

Private Higher Education

are religious and 20 are not). As in Japan, tuition is the major source of funding, and costs students about \$17,000 per year plus an additional \$7,000 for room and board. Endowments and gifts or donations are also important sources of income for institutions.

The prototypical U.S. institution enrolls on average 1,246 undergraduates and 520 graduate students (if it offers graduate programs). Enrollments have either increased or remained the same over the last five years. Regarding academic interests, American students are a blend of their Indian and Japanese counterparts; the most popular fields of study at the prototypical U.S. institution are business, psychology, education, English, biology, and nursing.

In terms of the professoriate, the average American institution employs 92 full-time faculty, 63 percent of whom are women. In addition, it employs 76 part-timers, among whom the proportion of women is almost identical to that of the full-time faculty (65 percent). The student/faculty ratio is 11:1, and 73 percent of upper-level managers are women.

Women's institutions in the three countries share a few key dimensions, but overall the differences outweigh the similarities.

Women's institutions in the three countries share a few key dimensions, but overall the differences outweigh the similarities. In terms of commonalities, in all three countries women's institutions are mainly urban or located near metropolitan areas. Reflecting a trend in higher education worldwide, a portion of the faculty in all countries is part time. In terms of differences, the main sources of funding vary considerably, ranging, as mentioned earlier, from tuition in Japan to government funding in India. There is a wide disparity in academic focus, from business and technology in India to more traditionally "female" subjects such as education and literature in Japan. Institutional missions vary along similar lines, from "impart education in the field of applied sciences such that women develop skills which will allow them to gain employment or start their own enterprises" to "educate a woman so that she can upgrade her father's home and family and her husband's home and family." In addition, large differences were found in the percentage of managers who are women, which likely reflects cultural and historical differences among the three countries.

A Call for Further Research

The results of our study give a general picture of women's colleges and universities worldwide and provide important comparisons among countries and in-

dividual institutions. However, much more research is needed, for which this study is intended to serve as a starting point. We hope that our findings will inspire other researchers to learn more about this very important segment of higher education.

Women's Colleges and Universities in International Perspective: An Overview, by Francesca B. Purcell, Robin Matross Helms, and Laura Rumbley, will be published by the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College in September 2004. To request a copy, please e-mail Laura Rumbley at rumbley@bc.edu. ■

Private Universities in South Korea

Seung-Bo Kim and Sunwoong Kim

Seung-Bo Kim is a doctoral student at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management. Address: 207-43, Cheongnyangni 2-dong, Dondaemun-gu, Seoul 130-868, Korea. E-mail: skimbo@hanmail.net. Sunwoong Kim is professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. Address: P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA. E-mail: kim@uwm.edu.

South Korea (Korea hereafter) has experienced a spectacular expansion of higher education during the last five decades. In 1950, the number of students enrolled in higher education institutions amounted to just 11,358. In 2002, 52 years later, enrollments had increased to more than 3.5 million, and more than 40 percent of the age cohort is enrolled at four-year higher education institutions. Even in a period of global massification of higher education, the Korean experience is particularly spectacular.

Throughout this rapid expansion, the private sector has played a vital role in the supply of higher education, as the government has concentrated its scarce resources into the speedy implementation of universal primary and secondary education. As of April 2002, there were 159 two-year junior colleges and technical colleges in Korea. Out of these 159, 143 were private institutions, accommodating more than 95 percent of students. At the same time, there were 163 four-year colleges and universities, 137 of them private. Out of about 2 million students enrolled at four-year universities, three-quarters of them were in private institutions.

Reliance on Tuition

The rapid expansion of higher education by utilizing the private sector comes with substantial structural problems. First, the overall quality of education is considered to be low, while the prices paid by students are

relatively high. The research output of Korean universities as measured by the Social Science Index is less than 4 percent of the U.S. output and 15 percent of Japan's output. According to the IMD Management School of Switzerland, the competitiveness of the higher education sector in Korea ranks 28th among 47 countries. Year after year, a substantial portion of Korean secondary school and college students seek to study abroad.

Most private institutions rely heavily on student tuition. In the 2000 academic year, tuition comprised 78 percent of the revenue of four-year private institutions.

As the government's financial support to private universities has been rather limited, most private institutions rely heavily on student tuition. In the 2000 academic year, tuition comprised 78 percent of the revenue of four-year private institutions. Even the national universities rely on tuition for 33 percent of their revenue. Such heavy reliance on tuition creates a heavy financial burden on households, particularly those with a lower ability to pay. Consequently, the dispute over the level of tuition has been a perennial problem for higher education.

Profit Motives

Besides the lack of government subsidy, low levels of endowments is another reason for institutions' heavy reliance on tuition. Besides the obvious reason for low endowments—the relatively short history of higher education—most Korean private universities have failed to attract a lot of donations, because they are regarded as for-profit organizations by the general public, even though they are legally designated as nonprofit. To encourage the private sector to provide such a large volume of higher education services, the government had to give a great deal of leeway to the founding families of institutions. The current law stipulates that the board of trustees can exercise almost complete control over financial and personnel matters. Also, one-third of board members can be a member of an immediate family of the founder. (In a recent survey of 83 private universities, control over 23 universities has passed, or is in the process, to the immediate family member of the founder.) Consequently, there is a great deal of room for the founder to misbehave. Nevertheless, the Korean system requires very little disclosure of financial and academic information from private institutions.

Faculty and students often challenge the owner regarding the improper transfer of funds. For example, the owner of a university may own a for-profit construction company, and the owner builds school

facilities using the company. Another example is the personal usage of university properties, such as houses or vehicles. Such disguised profit motives create an incentive for the owner to allocate more school funds to facilities and less to faculty development, research, and instructional activities, which are more difficult to embezzle. Such illegal behavior creates many campus disputes. Between 1997 and 2000, 44 universities (more than 40 percent of the examined institutions) have been engulfed with some form of disputes.

Regulations to Market-oriented Policies

Up until 1995, the Korean government not only maintained strict guidelines regarding the establishment and operation of higher education institutions, it also controlled the number of students in each department at each school, as well as student selection methods. In most cases, student quotas and school licenses were rationed to those institutions that could demonstrate to the government their capacity to provide quality education. Naturally, the strict regulations created substantial rent-seeking activities, while leaving little room for individual educational initiatives among institutions.

The 1995 higher education reforms greatly reduced government regulations.

The 1995 higher education reforms greatly reduced government regulations. It became much easier to establish a new university. The government no longer dictated the number of students outside of the Seoul metropolitan area. Consequently, more private universities have been established, and the enrollments increased. Recently, the government tried to create more competition and diversity among higher education institutions. The institutions that adopt more competitive and market-based policies—such as introduction of the probationary period and tenure evaluation of faculty members, salary increases based on merit rather than the length of service, and allowing students to choose their majors—are awarded government grants or subsidies. As college admissions in Korea have always been determined through competitive entrance examinations, Korean universities have a very well established ranking system. With more market competition, higher-ranking universities have a definite advantage in attracting better students, professors, and donations. Therefore, they want to have more autonomy and deregulation, while less-established institutions seek more government protection and entitlement. Since the number of college students is expected to shrink in the

Corruption in Central Asia

next two decades, the divergence of interests will create political conflict among institutions. It seems inevitable that some of the institutions will have to be closed down or merged with others.

The Korean government decided to move away from strict regulations to more market-based policies. Despite this change in direction, the government's role in higher education will not diminish at all, as it is imperative that the government maintains and enforces the rules of the game used in the competition. Since Korean higher education relies heavily on the private sector, the sector's effort of imposing market principles of transparency and openness would be useful in evaluating whether these policies create accountability and other desirable outcomes. ■

Academic Integrity and Its Limits in Kyrgyzstan

Madeleine Reeves

Madeleine Reeves is a doctoral candidate in social anthropology at the University of Cambridge. She is currently research associate at the East-West Center for Intercultural Dialogue at the American University–Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Address: Trinity College, Trinity Street, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, UK. E-mail: mfr21@cam.ac.uk.

A recent issue of *International Higher Education* sought to draw attention to the question of corruption in academe, a topic that has tended to be politely passed over in analyses of higher education policy and practice (see *IHR* no. 34). When it is discussed, corruption is generally portrayed as a deviation from some presumed “normal” state of affairs: it is portrayed as the exception, rather than the rule—the fault of the miscreant teacher, the lazy student, or the immoral administrator, rather than the product of systemic difficulties. The very language we invoke tends to presume the corruptness of a basically sound system, rather than a fundamental mismatch between what individuals and institutions are nominally “supposed” to provide and their ability to do so in practice.

This article proposes a somewhat different framework for thinking about the possibilities for ethically sound educational practice. It asks about the preconditions for, and limits to, academic *integrity*, the latter term understood in its double definitions of “moral uprightness, honesty” and “wholeness, soundness.” Corruption, in this perspective, is interpreted not as the deviant action of particular immoral individuals, but the symptom of a much broader, systemic *dis-integration*: the inability of certain parts of a system to integrate with, and thus respond to the needs of, other parts. This article draws upon interviews with academics and students in

Kyrgyzstan over three years, as well as the author's direct participant observation as a teacher of English in a remote, regional state university in which instances of corruption are widespread.

Kyrgyzstan, as many other post-Soviet educational systems, retains a high degree of ministerial control over the content and structure of university curricula.

Impositions and Improvisations

Kyrgyzstan, as many other post-Soviet educational systems, retains a high degree of ministerial control over the content and structure of university curricula. Ministerial plans dictate the precise number of hours that students of a given “speciality” are to dedicate to different subjects during the course of their five years of university education; these plans are typically displayed prominently in university corridors, and they regulate closely student and teacher course loads in any given term, the scope of particular disciplines, and the chronological order in which subjects are to be taught. A small percentage of courses can be nominated by faculty deans and departmental chairs (also subject to ministerial approval), and students are nominally entitled to one or two “optional courses” (*kursy po vyboru*) in their final years of study, although in practice these tend to be narrowly prescribed—often to a choice of just one. The standard teaching course load is 500 classroom hours per term, a figure that, week-by-week, would stagger many Western academics. Punishingly low rates of pay mean that it is not uncommon for teachers, especially younger teachers (who need more time for course preparation) to take on 1.5 and even double course loads in order to make ends meet.

Such a system presupposes both a considerable degree of homogeneity among student intakes across the population (students all entering university with an identical degree of preparation) and the ability of all universities to meet ministerial requirements in terms of personnel, literature, and material resources. Rural universities expose with particular clarity the absurdity of such assumptions. For while the university curricula in such institutions mirror those taught in the capital city, entering students come with nothing like the same degree of preparation, and the pool of qualified teachers that the institution is able to attract is far smaller.

The reality, of course, is that with all the goodwill in the world teachers simply cannot deliver what is expected of them. The result is either that they decide to deviate massively from the nominal content of a course