

but it is not on its own a sufficient step: changed attitudes in society, new methods in the universities, and adequate resources are also required.

Many provisions of the new law are aimed directly at the problem of corruption. Thus, a bicameral arrangement for governance has been introduced, with a senate as the overall body responsible for policy and finance and an academic council responsible for academic matters. The greater transparency in decision making as a result of power sharing, which it is hoped this model will provide, is intended as a safeguard against corruption.

This separation of powers includes the creation of the new office of the chancellor (based on the German model), an elective post responsible for administrative and financial matters, accountable to both the senate and the academic council but not to the rector. An organizational distinction has therefore been drawn between the rector's responsibilities for academic matters and the chancellor's responsibilities for the nonacademic—particularly financial—management of the university. This separation of powers is, again, intended to reduce the risk of corruption—though of course it will not assist directly in preventing corruption from occurring in the teacher-student relationship. As many academic decisions produce administrative and financial consequences, this separation of powers builds a permanent tension into the management of the university as a whole; and the law seems to recognize this by setting out a procedure for resolving financial conflicts. I gather that the risks of such conflicts were judged to be worth accepting, if the likelihood of academic decisions being corruptly influenced was thereby reduced.

Another element in making the university's governance and management more transparent is the law's provision for one-third of the senate's members to be students. This appears likely to radically change the nature of university governance in Georgia, particularly if students organize themselves so as vote in a bloc. From the perspective of a university manager, this does raise some practical issues, given an individual student's likely short-term senate membership, as set against the relatively long-term nature of much university decision making.

The law also mandates the establishment in each university of a "quality provision service." This policy may also be seen as a way of introducing transparent academic decision-making processes to make corruption more difficult. The actual content of this "quality" activity is not specified by the law, other than in its references to "systematic evaluation" of teaching and research. One important quality-related point to note is that there is now a general recognition at Georgian universities that the long tradition of the private, individual oral examination is no longer acceptable and must be replaced (or at least supplemented) by written examinations. The creation of such a "paper trail" that can be independently scrutinized is clearly a key anticorruption development.

All Georgian state universities must struggle to survive on inadequate resources. The positive aspect of the situation is that student tuition fees, submitted to honest accounting, now make up about 50 percent—sometimes more—of most universities' income: the Soviet-era tradition of total reliance on state support has disappeared. The future possibility therefore exists for universities to benefit from a buoyant, non-state-income stream. When students are paying relatively large sums in tuition fees, and have a powerful voice in university governance, it is perhaps possible that an enhanced sense of student "ownership" will further reduce the likelihood of corruption. That was certainly my sense from several recent discussions with student groups.

#### **CORRUPTION, POLITICS, SOCIETY**

Anticorruption measures at Georgian universities seem to have a chance of succeeding because they form part of a wider program of national reforms, driven by a government with a strong, democratic, modernizing mandate. These steps to counter corruption within the universities are not simply technical fixes, unrelated to wider organizational or social change, but form part of a completely new scheme for governance and management in the university. They are also of a piece with more general public-sector reform in the country. Changes to structures and responsibilities in the university are being introduced on foundations laid by more wide-ranging, changed understandings among academics, as exemplified by the recognition that the old oral examination tradition must go. We may consider that corruption is being tackled at Georgian universities through broader attempts at the formation of social capital.

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## New Developments in Colombia's Higher Education

### **CONSUELO URIBE**

*Consuelo Uribe is associate professor and dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Javeriana University in Bogota. Address: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Edificio Manuel Briceño, 3er Piso, Bogota, Colombia. E-mail: curibe@javeriana.edu.co.*

Access to higher education by Colombia's youth population is lagging behind by international and regional standards.

The country's 22 percent enrollment rate does not meet its needs in terms of technological and economic development. A large majority of students in higher education are enrolled in university-type institutions on average in five-year programs, while technological and technical institutions only have a fifth of all students.

Higher education enrollment rates in Latin America are on average 25 percent, which is largely not up to the level in other developing areas of the world, such as the so-called Asian Tigers. Colombia's enrollment rate is lower than the regional average, lagging behind neighboring countries such as Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru.

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Colombia's mediocre rate of access to higher education has been blamed for much of the country's faulty economic performance, producing a working population with low skills, inadequate connection of its population to the global world, poor scientific and technological training, low productivity and participation in research and development, and scant occupational mobility.

#### THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX

A unique characteristic of Colombia's educational system is the composition of public and private enrollments at the different levels of education. Whereas most primary (81 percent) and secondary (72 percent) students attend public institutions, 70 percent of students attend private higher education institutions. This contrast has to do with higher education institutions' role as relatively good businesses and public institutions having their growth restricted due to fiscal constraints.

This trend has serious consequences concerning higher education access for graduates of public secondary schools. Public universities (both national and regional) admit only about 15 percent of the new students. In national universities, there are always more candidates than places. Instead of moving to towns with extra places available at public universities, most students apply to private institutions with a range of academic standards, prices, and traditions.

The differences in public and private enrollments between basic and higher education in Colombia are related to the constraints on access to public universities. The limited access to subsidized (public) higher education means that the students who fail to gain admission and cannot afford to pay tuition opt out of the educational system.

#### THE EVALUATION SYSTEM

In contrast to the generally grim situation of its higher education system, Colombia is a Latin American country with one of the more complete and rigorous systems of government-led evaluation and accreditation schemes.

Evaluation through achievement tests was first instituted in 1970 for students graduating from secondary schools. The mandatory ICFES exam—named after the institute that designs and administers the tests—forms the main basis for determining admission to higher education institutions. Students from private, urban, and day schools consistently produce higher scores.

Evaluation of both public and private primary and secondary students (third, fifth, seventh, and ninth graders) was first introduced in 1990. This is called the SABER test, and it is designed and administered by ICFES. These tests have confirmed the higher performance of students from private, urban, and day schools.

A final exam (ECAES) for university undergraduates was introduced in 2000 for a few programs and became mandatory in 2003 for students in most professional programs. The ECAES scores are generally high at public national universities, with a few private elite universities matching or outdoing them.

The previously mentioned divergence between public and private enrollments at secondary and postsecondary levels is at odds with the configuration of test scores: mediocre or low test scores prevail for students from public institutions at primary and secondary schools and high scores for students at a number of public universities. This is a peculiar phenomenon in Colombia. It means that many graduates of private schools with the necessary skills to attend competitive public universities are being admitted there, displacing those from public schools who cannot afford to pay private-university tuition costs. No wonder disparate income levels are an acute problem in the country.

#### THE ACCREDITATION SYSTEM

Higher education accreditation in Colombia is government led and covers two aspects: institutions and programs. The National Council of Accreditation (NCA) has established the two-tier accreditation system. During the 10 years that the NCA has been operating, a total of 303 programs have been accredited. Institutional accreditation started in 2003 and has been granted to a total of 10 universities, 6 of which are private. Accreditation is granted for six to nine years. The "top 10" accredited universities, along with the National University of Colombia (outside of the accreditation track), are the ones with the highest ECAES scores.

Accreditation and quality assurance were both set up to counter the growth of private institutions with less than opti-

mal performance standards. Accreditation of public institutions has also been encouraged, given that some of the regional and local universities are having a hard time matching the standards of national institutions and private universities of excellence.

#### REFORMS OF GOVERNMENT MONITORING

Autonomy is the aspect that most likely comes to mind when higher education is mentioned in Colombia. The term is included in the 1991 Constitution in reference to tertiary education institutions and is developed further in statutory law. However, autonomy resulted in the proliferation of institutions that are having a hard time with evaluation and accreditation.

The current Uribe administration initiated a series of measures to reform the monitoring of both basic and upper levels of education. In higher education, the measures aimed at controlling the proliferation of programs with low quality standards and coordinating the monitoring of higher education with that of preschool, primary, and secondary schools. The steps taken have included the creation of a Vice-Ministry of Higher Education within the Ministry of Education, the setting of minimum standards for granting accreditation, redefining academic credit and the curriculum of credit-based programs, and enhancing technical and technological education. The last set of measures involves setting performance indicators for public universities as a basis for granting up to 12 percent of their budget. These indicators include completion time and dropout and enrollment rates, which all need to be improved if a public university wants to receive its entire approved budget. Teachers' salaries would also be pegged more strictly to productivity.

#### CONCLUSION

Whereas the measures taken by the Uribe administration will have an impact on Colombia's higher education system, the results have yet to be seen. The approach is well conceived in the sense that reforms include primary and secondary education as well and the public and private mix of the different levels. Yet, the challenge is big and the needs are extensive. ■

## Problems of Leadership and Reform in Pakistan

### S. ZULFIQAR GILANI

S. Zulfiqar Gilani is director of the Centre for Higher Education Transformation. Address: Centre for Higher Education Transformation, First Floor, Waheed Plaza, 52-W, Blue Area, Islamabad, Pakistan. E-mail: director@chet.edu.pk.

The process of reforming higher education in Pakistan started with great optimism and energy in early 2001 and gath-

ered momentum during the following two years but seems to have hit a rocky road since. While there are a multiple reasons for the prevailing situation, I see the single-most-important factor that hampered positive change as the individual limitations of the key leaders, including the vice chancellors. Those who were expected to lead the reform, barring exceptions, exhibited a lack of vision and understanding, as well as the requisite qualities.

The reform effort in higher education in Pakistan gathered momentum during three years, from 2001 through 2003, spurred on by the 2000 World Bank-UNESCO report, *Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise*. In Pakistan, the Task Force for Improving Higher Education (TF) and the subsequent Steering committee on Higher Education (SCHE)—in both of which I served as an active member—spearheaded the effort.

#### THE INNER SANCTUM

To begin with, most individuals in the two groups established to conceptualize and develop a road map for reforms largely failed to rise up to their tasks. The members' approach to the deliberations remained oppositional and subversive, rather than facilitative. The individuals had been selected by virtue of their positions held or some related factors. We were anyhow caught up in a paradox: most of us were likely to lose in one way or another, if and when the reforms were implemented. Those benefiting from the chaotic system were tasked to change it in a manner that could hurt their interests, which could undermine the very efforts the two groups were supposed to further. Despite the difficulties, the TF managed to produce a set of radical recommendations that, if implemented as envisaged, could bring about a sea change for the better.

#### STAKEHOLDER RESISTANCE

Of the many reforms proposed by the TF, a central one was to change the governance and management of universities, to make them more autonomous and introduce transparency and accountability into their administrative functioning. Here the main battles emerged with the chancellors, vice chancellors, and some senior members of the education bureaucracy. The chancellors foresaw an erosion of their unchecked powers. Most of the vice chancellors were concerned because the proposed reforms envisaged a transparent process of selection, a system of accountability of their performance, and checks on the blanket emergency powers they enjoyed. The systematization of university governance would similarly erode the power of the education bureaucracy.

Outwardly, all of them lamented the dire state of affairs in higher education and supported reform, as the pressure for that was coming from the highest authorities. However, behind the scenes their resistance to change was dogged and, unfortunately, effective. They clouded issues by quoting precedence, and raising legalistic and/or procedural constraints. Their opposition was informed by the mindset that the state