"We Do Not See it as a Precedent": The Entebbe Raid, Transformation of Western Counterterrorism, and American Hesitation

Abstract

This paper examines international responses to Israel's July 1976 commando raid on Entebbe Airport, Uganda, arguing that the operation constitutes a standalone turning point in the global history of counterterrorism. Drawing on declassified government documents, FBIS foreign broadcast reports, presidential library archives, and contemporary press coverage, it traces how the Entebbe raid accelerated a decisive shift among Western states away from multilateral United Nations frameworks and toward unilateral, militarized counterterrorism. While the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France each built upon lessons from Entebbe to enhance dedicated special operations forces, the United States conspicuously lagged behind. The Ford administration declined to treat the raid as a precedent for unilateral action and focused on international cooperation through multilateral agreements even as that approach had repeatedly failed since 1968. It was not until the West German GSG-9's successful Lufthansa rescue operation in October 1977 that the Carter administration took decisive steps, culminating in the December 1977 creation of Delta Force. This paper contributes to existing scholarship by centering the American response--its hesitations, internal debates, and eventual transformation--and by situating Entebbe as the decisive moment that redrew the boundaries of acceptable state action against terrorism for the Global North.