisis, (under a fully-repressed domestic financial system, they could work out prompt debt restructuring and cuts in interest rates without causing massive capital outflows) it was exposed to external capital liabilities out of its control. Yoon Je Cho, “Financial Repression, Liberalisation, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of South Korea’s Financial Sector Policies,” 2002 (2)
48. Triple E-class container ships being developed by South Korean shipyards are the largest and most efficient ever built. The Economist, 12 Nov. 2011.
49. Wang (1092)
50. Wang (1090)
51. Silve., Class 5
52. Wade (695)
53. Wang (1093)
54. Both the IMF and the World Bank encouraged this transition, as well as the elite jaebeols looking to increase competitiveness and profits. Wade (696)
55. Wang (1093)
56. Islam fleshes the process out in the following excerpt: “Locals could open foreign bank accounts; banks could extend credit in foreign currencies in the domestic markets; non-bank financial institutions and private corporations could borrow abroad; foreigners could own shares listed by national companies on domestic stock markets; foreign banks could enjoy wider freedom of entry into the domestic banking sector; and off-shore banks could borrow abroad and lend domestically.” Azizul Islam, “The Dynamics of Asian Economic Crisis and Selected Policy Implications,” UN ESCAP, 1998.
58. Wade inducts how “high-speed growth generated gross domestic investment demand even higher than gross domestic saving, itself about the highest in the world” (referring to Asian saving pre-1997). Wade (699)
59. Wade (695)
61. Hahm and Mishkin, (7)
62. Wang (1093)
63. The unit price of semiconductor chip fell by more than 70 percent. Hahm and Mishkin, 23.
64. Wade (697) Although as Hahm and Mishkin point out, the issue wasn’t of quantity: external liability at 33 percent in 1997 was by itself not a liability. Rather, the quality, the fact that they were short-term external debt in combination with a term mismatch was the underlying liability.
65. Again, this was a result of their highly leveraged privileges (high levels of debt insured by implicit government support) and following inefficient investments.
66. Hahm and Mishkin (20)
67. During the crisis, 17 out of 30 of exiting merchant banking corporations went to bust. Hahm and Mishkin (17)
68. Their non-performing loan to capital ratio was at 31.19 percent respective to the 12.2 percent ratio in the strictly supervised commercial banking sector. Ibid.
69. Cho refers to these banks as liberalized NBFIs (nonbanking financial institutions), which were in fact liberalized back in the 1980s in a compromise of its control and industrialists after the heavy chemical industries investment mistake and resulting slump in the economy. As most NBFIs were founded and owned by jaebeols, it follows they enjoyed little regulation (tax interest rate regulations and entry barriers). Cho (13)
70. *The South Korean government later revealed the short-term debt was in fact double, at 97 billion USD. Hahm and Mishkin (25)
71. High foreign liabilities and loans in the unsupervised frenzy accumulated in liability dollarization, which South Korea’s growing currency mismatch could not mitigate. The jaebeols and banks had invested and borrowed in US dollars but received returns in South Korean wons. As the South Korean won drastically depreciated, the net worth of borrowers also fell, especially for those entities with earnings primarily of local currency. As repayments were now improbable, defaults ensued and the economy contracted. Calvo and Mishkin (105)
72. Wade (699)
73. Hahm and Mishkin (1)
74. Hahm and Mishkin (33)
75. According to SERI, by 2002, the average ratio was reduced to 130.0 percent, down to 100 in 2003. Wang, 1101.
76. Hahm and Mishkin (45-46)
77. The same pattern of increased foreign equity is seen in top jaebeols. Wang, 1094.
78. Hahm and Mishkin (48)
80. Wade (700-701)
81. For example, short-term (around a month) interbank debts were rolled over into one to three-year government guaranteed bonds. De Bolle et al. (12)
82. +/- 1 percent until 2002, +/- 0.5 percent after, 2.5 +/- 0.5 percent forth 2004-2006 and 2007-2009. Sanchez (15)
83. Hahm and Mishkin (51)
85. Reuters. 5 Apr. 2012.
86. In 2007 external short-term debt was at 160.2 billion USD over 333.4 billion USD in total external debt, 140.7 over 399.7 in 2012 and projected to be 143.5 over 419.6 in 2013. IMF (3).
87. The downward progression of the deficit from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 0.6 in 2011, thanks to expenditure restraints and broadened taxes. IMF (2)
88. IMF (2)
89. At 3 percent of GDP highest in OECD
90. MEST, 2009.
91. Semiconductors dominate the top three percentages of R&D expenditure rate to sales by industry sectors at 8.14 percent, followed by medical, precision and optical machinery and watches at 7.29, then communications and broadcasting equipment at 6.23 percent. MEST, 2009.
92. This table reflects the high concentration of R&D efforts of global firms (jaebols); only natural considering 80 percent of the government’s R&D expenditures was channeled into the IT and automobile sectors. Anthony Bartzokas, “Country Review: South Korea,” UNU-MERIT, 2007.
93. Wang, 1095.
94. As Silve points, out moral hazard may be incited in state intervention rather than avoided as “it may favor collusion between high-ranking civil servants and business, as it is notorious at this level of responsibility, individuals tend to alternate both careers, to evolve in identical circles and to have interwoven interests.” Silve, Class 5 (17)
95. The most overt example is the current President Lee Myung-bak, a former jaebeol CEO (Hyundai Engineering and Construction). Kim, et al., Reuters, 5 Apr. 2012.
96. Powerful jaebeol lobby groups (such as the Federation of South Korean Industries) have effectively silenced efforts for jaebeol reforms. Ibid.
98. Reinert (287)
99. The small business sector workforce alone constitutes 27.5 percent of total workforce, of which 1.7 million are from the bottom 20 percent income bracket. Kim, et al., Reuters, 5 Apr. 2012.
100. The Economist, 18 Feb. 2012.
101. The Economist encapsulates, “South Korea, in short, has first-world manufacturing exporters and third-world services.” Ibid.
102. An annual survey conducted by the London Business School and Babson College, Massachusetts. Ibid.
AN OBSOLETE PARADOX
“What of the future? Our object is, and will be, to continue to give you the best possible service, whatever the conditions may be; to continue to give you a news service which is truthful and objective.”

—Frederick Ogilvie, Director-General of the BBC, September 1939

**BBC Independence**

During the Second World War, people came to rely on the radio as their best source of consistent entertainment and information. In Great Britain, all broadcasting and the majority of radio programming were controlled by one organization, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). It served an audience that was fickle, divided, and generally skeptical of propaganda. The BBC was acclaimed for its ability to report information in an independent and comparatively unbiased way. It successfully gained the trust and respect of their listeners during the war, and it has been the embodiment of British opinion ever since.

In a time of total war, the traditional expectations of government intervention and corporate independence are often cast aside. Wartime commitments and public sentiment often necessitate the full cooperation of a country’s assets without hesitation. During World War II (WWII), governments often used institutions within their borders for their own personal disposal. In Germany, the Nazi government took over all broadcasting and media within the country, creating a propaganda machine that was unparalleled in modern history. Such propaganda was quickly associated as a vile trait of totalitarianism, and Hitler’s largest rivals around the world condemned it. When the British government entered WWII, it was unable to take advantage of a similar propaganda machine. The Allies committed to themselves to fighting a war in which all information and broadcasting would be open to dissent and free from government intervention. The British government itself declared that the BBC was to remain “truthful and independent” during the war. Thus, the war of broadcasting became a conflict of ideologies: the independent and trustworthy BBC versus the propaganda machines of the German Empire. When the Allies won, it was believed that their superior values had ultimately led them to victory. With that victory, that BBC had secured a reputation as an independent and reliable news source. Such independence implies, as its definition states, that the BBC was not subject to control by others or not affiliated with a larger controlling unit. That reputation remains largely uncontested in the present day. Historical evidence even asserts that the government never played a major role in the programming of the BBC, and that the BBC was left to carry on “independently.” However, there are numerous instances during the war in which the BBC manipulated its broadcasting to meet the demands of an overbearing government. Unfortunately, while these censorships and manipulations allowed the BBC to remain free on paper, they truly cost the institution its autonomy. War dictates a very fine line between cooperation and independence. No one can deny that the BBC cooperated with the government, just as any British institution would have done during the war; however, whether or not the BBC remained “independent” is still a subject of some debate. Though the British government and BBC leadership both made claims that they would remain separate throughout the war, the BBC did not manage to remain independent of government influence during World War II.

**Historiography**

There are two notable schools of thought concerning BBC independence since the war. The majority of historians have defended the BBC’s sterling reputation, while others refute...
the BBC’s supposed independence. The latter seeks to expose the BBC as nothing more than an arm of some devious government propaganda machine. They appear to be a sizable minority amongst educated historians. They are rebuked by mainstream histories of the BBC that document it as an independent news source free from the use of propaganda. These two groups of distinguished historians have more or less debated this same topic since the end of the war in 1945.

A majority of historians have come to agree that the BBC’s reputation as an independent and honest news source during the war is more or less deserved. These historians include Michael Balfour and Asa Briggs, both of whom wrote comprehensive histories of the BBC during the war. These historians cite two major commonly held beliefs about the BBC from this era. First, they argue that the BBC not only stayed independent of the government, but at some points was openly critical of it. Government documents and leaders all vow that the BBC was left entirely independent of government intervention. The BBC sponsored some programs that mocked and criticized the government. In a time of war, programs like these were an unexpected change of pace. The BBC was hailed as a representative of strength of “liberty” and “free speech” that had led the Allies to victory against fascist regimes in Europe. The themes of the BBC coincided with the general notion of the day: that liberty had prevailed over oppression and solidified the reputation of the corporation in history. Furthermore, historians tend to compare the BBC to other media sources of the era to show that it actively avoided the use of both blatant propaganda and government intervention. Even before the war, the British were weary of such devices, and “there was a reluctance to imitate the strident self-advertisement and abusiveness of the Bolsheviks and Fascists.” They had established an early “emphasis on ‘truth’ and ‘consistency,’ which came naturally to the broadcasters, [and] produced long-term dividends as the war continued.” The BBC was quickly recognized at home and across Europe as the most honest source of news and information. Leon Blum, a notable French socialist, stated after the war, “In a world of poison, the BBC became the great antiseptic.” The truth is that the British had no real choice but to be honest in their broadcasts; they were preaching to an already similarly minded audience that could detect certain lies. The British use of propaganda could only have had an adverse effect on popular opinion. The leader of the BBC during the start of the war, F.W. Ogilvie, did not think of himself as a propagandist and, as a whole, his BBC “prided itself that it was independent of the government of the day.” Although that independence would be challenged, Ogilvie’s leadership sought to avoid such interference at all costs. Histories of the era have conclusively shown the government stance was to “leave the BBC to carry on . . . with a very close liaison between themselves and the MOI (Ministry of Information) and definite regulations as to how the work should be carried on.” Most historians have accepted this as conclusive evidence that the BBC remained independent and genuine in its broadcasting. Therefore, a significant number of prominent historians agree that the BBC deserves the sterling reputation it has received.

There remains, however, a notable group of historians that argue the BBC was merely another agency of propaganda employed by the government in a time of war. Perhaps the most prominent of these historians is Sian Nicholas, the author of Echo of War. These historians cite many government and BBC officials who had privately agreed that, “in circumstances of national emergency ‘full government control’ over the BBC would be necessary.” The full takeover of the BBC was a constant threat throughout the war. In fact, at one point in the war, the government did initiate a complete takeover of the BBC. When that failed, they chose simply to maintain close ties through the MOI. This relationship ultimately dictated the direction of the BBC throughout the war. These historians note that the BBC was dependent on the government for its operating budget. British citizens paid a “license fee” to the government that was then distributed to the BBC. In addition to that, multiple members of the MOI often had very close ties with the BBC. The former head of the BBC was named Minister, and “the MOI Radio and Communications division was . . . given a senior BBC official as Director.” At the beginning of the war, the government actually played a key role in restructuring BBC leadership so as to make it more efficient. It imposed a series of censorship regulations on what the BBC could and could not report. The MOI “would be given advanced details of programming, and would be responsible for censoring BBC programmes,” and “the BBC news Department would come directly under MOI control.” The BBC was ultimately reliant on the government for its success. Its programming was not only subject to government approval, but often times much of it was actually written by the MOI itself.

Evidence from the era can be manipulated to support both points of view: that the BBC served as another outlet of propaganda for the British government or, alternatively, that it remained altogether independent throughout the war. In wartime, it can be difficult to establish the difference between cooperation and coercion. Domestic institutions pride themselves on their loyalty and devotion to national causes such as war. The BBC was a British institution, and as such, it was
Radio Broadcasting

As the definitive invention of the 1930s, radio was undoubtedly the most influential disseminator of information during WWII. In 1931, only about twenty-seven percent of households in the United Kingdom had a radio license. By 1938, that figure had nearly tripled to an unbelievable seventy-one percent, or thirty-four million listeners.\(^\text{11}\) The radio provided information and entertainment in a quick and consistent manner, and it was becoming smaller, lighter and more attractive to everyday buyers. It was not an item of luxury, but an appliance of sheer convenience, and it quickly became a fixture within British households during this period. The radio typically rivaled newspapers and cinema in the media, but unlike these two, the radio “not only reached everyone but could tailor particular messages to particular audiences with far more precision than any other medium.”\(^\text{12}\) In 1939, George Orwell famously noted, “Twenty million people are underfed, but literally everyone in England has access to a radio.”\(^\text{13}\) Radio became the most convenient type of media before the war, and people came to rely on it for their entertainment and news. The BBC had capitalized on manufacturing early on, and was granted a government monopoly almost from the beginning. They had no competition, and the public was subject solely to their programming, for better or for worse. The British people truly became wholly dependent on the BBC. When she temporarily lost service, one British diarist noted that she would “never grumble about the programs again. I had been, I thought, ‘fed up’ with the things we got but now that I can’t get anything I feel I am lost…. I can’t get any news no matter what is happening.”\(^\text{14}\) She likened the radio to a sort of “friend,” who kept her updated. By the eve of war in 1939, the radio had become a staple of the British household, and it would play a major role in their understanding of impending conflicts.

The BBC and the British government have always been connected financially. In the twenties, the British government instituted a “receiving licence” for all radio listeners.\(^\text{15}\) This fee was collected by the General Post Office and then paid out to the BBC. A select group of citizens questioned this tax because it required them to pay the government for the use of private services. Social historian Mark Pegg agrees, writing, “Before the creation of the Corporation, it could be argued that it was unethical for a government department to collect money on behalf of a private company.”\(^\text{16}\) Ultimately, it was decided that such a tax could be collected as long as it was voluntary. Thus, radio license fees became a common occurrence in British society, and they were more or less unquestioned by the majority of British citizens. In 1939, every license holder played the government £1.10 annually in order to listen to the radio, and that fee accounted for the majority of the BBC’s operating budget. Although the BBC still remained independent from government influence, this fee kept them reliant on government collection. In 1942, in a speech to Parliament, the Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, stated that “The MOI has power to direct the BBC not only because of the pledge given to the government by the Chairman of the Governors in the first year of the war but also because the BBC now derives its finances directly from monies voted by Parliament.”\(^\text{17}\)

Radio Propaganda

Before the beginning of hostilities in 1939, both the British and the German governments had explored ways to utilize radio in the war effort. As Nicholas notes in her book, “Because of the scope of its appeal, the range of presentation styles it offered and its sheer ubiquity, radio was a propaganda disseminator of vast potential.”\(^\text{18}\) Leaders of these combatting powers realized that the radio was the best distributor of information and thus needed to decide how they would use it to manipulate public opinion. Propaganda generally has two forms, and each power chose to utilize a different style. “Black” propaganda, the type that is typically associated cultural conceptions of propaganda, is the blatant use of lies and deception to influence the hearts and minds of a targeted au-
dience. Its ultimate goal is to “turn the public by devious means away from their natural and patriotic inclinations.”

“White” propaganda, on the other hand, is “the necessary fostering and maintenance of [a] people’s innate will to win.”

When referencing propaganda during this period, people generally only noted the black propaganda, which was simply more obvious and prevalent. White propaganda is considered more complicated, for it must influence while being subtle.

The Germans came to perfect, and ultimately capitalize on, a “propaganda machine” that utilized elements of black propaganda. As early as 1933, the German government took control of all of the nation’s broadcasting, under the notorious Ministry of Propaganda, and its even more notorious Minister, Joseph Goebbels. Opposition newspapers were quickly banned, and the Nazi party effectively controlled the distribution of all information in Germany. It even went as far as “ensuring the production of radio sets that only received German radio stations, and by jamming enemy broadcasts.”

These extreme steps left broadcasting in Germany entirely dependent on the government. This domination was blatant and straightforward, and the German government did not pretend otherwise or apologize for its actions. The British government and its citizens noted the terrible extent at which the Nazis had commandeered the media, and they condemned them for it. It would become ultimately impossible for the British government to utilize the same tactics on their own people; it quickly learned that it had to tailor its propaganda into a form more suitable to its interrogative audience.

German tactics in Europe had made propaganda a matter of serious concern in Britain. The British citizens were capable of recognizing propaganda, and they knew that they should fear it. In 1939, The Times proclaimed, “If a government can cut off its people from almost all sources of information except those directly inspired by its own propaganda, those people have no check or standard of comparison. Undoubtedly lies and suppression of truth can play a very effective part in propaganda under these conditions.”

This is the epitome of “black” propaganda, and examples of it were quite common in Britain. One British citizen in Essex noted propaganda’s presence as a regular topic of debate; one of her friends had remarked, “I think its one of the weak things about German business, their propaganda,” and another said, “It’s so stupid.”

They had seen firsthand how this propaganda was being used on the German people, and they were terrified of similar government manipulation at home. As early as 1933, British Cabinet Papers noted that the German government under Adolf Hitler “has embarked on a programme of political propaganda on a scale for which there is no analogy in history.”

This warning did not really raise any concern until tensions with Germany increased near the end of the decade. In 1938, the British parliament discussed the censorship of its news abroad. Mr. Lee Jones noted, “but today we hear from various quarters of Ministers of Propaganda, subsidized and controlled news services, which either suppress entirely British news or so mix it with false deductions as to make an entirely erroneous picture of the people of this country.”

Times editorials criticized the use of such flagrant deception. British citizens called the Prime Minister’s attention to “the continuance of propaganda by radio from German stations and begged him to “make representations to the German government to stop this propaganda.”

Many articles concluded with sayings similar to this one that stated, “The Times of Saturday, April 1, was confiscated on arrival in Berlin.”

The British quickly learned to distrust German propaganda before the war had even begun. They become skeptical of all news sources and would slowly turn their attention to the validity of their domestic broadcasting. A general fear of propaganda ultimately gripped public opinion in Great Britain.

The British government knew that a complete take-over of British broadcasting would not have the same effect that it had in Germany. In a cabinet paper written in 1938, the newly appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, wrote a very detailed memorandum concerning the problem of propaganda that might arise in Britain. In this paper, he claimed that the British could prove themselves to be superior by not actively developing propaganda. He said that the British citizens were already afraid of propaganda, so “any propaganda done from here should be unobtrusive and unprovocative, as the German Government will do their best it or even stop it, but it also means that our propaganda if properly done, may have a big effect.”

Lord Halifax implied that the best way to combat such an aggressive propaganda machine was with honesty. He claimed that both totalitarian governments and parliamentary-based governments have strengths and weaknesses, but if the British government were to openly expose its faults it could ultimately protect its “prestige.”

While this idea would ultimately underlie the British choice to utilize white propaganda, it would not be their first attempt at propaganda.

**Early Government Intervention**

The British government had initially proposed a complete control of information similar to that of the Germans. In October of 1935,
When war broke out in September of 1939, the MOI effectively took control of the BBC. It tried to employ many of the same techniques that had made the Nazis so effective in Germany. Unfortunately, it had a terrible debut. The BBC’s programs were relatively boring and “consisted of ten daily news bulletins—there had been five before the war broke out.”

People were generally displeased with this change, especially during a time when real entertainment could have been an enormous comfort. On September 11, just ten days after the war began, the MOI “seized newspapers that reported action by the British Expeditionary Forces in Flanders, this information having first been released then withdrawn.” Such an action might have been expected in Nazi Germany, but it made headline news in Great Britain. The government had assumed that “if we were going to fight the Germans again, we ought to have the same weapons as they did,” by which they meant propaganda. This phase marked a relatively low moment in the BBC’s reputation. In the press, “words like ‘puerile,’ ‘travesty,’ and funeral’ now replaced ‘admirable,’ ‘invaluable,’ and ‘triumph.’” The British press took this opportunity to harshly criticize the BBC and its productions. The BBC, which had no choice but to yield to any and all demands from the MOI, was said to have “missed a magnificent opportunity of proving its mettle” against government intervention. It was quickly realized in Great Britain that black propaganda would simply not work. A state-run broadcasting corporation simply could not hold the attention of British popular opinion. Finally, the BBC stated, “conscious propaganda in entertainment is generally ineffectual.” Both the government and the BBC agreed that a new plan would have to take effect in order to meet the needs of Britons.

A Dependent BBC

The British government ultimately chose to employ white propaganda to influence the population, as the type of propaganda employed by the Nazis simply did not appeal to British audiences. The government’s “objection to such things was presumably based not simply on grounds of morality but also on the belief they were ineffective with audiences.” British propaganda started to embrace mild honesty as its policy in an effort to combat the blatant fabrications of truth in Germany. It did not bother to block German transmissions or impede access to alternative sources in any way. White propaganda acknowledges the truth while still attempting to influence the opinions of its audiences, and it was in the government’s best interest for the BBC to maintain a large audience with a small amount of differing opinion and independence, in order to sway public opinion as a whole. The government quickly realized that the BBC “under strict con-
trol might have been left with no choice but to broadcast communiqués and other announcements verbatim, and in general to fill programmes with material which seemed important to the government but boring the listener. Had the government formally kept control of the BBC, the official programming and lack of any variety probably would have turned the majority of British listeners away from the BBC or the government in general. As a result, the BBC was encouraged to remain independent and broadcast relatively honest opinions. If the BBC had not offered multiple opinions, historian Michael Balfour contends that, “it would have been giving its listeners inadequate reasons for the things it wished them to believe.” This freedom of broadcasting gave the BBC the illusion of honesty, which was more deceptive than actual. While asserting its independence the government privately assumed that,

Where a public are not spontaneously united, or where a government is pursuing a policy which does not enjoy preponderant support, the choice must arise between leaving the freedom to differ, with the risk that this may prevent policies from getting the support needed to make them effective, and removing the freedom, with the risk that the disunity to make them effective, and removing the freedom, with the risk that the disunity, though hidden, will in fact become greater.

The British government accurately assumed that it could not maintain popular support without some dissent among its press, but they gambled that this dissent would not ultimately compromise public opinion towards war. Rather, these small variations in opinion would distract people from the larger conflicts of ideology at hand.

Initially, the government decided to appoint two “advisors” to the BBC; one advisor would deal with mainly domestic programming while the other would deal mainly with foreign programming. The government expected that “in the ordinary course of events the advice of the two ministers would be accepted, but [it] added that there would be the right of appeal to the Minister in case of any difference.” BBC leadership did not initially welcome the appointment of these two advisors. One of the governors, Sir Allan Powell “expressed fears that the persons appointed would be able to range freely and without check over the whole field of the Corporation’s activities and administration.” The BBC reluctantly accepted the proposal, and two new advisors were added to the board. The government reassured the BBC that “there was no intention to supersede the Governors or the Director-General and that the only purpose of the proposed moves was to strengthen the machinery by which the Ministry’s directives on news and propaganda could be given to the BBC.” These ministers ultimately did have a significant role in determining the BBC’s programming, and they serve as another example of the government’s influence in the day-to-day affairs of the BBC.

In the spring of 1940, the government’s new plan boasted that the BBC would remain entirely independent. They were of the opinion that “The Government, through the MOI, had complete power but chose not to exercise it.” This statement simultaneously assured and wrested the BBC’s independence. The BBC was constantly at risk of being subverted by government take-over, and yet the government had promised not to interfere. The brief government take-over had left the BBC more docile, and it was much more willing to collaborate rather than again surrender its influence. Its independence was based more on the personal fears of its leaders than any concrete assurances.

The BBC, as all media during this era, depended on government news bulletins. As the government published bulletins about the progress of the war, and the BBC subsequently broadcast them. BBC leaders were really in no position to question or check the reliability of these bulletins, but had to publish them as fact. In fact, “if they had started openly to question the veracity of the bulletins, the government would have made short work of them.” Had the BBC published anything contrary, the government surely would have reasserted its control over the corporation. The BBC could really only provide varied opinions within the parameters set by the government. The government could control broadcasting simply by withholding information. Balfour went as far as to say that, “A decision by the government to withhold bad news could hardly have been defied without contravening the Defence Regulations.” The BBC really had no option but to relay the information it was given by the government, which effectively gave the government control over all news in Great Britain.

British citizens often criticized the BBC and the British government for the reporting of battle figures during the initial days of conflict and in the Battle of Britain. Prime Minister Chamberlain announced early on that the British government would not follow the German example of concealing its losses “except when it would be helpful to the enemy to have it.” Despite this proclamation, the British government remained reluctant about publishing casualty information about ships and airplanes that had been sunk or shot down. The reports they did publish during this era were often inaccurate and scarce. In one cabinet paper written by Lord Macmillan,
the Minister of Information, he suggested that the BBC should be careful with how they present this information, including the tone or emphasis of the speaker, the extent to which the details are dwelt on, the context, its reiteration, etc.\textsuperscript{51} The scarcity of these reports and the dependence on government news bulletins made it absolutely impossible for the BBC to regularly report accurate casualty estimates. British citizens simply learned to expect these numbers to be fabrications of the truth. One Mass Observation diarist noted that this information was being accepted “by most people with reserve. They cannot believe that we go over France and Germany doing such damage, and then it is announced that all our planes returned safely — or nearly always so.”\textsuperscript{53} The BBC had no choice but to report the estimates the government had released in the time and manner the government wanted. These early reports compromised the credibility of both the government and the BBC. Unfortunately, it would not be the last time the BBC subjected its programming to government coercion.

There are multiple instances in the war when the BBC handed over a great deal of its programming to the government. These large chunks of airtime were devoted to promoting government policies. The most popular of these collaborations was the “Kitchen Front,” a news program designed to help people ration. Nicholas notes, “The BBC was the obvious medium for food advice. It had a long tradition of programmes devoted to household management, and it took little adaptation to introduce a housewife-in-wartime theme.”\textsuperscript{54} The BBC was reluctant to allow the government so much broadcasting time, and it only agreed to a short segment on rationing. The food programs soon became a smashing success in Britain; in some cities Mass-Observation estimated that nearly 71% of housewives were tuning in.\textsuperscript{55} The BBC had no choice but to grant the Ministry of Food additional airtime, and these programs began to dominate the daytime programming of the BBC. The BBC however, had very little part in writing the programming, but rather “the presenter would write the script daily at the Ministry, and the BBC would be responsible for presentation.” Unfortunately, such privileges were constantly being granted to the government as a “courtesy” despite the BBC’s supposed independence.\textsuperscript{56} Eventually “discrepancies . . . emerged in the MOF’s and BBC’s conceptions of the planned programme.”\textsuperscript{56} In one case, the MOF wanted someone popular to represent this food related programming, while the BBC desired a spokesman with considerable content knowledge. Ultimately the BBC was forced to accept a compromise.\textsuperscript{57} Had the BBC truly been independent, they would not have had to cooperate with government obligations. These humble food programmes were merely another form of government-mandated propaganda that had appropriated large portions of the BBC’s programming, as the BBC learned to accept such influences begrudgingly. BBC leaders informed their colleagues that “We cannot . . . afford to allow things to be said in talks about food which are contrary to the policy of MOF, and any mistake is likely to lead to stricter control of our broadcasts.”\textsuperscript{58} The Kitchen Front talks ultimately influenced five million viewers, more than four times the audience of any other daytime talk show.\textsuperscript{59}

The BBC and the government cooperated again in 1942 to promote fuel economy. The people that had eagerly tuned in to food rationing programs were beginning to grow weary of the government’s mandates. Even Brendan Bracken, the Minister of Information, warned that “one makes it furious, the other resentful . . . There are too many people already working to limit of their capacity or unable to do so for reasons beyond their control.”\textsuperscript{60} Again, the British people began to grow tired of any form of direct propaganda, but the government insisted on programming time from the BBC. It tried to utilize the same techniques that had been so successful with the Kitchen Front programs, including, “direct informational propaganda.”\textsuperscript{61} This again caused contention between the government and the BBC leadership. In this particular case, the BBC Directors-General found themselves at odds with the Ministry’s liaison officer, Felix Felton. He had insisted “that any reference on the air to fuel had to be cleared by him.”\textsuperscript{62} Ultimately the public attacked the BBC and its campaign for its insistence on conserving fuel. Listener research showed that “the prevailing public attitude was ‘definitely critical’” and that “people felt the campaign should be directed at public bodies and wealthier people, not at working-class housewives.”\textsuperscript{63} The true irony of this campaign was that it had been written by the government and merely produced by the BBC.

When the BBC did produce its own programming, it often criticized the British government, and some of their most famous programs during this era actually openly mocked the government. The BBC saw the use of playful humor as a good morale booster during this era, and it gave rise to some of the most renowned comedians and programs in British history. One of the most famous of these programs was It’s That Man Again (ITMA) starring Thomas Handley. Handley played the Minister of the “Office of Twerps,” and later the Mayor of “Foaming at the Mouth.” All these roles poked fun at contemporary British leaders and government bureaucracy, but not enough to significantly damage the credibility of the government. One listener claimed “in wartime [ITMA] was a
national, morale-boosting institution, relieving stress and promoting solidarity. With an audience approaching twenty million a week it was a gift to the Ministry of Information.\textsuperscript{64} The Ministry allowed many of these shows to exist because they kept the citizens occupied without damaging any of the government’s standing. Had these shows actually hurt the government, they would have certainly been taken off the air. There is certainly no better example of this than J.B. Priestley. The BBC gave Priestley a weekly broadcasting segment, from which he built an enormous following among British citizens. They considered him a “man of the people.”\textsuperscript{65} Priestley’s perceived flaw, however, was his tendency to genuinely criticize British leaders in attempt to be more sincere. In October of 1940, Priestley decided that he “ought to stop broadcasting for awhile” after he received pressure from a disappointed government.\textsuperscript{66} Priestley’s replacements were put under greater government scrutiny, and none of them achieved the same following that he had. Even the programs that had criticized the government were designed to improve morale rather than to truly disparage the government’s reputation. When the government displeased of BBC programming, it had the power to take it off the air.

Conclusion

The British Broadcasting Corporation was not nearly as independent as its reputation suggests. There are multiple instances in which government manipulation and censorship impeded the BBC’s ability to effectively produce its own programming.

It wartime, there exists the expectation that a government can require the cooperation and loyalty of domestic institutions. In some cases, the government commandeers public institutions entirely, while in other cases, it merely pressures the institutions it requires. The Nazis controlled all forms of media, using them to create a black propaganda machine that was unparalleled in human history. If done properly, there is perhaps no better system for a government to advocate in a time of crisis. The Germans were not the only government to employ this blatant and direct form of propaganda. At the start of the war, the BBC allowed its programming and leadership to be entirely appropriated by government intervention, much like the Nazis had done before them. However, British citizens did not allow themselves to be manipulated in the same way the German people had; British audiences were already weary of propaganda and were not willing to accept it in such a blatant form. Therefore, the government had to utilize a more subtle form of propaganda to capture the “hearts and minds” of their citizens. The goals of both the British and German governments were the same: to effectively promote their rational for war and maintain support at home. Although their methods were different, they ultimately utilized propaganda in much of the same way.

While the British government claimed the BBC was independent and of it, there were many moments that it effectively controlled the corporation. The BBC was constantly subject to censorship from the MOI and dependent on ministry approval; it was also subject to government scripting and approval for all programming. The MOI appointed two advisors to the BBC that sat on the board, and took part in key decisions regarding broadcasting. In addition to these restrictions, the BBC was constantly at risk of complete takeover, making much more willing to produce government-approved pro-
gramming in exchange for even the most marginal amounts of independence. As the war went on, the BBC constantly relinquished large amounts of their programming for government-sanctioned productions, such as “Kitchen Front,” that were designed to help promote war-time era orders. Even programming that was thought to be mildly subversive and satirical had actually been subject to government approval, as the government did not allow any truly subversive programs to be broadcast. Although BBC leadership often complained, they always yielded when asked. How can an agency truly be independent if its programming is dictated by someone else?

The BBC’s unbiased reputation was one of ideals rather than actual merit. As the only broadcasting corporation in Great Britain, it came to represent everything that Britain represented. It represented the Allies: the just, egalitarian, honest countries, who were combatting the unjust, totalitarian and oppressive ones. The honest truth, however, is that during WWII, these countries wielded much of the same weapons and propaganda in much of the same way. Their reputation might have been solidified in their victory, but historical evidence suggests that the BBC was not the corporation that it is assumed to be.

ENDNOTES

2. Stenton (3)
3. Briggs (9)
4. Briggs (11)
5. Briggs (6)
6. Balfour (81)
7. Nicholas (15)
8. Balfour (82)
9. Balfour (18)
10. Briggs (3)
11. Briggs (12)
12. Nicholas (71)
13. Scannell (363)
14. Mass Observation (7)
15. Pegg (40)
16. Pegg (43)
17. Balfour (85)
18. Nicholas (4-5)
19. Nicholas (3)
20. Nicholas (3)
21. Nicholas (40)
23. MO (260)
24. Eden (259)
25. Jones 1918
26. Times (6)
27. Times (16)
28. Lord Hallifax (281)
29. Halifax (2)
30. Nicholas (15)
31. Nicholas (18)
32. Nicholas (19)
33. Briggs (96)
34. McAline (38); Nicholas (30)
35. Balfour (54)
36. Nicholas (30)
37. Briggs (97)
38. Nicholas (46)
39. Balfour (87)
40. Nicholas (40)
41. Balfour (88)
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Briggs (332)
45. Briggs (332-333)
46. Briggs (333)
47. Balfour (85)
48. Balfour (87)
49. Ibid.
50. Lord Macmillan (53)
51. Lord Macmillan (2)
52. MO (37)
53. Nicholas (73)
54. Nicholas (75)
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Nicholas (76)
58. Nicholas (78)
59. Nicholas (84)
60. Nicholas (85)
61. Nicholas (87)
62. Ibid.
63. Nicholas (89)
65. Briggs (211)
66. Briggs (213)
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THE FINE DETAILS OF BROAD BRUSHSTROKES
AN OCCUPIED CINEMA

Political Intimations in Three Popular Films of Vichy France

On June 14, 1940, the German army completed its successful invasion of France as its tanks and troops rolled into a dramatically vacated Paris. Eight days later, Marshall Philippe Pétain—the eighty-four-year-old hero of World War I—broadcast a radio message to the French people conceding military defeat and insisting that the fighting must end. Days later, an armistice was signed with Germany, a new French government headed by Pétain was established in the town of Vichy, and the most controversial, perplexing period of modern French history began.

For the next four years, France’s government was in thrall to its occupying power, and, despite postwar revisionism that postulated the image of a unified résistante France, most French citizens adjusted to their new life without open resistance. And, as Alan Riding demonstrates in his book *And the Show Went On*, so too did entertainment industries: many theaters, cabarets, ballets, and operas in Paris were alive and well during the war, and indeed prospered due to their new German patrons.

More so than any other entertainment industry, though, it was French cinema that flourished under the Occupation. It is, in one sense, surprising that in a time of austerity and war—not to mention censorship—the film industry could be so prolific. On the other hand, though, as the French director François Truffaut recalled in 1975, “movie theaters became a refuge for all, and not only in the figurative sense of the word.” They were certainly a refuge in terms of the escapism their movies offered: tales of romance, fantasy, and comedy in a country beset by a grim and vicious war. But cinemas were also a literal refuge from the bitter daily realities of cold apartments, food rationing, and occupied streets. As a result of these forces, movie attendance soared during the occupation. This popular demand for movies was matched by the French studios’ accelerated rate of output. A total of 219 movies were made in France during the four years of the Occupation—an unusually large number, due in part to German policies that banned American and other European films. With foreign competition removed, cinemas could only look to French product to fill their screens.

Most of the films released under the Occupation remain mired in obscurity today, frivolous thrillers or romances that were produced cheaply, released quickly, and soon forgotten. A few films, though, produced a more lasting impression. Marcel Carné’s *Les Visiteurs du Soir* (1942), Robert Bresson’s *Les Anges du Péché* (1943), and Henri-Georges Clouzot’s *Le Corbeau* (1943) remain pivotal films of the period, unique exceptions to the era’s trends in some ways and utterly beholden to them in others. All three films were helmed by masterful directors who would be canonized as giants of French cinema, yet not one of the films can reasonably be said to belong exclusively to its director. The legacies of *Les Visiteurs du Soir* and *Le Corbeau*, especially, lie not so much in their artistic merits as in the heated controversies that arose surrounding the films’ supposed political implications. Indeed, the films of the French Occupation, more so than those of any other period, were films shaped by the unique circumstances of the industry and by public opinion, which dramatically influenced how they were perceived and which reinterpreted their meanings in ways the films’ makers could never have anticipated.

*Les Visiteurs du Soir* (literally translated as *The Night Visitors*, and released in the US as *The Devil’s Envoys*) is a perfect example. With its script by Jacques Prévert (one of the most acclaimed and popular French poets of the era), its medieval romance of star-crossed lovers, and the casting of

PHILIPPE PÉTAIN, MARSHALL OF FRANCE’S ARMY IN WORLD WAR I, LEADER OF THE VICHÉ FRENCH STATE

AN OCCUPIED CINEMA
popular stars like Arletty and Alain Cuny, the film was conceived as a surefire popular hit—and the kind of escapist fantasy that could not possibly engender controversy. Indeed, Carné recalls in his memoirs that Prévert pitched the idea to him on those terms: “In order to avoid Vichy’s censorship as far as possible, [Prévert] thought that we should take refuge in the past: we could thus enjoy a greater freedom.”

Carné and Prévert’s fears of censorship were not mere paranoia: the film industry of the occupation was subject to the scrutiny of both German and Vichy censors, before and after production. Referat Film, a section of Germany’s Propaganda Staffel, had approval authority on screenplays, casts, crews, production schedules and distribution plans of new French films. They also enforced Vichy’s notorious Statute on Jews, passed in October 1940, which barred Jews from working in the film industry. In addition to German censorship, the Vichy government created its own censorship board, the Commission de Contrôle, which largely concerned itself with ideological content. The Vichy government wanted the film industry to project an image of French virtue and patriotism, in line with the country’s new motto: “Travaille, Famille, Patrie” (“Work, Family, Fatherland”). Films that featured noble and hardworking French citizens, devoted motherly figures, and themes of French pride were celebrated; films that questioned such themes, or even featured plot elements like divorce, were likely to face the scissors of the Commission de Contrôle.

The story that Prévert concocted was designed to avoid such controversy. Les Visiteurs du Soir is a romantic fable set in late 15th century France. Two travelling minstrels, Gilles and Dominique, arrive at the magnificent castle of Baron Hugues just as his daughter Anne is set to marry her fiancé, Baron Renaud. It soon becomes apparent, however, that Gilles and Dominique are in fact envoys from the devil sent to sabotage the engagement. In a famous early scene, the two freeze time during a ball to cast a spell on the engaged couple. Gilles uses his powers to seduce Anne, while Dominique bewitches Baron Renaud. The plan goes awry when Gilles genuinely falls in love with Anne, causing the devil himself to appear at the castle to intervene. The devil imprisons Gilles, wipes his memory and takes Anne for himself—but when Gilles meets Anne again, his memory revives and their love rekindles. In a desperate final act, the devil turns both lovers into stone, but the movie’s final shot shows that their hearts continue to beat, and their love persists.

In Carné and Prévert’s understanding, Les Visiteurs du Soir was merely a diverting fantasy, right up to its “love conquers all” ending. Yet when the film was released in December 1942, the French public saw something quite different: an allegory of persistence in the face of occupation. As Jean-Pierre Bertin-Maghit, a leading scholar of the period’s cinema, writes, the film’s opening scenes had powerful thematic resonances:

We are in the presence of a society (that of the castle) turned towards amusement, unaware of the danger that threatens it (the stopping of the ball). A society without contradiction, where the only apparent problems are born of the contact between the intruders, strangers to the established order . . . implicitly, the film takes us back to the situation before June 1940.

The film’s middle section, too, was suggestive, with the Devil character seen as a stand-in for Hitler. Most of all, though, it was the film’s ending that cemented its controversy: the beating hearts of the two stone-set lovers was
widely seen as an allegory for France’s spirit of freedom, still thriving even under occupation.\textsuperscript{7}

This interpretation of \textit{Les Visiteurs du Soir} became widespread as word of mouth spread, yet reviews in French newspapers of the time did not dare to mention it for fear of censorship. Still, most reviews were laudatory, often excessively so. In \textit{Oeuvre}, Jean Laffray gushed: “Marcel Carné gives us today not just a beautiful film, but a magisterial work bringing cinematic art to a high degree of perfection.”\textsuperscript{8} Henri Gerard, the critic for Cine-Vogue, called the film a work that can be compared to none other and whose appearance marks a strangely happy date in the history of world cinema. We are very proud that it was on the shores of France that such a work was conceived and that it was here it saw the light of day!\textsuperscript{9}

The film’s many rave reviews often touched on the same points. They praised Carné’s skilful direction and his ability to switch from historical realism to fantasy, they praised the film’s design and art direction, and they praised the witty script by Prévert as well as the affecting performances of Arletty and Alain Cuny. Yet, as Gerard’s review demonstrates, the overwhelmingly ecstatic nature of such reviews suggests more than just admiration for a well-crafted film. Many French critics held up the movie as an emblem of national pride, proof that the French film industry was still capable of grandeur and greatness. Such high praise, coupled with the film’s thematic controversy and its calculated commercial appeal, made the film a huge hit—and a hot topic of discussion.

An August 1943 article by Roger Régent in \textit{Les Nouveaux Temps}, a collaborationist daily paper, suggests the controversy the film engendered upon its reception:

a certain crack sometimes appeared between journalists and spectators; Marcel Carné’s film has its passionate defenders and its adversaries. Each side brings to the discussion a strong conviction and arguments that they have chewed over and matured during long weeks and even long months of meditation and stubbornness!\textsuperscript{10}

Régent’s article goes on to dismiss such arguments as tiresome and sterile, instead encouraging the public to appreciate the film on the basis of its aesthetic qualities and “poetic sense.” Likewise, the critic Michel Aubriant, writing for \textit{Franc-Jeu} (the newspaper of a collaborationist youth group) in February 1943, praised the film as a masterpiece but scorned those who stirred up controversy around it: “Let’s forget the opinion of attorneys or fruit merchants, the irritating perorations of professional gossips.”\textsuperscript{11} The message that such Vichy-friendly papers was sending was clear enough: enjoy the film, but don’t read too much into it.

For their part, the film’s makers affirmed that they had never intended a political message, but said that the public was free to interpret the film as they pleased. Prévert stated to the newspaper \textit{L’Action} that he and his co-writer Pierre Laroche “only ever wanted to tell a story.”\textsuperscript{12} Even years after the war, Carné insisted that he had not intended the film to be a political allegory. In his memoirs, Carné addressed the allegorical interpretation to the film’s ending but did not take credit for it:

I would not swear that Jacques and I had thought of that. But in any event we accepted that interpretation since it responded to...
a real need on part of the public when the film was released in late 1942.\textsuperscript{13}

Ultimately, then, for all the speculation its ending produced among the French public, Les Visiteurs du Soir was not a brave political allegory. It was a masterful piece of entertainment that managed to please everyone for different reasons. It offered a reassuring political message to those inclined to read it that way, it was considered harmless by the German authorities, and it satisfied the public’s desire for quality escapism.

Les Visiteurs du Soir was so beloved that it won the French government’s prize for best film of the year in 1942. The following year, the honor went to another critically acclaimed and popular film, Les Anges du Péché (Angels of Sin, released abroad as Angels of the Streets).\textsuperscript{14} The film began as something of a risky commercial bet, though, with a story set almost exclusively in a convent and a then-unknown director, Robert Bresson, in the director’s chair. But on the basis of a script by acclaimed writer Jean Giraudoux and a cast led by star Jany Holt, the film was greenlit and largely funded by the Crédit National, a nationally owned financing agency which since 1941 had partnered with the Vichy government’s film committee to co-finance new productions.\textsuperscript{15} This explicit connection to Vichy is telling: though the movie is certainly not propagandistic, it is the kind of moralistic, high-minded film the government wanted to associate itself with.

Les Anges du Péché dramatizes a battle of wills between two very different women: Anne-Marie, an eager young novice in a Dominican congregation of sisters, and Therese, a former prisoner who seeks refuge in the convent after killing her former lover. Anne-Marie tries to take Therese under her wing and rehabilitate her, but she encounters hostility and resistance: Therese is in the convent to hide, not to find God. Eventually, Anne-Marie’s headstrong ways and her insistence on perfectly pious behavior stir up trouble at the convent, and the other sisters decide to expel her from the community as a “necessary sacrifice.” In the end, though, a deathly sick Anne-Marie returns with a dying wish to say her vows and be fully initiated. As Anne-Marie is unable to pronounce her vows on her deathbed, Therese, who has now been located by the police, agrees to say them for her. With this symbolic redemption, the police arrive to arrest Therese and escort her to jail.

Today, the movie is best remembered as the first feature by the great director Robert Bresson. At the time, though, Bresson was unknown, and publicity emphasized the film’s writers: Father R.L. Bruckberger, a Dominican priest and public intellectual, and the celebrated dramatist Jean Giraudoux. These two men collaborated with Bresson to create a decidedly Catholic moral fable. Even apart from its obvious religious context—the convent setting, the fact that all the major characters are nuns—the film abounds with Catholic themes of sin, guilt, sacrifice, and redemption. The script sets up a schematic divide between its two main characters: the pious, almost saintly Anne-Marie and the scornful, sinful Therese. Throughout the film, Anne-Marie’s attempts to reach Therese are consistently rejected; it is only with Anne-Marie’s death that Therese undergoes a spiritual transformation. The grave austerity of the final shots—as Therese reverently recites Anne-Marie’s vows, and then silently descends the stairs to the police, past the watchful eyes of the other nuns, to calmly accept her fate—suggests repentance, a lost sheep coming back to the flock.

With its explicitly religious nature, Les Anges du Péché was appealing to the Catholic Vichy government, representing the kind of high-minded, morally serious film the government’s film committee liked to finance. Yet to consider Les Anges du Péché Vichy propaganda would be to overstate the case, and to ignore many complicating factors about the film’s production. Certainly the film’s makers were no stooges of the Vichy government. In fact, many of them were quite the opposite. The film’s star, Jany Holt, was an active member of the Resistance who later received the Croix de Guerre (Cross of War, awarded for courageous and/or herc efforts in the name of France) for her efforts.\textsuperscript{16} Bruckberger, the co-screenwriter, was the chaplain general of the French Resistance, and after the liberation in 1944 had the honor of saying mass at Notre-Dame for France’s new hero, Charles de Gaulle.\textsuperscript{17} Bresson knew firsthand the horrors of the Germans, having spent a year as a prisoner of war in a German camp just before helming Les Anges du Péché.\textsuperscript{18} Thirteen years later, he would make one of his greatest masterpieces, A Man Escaped, about an imprisoned Resistance fighter, opening the film with an on-screen commemoration of the thousands imprisoned during the German occupation of France.

Three of the movie’s prime shapers, then, clearly had no love for Vichy, and with such historical hindsight it is tempting to read an allegory of the Resistance in Les Anges du Péché. There are certainly parallels to be found between
the convent depicted in the film and the real-life French Resistance. The community of nuns in the film is shown to be a force of good that nonetheless draws from the lowest ranks of society, including former criminals. The character of Anne-Marie—the fervent, eager young volunteer—resembles the idealistic students, many of them communists, who joined the Resistance in significant numbers. Most significantly, underlying the entire film is a sympathetic depiction of the nuns’ isolation from the outside world as a result of devotion to their cause. In one early scene, Anne-Marie burns her personal effects and pictures, severing ties with friends and family to devote herself wholly to her new life. Likewise, many members of the Resistance had to go into hiding, change their names, and discard their former identities.

These resonances cannot be entirely ignored, yet they are most likely unconscious ones. Bruckberger’s experience working with Resistance members and Bresson’s imprisonment may have manifested themselves in the film’s depiction of claustrophobic community life, yet there is no evidence suggesting that either man deliberately intended a political message about the Resistance. The movie’s theme aims at the spiritual, not the political—and like many films of the period, it is set in a peculiar, alternate reality of the period: there were virtually no conscientious objectors to working under the new circumstances. A few French directors fled abroad before the occupation, but those who remained felt little compunction about going back to work in a Vichy-supervised film industry, even one that now excluded Jews and was at the mercy of two censors. Some directors even felt that it was their moral duty to continue making films for the French public during a time of hardship; others merely needed the work. For whatever reason, a vast majority of French directors happily worked under Vichy’s new rules, and saw no moral complicity in doing so.

Ultimately, then, it is doubtful that the makers of Les Anges du Péché intended a direct allegory about the Resistance. More realistically, they separated their political leanings from their professional life, and avoided any conscious political message. Certainly there was no talk of hidden meanings upon the film’s release, though the film was greeted with much the same enthusiasm as Les Visiteurs du Soir. The famous actor, playwright, and director Sacha Guitry raved that the film had “not a lapse in taste from beginning to end . . . no sentimentality, no vulgarity, no pretensions . . . It is much better than cinematic!” The critic André Bazin—a voracious cinephile who would go on to found the magazine Cahiers du Cinéma (Notebooks on Cinema) and help usher in the French New Wave—praised the film as “the dazzling exception to the rule that makes an artistic hell of French hagiographic or edifying cinema.” In Bazin’s view, the film deftly skirted the traps of sentimentality and pretension, instead proving itself a film “of ‘international stature’” and demonstrating that “the efforts of French cinema are not limited to those of a technical order but spill over into the intellectual and spiritual stance of our production.”

Both Les Visiteurs du Soir and Les Anges du Péché were prestigious films with respectable subject matter, and they attained the effusive praise of French critics. Henri-Georges Clouzot’s 1943 film Le Corbeau (The Raven) was another matter entirely. In some respects, the movie is representative of the many thrillers and murder mysteries that flooded the French marketplace during the Occupation. Lacking the historical sumptuousness of Les Visiteurs du Soir and the religious themes of Les Anges du Péché, Le Corbeau is instead a lean, mean little thriller. It is also perhaps the boldest, most truthful, and most political French film to emerge from the Occupation. The uncomfortable truths presented in Le Corbeau struck a nerve with French audiences, and after the war the film served as a whipping boy for both Left and Right, leading to a ban on the film and its director. Years later, the French public’s rejection of the movie speaks to its power and honesty.

Of all the movies released during the Occupation, Le Corbeau is the one that seems to reflect the period’s realities most deeply, and the one that most needs to be understood in its proper context. Paradoxically, though, the movie’s origins go back to the early 1920s and the small French city of Tulle. For many years, the residents of Tulle were subjected to a slate of anonymous letters bearing cruel and scandalous accusations. National newspapers picked up on the juicy story, until the culprits were found to be two...
local women with no apparent motive but misanthropy and gossip-mongering. Years later, the aspiring screenwriter Louis Chavance seized on the story for a movie idea. As early as May 1933, Chavance was researching the case and seeking the advice of psychological experts on the motives of anonymous letter writers, and in 1937 the first draft of *L’Œil de Serpent* (The Serpent’s Eye) had been finished. Over the next six years, *L’Œil de Serpent* slowly morphed into *Le Corbeau*.

“The movie’s theme aims at the spiritual, not the political—and like many films of the period, it is set in a peculiar, alternate France where the realities of the war and occupation seem not to exist.”

The final film is not a historical account of the Tulle affair, but rather an original story of poison-pen letters inspired by the earlier case. The movie opens with a title card identifying the location vaguely as “A little town, here or there,” and soon plunges the viewer into a decidedly unpleasant village. First we meet Dr. Germain, the film’s misanthropic protagonist, washing his hands after overseeing a miscarriage. Emotionally unaffected by this failure, he heads to the hospital where we meet Marie, a disagreeable and meddlesome nurse who is in the habit of stealing morphine for her own use. Germain then takes a house call to visit Denise, a voluptuous blonde who is clearly faking illness in an attempt to seduce him. Even Denise’s preteen sister is shown in these opening scenes to be an eavesdropping snoop; in short, virtually everyone in the village seems rather odious. The two shining exceptions are Dr. Vorzet, an elderly psychiatrist and upstanding member of the community, and his young wife Laura, for whom Germain clearly harbors feelings.

Soon enough, anonymous letters—signed by “Le Corbeau”—begin flooding the village. Germain is accused of being an abortionist, Laura is said to be unfaithful to her husband, and rumors spread as more villagers receive scandalous notes. The accusations cause one suicide and soon foster an environment of mistrust and paranoia, as villagers begin ganging up on suspects and demanding their arrest. Accusations are tossed around freely until Germain finally determines that the two culprits are none other than the two pillars of the community, Dr. Vorzet and Laura. At the film’s end, Laura is taken off to prison, while her husband is murdered in an act of vengeance.

As this reductive plot summary suggests, *Le Corbeau* is a profoundly dark, misanthropic movie. The film’s director, Henri-Georges Clouzot (here making his second film) would develop a reputation for cynical thrillers about the darker side of human nature, including classics like *Diabolique* and *The Wages of Fear*. But *Le Corbeau* had a more biting social context than anything else in Clouzot’s filmography. With its depiction of a tiny French town where citizens turn each other in out of fear, paranoia, and cowardly self-interest, *Le Corbeau* resonated with the realities of the Occupation. Even without any explicit references to the war, the underlying plot device of anonymous letters took on an uncomfortable significance for the French. During the Occupation, authorities offered rewards for citizens to denounce known Resistance members or other dissidents, and an estimated 3 million letters were sent to the authorities for this purpose. *Le Corbeau* turned an unflattering allegorical mirror on this reality.

The tone of the first reviews suggests the film’s chilling effect. Even those critics who celebrated *Le Corbeau*—and there were many—did not react with the kind of ecstatic praise that greeted *Les Visiteurs du Soir* and *Les Anges du Péché*. Instead, their notices carried a weightier, more unsettling tone, suggesting that the film had frightening implications. Jules Lhost, writing for the publication *Cassandre*, said that the movie had a way of “revealing the invisible, what is hidden behind the faces of the men, women, and children we rub elbows with every day” and that the film “must necessarily provoke a shock, a reaction, a sudden start.” René Barjavel, writing in the pages of *Spectateur*, celebrated Clouzot’s way of showing the corruption of even hospital doctors, but went on to state that Clouzot’s characters were “no more ignoble in their work than most of their colleagues, than most other businessmen, than most men, than you and me.” Roger Régent said that he could not talk about the film in the same way as he did other films; his ambiguous assessment of the movie expressed amazement that it got by the censors and
highlighted its “anticlericalism and, maybe, its subversive power against a certain bourgeois conception of society.”

Régent’s words about the film’s power proved prophetic, yet it is unlikely that he could have predicted the extent of the controversy the movie would provoke. Le Corbeau managed to alienate virtually every faction of French society. The Church called it blasphemous, likely objecting to its discussion of taboo subjects like abortion and its critical view of Church members—especially the priest character, who encourages the lynch mob mentality of his congregation. Proponents of the Vichy regime saw a loaded attack on their ideological values of work, family, and homeland. Leftists protested even more strongly, seeing the film not as a denunciation of bourgeois Vichy society but as an anti-patriotic condemnation of the French character. The clandestine Resistance paper L’Écran Français argued that the movie’s characters were “crippled, immoral, corrupted and dishonored,” characters “which the servile imagination of M. Clouzot has made up as if under Nazi orders.” The article went so far as to claim that the movie was “produced and encouraged by the Germans in camouflage” and that it “feeds an anti-French propaganda.”

The idea that Le Corbeau was pro-German propaganda was fueled by many factors, but especially by Clouzot’s connection with Continental Films. Continental was a German-run studio that had come to France soon after the Occupation. Run by Alfred Greven—a producer appointed by Goebbels to kick-start the French film industry—Continental soon became the most prolific studio in France, and Clouzot was one of many French directors who signed a contract with them. Yet the studio was not in the business of creating Nazi propaganda; Goebbels left that to the newsreel division. Instead, Greven—no to mention his personal history of working in Germany before the war—increased suspicions that he was a secret German sympathizer who wanted to undercut French nationalism. What made his case even more damning was the pernicious (and false) rumor that the film had been released in Germany under the title A Little Town in France, implying that the film’s beastly little village was a microcosm for all French society.

After the liberation, various comités d’Épuration (purging committees) were established to weed out those French who had collaborated with the Germans. The most extreme collaborators were executed, others were punished with jail time while some offenders were entirely overlooked. It was, in many cases, an arbitrary process, yet the controversy surrounding Le Corbeau ensured that Clouzot and his team were scrutinized with particular attention. The movie certainly had its defenders: prominent intellectuals like Jacques Prévert and Jean-Paul Sartre argued that it was not anti-French, while Chavance argued fervently in editorials that he had begun his screenplay in the mid-30s and had never intended a political statement. Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence in Le Corbeau’s favor was a letter from French Lieutenant Colin-Reval to the president of the commission, proving that the film had not only never been released abroad, but indeed that German authorities had rejected it for foreign distribution because it “did not convene to a German mentality.” Despite all this evidence, though, the Commission d’Épuration du Cinéma banned the movie, banned Clouzot and Chavance from working, and even imprisoned or banned some of the movie’s actors. Though the bans were lifted by 1947, the harshness of the commission’s verdict shows the intensity of the reactions it provoked. Even thirty-six years after its release, in 1979, committee member and Communist film director Louis Daquin stated that he did not regret its condemnation.
Peeling back all these layers of controversy, distortions, and accusations, the question remains: who or what does *Le Corbeau* really target? One answer seems clear enough: the movie casts a scornful eye on anonymous letter writers, and by extension all those French who denounced their fellow citizens under the Occupation. Yet, as film scholar Evelyn Ehrlich argues persuasively, the movie has bigger targets than that: it is profoundly anti-Vichy, an evisceration of that government’s dubious conservative ideology.

The film repeatedly subverts expectations regarding traditional societal roles. Laura, the virtuous, dutiful young wife, is revealed to be a malicious liar. Dr. Vorzet, the wise elder trusted by the whole community, turns out to be the culprit whose rancorous letters drive a sick boy to suicide. Everywhere throughout the film, symbols of moral and societal authority—doctors, priests, prefects, policemen—are exposed as frauds, while characters that would be condemned by the standards of Vichy morality—like Denise, who initially seems merely a lusty sexpot, and Germain, who is accused of being an abortionist—become the unlikely heroes who stand up to the hysteria.

Even if the film doesn’t espouse an explicitly political message—there is no figure corresponding to Hitler or Pétain, nor does the movie have anything to say about the Resistance—the damning subtext of *Le Corbeau* boldly defies the ideological underpinnings of the Vichy regime, something that no other film of the period dared to do. Unlike Marcel Carné, who always denied an intentional political allegory in *Les Visiteurs du Soir*, Clouzot later declared that he did have such meanings on his mind. Years after the film’s release, he admitted:

> Here is exactly why I made [the film]: I was up to the head in anonymous letters; we were living in a frightening regime of denunciation . . . I scuffled with Greven who said to me: ‘It’s an extremely dangerous film’ . . . but I insisted upon doing it, I liked it; it was a revolutionary film.\(^{37}\)

One of the many paradoxes of the Occupation was that to make his anti-Vichy “revolutionary film,” Clouzot had to collaborate closely with the very forces he was railing against. So, too, did Bresson and Carné, and indeed any filmmakers who hoped to make a living during the period. From a modern perspective, it can be easy to judge such men for even the smallest complicity in the corrupt institution that was Vichy France. They did, after all, submit to a film industry that excluded Jews and had close ties to the occupying Nazi powers. Yet such facile judgments belie the complex realities at play. The story of the French Occupation is not a simple tale of heroes and villains, but an unsettling one of moral ambiguity. *Le Corbeau* has a famous scene that still speaks to this reality. In a darkened classroom, Dr. Vorzet gives Germain a lesson in moral complexity, as he turns on a lamp hanging from the ceiling and watches it swing back and forth. “You think that good is light and darkness is evil,” Vorzet says. “But where is darkness, where is light? Where is the border of evil? Do you know which side you are on?” Like so many French during the Occupation, French filmmakers lived on that ambiguous border, working with forces of darkness to bring their works of art to light.

### ENDNOTES

1. Truffaut (7-8)
2. See Appendix B (203-204) to Ehrlich’s *Cinema of Paradox: French Filmmaking under the German Occupation* for figures on filmgoing before and during the Occupation.
3. Carné and Guiguet (125), translation mine.
4. Riding (59)
5. Ehrlich, *Cinema of Paradox* (29-32)
7. See Ehrlich’s *Cinema of Paradox* (103), Bertin-Maghit (144-145), Riding (194-195).
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Clipping from L’Action, 1942, accessed in dossier CARLES 259-B75 in the researchers’ space at the Cinémathèque Française, Paris, France. Translation mine.

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