I am grateful to my four colleagues. I have learnt enormously from their comments. I am especially privileged to have two Jewish colleagues responding to Catholic doctrinal theology in evolution. For brevity and respect, I treat each person separately, focusing solely on critical questions they raised. I deal with the Roman Catholics first so that the logic of the Catholic doctrinal position is clarified before addressing my Jewish interlocutors. I apologize for questions I ask the respondents which they do not have the opportunity to answer. The questions are pedagogic and meant to encourage future exploration of unresolved issues.

To remind readers of terminological distinctions I employed in the book and use below: “biblical Judaism” denotes Judaism until the time of Jesus; “rabbinic Judaism” denotes the form of Judaism beginning in the second century and slowly emerging as the mainstream Jewish tradition; “Hebrew Catholics” denotes Jewish followers of Jesus who unite themselves to the Catholic Church and have various levels of practice regarding written and oral Torah; and “Messianic Jews” denotes Jewish followers of Jesus who operate with various senses of unity (if not formal union) with Gentile churches and have different levels of practice regarding written and oral Torah.

Bruce Marshall: Marshall raises two issues, one doctrinal, one practical. The doctrinal: God’s will regarding Israel is surely not “permissive” but positive, for Israel, as scripture shows, is positively willed. God’s permisse will is often taken to indicate something that is not positively willed but only permitted. The good, for

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1 I also wish to thank David Armstrong, Karma Ben-Johanan, Isaac Chenchiah, Angela Costley, Bruce Marshall, David Maayan, and Malka Z. Simkovich for helpful conversations arising out of this panel discussion. Thanks to Adam Gregerman for facilitating this published exchange and Kendall Soulen for arranging the discussion of my book at the Society for Post Supersessionist Theology, Panel (2021); see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A983VddpnFM.
instance, is always positively willed. Evil, however, is permitted so that freedom and the good may flourish. God never positively wills that which is permitted. Hence, Marshall argues, it is inappropriate to describe rabbinic Judaism as permitted rather than positively willed.

Marshall says there can be no question that biblical Judaism is positively willed by God. Likewise, there can be no question that the covenant with God continues in rabbinic Judaism, for God has remained faithful to his covenant. But Catholics need to view rabbinic Judaism differently from biblical Judaism because God positively wills all people to be in communion with him through Christ and His Church. Within this positive will, Hebrew Catholics are included but not rabbinic Jews. One might put the dilemma in this way: Does the Catholic Church teach that the highest good for biblical Israel is found in rabbinic Judaism, in Hebrew Catholicism, or in both? Remember, this is asked knowing that rabbinic Judaism is based on and emerges from biblical Judaism’s irrevocable covenant and is also God-responsive. Also, it is recognized that at the subjective level, both communities have shortcomings and failings.

The Catholic Church does not formally teach an answer to this specific question. However, the argument of my book was that it would have to reckon with the example of Hebrew Catholicism. This form of Catholicism alone keeps intact the two truths that Marshall advanced as taught by the Catholic Church. The two truths are: (1) the saving mission of Christ and his Church is willed by God to be universal, extending to every human being; and (2) God’s covenant with Israel, with the Jewish people according to the flesh, is irrevocable. Hebrew Catholics keep those two truths in harmony. Rabbinic Judaism does not, only affirming truth (2). Furthermore, I suggest that the Catholic Church should view rabbinic Judaism differently than Hebrew Catholicism because it does not affirm the objective truths that the messiah has come in Jesus and that through his cross and resurrection, Israel’s covenant has now been extended to gentiles through Jesus the Jew. Rabbinic Judaism cannot be the highest good to emerge from biblical Israel for the Catholic Church constantly denies the possibility of parallel paths of salvation, one for Jews, one for Catholics. In saying the latter, it does not deny the salvation of the Jewish people, past, present and the future. Nor does it deny that rabbinic Judaism is a call to holiness, to a special priestly vocation for the nation. In fact, this tension is well expressed in the document issued on the fiftieth anniversary of Nosstra Aetate, ‘‘The Gifts and the Calling of God Are Irrevocable’’ (Rom 11:29): A Reflection on Theological Questions Pertaining to Catholic-Jewish Relations on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of ‘Nosstra Aetate,’ #4,” (2015), 36: “That the Jews are participants in God’s salvation is theologically unquestionable, but how that can be possible without confessing Christ explicitly, is and remains an unfathomable divine mystery.”2 This statement represents the tension present in Catholicism and held together in the two truths rightly identified by Marshall.

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2 Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, “The Gifts and the Calling of God Are Irrevocable” (Rom 11:29) - A Reflection on Theological Questions Pertaining to Catholic-Jewish Relations on
Applying permissive will to rabbinic Judaism implies that it is like an evil permitted. Marshall is right to question this. However, it would be misleading to say that in its present form rabbinic Judaism is positively willed by God from a Catholic viewpoint, because salvation in Catholic dogmatics includes recognition of God as triune. That a Trinitarian confession is not part of rabbinic Judaism is self-evident. Though one can respect this rabbinic Jewish self-description, it cannot be the final form of Judaism that is positively willed by God. The present form of rabbinic Judaism does have a providential purpose in God’s plan and rabbinic Jews as a community will eschatologically, if not before, come to see that Jesus is messiah. This latter belief is found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church 840:

When one considers the future, God’s People of the Old Covenant and the new People of God tend towards similar goals: expectation of the coming (or the return) of the Messiah. But one awaits the return of the Messiah who died and rose from the dead and is recognized as Lord and Son of God; the other awaits the coming of a Messiah, whose features remain hidden till the end of time; and the latter waiting is accompanied by the drama of not knowing or of misunderstanding Christ Jesus.\(^3\)

The important shift in the Catholic position is in the last part of the final sentence. No longer is rabbinic Judaism seen as rejecting Jesus Christ willfully or sinfully. Rather, it is viewed as keeping to its God-given covenant in fidelity to the true and living God. The Catechism accepts that rabbinic Judaism is not founded on willful denial (‘not knowing’ or of ‘misunderstanding’ – technically, what is called in Catholic theology ‘invincible ignorance’). This is in keeping with St. Paul’s understanding of a providential meaning to Jews who do not accept Jesus. Eschatologically, it is impossible to make sense of the “participation in salvation” that the Jewish people share without their eventually and explicitly coming to know the messiah, Jesus Christ, who is also the Second Person of the Trinity. The fullness of salvation entails the beatific vision of the triune God. I recognize that this kind of response might be found insulting and implausible to Jewish colleagues. However, I contend this is the logic of Catholic doctrine.

If one retains the terminology of “God’s will” when analyzing this issue, I would now prefer the fuller term “consequent operational will” (although it has its own problems). God has an antecedent will, which is what God wills positively. There is a consequent will, which can be divided into operational and permissive. The permissive is usually used of evil (that which God permits). But the operational has a higher status of dignity. It shows how God actually works through good to eventually achieve His antecedent will. It avoids the negative implication that Marshall rightly protests against. It allows for the proper distinction between the higher

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good of Hebrew Catholicism within God’s Church, compared to rabbinic Judaism. It allows for the harmonious tension of the two truths in Catholicism noted by Marshall.

Marshall’s practical question regarded the weight placed upon the slim shoulders of Hebrew Catholics who “constitute an immeasurably small fraction of world Catholicism, visible only to those who expressly look for them. Their place within the Church’s overall understanding of her responsibility to the Jewish people today is at present unclear and in need of strenuous reflection.” I entirely agree.

This inner reality, the church of the gentiles and the church of the circumcision, has only become evident since the Council because Jewish rituals and practices have up until then been negatively understood. Hence, in Gifts, fifty years after the Council, the Church is just registering this emerging reality without having worked out its significance. When I began work on the book, this issue had been off my radar. In Gifts 15 it says:

In the early years of the Church, therefore, there were the so-called Jewish Christians and the Gentile Christians, the ecclesia ex circumcisione and the ecclesia ex gentibus, one Church originating from Judaism, the other from the Gentiles, who however together constituted the one and only Church of Jesus Christ (emphasis added).

This distinction maintained within the “one Church” is not a historical matter of empirical numbers or a nostalgic recall of an early New Testament community. In Gifts 43, in the last paragraph of the section on “The Church’s mandate to evangelize in relation to Judaism,” this distinction is given a constitutive and qualitative status not to be found in any other official church document as far as I know:

It is and remains a qualitative definition of the Church of the New Covenant that it consists of Jews and Gentiles, even if the quantitative proportions of Jewish and Gentile Christians may initially give a different impression. Just as after the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ there were not two unrelated covenants, so too the people of the covenant of Israel are not disconnected from “the people of God drawn from the Gentiles.” Rather, the enduring role of the covenant people of Israel in God’s plan of salvation is to relate dynamically to the “people of God of Jews and Gentiles, united in Christ,” he whom the Church confesses as the universal mediator of creation and salvation (emphasis added).

This reality has gone largely unnoticed in the reception of Gifts. A recent publication by Antoine Lévy, O.P., entitled Jewish Church: A Catholic Approach to Messianic Judaism (2021) boldly sketches out the contours of this constitutive and

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Qualitative reality in dialogue with Mark Kinzer’s Messianic Jewish bilateral ecclesiology. It helps to address Marshall’s question in some detail, although this reality is fragile. Lévy argues at least four theses relevant to this discussion. He uses “Jewish Church” for “Hebrew Catholics.”

First, and most importantly, Lévy argues for a serious difference between rabbinic Judaism and Messianic Judaism because for the former, the Torah (written and oral) is the mediator of God’s will, and for the latter, it is Yeshua, the messiah, through whom the written and oral Torah are understood and practiced. However, within Christ’s body the Torah is practiced differently by Jews and Gentiles. The practices of Hebrew Catholics are different from rabbinic Jews in terms of intentionality, explicit telos, and in actual rituals. For example, some prayers and rituals may remain the same as those of rabbinic Jews, but their meaning is different because the messiah has come. Some prayers and rituals may be modified because the messiah has come. Lévy makes clear that Kinzer’s founding premise that Messianic Jewish communities are to be identified with rabbinic Judaism is simply not possible or plausible. He rejects Kinzer’s view that Messianic communities are a bridge and witness to both Gentile Christianity and rabbinic Judaism because of these Messianic communities’ false self-understanding. Messianic communities can only properly witness to rabbinic Judaism by being visibly united to the gentiles who also follow Yeshua, properly displaying the nature of the extension of the Jewish covenant to all the nations. “Properly” here means under the rules of Catholic ecclesiology. For Lévy, this does not, as in the past, entail erasing the Jewish covenant for those Jews who follow Yeshua. For Lévy, in comparison to Kinzer, practicing the Torah for Jewish followers of Jesus is not a strict obligation or a matter of religious vows. In Catholic terminology it is not an intrinsically necessary means of salvation.

Second, Lévy says this Jewish Church is under-defined. He suggests four characteristics for it to be authentically Catholic (193). It must be corporate, “since this is about the presence of Israel qua Israel in the Church, in contrast to the limited existential options of private individuals.” It must be distinct, “since it must give Jewish disciples the possibility to express the uniqueness of their calling as Sons and Daughters of Israel.” It must be in “communion” with Gentile brethren, “since such communion is at the foundation of a truly Catholic Church.” This requires shared table fellowship and acceptance of the pope as the visible sign of unity. The Jewish Church would also have its own bishops. It would be in unity in the same way as the Eastern Catholic churches, with their very different rites, are in communion with Rome. Levy prefers to think of the Jewish Church as an “ordinariate” in order to preserve its vital role in the definition of the church, constituting part of its DNA so to speak. Finally, it must be stable, “since it must contribute to God’s project of preserving the existence of Israel as a corporate reality” (193).

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5 Lévy’s critiques of Kinzer are in some ways a Latin Roman Catholic critique of a low church Protestant ecclesiology which permits autonomous churches without visible hierarchal ministry overseeing their unity.
Third, Lévy argues that in preserving Messianically transformed Jewish commandments (mitzvot), Hebrew Catholic communities would create the true witness that Kinzer seeks to build. This Jewish Church is thus a challenge to both communities. To rabbinic Jews, it is a witness to the reality that the messiah has come, though he does not abolish Jewish identity but transforms it, as was always the expectation in both biblical and rabbinic Judaism. To gentile Catholics, it is a witness to the Jewish covenant and how that covenant has been widened to now include the gentile nations. It demands a deep conversion to the charism and gifts of this ecclesial reality, outlined by Lévy in his work, without which the church lacks the “marks” that make it true to its calling (358 fn. 79).

While Lévy’s book does not address Marshall’s empirical concern, it begins to provide a framework that would encourage this fragile empirical reality. It shows that on such slim shoulders that are hardly formed, much depends. What is important is that gentile Christians become attuned to fostering such an ecclesia, and Gifts has gone some way to putting out a red carpet, even without yet knowing what the shape of such a reality might look like. Lévy has given theoretical form to the shape of the Jewish Catholic Church more than any other work that I know of, which is why I have outlined it in detail. It must be acknowledged that nurturing this ecclesial reality will entail difficult conversations with Jewish dialogue partners who see this phenomenon as both apostasy as well as encouraging the extinction of the Jewish people as a nation. This is no light charge. (This topic is covered further below.)

Philip A. Cunningham: Cunningham presents a few claims. He says that I have relegated the doctrinal authority of NA. He also says I incorrectly claim that NA did not address living Judaism but explicitly only biblical Judaism. Related to this is his challenge to my claim that only starting in 1980 with the utterances of Saint Pope John Paul II does the Church explicitly link biblical Judaism with rabbinic Judaism.

I agree with Cunningham that NA has doctrinal authority and that it supplements Lumen Gentium 16. The argument of my book was that NA should not be read alone without LG 16. This hermeneutic was enjoined by the 1985 Synod of Bishops which decreed that the four Constitutions provide the interpretive key and dogmatic context for reading other documents such as Declarations, which NA is. The passage Cunningham cites from my book (14) was written with this context in mind. LG is relevant here because it discusses those “who have not yet accepted the gospel” [Il tandem qui Evangelium nondum acceperunt], nondum clearly implying that there will be an opportunity to do so. It speaks of those who are technically “invincibly ignorant” of the truth of the gospel. It also uses the technical term from Aquinas ordinantur in the next part of the same sentence: “Finally, those who have not yet accepted the gospel are related [ordinantur] to the people of God in various ways” (Summa Theologiae III, quest 8, art 3, to 1). In the Summa passage

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6 Whether Kinzer’s view is accurately portrayed in Lévy’s work is a question I leave aside.
cited Aquinas argues that *ordinans* indicates that all people have a positive potential relation to Christ as their head. No one is excluded from this universal call. No one is positively willed for damnation. Aquinas also distinguishes between actuality and potentiality and clarifies that the actuality only happens through baptism and communion within the Church. Potentiality must be made actual through grace and human cooperation. Hence, my argument was and is that LG gives us the soteriological status of the groups it depicts and who are then treated in NA. That is why LG also ends with the necessity of mission, citing Mark 16:15: “Preach the gospel to the whole creation.” Mark’s formulation expressly uses creation, not nations (“*omni creaturae*” in the Vatican text which quotes the Vulgate). If one reads NA alone, without LG and Mark 16:15, the status of these religions will not be understood properly. Cunningham and I are therefore in agreement about the doctrinal status of NA. We are probably in disagreement about the how LG influences one’s reading of NA.

Cunningham also argues that I incorrectly maintain that Catholic formal identification of rabbinic Judaism as an outgrowth of biblical Israel had to wait until 1980. Cunningham presents linguistic and contextual arguments against my view. I have defended my view in detail in my earlier book. However, I can now cite Gifts 39 for support, as it expresses a view on the dispute between Cunningham and me:

> Because it was such a theological breakthrough, the Conciliar text is not infrequently over-interpreted, and things are read into it which it does not in fact contain. An important example of over-interpreted would be the following: that the covenant that God made with his people Israel perdures and is never invalidated. Although this statement is true, it cannot be explicitly read into “*Nostra aetate*” (No.4). This statement was instead first made with full clarity by Saint Pope John Paul II when he said during a meeting with Jewish representatives in Mainz on 17 November 1980 that the Old Covenant had never been revoked by God.

Admittedly, Gifts has no magisterial authority so it does not trump Cunningham’s argument. I agree with Cunningham the explicit statement from 1980 is perhaps implicit in NA, but it is not stated or formally taught until 1980.

Cunningham’s second point relates to Christology. He suggests a fourth model (in addition to the three in my book and thus asks that I attend to this approach) which coheres with the ecclesiastical “guide ropes” and which he says would lead to “genuine brotherhood with the people of the Covenant.” His approach, he argues, would also be more acceptable in Jewish-Catholic dialogue. Cunningham is right on the first point. The second remains to be seen. Given constraints of space, I

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7 I also should clarify that my citation of Ilaria Moralli’s claim that “The status of Council documents are themselves contested” (9 fn. 26) was meant to illustrate a viewpoint. I did not affirm her claims in my book.

D’Costa: Response from the Author

simply register some questions to Cunningham’s interesting fourth model to highlight the sources of our difference and the range of ecclesial “guide ropes” that still need unknotting.

There is an asymmetry between rabbinic Judaism and Christianity. The rabbinic Noahide covenant allows gentiles to remain gentiles and to seek God through that path. Gentiles are not required to become Jews but must adhere to a limited collection of (mostly moral) laws. The Catholic Church has been called to a different vision. It must be faithful to this vision in dialogue. It has always taught from the New Testament onwards, and still does in LG 8 and 14, the necessity of Christ and his body, the Church, for salvation. It has also called for mission to all creation. How does Cunningham’s fourth model explain these teachings? Cunningham’s position seems to contravene Marshall’s first truth which is part of Catholic dogma: that the saving mission of Christ and his Church is willed by God to be universal, extending to every human being. Admittedly, Vatican II taught that those invincibly ignorant of the gospel are not thereby lost. I agree with Cunningham, the term “invincibly ignorant” is not pleasant when applied to a sincere and pious Jewish person who may be deeply knowledgeable about Christianity. The point of the term is to designate someone who in good faith is not a Christian and yet may eventually be saved through Christ.

Cunningham’s model is a Rahnerian type of inclusivism, without Karl Rahner’s insistence on the necessity of mission based on the importance of explicit knowledge and confession of Christ. It is a position best developed by Jacques Dupuis who called it “inclusivist pluralism,” taking Rahner to the limit. Cunningham’s position affirms a Trinitarian God present in Torah practice and thus a fully salvific Trinitarian presence in rabbinic Judaism. This then explains how Judaism is salvific in Catholic eyes and it also obviates the need to conduct missions as Jews are already saved. One might ask whether this approach honors the constitutive nature of faith in Christ, whereby a person is formed through this faith in a very specific way by the reality of God as trinity. This was von Balthasar’s criticism of Rahner. Rahner, in his eyes, was on the verge of making explicit Christian faith irrelevant and thus minimizing the habit formation of Christian practices and faith. Is “anonymous Christianity,” as Rahner had called it, finally no different from explicit Christianity? If so, what need of the incarnation? What need of the Church?

To ask this is not to deny the significance of the Torah’s being the channel of grace that leads to the affirmation that “the Jews are participants in God’s salvation.” This phrase from Gifts 36 does not say this is the fullness of salvation brought

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in Christ. “Participants” is a technical term that was used in John Paul II’s *Redemptor Missio* 5 (1990) and again in *Dominus Iesus* 14 (2000) which indicates that such “participations,” which can vary in degree and kind, all derive from Christ and lead toward him for their fulfilment. While both those documents were not discussing Judaism explicitly, the principle they expound can be applied to Judaism, which is surely why the term “participation” is used in *Gifts*. It signifies a kind of hierarchy in the objective revelatory order of history. This would not mean that holiness and goodness of the highest order could not be found at the subjective level in rabbinic Judaism. It is not difficult to find such “saints” outside of Christianity. The issue is about the first cause and end of salvation history being the Trinitarian God. Cunningham’s solution also fails to signify the fulfilment of this salvation in Israel’s messiah, who the Church takes to be Jesus Christ.

Cunningham’s model seems to set aside the most central of Catholic theological questions in the Jewish-Catholic dialogue: is Jesus Israel’s messiah? Pope Benedict says, “The question of the messianic identity of Jesus is and remains the real issue of dispute between Jews and Christians.” This is admittedly from a Catholic viewpoint. The incarnation and trinity might equally qualify as central issues of dispute. There is wisdom in acknowledging that the question of the identity of the messiah may not be settled between Jews and Catholics until the eschaton, but that does not mean it is not a central question for Catholics.

Cunningham’s final question to me is: if Catholics have any desire to convert (he calls it a “persuasive intent”) Jews because of their witness of faith in Christ, does this overstep the boundaries of “dialogue”? He argues that his view reflects the direction of the Catholic Church’s official position. This is contrary to my argument that witness does have an “intent,” a call to “conversion” to Christ. Any such “intent” to be legitimate must be carried out with true respect toward the Jewish person, self-critical attention to power structures, and knowledge of the horrifying history of Jewish-Christian relations. It also must be non-coercive, not eradicate Jewish identity, and positively affirm the irrevocable covenant at the heart of rabbinic Judaism. Cunningham offers a pathway through the official documents that supports his view in the same manner that I tried to support mine (and admittedly failed in respect to not referring to the US Bishops’ corrective of the appended “Note”).

I make two further observations about Cunningham’s argument, while addressing our basic differences. First, we can find no mention of an explicit intention to convert Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs in the huge collection of Vatican documents related to these religious groups and none in speeches delivered to these groups by the formal magisterium and its offices. What we do find is good will, greetings on major festivals, praise for elements within these traditions, injunctions to work together for the common good, and encouragement to engage in ongoing dialogue. While recognizing that rabbinic Judaism is a *sui generis* case

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compared to the “religions,” one should not deduce from these documents that mission has disappeared from the Catholic agenda. The necessity of universal mission to all peoples and creation was expressed in the Council in Ad Gentes, then again by Pope Paul VI in Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) and emphatically by Saint Pope John Paul II in Redemptoris Missio. In the Catholic Church’s own reflection on this matter, in a technically non-magisterial document Dialogue and Proclamation 2 (1991), it says “Proclamation and dialogue are thus both viewed, each in its own place, as component elements and authentic forms of the one evangelizing mission of the Church. They are both oriented towards the communication of salvific truth.”

Furthermore, Gifts explicitly addresses the question of evangelization and the Jewish people. What does it say? While using confusing terminology on this matter, a point that Cunningham and I agree on, it nevertheless affirms “Christian mission and witness, in personal life and in proclamation, belong together…. Christian mission means that all Christians, in community with the Church, confess and proclaim the historical realisation of God’s universal will for salvation in Christ Jesus (cf. ‘Ad Gentes’ 7, [emphasis added]).” Confess is one matter, proclamation is another, and the latter includes a “persuasive intent,” that is, it endorses efforts to persuade Jews regarding the truthfulness of that which has salvific truth. Why would Ad Gentes, which is entirely devoted to “mission” as the very nature of the church deriving from the trinity, be affirmed in the short section of four paragraphs on “The Church’s mandate to evangelize in relation to Judaism”? Furthermore, why does the final paragraph in this section speak of the Hebrew Catholic church, the “church of the circumcision,” as being a qualitative aspect of ecclesiology? And why finish this same final paragraph with LG 16: “all people who have not yet received the gospel are aligned with the people of God of the New Covenant.” It then cites the full section on the Jewish people from LG 16. As noted above, LG offers a special dogmatic perspective on the way N/A should be read. While the Catholic Church is aware of a sui generis Jewish irrevocable covenant with God, it is also without contradiction committed to confessing and proclaiming the “historical realization” of God’s “universal will for salvation” in the coming of the messiah, Jesus Christ. It marries the tension of affirming both God’s universal salvation in Christ and the irrevocable covenant with rabbinic Judaism by introducing the Jewish Catholic Church. If “persuasive intent” means Catholics hope to convince others of the truth of the definitive revelation in Jesus Christ, then surely persuasive intent cannot be excluded, though ultimately all things are in the hands of God.

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13 The document was published in English. The official English translation of the term ordinantur in Lumen Gentium is rendered as “related.” It is not clear why the terms are changed in Gifts.
I will return to this constellation of issues in what follows as I engage with my Jewish colleagues. There is some overlap, inevitably, with the materials discussed above.

**Rabbi David Sandmel**: Sandmel raises three questions: First, Sandmel suggests a change in terminology to make my thesis clearer. He suggests I should use “inclusive supersessionism,” which he sees as equivalent to my “fulfilment” position, as an acknowledgment this position has elements of soft supersessionism. In my book I avoid the term “inclusivist.” For Sandmel, this is in contrast to “exclusivist supersessionism,” which is a form of replacement theology. He suggests this terminology in order to make what he sees as the real logic of my position clear: Catholicism has not moved away from supersessionism of sorts. Sandmel is too graceful to say this bluntly, but I take this concern to be that soft supersessionist logic still perpetuates a view of some sort of “lack” in rabbinic Judaism (“lack” implying deficiency). Sandmel does not see his tradition in this way and is uncomfortable engaging in dialogue when his tradition is viewed in this manner by the dialogue partner. He also is concerned that this view allows Catholics, for whom NA is not bedtime reading, unintentionally to slip back into replacement theology and hard supersessionism.

Sandmel is correct in his analysis. There are a few features of his observations I would like to comment on. First, I take seriously the way in which soft supersessionism can so easily slide back into hard supersessionism. The work of catechetics is vital and the size and educational level of the Catholic population means that this point will take many years to be absorbed by Catholics. Only when doctrine is firmly established does it get taught in schools, seminars, colleges, and most importantly in the pews. This explains my focus on doctrines in my book. I concur with Sandmel in his worry about soft turning into hard supersessionism.

Second, I am uncomfortable with the notion of “inclusive supersessionism” because that which is included is always transformed in the “inclusion.” Recalling Levy’s book cited above in my discussion of Marshall, Hebrew Catholics are no longer identified with rabbinic Judaism. Although they may desire to follow some rabbinic Jewish practices, these practices will be transformed from their original context due to the messianic intentionality and explicit telos now invoked. One cannot say that rabbinic Judaism is “included” in Hebrew Catholicism from the viewpoint of rabbinic Judaism. One should respect this. Fulfilment is the term used in most ecclesial documents. I prefer it for both these reasons.

Third, two Jewish writers, David Novak and Jon D. Levenson, both make strong cases for the coherence and tenability of Christian soft supersessionism. Without some form of this, Christianity would relativize itself out of making truth claims. Novak notes that there would be no reasons for Christians to be Christians if they did not hold to the truth of Christianity as God’s definitive revelation. There

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could be no reason to explain why a Jew may convert to Christianity. The challenge for Christians is to affirm some form of soft supersessionism while not eradicating the positive meaning of rabbinic Judaism as a consequence. My book tries to do this. I show that the Catholic magisterium has, within fifty years of the Second Vatican Council, affirmed unequivocally that the Jewish covenant is valid, that it is operative, that God does not go back on his promises, and most importantly, that rabbinic Judaism is a continuation of this covenant. I uphold these claims while also retaining the traditional claims that Jesus Christ is the Jewish messiah who fulfils that covenant by serving as a light to the nations, by inviting gentiles to participate in fellowship, and by deepening and transforming the knowledge of the form of God as triune.

The incarnation has been viewed as idolatry in rabbinic Judaism for making a human (Jesus) into God. (Jews have this concern in common with Islam.) There are a range of sophisticated Jewish opinions on this matter: Christianity as a whole is idolatrous because of the centrality of the incarnation; Christianity is both true in its worship of the one God of Abraham and idolatrous in its view of Jesus (both views being held together in tension); and the minority view, Christianity is not idolatrous in affirming the incarnation and is pure monotheism. The middle view is expressed in recent times by Rabbi Dr. Meir Soloveitchik: “I must emphasize that Jews recognize the difference between Christianity and pagan idolatry. Christians, like Jews, worship the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. At the same time … Jews believe that Christians, in the process of worshiping the God of Abraham, also worship a human being who was not God.”

Political and social circumstances often influenced the Jewish viewpoint. Karma Ben Johanan shows how within the safe context of modern Israel, free from Christian persecution, significant halakhic figures in contemporary Orthodox Judaism define Christianity as idolatry. Others, a very small minority, take this a step further in arguing that this would mean that theologically, Christians as idolaters should not be allowed to settle in the land. This is found in the theology of some of

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16 Jon D. Levenson, “Can Catholicism Validate Jewish Biblical Interpretation?,” *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 1 (2011), 170–85; and Jon D. Levenson, “How Not to Conduct Jewish-Christian Dialogue,” Commentary Magazine, December 1 (2001), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/jon-levenson-2/how-not-to-conduct-jewish-christian-dialogue/. Levenson even makes a strong case that traditionally Judaism is hard supersessionist regarding all forms of idolatry and paganism that existed prior to itself. When this hard supersessionism entails violence, there are problems with it. When it does not entail violence but is focused on truth, when a belief that is true compared to something that is less true, it is permissible and indeed necessary. Otherwise, Judaism could not make truth claims at all and relativism would rule.
the followers of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook. The claim I make is that Jewish supersessionism viz. paganism and Jewish views of the incarnation illustrate a philosophical point that lack is always a shadow side of truth claims.

Fifth, while Judaism contains forms of hard supersessionism toward paganism and idolatry, soft supersessionism is peculiar to Christianity (and to forms of Islam in their view of Jews and Christians). This is a feature perhaps related to chronology and genealogy: Abraham as a common father both generates contestations about who are the true sons and daughters by the later arrivals on the scene. This construction of Abraham also provides resources to think of members of these three traditions as being Abraham’s true sons and daughters. Furthermore, Christian soft supersessionism is not a reciprocal process. When Christians claim Jesus is a soft fulfilment of Judaism, they really mean Christianity’s version of biblical Judaism is being fulfilled. The notion of fulfilment can hardly be so straightforwardly applied to rabbinic Judaism. It is after all a post-biblical tradition. In this sense, Sandmel is right to raise his disquiet about the term lack. Is there a lack in rabbinic Judaism in relation to Catholicism in any objective sense? Or is this just a Catholic perception?

Sixth, it is worth asking whether this messianic lack in rabbinic Judaism is also one that rabbinic Judaism identifies itself. I think the answer would be both “yes” and “no”. Rabbinic Judaism in its own view has not reached its own teleological fulfilment until the messiah comes and the Temple is restored (and there are various scenarios within the tradition that mark this fulfilment). In this sense, to speak of a lack is not an external critique but an acknowledgement of a lack that rabbinic Judaism still anticipates will be fulfilled. At the same time, rabbinic Judaism’s “no” to Jesus as messiah can hardly be seen by rabbinic Jews as a lack; this judgment is externally imposed by Christians. The “no” of rabbinic Judaism regarding Yeshua needs to be registered seriously. Yeshua fails to meet the expectations of the anticipated Jewish messiah of mainstream rabbinic Judaism, and Christian attitudes toward him is most often understood as idolatry. The conversation here has only just begun. It is difficult at this stage to establish whether we are seeing two incommensurable traditions in Catholicism or rabbinic Judaism such that there could be no serious discussion about the messiah, or whether there is intellectual space for these questions to be properly aired and to have traction within each of the traditions.

Finally, Catholics must register the seriousness of the issue of violence and intimidation between religions, in this case by Catholics toward Jews. The long history of violence always casts a shadow over any conversation between Catholics and Jews who are the true sons and daughters by the later arrivals on the scene. This construction of Abraham also provides resources to think of members of these three traditions as being Abraham’s true sons and daughters.

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19 See Jon D. Levenson, Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), who carefully deconstructs, for positive reasons, the too easy use of the metaphor “children of Abraham.” Vatican II was ambivalent, but not entirely dismissive, of this model.
and Jews. Vatican II, in its teachings in *Dignitatis Humanae*, insisted that both religious and secular communities, despite differences between them, must be granted civil rights and freedoms. This statement is a serious development in Catholic social thought, based on a recovery of elements of Christian anthropology. Note that this development does not require the Catholic Church to affirm as true the views of these other communities.

Sandmel’s second concern is about Jewish *mitzvot*. He correctly recognizes that the logic of the Catholic position that is slowly emerging from the teachings of the magisterium leads to some very methodologically problematic and fraternally risky implications. He argues that it is inappropriate methodologically to analyze rabbinic Judaism from a Catholic perspective. It is not up to Catholics to discern which forms of rabbinic Judaism are God-given and God-responsive and which are not. I said in my book that I would prefer to avoid these implications, but they were logically generated questions! And if the first methodological objection is correct, the second objection is then automatically granted.

Responding to Sandmel’s first methodological point, one might ask, do the Noahide laws in Judaism also employ an inappropriate methodology whereby gentile practices are assessed as legitimate or illegitimate from a Jewish view? I think not. It is a responsible exercise of a community to reflect on the religious status of those not within the community using categories generated from within the (in this case Jewish) community. Those categories can sometimes even overlap with the views of the outsiders being analyzed. David Novak, for example, makes an interesting case that the Noahide laws can also be understood in terms of “natural law” and thus might gain more traction with non-Jewish communities. This approach has been positively embraced by some Catholics. However, many a postmodern community who rejects natural law would still have this analysis applied to them by Novak. In that situation, the natural law argument will not be withdrawn, for its applicability is not reliant on its conceptual acceptance by the group being analyzed in terms of their acceptance of such laws. Furthermore, the Jewish community may determine practical actions in the light of such analysis. Eugene Korn writes, “the talmudic tradition split the gentile world into two sub-categories: immoral persons who reject the Noahide commandments and to whom tolerance is generally not extended, and gentiles who accept the laws of the Noahide covenant who are regarded positively, whom Jews are obligated to protect and sustain.” I have noted above both how social power can determine how conceptual categories are actually applied and how the relation of power to practice is always a contingent one.

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point is that methodologically, all religions are involved in interpreting other religions and non-religions from within their own world view. We should not expect otherwise.

Having said this, I fully accept that a Catholic appraisal of Judaism is different from the study of Judaism. Any Catholic appraisal of rabbinic Judaism as a type would also have to eventually know this tradition in detail as the tradition understands itself. The Catholic theological analytical appraisal would be first about the type, rabbinic Judaism, and then its application to the different granular forms of rabbinic Judaism. This parallels the need to first establish what the Noahide laws are and only then to look at their subsequent application to particular non-Jewish societies. In the second stage application process there is reciprocal interaction. For the application of the Noahide laws, non-theistic religions have posed interesting problems since it may not be clear whether they are idolatrous in their “alternative” cosmologies and whether the traditional prohibition against idolatry would require reconceptualization in the present. Likewise, the diversity of rabbinic Judaism poses interesting questions to the affirmation of the type, rabbinic Judaism. My book was dealing with the first generalized task: the emerging theology of a Catholic appraisal of the type, rabbinic Judaism. The subsequent application to the granular phenomena of rabbinic Judaism cannot be evaded in the long run. However, it can also accept that being Jewish does not require the religious practice of the Torah, just as rabbinic Judaism also views the matter. Ultimately, it is impossible for the Catholic magisterium to positively affirm rabbinic Judaism in a generalized manner, purely as a type. Can it affirm rabbinic Judaism, including forms which view Christianity as idolatry, without a certain level of self-contradiction? Would forms of rabbinic Judaism that are hostile to Christianity have the same status as the rabbinic Judaism that generated the 2015 Declaration, To Do the Will of Our Father in Heaven: Toward a Partnership between Jews and Christians?24 What will Catholics make of their own generalized affirmative statements about rabbinic Judaism when rabbinic Judaism contains groups which deny that other forms of rabbinic Judaism are legitimate and have insist they have departed from proper Torah practice? Finally, it goes without saying that the Catholic Church has no authority whatsoever to tell Jewish people how to be good Jews and what constitutes rabbinic Judaism. That is a matter internal to the Jewish community.

Sandmel asks whether my argument that the teachings of Vatican II are not discontinuous with the full authority of previous magisterial teachings implies that Jewish views that Vatican II represents a “sea change” or “Copernican revolution” are incorrect. Two considerations are in order. First, I acknowledge that a number of Catholic theologians would disagree with my analysis regarding the claim there is no “doctrinal discontinuity” in Vatican II. This is because “the epistemological presuppositions of each group differ” (188, cited by Sandmel). Disagreements like this are normal. Hence, some Catholic theologians would entertain Sandmel’s view.

24 See https://www.cjcuc.org/2015/12/03/orthodox-rabbinic-statement-on-christianity/.
Second, everything hinges on the term “full authority of the magisterium” regarding continuity or discontinuity (188, cited by Sandmel). If discontinuity is to be claimed, then one must show teachings derived from the full authority of the magisterium showing X at one point (i.e., that the Jews do not have a valid covenant), and not X at another time (i.e., that the Jews do have a valid covenant). There is no a priori reason to dismiss any evidence offered. I spend a chapter in my book (27-63) examining the major argument for such discontinuity. The doctrinal statements arising from Cantate Dominus have the full authority of the magisterium. They appear to constitute evidence of discontinuity. However, I show that when Cantate deals with Jews it has different epistemological presuppositions about that type from the Vatican II documents. In Cantate it is assumed that Jews are those who knowingly deny Christ whom they know in their hearts and minds to be the messiah. In Vatican II it is assumed that the Jews do not willfully deny Jesus’s status. Hence, the epistemological presuppositions differ generating two types, both called “Jews,” but understood very differently. I further argued that once this is identified, Cantate provides serious resources to think positively about Judaism! This is because Cantate acknowledges that God works through Jewish festivals and practices in a quasi-sacramental form that point to Christ.  

This is also found in Ex Quo Primum (1756). What Cantate protests is the practice of these Jewish festivals (in Christian communities as well) after the time of Christ because they in effect deny the truth of Christ, the messiah’s, arrival. They deny that it is Christ who saves, not these quasi-sacramental practices. Once it is recognized that rabbinic Jews do not willfully deny Jesus’ status, it opens the door to the type of insight found in Gifts 36: “That the Jews are participants in God’s salvation is theologically unquestionable, but how that can be possible without confessing Christ explicitly, is and remains an unfathomable divine mystery.” Their festivals and practices do participate in God’s grace in terms of a general type.

My concern about continuity and discontinuity was exclusively regarding the “full authority of the magisterium.” However, I sadly have no hesitation in acknowledging a pervasive and deep-rooted anti-Jewishness in “Catholic culture,” including even among popes. Here there is genuine discontinuity, but not in the teachings of the magisterium. Gifts 17 openly acknowledges this long history of perverted Catholic culture:

On the part of many of the Church Fathers the so-called replacement theory or supersessionism steadily gained favour until in the Middle Ages it represented the standard theological foundation of the relationship with Judaism: the promises and commitments of God would no longer apply to Israel because it had

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not recognised Jesus as the Messiah and the Son of God, but had been transferred to the Church of Jesus Christ which was now the true ‘new Israel,’ the new chosen people of God. Arising from the same soil, Judaism and Christianity in the centuries after their separation became involved in a theological antagonism which was only to be defused at the Second Vatican Council.

Hence, I agree that Sandmel is right to use the terms “Copernican revolution” and “sea change” in relation to Catholic culture in a broad sense. However, if applied in the specific sense of the “full authority of the magisterium,” these are inaccurate terms.

**Ruth Langer:** Some of the issues Langer raises have already been covered above. However, I want to respond to two questions she asks. The first is that my position is not helpful or practical for Jewish-Catholic dialogue. It views rabbinic Judaism only through Catholic spectacles, not on its own terms. Langer’s second point is that my arguments for non-coercive mission are unconvincing to Jewish ears for they still spell the extinction of rabbinic Jewish existence, especially with the introduction of Hebrew Catholics into the equation.

I have addressed the issue of failing to see rabbinic Judaism in its own terms. I think Catholics need to do this. However, my book was not focused on the many contributions, questions, and spiritual beauties and riches within rabbinic Judaism. Langer’s deeper objection, I take it, might be expressed more forcefully: Why do Catholics like D’Costa not get it? Messianic Jews and Hebrew Catholics are not good Jews. They are apostate Jews. One should respect the Jewish community’s own self-definition. To tell Jews that Hebrew Catholics keep their Jewish identity intact is like Jews telling Catholics that Marcionism, despite being condemned, is fully Catholic. What is the point of dialogue when D’Costa is so impervious to Jewish voices? He is not listening. Dialogue with people like him cannot go far.

I respect the authority of rabbinic Jews to define their own boundaries and to decide who is and who is not an apostate. I accept that rabbinic Jews usually question the status of both Messianic Jews and Hebrew Catholics, and this should be respected. They are apostates, but still Jews. Apostates lose many rights and privileges. I accept that supporting apostate Jews as the Catholic Church seems to, in supporting Hebrew Catholics, is a new menace to Jewish self-definition. I can see how it is thereby construed as another Christian invitation to self-extinction by Jews who do not follow Jesus. This is regrettable. I acknowledge the problem.

However, while rabbinic Jews do own the categories and authority for their own self-definition, it is not clear to me that Hebrew Catholics, as Lévy argues,

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27 Although in truth, matters are more complex and fluid, as Shalom Goldman depicts in his *Jewish-Christian Difference and Modern Jewish Identity: Seven Twentieth-Century Converts* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015).
are or should be under the authority of rabbinic Judaism. There is no contestation by any group that Hebrew Catholics are “Jewish.” The definition of Jewishness is defined by one’s genealogical link to Abraham. Who then owns the term “Jew” in the modern context? Rabbinic Judaism does for those who wish to be rabbinic Jews (and here there is diversity)\(^\text{28}\); the High Court of Israel does for those who wish to apply for the right of return to Israel as Jews (and here Yeshua-followers are legally refused due to their apostasy)\(^\text{29}\); and the Church does for those who are Hebrew Catholics, seeing them as deriving from biblical Judaism. The authority to interpret biblical Judaism for Hebrew Catholics is finally Christ’s, as is the interpretation of their own possible rabbinic Jewish tradition. There are no easy answers here. Perhaps the most that can be asked for is a recognition of the legitimate complexity of the right of different groups to properly exercise theological jurisdiction.

In the long run Jews may wish to withdraw from conversation with Catholics, seeing Catholics both breeding and nurturing apostate Jews and thereby showing “persuasive intent.” I sincerely hope this will not be the outcome. If we can be honest with each other about what we believe and why we believe it, and show a willingness to be interrogated about those beliefs, surely that is the most dialogue can ask for.

The purpose of dialogue can be many things: bridge building; work for common goals; social action; scriptural engagement; learning from each other’s spirituality and practices; working through our own tradition’s madness, sadness, and glories; and listening to critical views that make us very uncomfortable. However, I prefer to think of dialogue using the guiding metaphor of friendship. And friendship, according to Aquinas, is the highest goal we might seek with another.\(^\text{30}\) That friends may desire the greatest good for each other is a virtue; that they learn from the other what the good is, is equally a virtue. The first has an element of persuasive intent; the second requires humility and receptivity. Both require trust, that most fragile of realities, but the most precious.

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\(^{29}\) The famous test case on this matter was regarding a Hebrew Catholic, who was also celebrated at Yad Vashem! See [https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/communities/mit/rufeisen.asp](https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/communities/mit/rufeisen.asp); and Nechama Tec’s depiction of the story, *In the Lion’s Den: The Life of Oswald Rufeisen* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and covered in Goldman, *Jewish-Christian Difference*, 149-68.