

BX
3701
.S88x

STUDIES

in the Spirituality of Jesuits

PROPERTY OF BAPST LIBRARY

JAN 10 1983

BOSTON COLLEGE



Institution and Person

William J. Burke, S.J.

Published by the American Assistency Seminar on Jesuit Spirituality,
especially for American Jesuits working out their aggiornamento
in the spirit of Vatican Council II

Vol. II

February, 1970

No. 1

STUDIES

in the Spirituality
of Jesuits



Institution and Person

William J. Burke, S.J.

Published by the American Assistancy Seminar on Jesuit Spirituality,
especially for American Jesuits working out their *aggiornamento*
in the spirit of Vatican Council II

THE AMERICAN ASSISTANCY SEMINAR ON JESUIT SPIRITUALITY

consists of a group of Jesuits from various provinces who are listed below. The members were appointed by the Fathers Provincial of the United States, in their meeting of October 3-9, 1968. The purpose of the Seminar is to study topics pertaining to the spiritual doctrine and practice of Jesuits, especially American Jesuits, and to communicate the results to the members of the Assistancy. The hope is that this will lead to further discussion among all American Jesuits - in private, or in small groups, or in community meetings. All this is done in the spirit of Vatican Council II's recommendation to religious institutes to recapture the original charismatic inspiration of their founders and to adapt it to the changed circumstances of modern times. The members of the Seminar welcome reactions or comments in regard to the topics they publish.

To achieve these purposes, especially amid today's pluralistic cultures, the Seminar must focus its direct attention sharply, frankly, and specifically on the problems, interests, and opportunities of the Jesuits of the United States. However, many of these interests are common also to Jesuits of other regions, or to other priests, religious men or women, or lay men or women. Hence the studies of the Seminar, while meant especially for American Jesuits, are not exclusively for them. Others who may find them helpful are cordially welcome to read them.

THE MEMBERS OF THE SEMINAR ARE:

- William J. Burke, S.J., Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167
Thomas E. Clarke, S.J., Woodstock College, Woodstock, Maryland 21163
James J. Doyle, S.J., Bellarmine School of Theology, 230 S. Lincoln
Way, North Aurora, Illinois 60542
John C. Futrell, S.J., School of Divinity, St. Louis University,
200 North Spring. St. Louis, Missouri 63108
George E. Ganss, S.J., The Institute of Jesuit Sources, Fusz Memorial,
3700 West Pine, St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (Chairman of
the Assistancy Seminar, and Editor of its Studies)
Hugo J. Gerleman, S.J., The Institute of Jesuit Sources, Fusz Memorial,
3700 West Pine, St. Louis, Missouri 63108 (Secretary of
the Assistancy Seminar)
John C. Haughey, S.J., America Staff, 106 West 56th St., New York,
New York 10019
David B. Knight, S.J., St. Charles College, Grand Coteau, La. 70541
Vincent J. O'Flaherty, S.J., St. Stanislaus Seminary, Florissant,
Missouri 63032
John R. Sheets, S.J., Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233
John H. Wright, S.J., Jesuit School of Theology, 1735 LeRoy Street,
Berkeley, California 94709

Copyright, 1969, by the American Assistancy Seminar on Jesuit Spirituality
Fusz Memorial, St. Louis University,
3700 West Pine Boulevard
St. Louis, Missouri 63108

C O N T E N T S

	Page
<u>Introduction</u>	1
Problem and Pseudo-problem: the comforts of evasion	2
Neo-Classic and Romantic: literal and symbolic meaning	3
Historical Parallels: the Ages of Contradiction and Complexity	5
Reciprocal Relation and Respect	7
<u>Part One: The Responsibility of Institute to Individual</u>	8
Inter-action and Inter-influence	8
Atmosphere and Administration	11
The Illusion of Control: ritualistic compensation	13
Marx and Qualitative Change	16
Institute and its Sense of Self	19
The Self of Institute	21
Apostolic and Prophetic Mission	22
Institute's Presence	
<u>Part Two: The Responsibility of Individual to Institute</u>	26
Participation Mystique	28
Undifferentiated Presence and Individuated Membership	29
Autonomy	29
Acculturation: Intra- and Extra-Psychic Membership	30
Sensory Deprivation and Actuation	32
Contemplation, liturgical and political, or Chutzpah	34
<u>Part Three: Spiritual Administration or Realpolitik</u>	35
Politics: Imagination and Prophecy	36
Reduplicatives:	37
The Politics of the Machine	37
The Politics of Nominalism	37
The Politics of Getting	37
The Politics of Resentment	38
The Politics of Realpolitik	38
Competence, Excellence, the Mysticism of Service	39
Excellence	40
The Mysticism of Service	41
The Man in the Middle: Jesuits and the Forty-third Rule of the Summary	42

Rubric and Author's Preface

1) Given the complexities herein examined, as well as the continental sweep and differences of the American Provinces, it is well to state here that what I have hoped for in this effort is neither conviction, nor conversion, nor even agreement, but solely address. What is offered here is not the convenient clarity of the tailored insight to be accepted or rejected, but one man's reflections written down for another man's reflection. Personal experiences differ as does the personal understanding of those experiences. An old Gallic proverb guarantees the value of such difference.

2) It is said that young Jesuits reject old categories. I have tried to use new categories of style and classification so that effort, at least, may make a meeting possible. There are some old categories, too, those just below the rim of popular retrospect, still vested in forgotten recriminations, but, being cold, so made serviceable for present contrasts.

3) The use of Melville's maritime metaphors in Parts II and III might seem like just another rusty anchor cable. The amplitude of allegory allows emotion to surface and blow, and reminds us that the mysterious and trans-temporal realities of love and death are received into the person through a shared nature. The time of our lives, in some sense, is that of the gnomonic aorist.

4) These lines of De Unamuno have come back to me often as I wrote for Jesuits: "Science does not give Don Quixote what he demands of it. 'Then let him not make the demand', it will be said, 'let him resign himself, let him accept life and truth as they are'. But he does not accept them as they are, and he asks for signs. And it is not that Don Quixote does not understand what those understand who talk thus to him, those who succeed in resigning themselves and accepting rational life and rational truth. No, it is that the needs of his heart are greater."

5) Finally, De Unamuno's Epilogue, written in Salamanca in 1912, will serve as my prologue: "And forgive me, if I have troubled you more than was needful and inevitable, more than I intended to when I took up my pen proposing to distract you from your distractions. And may God deny you peace and give you glory."

Institution and Person

Introduction

Since the time of Thorstein Veblen two forms of sociological investigation have flourished in the United States: one of Method, the other of Theory; both, accordingly, lose sight of reality. C. Wright Mills sharply comments that the Higher Statisticians atomize truth and falsity into such discrete particles that there can be no decision between them; by the expensive rigor of their methods they succeed handsomely in trivializing both man and society. The Grand Theorists tend to verbalize in turgid prose, inconsecutive readings and commonly mistake their beginnings for their results. Both of these Schools tend to make of the Social Sciences an elaborate method of insuring that no one learns too much about man and society, the Method School by its formal but empty ingenuity, the Theorist School by formal, cloudy obscurantism.¹ Mills' assessment is, perhaps, too strong and sweeping. Yet it does not seem true to say that of statistical studies, committee reports and papers the Jesuits are tiring. The grounded suspicion arises that florid theorizing, comforting statistics are putting reality at one more remove from a purchase that is at once holy and wise. These men sense that reality is both active and passive; it not only is but it may become; the same reverence may not only let it be but make it become. After so many studies the expense of evasion is not well borne, and vigorous address, as a posture, is abrasive and only dramatic. Chasing a shift of light, it is easy to be deflected into examining points of conflict in schools and papers; we may be led into evasion or avoidance, possibly with relief, of the crystalline problem which wants cracking. That we perhaps will be allowed only one blow, while indeed it must give

1 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, preface by C. Wright Mills (New York: Viking Press, 1953).

us pause, must not fall upon us like a paralysis, an aboulia coursing loyally along after rational expertise. The time for such studies as this may be over. So gilded by memorable skirmishes and glossed by arcane, factional connotations are the terms Institute, Individual, Community that only a slippery purchase on them is now possible. The casual elision of the Church and of the Society's problems, itself, offers more of an indication of the Society's practical attitude than many studies would afford. Sheltered by that which we should be helping to shelter, perhaps we have come to know that there is a value to a problem, or a constellation of problems. A problem becomes, or is recognized, as a need when endless refinements of it begin to afford a kind of consolation; this is the cloven print of acedia traceable in corporate action, frenetic efforts at purposeless clarity.²

It is obvious that there is a deep need for reassurance before the confounding realities of this post-conciliar Church that platonic, disengaged statistics offer; and this is the Illusion of Control. There is a satisfaction that someone, like the Channel Fleet, is watching the problem. It is a palliative, a peace offering to the Furies, shadowy eminences now taking form in our collective dreams.

Problem and Pseudo-problem: the comforts of evasion

There is a value to a pseudo-problem; the shade of it provides the unique luxury of precipitate action, of weekend decisions, of discontinuous resolutions as Hostages to Crisis, and of a seedy politics which offers only manipulation since leadership requires a stronger light.³ History has its Lord; it is made by men but it also makes them,

2 "Society, let us complicate existence to the point of drudgery so it may act as a drug against reality." Lawrence Durrell, in his Clea (IV); from the Alexandria Quartet (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1961), p. 139.

3 "Very well. No; if he says no moon, then of course there can be no moon. Otherwise we destroy his system of thought and confuse his quest for truth." Jennet of Richard; Christopher Fry, The Lady's Not For Burning, Act I.

unless they are decoyed by sincerity into a classic pelagianism, representative not so much of an historical, doctrinal imbalance as it is of a natural proclivity of the conscious mind. Men may spite or foil, unwittingly, the active design of history and so delay its benefaction which God intends: control for those elements which distract us; contemplation for the recognition of those saving energies which redeem us. That the world should be remade in our image, according to the practical planning of our cautious logistics and converted by the bleak practicalities of our increasingly pragmatic theologies is a temptation for Angels.⁴ But, as Günther Glass reminds us: the scarecrow is made in the image of man.

Neo-Classic and Romantic: literal and symbolic meaning

As Lord Chesterfield once enjoined his son, the capital sin in society is to let the mind wander. The clear-headed Dr. Johnson railed against and humiliated his Boswell for the prime offense: one must not be silly. Of the Neo-Classics F. L. Lucas wrote that they were not emotionally over-cold, but mentally over-alert, not unfeeling but unsleeping.⁵

To cast our reflections in the categories of Neo-Classic and Romantic would be to settle for another wearying polarity with which we have had a surfeit. Still, there are refreshing and clarifying parallels between these two attitudes, for it becomes more apparent that it is impossible to speak to a Puritan about love, no matter how gamey his private pastimes may be; it is impossible to speak to a Philistine about beauty, however earnest his pragmatism.

To the Neo-Classic of these times the rule of reality is logistical exactitude and a computerized extrapolation for which one

4 "Satan tried to convince his fellow angels that he had created himself and then created matter out of his own body". Prudentius, Hamartigenia, #168; also H. Murray, The Personality and Career of Satan, The Journal of Social Issues, Oct. 1962, XVIII, #4.

5 F. L. Lucas, The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideals (Cambridge, University Press, 1963), p. 50.

waits but does not really expect. That there is a value here is beyond question. But so gluttonous is reality that one value will not satisfy it; it feeds on many and itself grows through them.

Romanticism seems to grasp the importance of environment, of atmosphere, the power of material adjuncts over the soul. It seems also to understand that communication is at once literal and symbolic, that life is lived at the fountainhead of two streams, the conscious and unconscious. It affirms the value of St. Thomas' words, that the mind of the sleeper is more receptive than that of the waker.⁶ While it is surely true that a baseless, prophetic rhetoric affords only the filament for the brief flash of the holy war, still may we sustain the charge that in a time of open possibilities we have not dreamed deeply enough, that our utopian thinking is so insured by reason as to be without risks, at least those that would affright the conscious mind.⁷ Indeed, both the Neo-Classic and the Romantic have earned their unique and deserved opprobrium; option between them is at least unwise and will only deepen the division that presently exists. But it may well be, as indeed I believe that it is, a necessity to blend both of these within the same Society of Jesus. This Society was founded to the accompaniment of dreams and visions, probably far more than have been recorded; it was characterized by an unintimidated elan and a fiducial constancy in seeking God's Will to be revealed. Whenever two movements oppose each other, they become caricatures and travesties of themselves; the Neo-Classic, clutching the homely virtues, finds in turn that he himself is clutched by a righteous rigidity, soon to become ruthlessness, which he securely felt to be dead with the last Jansenist. For the Romantic such reversal is just as disheartening; formerly insouciant, he becomes only witless; once free, now only antinomian. The pure and concentrated forms of both are sorely needed now; their parodies have hobbled us long enough; those

6 St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 12, art. 2, ad Ium, [De Prophetia].

7 David Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (New York, Doubleday Co., 1954), p. 67 ff. Also The Santa Clara Conference, Proceedings, Vol. IV, pp. 77-78; 1967.

parodies which offer us no humor but only the bitterness of caricature.

Whatever nomenclature is used, whether it is the misleading one of Old and Young, Conservative or Liberal, Conventual or Observant, Bolshevik or Menshevik, there is division in a Society which should be united, but united in a unity which does not annihilate differences but blends them. It may, therefore, be of some salutary value to examine the relations, those of privilege and obligation that exist between Institute and its personnel and between the unity they should effect and the Church and the world.

Historical Parallels: the Ages of Contradiction and Complexity

Assaying, estimating, formulating the reciprocal responsibility that obtains between Institute and individual, if it is to be of any value, must be carried on in vivid awareness of the significant forces which bear upon each. After each Council of the Church there followed a period of imbalance, a vigorous and sincere, if euphoric, sense of newness which made history re-commence with the last Session, a Cartesian beginning. In times past there have been, as there are today, traces of what might be called the subtle heresy of eclectic orthodoxy. That hardy perennial, Conciliarism, seems in flower again; the incongruity between Jesuit identity and conciliarist propositions and procedures is apparently muted at present. Not dissimilar to our own times were the problems facing the early Jesuits: the relation of grace to man's free will, the function of the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist, the relation of the Hierarchy of Bishops to the Papacy, the gradual rise of the Gallican Church, the loss of Devotion to Our Blessed Mother.⁸

With the waning of Chivalry there arose the Politics of Power; with the loss of the unity of its Faith Europe sought its unity in the New Nationalism and the hegemony of the mercantile class which was based upon a Secularized Ethic of economic morality. The question

⁸ It was said in those times that "the best homage to be given to Mary was the hymn of silence."

here is not one of identities but of parallels. The history of Post-Reformation Theology witnesses the Society's intelligent fidelity to the Church; the Suppression of the same Society evidences that its purchase on the politics of power were superficially dangerous and its philosophy of Nationalism naive.⁹ If our's is the Age of Complexity, their times were the Age of Contradiction. Dr. Alexander writes of the period:

This internal split between conflicting attitudes was clearly expressed in Baroque architecture, where the struggle between rigid formalism and mannerism resulted in torturous and tasteless exaggerations expressing a stress of freedom of form and the rejection of the shackles of classical tradition. Baroque man in his bombastic flaunting emphasis on force and grandeur and on the sensualism of the flesh, appears as a caricature of the true individualism of the Renaissance man. The individualism of the Baroque man is more a pose, a defensive assertion of something that was waning under the corrosive influence of reason.

The prevailing values of the times were contradictory. Feudal honor, individual bravado, the duelling sword were challenged by the burgeoning civilian virtues of thrift, sobriety, practicality, compromise and resourcefulness. The hidalgo yielded his place to the merchant. Cervantes' Don Quixote becomes insane fighting for the waning feudal ideas of the Knight against an encroaching, prosaic leveling of reasonableness.¹⁰

What the earlier, prelapsarian Society offers us is not simply an object for admiration and reconstructive imitation, but a warning: no Society can afford to become its own problem for very long; nor can any Society solve its problems by denying them and transferring its personnel to other locales. No Society, such as our's, can understand itself except in relation to the Church and the world; relation demands the tension of otherness; it is the tension of

9 J. M. Ferguson, Economic Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

Preserved Smith, The Social Background of the Reformation (New York: Holt, Rhinehart Co., 1962).

10 Alexander, Franz, M.D., Salesnick, Sheldon, M.D., The History of Psychiatry (New York, Harper Row Co., 1966).

integrity [tensegrity] that the Society must define more exactly. And this not in terms of a superficial secularity. Religious Orders and Mystics have admonished the Church in former times but there was a saving wisdom to their words; above petulance, beyond nationalism and without selfishness they spoke the words that built and did not destroy or diminish.

In an upheaval there is no place to stand, except perhaps within the puzzling, defensive perimeters of one's own community; there problems which are unreal and reflect only a deeper dysfunction of the outfit itself may be endlessly discussed; social identities so achieved may be comforting but they are fictional; planning is practical and largely uninspired. To the Jesuit, decoyed from his study and work, the Society itself becomes the problem; his apostolate can become an evasion at a deeper level, that is a compensation seeking consolation and reassurance from the abrasions and irritations of community ambivalence, and thereby neglecting the technical competence which should always typify Jesuit charity. Many a Jesuit today would underwrite the epitaph the late W. C. Fields wrote for himself: "On the whole I'd rather be in Philadelphia."

Reciprocal Relation and Respect

There must be a reciprocal respect within the Society for both the Neo-Classic and the Romantic; the one asks for form, the other for content. And both must admit that they -- we -- are late. Both can only echo, hopefully with substance, the call of Peter Berger, Sociologist, for a reaffirmation of the need for Transcendence and Mystery in human life and culture.¹¹ The Stewards of the Mysteries of God, as St. Paul has called us, will not be aligned among themselves or related authentically to the Church or to the Faithful apart from these Mysteries as experienced in the individual and the corporate self.

Both the Neo-Classic and the Romantic must understand

11 Peter Berger, A Rumor of Angels (New York, Doubleday Co., 1969).

that there are no partisan victories of any value; both must seek not to prevail but to resolve. The Society needs neither of their views except in so far as these are together productive of that new third element, given by both but possessed by neither. If the Romantic rails against a deadening reasonableness and urges attention for the contents of the individual and the collective unconscious, the Neo-Classic rightly demands, and probably has the power to translate these symbols into a saving sense. That we have the courage for such threatening work should be beyond question; that we have, in fact, a hermeneutic sophisticated and mystically profound enough remains to be proven both in contemplation and in action.

Part One: The Responsibility of Institute to Individual

"The lengthened shadow of a man is history,
said Emerson....." T. S. Eliot

Inter-action and Inter-influence

A Society will reflect the anxieties and vicissitudes of the people out of whom it is composed; these same people, individually, will reflect the identity or ambivalence of the corporate entity to which they belong. It is a process of inter-action. But it is not solely a registering of mutual attitudes; there is also what might be called an inter-influence that is mutual and profound, and this whether one accepts the value system of the society or is fighting against it, even while still a member; short of severance from the society, there is no way of avoiding such influence. The recent work of Dr. R. D. Laing, in a parallel context, establishes a reasonable probability that every society is imaged by its people, that the sick and the troubled are really exact, although partial, reflections of the society in which they live; society's rejection of itself finds its victims.¹

 1 Laing, R.D., M.D., The Politics of Experience, Introduction (New York: Pantheon, 1967). "Around us are pseudo-events, to which we adjust with a false consciousness."

This inter-action and inter-influence, v.g., under the rubric of a pervasive fear or insecurity, often appears as a defensive regression, or an unreflective, fearful adaptation to a fictionalized reality. The assumption that such a dialectic between person and institution is to be confined to a verbal and conscious process seems unwarranted.² Both the sworn and the swearer are under the impact of their surrounding world [Mitwelt] to a degree and at a depth neither may recognize. Thus it can happen that majorities within a society who insist that they are in touch with reality, may actually be quite disengaged from it and they may, thereby, adapt to an illusory reality. Such disengagement is effected not by relation to the world but through immersion in it, by the failure to maintain that degree of distantiation [Besorgen] required for objective, sympathetic judgment. Indeed, a society that might have been genuinely relevant may become only fashionable; fickle, alas, when it might have been fey.

Inter-action and inter-influence, where these are conscious, can be modulated and constructively controlled; where they are unconscious, or simply not conscious and recognized, they must be discerned. Institute must always question itself as to whether what it is doing and what it thinks that it is doing are really the same thing, as Northcote Parkinson has warned. Ambiguities here are disruptive, if not destructive, of any institution. Certainly, if not the first, then among the first obligations of Institute is the work of discernment. Perhaps no term in the Society's ascetical tradition has been so universally invoked and so equivocally interpreted as has been discernment during these last several years; it has become confused with consensus and/or majority opinion; it is increasingly being vested in the odd raiment of pentecostalism; it has become a common charism. It is used to reenforce, reassure and ratify procedures that are of doubtful spiritual authenticity; less a grace-inspired insight, involving retrospect

2 "The unconscious mind accepts contracts made at the conscious level and perhaps it never breaks them". Santa Clara Papers, vol. IV, p. 93.

and prospect, issuing from a high degree of spiritual experience and personal abnegation, it is becoming a tactic, part of the legerdemain of meetings. There seems value in suggesting here that Institute, before it uses discernment, should examine what it is and what it is not. What the Jesuit today desires is leadership which knows its exact relationship to the world and the Church, and knows it through a discernment that is invested with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. The result of this discernment is peace, tranquil and confident vigor of which there is a paucity in these times.³ The wise man who waits is different from the coward who hesitates.

It is axiomatic that institutions cannot keep up with rapid change. Indeed, this axiom is based upon historical inference, but, happily, not upon historical necessity. There are two facets of discernment which our spiritual writers neglect, but which are crucial to it, and they are the Past and the Future. Melancholy is the jest that the time-lag has notably decreased in the recognition and qualified acceptance of the theories of Gallileo, Newton, Darwin and Freud. There is reason to suspect that this phenomenon is due not to a question of timing but to an attitude of mind. The assumption grows that only by natural calibrations can we gauge the future, but the future is known only through vision and with fortitude, a Gift of the Spirit, strong enough to bear that vision. For Institution to be always responding tardily to challenges simply puts the entire enlistment in a state of emergency and not expectation; this is depressing to the men; repressed anger is only one of the reactions of men who keep hoping for creative foresight: for once to be there and to be ready.⁴

-
- 3 Of the Roman Conquest of Britain Tacitus observes: "They made an emptiness and they kept on calling it peace" (Agricola).
- 4a. Of the old New York Mets Ed Kranepool remarked: "The crowd would give you a standing ovation, if you only caught the ball. Winning and losing weren't really important. It was an achievement just to play ball and not get hurt" (Time, 9/5/69).
- b. Another reaction is the Fatigue Syndrome, as in "I'm tired, weary, fed up". Not lost to us the gritty wisdom of the cynical Lord

Adapting to the reality of yesterday, already passé, perhaps only reflects in action the loss of the Spiritual Exercises as formative of the collective and personal spirit.

Atmosphere and Administration

Institutional procedures and governance are perhaps not as aware as they should be of the significance and importance, sometimes decisive, of the atmosphere in which its personnel must live and operate. Unlike the more common forms of social relationships, the Society is a Total Institution which envelopes and influences every area of the lives of its personnel; it reaches every level of their existence; it touches the past, present and future.⁵ The individual relates to his institution in manifold ways but he does this through a medium of atmosphere the importance of which is not sufficiently considered. It is this atmosphere, charged as it is with positive and negative powers, which institutional [corporate] discernment must address. The term, atmosphere, is perhaps too vague an expression; it is the terrain of emotional response, of inference and surmise, of rumor and unconscious attitudes out of which suspicion or trust arise; it is a matter of connotation; its influence is pervasive. Finally, it is probably the first place to look for the symptoms of institutional health or non-health. To call this phenomenon of social grouping "morale" seems too external, a sort of general, corporate esprit. What is spoken of here is something that affects every man in different ways, many of which are unrecognized by himself. A man suffers or prospers to a very great extent under the influence, beneficent or not so, of his community, and over this he has little control, except to bear it well. He may, as many appear to be doing, insulate himself against an atmosphere that is hostile, depressing, over-possessive, or intrusive, suffocating or diffusive.

Henry: "Men marry out of weariness; women out of curiosity" (Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Grey).

5 Goffman, Erving, Asylums: Behaviour in Public Places . . . (Anchor, [A 277], 1967); The Santa Clara Conference, vol. IV, p. 73.

The stress-potential of Jesuits is high, higher than some psychologists were inclined to place it. A man does not like to admit that he is insecure or feels threatened; there are solid indications that many do. In Total Institution insecurity is a unique threat; it is as if a layman's profession and marriage were falling at one and the same time, dragging with them years of earlier, putative integrity and fidelity, as though earlier sacrifices could be stained by the inky marginalia on the records of the past. He who used to think his only enemy was sin, now finds himself closing fast with futility. One might rightly respond that such is simply not so and be correct. The truth here resides not in the verity, the rightness or the wrongness, of the proposition, but in the fact that this man feels this way.

Within the past two years most Jesuits have been made aware of their monetary value to the Community and this has had, despite its probable necessity, a series of effects difficult to analyze. It seems ironic that a Society which has prided itself recently on its effort to end the distinction between the Professed and the Non-professed, should now seem to be making the egregious error of distinguishing Jesuits by their earning power. It is a sadness for a man of some years in the Society to see what he thought to be a Covenant suddenly turned into a contract. This is a sadness which it is Institute's obligation to dispel; either let it be proven that such is not the path of the future Society, or, if it is, let the men be educated to understand what is taking place. It might be suggested that they also be told whether this step is freely elected by a provident administration or being forced upon us by an improvident one. Institutional candor is one of its foremost responsibilities. It is a commonplace to hear middle-aged and older Jesuits say that they wonder really whether the Society will care for them in terminal illness and death, or whether it will be able to do so. In some ways sadder is it to hear that young men placing their trust and security outside the Society. To a wise administration that can translate the sentiments of its personnel, it will be clear that there is not such a gap between the young and the

old, since they seem to agree at a very central point: they are tending to mistrust Institution. The 'generation gap' may be an expensive fiction; as a tactic of diversion it is unworthy, even when it is instinctive.

If trust is diminishing, or is in fact lost, and if pride in membership has, in the opinions of many, been slipping for the past few years, the Institution may infer the state of its current health. Trust and pride are at the heart of institutional life, a delicate economic of life and loyalty.

Institutional ambivalences, uncertainties and administrative friction are transmitted, unwittingly, to personnel along a signal system as intricate as it is effective. What happens on the quarter deck is known in the fore-castle within minutes and without courier. This need not be traced to some type of extra-sensory perception, although such may well be involved; the apparatus of non-verbal communication is ample enough to explain this type of information transfer. Indeed some researchers maintain that this mode of communication transfers more exactly "the state of things" than does a verbal communiqué. Failure to be aware and profoundly understand this mode of communication fosters within any institution the illusion of control.

The Illusion of Control: ritualistic compensation

The illusion of control leads an institution into a false security; it tends to beguile an institution, by a mechanic not easily analyzed, to instinctively select only certain problems for solution. But such solutions are only partial, illusory and fragmentary; some become over-accentuated in an almost ritualistic compensation for larger neglects, while storing within the institution a coiling and unresolved tension which is recognized only by symptom in its personnel and procedures. Deep and devious is the appeal of magic whereby legerdemain makes a part of reality the whole of it, as if by controlling what is seen, the unseen and the feared is also somehow controlled [Neumann]. Such legerdemain manifests itself in an attempt to solve problems before the problems themselves are wholly recognized and

understood. Many Jesuits sense that there is more, considerably more, involved in the questions of small communities, lay dress, personalism and social concern; some now wonder whether the Second Vatican Council has given a warrant or a pretext. The degree of emotional pressure stored in these questions often makes it impossible, or inadvisable, to discuss them.⁶ The work of Bettlheim, MacLuhan, Laing and others has clearly shown that clothing is a language of communication; but such communication often goes beyond what the individual wishes to, or knows that he is, communicating. The protection which Institute offers its personnel is never to be an insulation against the difficulties of life; it should be a protection shrewd enough to discern and understand what it sees. Many and delicate are the ways in which men protect each other; much is left unsaid but action shows understanding; intelligent compassion, firmness, fading like the French Franc, seems to be yielding to a cloying sentimentality and a sophomoric rationalization. If our men were capable of receiving and giving no more than this, it would be tragic, but the case would be closed and the Society could content itself with keeping the wounded walking; logotherapy could be styled down to harmless logorrhea, and perfection would be purgation.

Bunkers, nests, bivouacs or bungalows, man's sheltering habits are multi-motivated and multiform. As with clothing so with shelter; there is a deal to be learned from architecture as well as from habiliment. The agitation over small communities has been carried on with a limited logistic and an a-symbolic logic. Indeed, small communities may well be good, but it is, I think, a durable axiom that the motives for which one adopts a given procedure are as important as the procedure itself; and that these motives often are in part - sometimes the most important part - unconscious, or unrecognized by the agent-subject. Further, the subject may not be agent at all, but patient,

⁶ To some these questions only mask a disagreement deeper than form and discipline, one that is credal, theological and philosophical.

not acting but being acted upon. One crucial factor here is the fact that these decisions which one makes may shrink in the rinse of time's humiliation; that institutional, corporate disenchantment stood by and watched it happen fixes the horns of anger and tears firmly. Permissiveness must accept its responsibility; there is not question here of restricting wholesome experimentation in dress and dwelling. The Paternity of Ignatian government has too long been confused with a Freudian parody. The Paternity Ignatius knew was that of the Father who, in Dr. MacQuarrie's words, 'lets be'; He is Primal Being, Permissive Being but He communicates to His Son the entire Divine Essence [salva relatione], including the spirating power to process the Holy Spirit of Wisdom and Truth, that He may give His Son both the power and the content of His Revelation, both personal and verbal, prophetic and sacrificial.⁷ We are less open to reality than we are floundering in a morass of superficial spirituality, a slippery goodfellowship for which compliance, if not complicity, are tithes small enough to pay, unexamined clichés, a kind of comraderie which is coming closer and closer to perjuring the individual grace of vocation and sapping the autonomy a man must have to stand alone before God and at His Goodpleasure.⁸ Lateral loyalties easily deflect a man from the encounter for which he came; his unconsciousness of this seems to testify to a top-side lightness and to the density of fear in the hold. It becomes more frightening to observe how closed to certain areas of human knowledge and research are community meetings; like many closed communities it beholds only itself. Not dissimilar is the Faculty Senate of some Universities which body, having created the world, presses on to discover the wheel. Yet there is no little worm of humor that eats our hearts to the edification of the People of God.

7 MacQuarrie, John, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Chas. Scribners & Son, 1966), p. 182.

8 Rahner, Karl, S.J., Christian Commitment (New York, Sheed & Ward, 1963), p. 105, pp. 75 ff.

Institute is too ready, with relief, to take the unexamined, literal words of its membership seriously and give literal permissions which are of little comfort and questionable validity; the escalation of demands on Institute seems to indicate that the first request was not really understood and so flared out into several demands. Concern for validity seems to recede to the point where permissions of any kind are outdated. He would indeed be a rash fellow who would attempt to define beyond dissent the aetiology of today's procedures; to assign labels of respectability would be to go beyond his competence; such self-appointed prophesying is at least unseemly. However, it would be temerarious for any Institution which has theoretically accepted all a man's liberty to content itself with explanations for the changes presently taking place that derive wholly from this week's transient passions and clichés. The command structure must realize that the flight from the so-called Houses of Study and Formation involves many probable explanations other than the one it has apparently accepted; and almost none of these are flattering to the Institute or encouraging for its actual continuance, except as a Secular Institute. Bearing wholesome scrutiny would be the possibility that this move is a repudiation far deeper than has been realized. The fickle finger of fate, changes direction; reptilian and suggestive, it is pointing to deeper dysfunctions which, if ignored, assure the Institution a prolonged illness with which to occupy itself.

Marx and Qualitative Change

Change is not always correction, and since, according to the theorem of Karl Marx, quantitative changes suddenly become qualitative changes, Institute should re-evaluate its faith in change and distinguish sharply between experimenting and gambling with the future, both its own and that of its men. In the minds of many Jesuits the process of fragmentation has become more evident over the past two years, an anabaptist movement in the manner of the Brothers of the Free Spirit [Knox] and characterised by free interpretation of the

Vows and the Constitutions. The feeling is prevalent that administration is not solving any problems but simply relocating them at an expense which seems to imperil the fiscal solvency of a considerable part of the Company. Perhaps more serious is the sentiment that one encounters in Ours which seems to feel that the Mass, the Liturgy, is being used as a kind of public relations gambit, a kind of quick numinous ratification of motions and minutes. Some are led to ask what kind of union is really desired; indeed, is it still safe to assume that one takes the Sacrament, secure that he may still think differently, if not better, than his Brother?

Grave also is the concern many of Ours have that government may be changing Jesuit life to such a degree as would invalidate the Vows themselves. In 1967, all Assistancies were asked to present to the Roman Curia the questions of major concern to their men; the first question proposed by the English Assistancy was: what is the difference, if any, between the Society and a Secular Institute? Other Assistancies echoed or listed the same question and reflected an uneasiness with regard to common life and the forms of community governance. Now it would be well to insist here that these sentiments do not reflect any palsied initiative on the part of the questioners; the average Jesuit is neither passive-aggressive, nor passive-dependent; he is quite capable of operating independently; a simple sense of honor keeps his word to live life according to the Constitutions of the same Society. It would seem, therefore, that a simple sense of responsibility on the part of institution should offer him the clarification he asks. To classify this rightful request as a neurotic need for reassurance would only reflect a bilious and blighted judgment, or possibly ignorance.

It is not uncommon to hear Jesuits wonder aloud whether, in five years, the Society will still exist. Others question, although less publicly, whether they will still want to be part of the Society at that time since it becomes increasingly clear to them that they are being forced to live in a manner they did not choose when they entered

the Society. Pensive and nettled, they discern little difference between current modes of governance and the 'fait accompli' of older tyrannies. Again, let it be understood and underscored that the question here is not whether these opinions are right or wrong, well-founded or not; these are not merely intellectual views; they are emotional reactions to a troubled atmosphere. Summary affirmation or denial is to no purpose; what is needed is an acute and profound discernment which must involve a kind of meta-logic expansive enough to translate the real meaning of these views. It is suggested, again, that many of the "issues" so surcharged with emotion and productive of so much abrasion are really not the issues at all; they are questions which, by a form of transference not so very esoteric, have picked up the emotional charge of other questions which either are repressed, unconscious to the man, or which he fears to speak of openly. Understandable is this human hesitance; emotional identification with opinion and the consequent clouding or inflaming of questions is now a commonplace. What seems to some a neat surgery of logic, scrubbed and aseptic, is to others a personal attack, simply another broken bottle and a bar-maid's kiss.

It could well be that we all will have to emulate the legendary fifteen minute resignation of Ignatius to the end of the Company; the Will of God surely extends not only to the operations of the Society but also to its existence. Perhaps the spirit and form of Jesuitism will have to change to a form of secular institute, or a less common form of life, or simpler apostolates. The Indifference, Tantum Quantum and the Greater Honor and Glory of God of the First and Fourth Weeks of the Exercises should equip and condition him to receive these changes with grace and style. But the Jesuit wonders whether such changes will, or are, flowing from an abnegated contemplation and discernment, or rather from a confused, secularized theology, from a spirituality inadequate to the complexity of the times and the men themselves, or from no spirituality at all. For Institution there are two facts which demand its close study; first, that men can look at

the same issues and come to such different conclusions; here the point is not difference but total difference. It could be rightly inferred that the bond of union which should unite our minds as well as our hearts is slipping badly. That the Spiritual Exercises are no longer the unifying bond among Jesuits has been stated repeatedly during the past five years; the proposition may well be correct, but it does not suffice to explain the question. Secondly, Institution should examine itself and see whether it has not forfeited the obligation and the opportunity to instruct while it governs.

Institute and its Sense of Self

The manner of and the degree to which an Institution understands itself will be found in its written, verbal declarations, in its administrative procedures, but also by what it fails to do or omits doing, by the excellence or mediocrity of its action and by the interpreted significance of what it fails to do. The Society of the present day is operational with much and many of the more determining parts of its Constitutions in suspension; within the larger ambit of the Church it is proceeding with much of Canon Law in suspension, notably the canons De Religiosis. That a doubtful law does not bind is of slender consolation to the average Jesuit; he is not seeking legitimate release from this or that law but trying with great difficulty to recognize the precise angle of his relationship to the entire body of law and prescription which govern his life. In freedom he submitted to these laws and always felt that somehow by a higher form of that same freedom he obeyed them. This is not a pedantic, scrupulous insistence on the clarity of the law. Rather, he reflects his training and still confusedly feels that the Will of God is made known to him through the Constitutions and the orders, direction of his Superiors; he cannot easily forget the words of Ignatius: "He flatters himself he is obedient when, by some stratagem or other, he persuades the Superior to give him what he himself wants; this is not obedience but a cloak of his malice."

An imprecise conciliar theology which seems exactly to equvalate the state of the Vows of Religion with the Sacrament of Baptism, an opportunistic politic, a growing hesitance and uncertainty on the part of those who govern him will not solicit his allegiance successfully. He may look back on those who trained him and regretfully conclude that they were not really serious, or he will build a false world out of an obediencial potency that does not exist, or he will simply put the whole apparatus aside and live as a diocesan priest within the Society, or outside of it. Then again he may, bowing to secret arrogance, justly wonder who has left whom.

Perhaps partly traceable to this is a growing reduction of vision among Jesuits. Where community is discussed, we rarely see ourselves as members of an international community of historic value and present force; the danger of Nationalism, so much feared by the early Jesuits, is less a danger now than it was a few years ago at the time of the last General Congregation; now the tendency is to reduce concern to a Province, to a House, to a part of a House, to seek academic tenure and social security on a University Faculty; in other words, to withdraw into smaller, more controllable and less threatening environments. The new personalism and interpersonal relationships do not fully explain the move to smaller communities; fear, recognized or not, is present and men seek small houses just as men have sought bunkers.

Grant or deny the value of laws; affirm, as you may, the value of no laws at all; insist, with fair probability, on a new form of freedom. This is not the question at issue here. Submitted is the view that the Society's juridic structure is in sad repair and that, at this level and at this time, it is almost impossible to relate to Institute. Reverse Epikeia that affirms the law to find the spirit characterizes the Jesuit of the Fifth Annotation. But the poignant question we all face and we all must answer: magnanimous and liberal, or foolhardy and naive? We may yet fill the ranks of the Third Degree of Humility which, in quieter times, we only desired.

The Self of Institute

It is arguable but also enlightening to consider the corporate self of Institute as analogous to, or parallel with the structure of the Church, that is as sharing with the Church and possessing both a juridic and a charismatic mission. Either from the perspective of a Jungian counterpointing of Animum/Anima, or from the mythic anthropology of Eliade's androgenous unities, or from the ecclesiology of St. Robert Bellarmine in its explication of the potestas Ecclesia plena, the analytical distinction and operative resolution of both aspects, the juridic and the charismatic [or the pneumatic, or the mystical] is of central importance for any institution and for those who would relate to it. Failure to recognize and resolve these modes of corporate existence confronts the individual member with a Janus-like, schizoid stance on the part of Institution, an alternating current of communication wherein the two aspects are dissociated, inconsistent and mystifying.⁹ Institute only speaks and governs when both of these essential formalities of its life are fused by a conscious awareness which is not a little facilitated by its understanding and acceptance of its own historical tradition. Where both aspects of the corporate personality are blended, there is what Fr. Aquaviva styled administratio spiritualis.¹⁰ The reciprocal relation between these elements affords a reasonable ground for estimating the maturity or senescence of an institution. To evaluate the vitality of an institution seems to require a different mode of distinction; vitality is deceptive; it may be a simple response to stimuli which will not endure; it might be a euphoric reaction to novelty; or more dangerously it might be the flossy prelude to a killing somnolence.

9 From Glossalalia must be distinguished Schizolalia which is a jumbled communication issuing from a disturbed and dissociated center. Cf. Sakel, Manfred, Schizophrenia (New York, Philosophical Library, 1958), ch. V, p. 72.

10 Institutum Societatis Jesu (Florence, 1892), vol. II, p. 321 [as recorded by Fr. Bernard DeAngelis].

Apostolic and Prophetic Mission

It has been suggested that a second distinction might be more serviceable here.¹¹ Since an institution's sense and explicit understanding of its mission is essential, if its personnel are to be able to relate themselves to it and so understand themselves through their dedication and service, this sense and understanding must be complete and exact. It is suggested that the current Society concentrates almost exclusively on its Apostolic Mission; there seems little awareness of its Prophetic Mission. Failure to recognize and understand and actuate this prophetic potential must lead, so it seems, to an impoverished apostolate, only imitative and rarely genuinely creative, to an apostolate adopted from popular motives and rarely one accepted in humility and holy fear as to what it will demand, one that is unpopular, unpalatable and unfashionable. The power and elan of the Society of Jesus may finally be only legendary.

Apostolic zeal will accomplish good things, but the motto of the Company enjoins upon us the duty and privilege of discerning the better service. Such service is only possible, if the prophetic sense is revived through abnegation, contemplation and marked receptivity to the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Many Jesuits are worried that simple sweat in small causes will only exhaust and not recreate the Society; they believe that the unity of the Society is not an "achieved" but in many ways a "given", that is given by the Grace of Vocation which we share and realize only through and in contemplation. The unity which can be wrought in us by Grace will be more effective in the apostolate than will the artificial unity achieved through any consensus of partially democratic process. As in other instances, we try to effect and share a unanimity of concept and word while we seemingly overlook the fact that this sharing presupposes as prelude a personal, assimilated experience of God through the Exercises. One, with reason,

11 Conventus De NN. Spirituali Instructione Acta et Documenta (Rome, 1967), 8a Sessio, doc. #20, p. 142.

suspects the value of any union which rests only on a verbal or propositional agreement, or on merely parliamentary procedure. The joy we deprive ourselves of may just be the bright prospect of seeing revealed to us what form our future unity will take and what of the 'magnalia Dei' will be revealed in our work. To be shrewd when we might have been wise is perhaps a latter day consolation; it is not a heartening expectation. Perhaps we are guilty of reducing post-conciliar theology to the earnest clichés of good will and energy stored in a pre-conciliar time. But good will was never enough for the Society; Ignatius placed upon it the burden of discerning charity, which is an apt definition for wisdom.

Whether it is styled charismatic or prophetic, it is suggested that this aspect of the life of the institution is presently muted. If one adds to this the juridic ambiguities of which we have spoken, it will readily appear that institution must be faulted for the veridical image it offers to its enlistment.

Institute's Presence

Finally, Institute would profit from an evaluation of its corporate self in terms of what Existential Psychoanalysis has called genuine presence. It is their principle, demonstrated to their satisfaction, that people can never relate to each other except in this genuine presence. Of Encounter Binswanger observes:

"Encounter is a 'being-with-others' in genuine presence, that is to say, in the present which is altogether continuous with the past and bears within it the possibilities of a future."¹²

Certainly cavalier would be the method which inaccurately transposes speculation on the individual to the corporate personality. Constructs are of limited utility, but they do afford a purchase on a complex phenomenon which, even in its wiser correction, offers the hope of progress.

¹² Binswanger, Ludwig, Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy, p. 21; from Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy, H.M. Ruitenbeek (New York, Dutton Co., [D94]).

For the Society there is no present without a past and a future. Should the Society forfeit its past, allow it to be taken away, falsified or disparaged, it thereby diminishes its presence to its men. Between the two present anomalies of rejecting the past or fallaciously reconstructing it in blind faith in the salutary nostalgia of return, it must like Antigone, in peril from kings and a people, give its dead and dying honorable burial and the tribute of candid appraisal. Failing, this, institution severs its rhizoma, its own life root, which alone insures coherent and consistent growth. Rootless incontinuity insures only a fitful future and uneven prospects.

The economic which adapts to only a present, fashionable reality, literally translated and therefore but half understood, is destined to penury.

If its past is shaded and its future misted with uncertainty, the Society offers little that would enable a man to relate authentically to it. Or, what is perhaps more important, it affords the individual almost no means of self-differentiation from it.¹³ This differentiation process is of maximum importance for intelligent incorporation as member into any society. Institutional hesitance seems to many Jesuits to be manifest in the type of spirituality it offers its members.

But more disappointing to them is the impression that Institute has underestimated the present calibre, spirit and obedience of its men. Obedience is sometimes made into a problem not by the men but by the institute itself which hesitates to give an order, or does not know which one to give. This is a frequent and convenient fiction; it is a pseudo-problem.

One might object here that such clarity is not to be expected of the Society "at this time in the life of the Church". Now

 13 Slater, Philip E., Microcosm, structural, psychological and religious evolution in groups (New York, John Wiley ' Sons, 1966), pp. 238 ff. This book abounds in unintentional witticism; adversaries are despatched with tart vigor and righteous relief.

perhaps is the acceptable time to question the verity of that adage which has interposed itself between so many questions and so many bright possibilities. Secondly, the question may be justly posed: will such clarity ever be found if our logistic is limited to literal understanding and apostolic enthusiasm. Failure to maintain longer lines of proprieate striving, the relaxation into the achievement of only segmented goals is destructive to the unity of the individual personality; it is at least probable that such will be no less pernicious to the corporate person of institute [Allport]. Just one more, even brilliant, veronica is only a posture postponing the Moment of Truth.

It is probably patronizing and unwarranted to seem to suggest what an institute should be. No one can tell the Society what it is or must become. Should the Society decide to become a Secular Institute and not an Order, should it agree to change its formation and works to the more practical expectations of a pragmatic culture, should it opt for equality instead of excellence, these are good options. But it will be argued wherever Jesuits gather in the years ahead that the Society accepted enlistment not for the good, but for the better. When the young are Jubilarians, they may have cause to wonder whether the Society made an Election or accepted a "fait accompli," whether, being less, they might have been more. Neither messianic message, nor apocalyptic threat is of any value. The Neo-Classic who can stare down the Romantic has a paltry conquest; we already have the New Law and one more bootless prophecy simply tries the patience.

John Gardner writes:

"No society will successfully resolve its internal conflicts if its only asset is cleverness in the management of these conflicts. It must also have compelling goals that are shared by the conflicting parties; and it must have a sense of movement toward these goals. All conflicting parties must have a vision that lifts their minds and spirits above the tensions of the moment."¹⁴

¹⁴ Gardner, John W., Excellence. Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 117.

Part Two: The Responsibility of Individual to Institute

"And God bless Captain Vere."

Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor

The capacity and will of the individual to fulfill his obligations to his Institute are essentially qualified by the stance of the Institute itself. Is the Institute secure, courageous and perceptive enough to accept the very gift it demands? Still, it would be misleading for the individual to see his relationship as merely an "I" and "Other" affair, a simplistic, bilateral agreement. Such an attitude involves the obscuring of the grave risk which such involvement carries with it; the subject himself is either perfected or deformed; fidelity to an Institute is fidelity to one's own word and self. Such an attitude at once joins and separates subject and institution; it sets up a false tension of discrete duality in oblivion of the fact that henceforth from the time of mutual acceptance each will be judged by the other; their mutual welfare is uniquely interlocked.

Wherever men who are joined by common purpose in an institution have allowed this duality to blight their vision, that common purpose suffers and is eclipsed by the politics of pressure or extortion; there is no covenant but a kind of rivalry. It is said that Charles Fox, that Dark Chanticleer of Commons and favorite of the Fleet, once remarked that in the Royal Navy the men were warped to fit the ships. As the Lords of the Admiralty learned - slowly - during the Mutinies of Spithead and the Nore, the ships could not then be warped to fit the men.¹

Membership in a specialized society requires a training so that the person may learn his obligations and how he should fulfill them. Thus the first obligation of the individual is to accept the

1 Dugan, James, The Great Mutiny (New York: G.P. Putnam Co., 1958) chapter III, The Humble Petition, p. 52 ff.

training, specific to his institute, which is offered him. Untraining makes an unjesuit, just as poor training makes a poor Jesuit. Presently the pressure on the individual is to find that training. It is discussible but possibly helpful to say that if an outfit does not know what it is, or only partially identifies itself with simply a functional identity, training is either impossible or misleading. Thus untraining takes on a different meaning; it is less a free and wise decision to dispense with structures of training and more an unconscious admission that it does not know what to do or how to do it.

Perhaps one of the cardinal obligations of the individual is to recognize by an average humility his own incompetence. To serve an institute, and certainly to change it, requires wisdom, abnegation and experience; awareness of this makes some Jesuits comment: we are being done to death by amateurs. More than ever the person's first obligation is to rely on God's own instruction [Providence/Paideia] of him. In some such way as this he will come to understand the Four Cycles of Incorporation: enlistment, absorption, recoil and resolution. Only a personal discernment will suffice to understand these motions within himself; such an understanding will make him slow to project his own personal connundrums onto the community; and make him wisely wary of accepting unqualified involvement in so-called community problems. For these are not obstacles, heights to be surmounted, they are a moraine, an excrescence of the sentimental metaphors which shroud our life and make our holocaust dangerously imprecise; they are a moraine left by the personal avalanches of failed expectations, unrecognized needs and projections, fearful refusals to accede to reality. For our man it would not, I think, be over-fastidious never to look upon that pile.²

Sadly enough many Jesuits now feel they must consider Institute an obstruction, that they must operate at some remove from it.³ The

2 Gen. 9/ 20-27.

3 Santa Clara Papers, vol. IV, p. 87, p. 79, "...we shall see more of this in the years to come, given our present directionals, until we reach a split."

promised symbiosis of community is really a smothering prospect. Religious, mired in the problems of their Institute, in an atmosphere of confusion, small-bore savagery, indecision and random cowardice, cannot think except in terms of parietal, saving solutions. What is needed is not solution but redemption, perhaps more passion and less of action. If mind and sense are dulled by the repressant narcotic of hesitance, passion and suffering become sickly, infected, shabby reproductions of what might have been their only greatness, consistent with their priesthood. Flying arrogance, the person now may have to think in terms of redemption, not only of the world but of his Order.

Participation Mystique

The Spirituality of the Society is a process of individuation and differentiation; it angles the person toward inclusion in the community but in different degrees at different times of his life and development. It is only by personal asceticism that the person can develop from undifferentiated presence to individuated membership, as his relation to the group becomes conscious at deeper and deeper levels.

Erich Neumann writes:

The more unconscious the whole of a man's personality is and the more germinal his ego, the more his experience of the whole will be projected on the group..... The more unindividualized people are, the stronger the projection of the self on the group, and the stronger too the unconscious participations of group members among themselves. But as the group becomes more individualized and the significance of the ego and of the individual increases, the more these inter-human relations must be made conscious and the unconscious participation broken down.⁴

Slater, incongruously denying any Jungian bias, accepts Neumann's statement as a succinct clarification of the essential problem and process of group development. Writing in a somewhat narrower context than Neumann, Slater speaks of the dysfunctions of group associations as traceable to a communality of ignorance and a projection of identical fears which,

⁴ Neumann, Erich, The Origins and History of Human Consciousness (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), p. 275.

because they are identical, can seem to be communicated by means of cues so minimal as to appear telepathic.⁵ He then cites Neumanr

...excitation of one part of the group can affect the whole, as a fever seizes on all parts of the organism. The emotional fusion then sweeps away and the still feebly developed differ-⁶ences of conscious structures in the individuals concerned....

Then commenting with pertinence to our earlier remarks, Slater observes: "This is also the phase to which magic is most appropriate."⁷

Undifferentiated Presence and Individuated Membership

One of the principal obligations of the person to Institute will be to understand the mode and degree of his relation to it. The Society itself has been hurt by those who over identify with it as well as by those who are abreacting against it. Ascetical Theology with its earlier insistence on a blind, formless faith seemingly must accept some of the responsibility for the repression of conscious incorporation; such piety seems to have confused the Society with the Church.⁸ Incorporation as an individual is best assisted by hope, personally realized and articulated.⁹ The Society can neither demand nor accept this amorphous, unstructured, undifferentiated membership. Nor can any person offer it or assent to those forms of training, or lack of it, which make such inclusion possible or inevitable.

Autonomy

In Bettlheim's "complex society" the demand for an intelligent, personal autonomy is insistent. The individual in the Society presently requires a high degree of personal autonomy which would hopefully derive, in part, from the equipoise of the First Week; his

5 Slater, op.cit., p. 239.

6 Neumann, op. cit., p. 272; Slater, op. cit., p. 239.

7 Slater, op. cit., p. 239. Cf. also p. 14 of this paper.

8 Santa Clara Papers, vol. IV., p. 75-76.

9 Of assistance also would be a wise Spiritual Father whose craft was well in hand and who, like Henry James as a dedicatory plaque in a small London Church describes him, "was a lover and an interpreter of the fine amenities of brave decisions."

spiritual and psychological health may well require that he resist the present forms of Acculturation, rather than consent to them. His energies must not be deflected and exhausted by the effort to achieve solely an extra-psyche adjustment to reality; such a process dangerously diminishes his presence to himself.

Acculturation: Intra- and Extra-Psyche Membership

Dr. Maslow writes:

There is not only an orientation to the outer but also to the inner. An extra-psyche centering point cannot be used for the theoretical task of defining the healthy psyche. We must not fall into the trap of defining the good organism in terms of what it is "good for."¹⁰

Extra-psyche, environmental adjustment will depend almost totally on a previous, or a concomitant intra-psyche adjustment. Or, in Heidigger's terminology, the individual has a tri-partite relational system on which his maturity depends; he must relate to his own inner self [Eigenwelt], to his social ambient [Mitwelt] and to the biological world [Umwelt]. Reading capitulation of behaviour as conversion of the heart, institution may easily conceive of its task as the control and care of large numbers of personnel; or from a purely functional viewpoint it will see them as utility quotients; or, again, faced with crises of governance, procedure and purpose, Institution tends to depersonalize. Dr. Stanton's studies show clearly that Institution readily and unwittingly adopts the most subtle, ubiquitous and destructive misunderstanding of all - a chronic tendency to depersonalize.¹¹ From his research Dr. Maslow persuasively presents his view that the self-actuating, individuated, authentic person shows a "surprising amount" of detachment from people, a strong liking for privacy, even a need for it; he evidences a calm good-humored rejection of the stupidities and imperfections of the culture, with a greater or lesser effort at improving it; he weighs and

10 Maslow, Abraham, "Health as Transcendence of Environment," Pastoral Psychology, vol. 19, #188, p. 45 ff.

11 Stanton, Alfred, M.D., Schwartz, Morris, A Study of Institutional Participation (New York: Basic Books, 1954), p. 214.

judges his culture by his own inner criteria and makes his own decisions; his detachment, independence and self-governing character make him look within for the guiding values and rules to live by.

Sketching the evolution of psychoanalytic thought regarding the unconscious, Dr. Maslow observes that, whereas formerly the unconscious was considered as the bleak residuum of the personal and collective depravity inherited by every man, it is now understood as a precious resource:

But now we have found these depths to be also the source of creativeness, of art, of love, of humor and play, and even of certain kinds of truth and knowledge; we can begin to speak of a healthy unconscious and healthy regressions. And especially we can begin to value primary process cognition and archaic or mythological thinking instead of considering them to be pathological. We can now go into primary process cognitions for certain kinds of knowledge, not only about the self but also about the world to which secondary processes are blind.¹²

As remarked earlier, often the person who feels he has related to the world has reached only the appearances of it, and may, in fact, be quite estranged from it, since he has equated Being with his own overly-sensitized perception of it, or he has interpreted reality before really knowing it. But of capital importance for our concern is the observation of Dr. Maslow:

Only by such differentiation [between intra- and extra-psychic] can we leave theoretical place for meditation, contemplation and for all other forms of going into the Self, of turning away from the outer world in order to listen to the inner voices. This includes all the processes of all insight therapies, in which turning away from the world is a sine-qua-non, in which the path to health is via turning into the fantasies, the dreams, the preconscious, the conscious, the archaic, the unrealistic, the primary processes; that is, the recovery of the intra-psychic in general.¹³

If extra-psychic, environmental, relational adjustment is overly valued

12 Maslow, op. cit.

13 Maslow, op. cit.

and exclusively counseled, then does it seem viable to state that personal prayer and contemplation are rendered impossible, since access to the inner self is closed. To harrangue the host to holiness is heartless rhetoric, if the key is withheld.¹⁴

It would be prudent to review the mechanics of the Col-
latio and Communal Liturgical Forms; these forms are obviously whole-
some but they may become, due to lack of discernment, necessarily
exclusive of other equally necessary forms. It is suggested also that
The Ignatian Examen has been reduced to a casual, if earnest, scrutiny
of behaviour and thus it has become of minimal value to genuine self-
knowledge. The one dimensional self is easily surveyed.

Communities founded on a computer principle of compati-
bility, geometric relation, or common, superficial purpose, under this
rubric at least, carry a toxic potential which has not been sufficiently
examined. It is out of the intra-psycho richness of the person, actu-
alized by contemplative process, that the Community and its forms will
flourish and never from an exclusively extra-psycho verbosity. Lastly,
in this connection, the opinion is defensible which suggests that the
basic stance of the Society and its personnel toward the world, if it
is ligated to the purely extra-psycho, will never effect anything
worthy of the life-dedication of its members; it is, by such unilateral
adjustment, domesticated and tranquilized. It has ratified the exe-
cution of its own creativity and vision; there is no prophecy beneath
its apostolate and no mysticism informing its laws. The Kingdom and
the Two Standards can then have no force and that bracing vitality
which makes risks worth taking is not lost to us alone, but to those
for whom we entered this Society.

Sensory Deprivation and Actuation

The Jesuit today is wisely advised to question the wide-
spread use of sensitivity process. The history of this process is

14 Luke 11: 45-52: "...you have taken away the key of knowledge;
you did not enter yourselves, and you hindered those who were
entering."

familiar; it has since 1959 gone through a series of variations. The first, recent, formal work on Sensory Deprivation was initiated at Harvard University School of Medicine and the Department of Psychology of Duke University, and the studies of Major Harold Williams of the Walter Reed Army Research Center; it was developed by the outstanding work of Dr. Thomas J. Lifton, presently of Yale University and Dr. James Anthony of Washington University. It is arresting, therefore, to read in Dr. Maslow's article the remark, distressingly brief, undeveloped and representing a shift of emphasis:

As a single example of this consequence of the change in attitude toward unconscious process, I hypothesized that sensory deprivation, instead of being frightening, should for very healthy people be pleasing. That is, since cutting off the outer world seems to permit the inner world to come to consciousness, and since the inner world is more accepted and enjoyed by healthier people, then they should enjoy sensory deprivation. I have recently heard of one experiment in which highly creative people reacted in just this way, but I do not have details.¹⁵

Spirituality cannot any longer afford to be savaged by polarities; any spirituality, graced with wisdom, will balance sensory deprivation and actuation. The individual may well find that he must see to this balancing himself; this is his obligation. The studies of Walters and Karal [1960] indicated that social isolation leads to increased susceptibility to social influence only if the experience of isolation is accompanied by anxiety.¹⁶ The person must weigh current enthusiasm for community and personalism and inter-subjectivity against a more extensive and technically informed background than Institute presently affords him. It could be argued that anxiety and personal stress-reactions are dictating procedures which sedate only the symptoms and are, in fact, evasive of the deeper dysfunctions from which this anxiety is itself in flight.

 15 Maslow, op. cit.

16 Walters, Marshall, Shooter, "Anxiety, Isolation and Susceptibility to Social Influence," The Journal of Personality, (Duke University), Dec. 1960, pp. 519-529. Cf. also Solomon, Kubzansky et al., Sensory Deprivation, a Symposium (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

Contemplation, liturgical and political, or Chutzpah

The prophet will accept the desert and its deprivation, and he will take with joy the honey of sensory actuation, the bitter-sweet, chiaroscuro quality of his life. The obligation of the Jesuit toward his Institute will be well fulfilled if he offers the quality of his contemplation as informing his thought and action. His contemplation will be personally purifying of what the Greeks called Hybris, an ambitious pride, and of what the Jewish tradition has summed up in that delicious word Chutzpah, a brassy arrogance which cannot back its play. Institute is easily intimidated by the sureness of the shallow. His contemplation will be a liturgic work, that secret service whereby each man fits himself to contribute to the community his own simple integrity and the quiet personal endeavor to be a fit member; this is to realize the intrapsychic dimension of the Liturgy. His contemplation will be political, a personal work embraced for the good of his Polis; when he speaks in the Agora, he gives sound to his former silence which now gives that sound substance. Recognizing abnegation (rightly understood) to be pivotal to the Constitutions, the man of the Exercises resists the opportunistic drive to take advantage of Institute's present vacillations and diffusions either to his profit or to his pleasure. The Jesuit understands that his procedure, as well as his life, is supernatural; as Fr. Aquaviva wrote to the Provincial of Venice - Milan in 1598: "Both the Superior and the subject must be supernatural men, or their dialogue is cast in ambiguity and doomed to failure."

Ultimately, I believe, each man's sense and realization of his obligation to Institute will be different as God will direct him. To say otherwise would be to imperil the realization that both are growing and their relationship should undergo productive mutations. To effect only a kind of "entente cordiale", with lines and rights clearly drawn, invites only a Mexican Stand-off; to freeze the relationship at the level of ritual, or even of the cultic, is to lose the reality of mystery by which we are called together. What is needed now is a richer

insight into the symbiosis of supernatural life of men in groups. We have not been called by the lure of the Lodge.¹⁷

Part Three: Spiritual Administration or Realpolitik

"Right now the mood is becoming grim and anxious
The politics of resentment threaten to dominate."
Open Letter, Sept. 1966 from
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy

Bishop John A. T. Robinson, speaking recently at the Graduate School of Ecumenical Studies, Bossey, Switzerland, offered four possibilities for the individual's relation to institution:

1. Say yes to the institutional church and take responsibility within the institution as a possible Christian vocation, i.e., personally refuse to write off the Church.
2. Those who, like Charles Davis the Roman Catholic theologian, turn their backs on institution.
3. Those who say neither "yes nor no", e.g., people who turn their back on the time-wasting controversies and go on with jobs they consider more important, such as teaching.
4. Those who say "yes and no" at the same time, who bear the tension "of being split apart" by having one foot in the institution, the other out, like the worker-priests.¹

These are roughly the equivalent choices, as many see them, available to Jesuits, although one must again distinguish between the Church and the Society. Yet I think that the factor that will charge the energies of decision will derive from the quality of administration under which the institution is operational. During the past several years a type of leveling process has been at work in the Society; an egalitarian spirit, not necessarily malign, seems to be eliminating the Profession and leveling the educational formation of Jesuits; this same spirit makes of discernment a common charism; the form of the Society's government is more and more an imitation of democratic process. Presently there is not available

¹⁷ Tiger, Lionel, Men in Groups (New York: Random House, 1969).

¹ From The Churchman, Feb. 1969.

to us a spiritual theology ample enough, nor a political philosophy profound enough with which to confront these new forms, essentially qualifying as they are to the style of Jesuit life. It is very difficult to understand the juridic life of the Company now except in terms of a new form of politics which appears to alter the older relation between the pneumatic and juridic aspects of the Society.

Politics: Imagination and Prophecy

From Pericles, Acton, Burke and Norman Mailer the history of politics carries an invidious taint; that politics has the ambiguity of a fine art is evidenced from Machiavelli, Castiglione and Schlessinger.² Indignation against the forms of politics and power in the Society will accomplish little; rather must the Society face the questions involved in these areas with wholesome wisdom. Man naturally inclines to politics because it "gets things done." At a time when so much needs to be done, pious, cloudy indictments of politics involve their own peculiar malice. It is perhaps time now to move beyond the obvious mutations of Freudian sexuality and address the more subtle psychology of Adler, descriptive of the anatomy of domination and the masks of power - one might say, the more northerly latitudes of libido; that this domination itself, as in the Old Testament, is heavily nuanced with sexuality will surprise no one; difficulties in the area of the second and third vows are often correlative.

Last June at the Commencement Exercises of Wellesley College Senator Edward Brooke [R. Mass.] was discomfited by the address of the Valedictorian; it was an incisive rebuttal of the Senator's main address. The young lady, Miss Hilary Rodham, rejected the Senator's definition of politics as the art of the possible; she offered her own: politics is and must be the art of the impossible. This statement is

2 Cf. Anthony Jay, Macchiavelli and Management; Douglas Macgregor, Leadership and Motivation; salty, censorious but enlightening is Ian Henderson [Edinburgh], Power Without Glory, a Study in Ecumenical Politics.

worth our earnest meditation. It seems not overstated to say that the finest moments in the history of the Society were those when it confronted the impossible. Neither the young lady, nor the earlier Jesuits meant the metaphysically impossible, but those utopian, quixotic goals rendered impossible by moral impotence, psychological impoverishment, human stupidity or spiritual inertia. This kind of politic seems to offer God some role in governance other than ratifier of human contrivance. We are in a state of transition and it would be wise for us to consider the options; if the older forms are to be replaced by a kind of democratic process not yet identified nor understood, then might holiness, flecked with imagination, and prophecy, openly inflected by the Spirit, afford a felicitous beginning. Such would benefit the world and not merely the Society, for our problem is the world's problem. Delightfully ironic would be the implementation of Calvin's dream by the Jesuits.

Reduplicatives

There seems reason to fear that, departing from our earlier mode of governance - and holding only amateur standing in this business anyway - we might merely reduplicate Machine Politics much in vogue in our cities before the Second War; it is not readily apparent that such would be renewal of a creative sort. A more recondite, but real, option would be the establishment of the Politics of Nominalism; with the whimsical charity of the inconstant, this politician "posts with such dexterity" to exercise the power he would confer on God, a power to His Absolute Will, a power which He Himself has, with His Blood, declined. As Lord Acton once epigrammatically observed: Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.³ Then, too, there is contemporary appeal to the Politics of Getting; Harold Lasswell writes: "Politics is the art of getting the most of what there is to

³ Cf. Himmelfarb, Gertrude, Lord Acton, A Study in conscience and politics (Chicago: Phoenix Press, 1962).

get, and what there is to get is income, deference and safety."⁴ Senator McCarthy's Politics of Resentment seems already operative among us. But lastly, we might find - such are the deforming possibilities of power - that we would rediscover Realpolitik, which is defined by Cassel's German Dictionary as: realist politics, devoid of sentiment and supported by brute force. As remarked earlier, institution under pressure quickly depersonalizes; some Jesuits claim to have seen the fins of ruthlessness surfacing already.

Doubtless there were those in the early Society who, like Pitt the Younger, could "translate the shortcomings of State into victories of discipline". Such only testifies to the agility of power and not to its wisdom.⁵ The only valid form of politic for the Society is one characterized by a factionless magnanimity and the high craft of mystical discernment. The absence of neither will be forgiven us. The question seems important; should we fail to address it, we might be merely giving ourselves to be static, brittle personages in a dramatic tableau, waxen images to the dubious distinction of man's past mistakes. Lawrence Durrell writes:

The hybris, the overweening, is always there; but it is a matter of scale. The Greeks traced its path with withering accuracy, watching it lead to ate - the point at which evil is mistakenly believed to be good. Here we are then at the end of the long road - races dehumanized by the sorceries of false politics.⁶

It seems imperative immediately that theological

4 As cited from John Seeley's The Americanization of the Unconscious (New York: International Science Press, 1967), p. 22.

5 Dugan, op. cit., p. 19. William Pitt of whom it was said: "This frail bark was held together by dedication, insularity, tenacity and a total absence of magnanimity rare among British statesmen."

6 Durrell, Lawrence, Tunc (New York, Dutton Co., 1968), p. 40. Another sinister prospect is suggested by the surrealist, Kurt Vonnegut when he describes a future: "And Halyard suddenly realized that, just as religion and government had been split into disparate entities centuries before, now, thanks to machines, politics and government lived side by side, but touched almost nowhere."
The Playerpiano.

clarification be given the term Discernment and the usages of Consensus and Collegiality, imprecisely and univocally adopted from the Second Vatican Council. The reliability of consensus-government will depend critically on the degree of health/non-health of the community; it must be adjusted to the purposes, both conscious and unconscious, of the community. The convergence of consensus is not found in a contrived unanimity wherein many agree on mis-information, or a few propagate prejudices and personal projections; it is not simply a matter of addition, a kind of arithmetic "tour de force". The convergence of consensus is a work of the Spirit breathing where He will and how He will, drawing all things to Himself. One can only await this, or, at peril of great loss, replace it, substitute for it or anticipate it. Dr. Stanton writes:

...But the security which accompanies a consensus is so precious that both parties tend to maintain it at the expense of their critical abilities....This consensus/security is necessary because each would become momentarily uncomfortable if this shared fiction were questioned. Fifty million Frenchmen can be wrong, but they strongly prefer not to find it out.⁷

Competence, Excellence, the Mysticism of Service

If Lawrence Peter is correct in regarding this age as the age of Creative Incompetence, it is John Gardner who reminds us that only competence will keep a society solvent. Many Jesuits today feel that they are too much absorbed in the intramural concerns of the Company and that their competence is suffering. For some living outside is defined as not living inside and thus the same problems attend them. It just may be that the institute and the individual might discharge their reciprocal responsibilities more effectively through personal competence, religious and professional, than by sophomoric, rotarian togetherness.

John Gardner writes:

The transformation of technology and the intricacies of modern social organization have given us a society more complex and

7 Stanton, op. cit., p. 195-196.

baffling than ever before. And before us is the prospect of having to guide it through changes more ominous than any we have known. This will require the wisest possible leadership. But it will also require competence on the part of individuals at every level of our society. The importance of competence as a condition of freedom has been widely ignored. An amiable fondness for the graces of a free society is not enough. Free men must be competent men. In a society of free men competence is an elementary duty.⁸

But suddenly striking at what he calls the amiable mediocrity of a free society, he faces the desperate word - excellence:

Free men must set their own goals. There is no one to tell them what to do; they must do it for themselves. They must be quick to apprehend the kinds of effort and performance their society needs, and they must demand that kind of effort and performance from themselves and their fellows. They must cherish what Whitehead called the habitual vision of greatness. If they have the wisdom and the courage to demand much of themselves, they may look forward to long continued vitality. But a free society that is passive, inert, preoccupied with its own diversions and comforts will not last long. And freedom won't save it.⁹

Excellence

However we are to exegete this passage, at least the word excellence is on the table. Bowing and grateful to Heidigger, Maslow, to sociology and psychology, the Society must face a triad of its own and in its own unique way; it must face Excellence, Mystery and Goodness.

It can no longer afford pseudo-problems; we protest personalism, while there is distressing evidence of depersonalization; we talk endlessly of community while many Jesuits feel less members of a community now than they did five years ago; we talk of spiritual renewal while we make such renewal impossible by passing by the intra-psychic potential that makes it possible. Indeed, there is too much talk of values which on the graph of action are absent.

St. Paul has called us Stewards of the Mysteries of God;

8 Gardner, op. cit., p. 158.

9 Gardner, op. cit., p. 161.

we are in fact more than this. Each in his tiny way is a Mystery of God. Administration, procedure, politic, responsibility and privilege must be read through a finer glass and vivified by the grace of a higher vision.

The Mysticism of Service

Institution must deal with men who are very holy and quite innocent. Sometimes it must hurt them. Contarini and Seripando, the ecumenists of the Council of Trent, perhaps were right; there are two justices, although we define them differently now. Despite itself institution will punish the innocent whose innocence it cannot understand or fails to translate. Institute should know its risks; it is not hunting the villain, stiffening the back-slider, or sniffing out the rapine in someone else's holocaust. If it is so daring as to accept the place of God, it must confront the just man, and it just might kill him by the unredeemed law of its kind. Perhaps there is not much institute can do about it; to stand between God and His man is to accept the role of Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, Abraham, to raise the knife. In Herman Melville's allegory Mr. Billy Budd has struck a rating of the Queen's Service; harm to a rotten rating is still punishable. What remains is that both do their duty, the hanger and the hanged; the one to be haunted by, the other finally to be held by the Mystery of Goodness. Our Vows are given to God; God will deal with His man and perhaps institute cannot question this, or palliate it, or accept the blame, but can only intercede with God, execute the order and stay out of the way. Institute and man are here united in the mystery of an uncommon vocation. That either or both complain of each other is unseemly for men who know what they are about. If Institute expected neatness, it failed to understand its own invitation. That the individual should refuse the proving of God, or that Institute should fail to mediate it, or usurp God's place and scourge a man without warrant, or worse lead him to think that God has deserted him, this is the unique hazard of reciprocal relation. The alchemy of holiness involves fidelity and responsibility to and for the other; both are facing the reason for their

existence; each must see in the other the reason for their covenanted relationship, a reason strong enough to require a man's life; each holds the reason for the other's Jesuit existence. For refusal the individual always atones; if he is fortunate, he does so consciously and with a pure intention. But Institute is too vague to ache; so will the sleep of some retired admirals be troubled by the creaks, the shadows and mists of forgotten harbors giving back the silhouettes of men who were never arrogant enough to say they were sinless, never hard enough not to care; and in their gardens some rogue of a tar will have seeded the mandrake root among their roses to ruffle their waking with remembrance.

There is little equity to the spiritual life; the more must there be honor.

The Man in the Middle: Jesuits and the Forty-third Rule of the Summary

In the face of present complexities and apparent alternatives it is my belief that there is another position that qualifies the Jesuit. In the spirit of the forty-third rule of the Summary he is the man in the middle.¹⁰ A certain proclivity of mind and propensity of grace makes him renounce, with regret, the feeling of righteousness of the Neo-Classic Reconstructionist and the feeling of exhilaration of the Romantic in rebellion. He accepts within his own frame the perilous tension of both sides "at variance among themselves". For this the Holy Spirit gives His Gifts of Understanding and Fortitude.¹¹ Priestly identity reveals to him his obligation of mediation and sacrifice; the

10 Rule 43. "In the Society there must not be nor seem to be any inclination of mind towards either side of any faction which may chance to exist between Catholics; but rather let there be a universal charity embracing in Our Lord all parties though at variance among themselves". See also Common Rule 28.

11 "To understand - and how is that defined? Who dares give that child its proper name? The few of understanding, vision rare, who veiled not from the herd their hearts but tried, poor generous fools, to lay their feelings bare, them have men always burnt and crucified". Goethe, Faust, Part One: Night.

heart-chilling understanding of what his vocation means, its socializing function, this cold consistency which aligns him beyond evasion with Christ, Priest, and Prophet, will warm only by the heat of his own hand as he holds his bleak commission. "Come, Lord Jesus" is more than an antiphon and less than an anthem; it arises out of the dunes of fear - if the chap is sensible - and the oases of expectation. Freely electing, as an alter Christus does, to be pinioned and punished between two Extremes, he understands the one who would steal the glory of the past and the other who would rob the glory of the future for the aggrandizement of his own life span. One man's life is too short for such pleasures, so expensive to future men, now only boys, sons not his own, who may look to join our Company and who, in those future times, will "Not fear their fellowship to die with us".

The cost of discipleship is the value of mediation. It is a sacrificial work, not the sacrifice of the Great Liturgy of the Divine Victim but the small, closeted liturgy of the human victim. It is sacrificial, leaving to God's bright contrivance the gift he will receive. Made expectant by John Updike's gnomic line: "the expected gift is not worth giving", he waits. A man shopping for a gift for himself always feels like turning up his collar.¹²

With serpentine wisdom and bird-like simplicity the man of Ignatian abnegation knows - viscerally - and with the certainty of experience that God, quaintly and with touching courtesy, serves the sacrificed self and is thankful that his sacrifice need never forfeit this secret, for this secret is the personal, realized reason and ratification of his sacrifice. He understands the amplitude and purpose of Priestly Mediation as reconciliation and not option; if it fails, then he receives within himself, not the anger of men, but the sorrow of

12 "Out of natural courtesy he received, but did not appropriate. It was like a gift placed in the palm of an outreached hand upon which the fingers do not close." Herman Melville, Billy Budd, An Inside Narrative, edited from the Manuscript by Hayford and Sealts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), no. 310, p. 121.

Jesus: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem!" As a Priest in the shadow of Jesus he recognizes the Greek and the Scythian only as people, the long and the short and the tall, from Gracie Fields to Barbra Streisand.

To this Class of man the unity of the Society is founded on personal vision and the divine experience of each, indispensible man; the union is made by the Spirit who by the very differences of His revelation converges to unity. It is the Spirit who saves from the loneliness of personal life and experience by offering a man a place where the awesome effort to lead and follow one's life may somehow benefit all who share it with him.

When Mr. Budd was hung, it was from the mainyard, amid-ship, and not from the foreyard. Melville's slender symbolism tells us he died motionless, except for the roll of the vessel. For Mr. Budd there could be no lee side, no shelter from the wind, only the endless pitch from one side to the other which would go on killing him after he was dead.

The hull was just regaining an even keel when the last signal ...was given. At the same moment it chanced that the vapory fleece hanging low in the East was shot through with a soft glory as of the fleece of the Lamb of God seen in mystical vision, and simultaneously therewith, watched by the wedged mass of upturned faces, Budd ascended; and, ascending, took the full rose of the dawn. In the pinioned figure arrived at the yard end, to wonder of all not motion apparent, none save that created by the slow roll of the hull in moderate weather, so majestic in a greatship ponderously cannoned.¹³

The men of the Society hope for Justice, but they desire it by remotion and eminence, the old-fashioned "via remotionis et eminentiae." Justice of God, then also the Mystery of His Goodness wherein resides His intrinsic Glory in Himself and out of which His extrinsic Glory rises in us and in our world.

Feeling like a mallard out of the morning marshes, green-ringed and fast, failing grace, rising up across the guns, this foggy klaxon calls out fire. But to die in the spring or the autumn is small

13 Melville, op. cit., no. 320, p. 124.

difference to the individual or to your average duck; someone makes them return and tells them when it is time to go.

I join that robust anti-clerical, the Spaniard Unamuno, and ask that God may spare us peace and give us glory. Indeed, Glory: joy in another, that glory we had with you in the beginning.

He uttered a triumphant cry; it is accomplished.
And it was as though he had said:
everything has begun.

Nikos Kazantzakis
The Last Temptation of Christ

William J. Burke, S.J.
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Mass.
The Feast of the Baptist
August 29, 1969

