THE IMAGE OF GOD IN MAN: ALEXANDRIAN ORIENTATIONS

It is not the function of a seminar like the present to make a fresh contribution to the field of patristic theology. Rather, it seems advisable to present to you ideas which (1) are already the possession of patristic scholars but (2) do not draw sustained attention from dogmatic theologians, ideas which (3) may well prove fruitful for contemporary theology if properly exploited, ideas which (4) can be critically appraised by a group such as this, experts in speculative and historical theology, practitioners in seminary hinterlands and urban universities.

For all these reasons, my remarks will center on the image of God in man. Enthralling to the historian of ideas, the idea has not impressed the manualist. This, despite the fact that the image theme touches intimately the triune life of God and the sacramental life of the Christian, that it can command the theology of redemption and the history of salvation, that it can illumine the dark depths of sanctifying grace, that it can add a different dimension to our understanding of sin as an offense against God.

I shall deal, then, with the divine image in man. Not in its total magnificent sweep across history, from the Gilgamesh Epic to Emil Brunner, but only the patristic development. Not the whole range of patristic speculation, but only the Alexandrian orientation. Not even all the Alexandrians, but four of the more suggestive: Origen and Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria. Not the totality of their image theories, but broad lines and fascinating facets.

ALEXANDRIAN BACKGROUND

An intimate understanding of the Alexandrian contribution to image theology demands some knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual background that helped to fashion it. I would suggest that four influences were uncommonly strong in this regard.
First, Scripture. This is Christian Alexandria's springboard and basic inspiration. And here there is question of creation and re-creation, of Old Testament and New, of Adam and Christ. The origins of the Christian conception of the divine image are rooted in the opening act of salvation history. The text par excellence is Gn 1:26-27—the first man and the first woman are fashioned in God's image (Hebrew šelem, Greek eikòn), after His likeness (Hebrew d'mùt, Greek homoiosis)—a text which the Psalmist elucidated (Ps 8) when he saw man made “but little lower than God,” gifted with the two marks of majesty which Ps 145:12 refers to Yahweh's kingship: kábôd, glory or splendor; and ḥādār, honor, sublimity, grandeur, eminence, exaltation. Less significant for the Fathers will be the Wisdom of Sirach, delineating manifold powers and abilities of man on the basis of the divine resemblance (Sir 17:1-13), and the Wisdom of Solomon, which finds man copying God's immortality and eternity (Wis 2:23).

Absent from the Gospels, the image idea plays a significant role in St. Paul's Christology and anthropology. There are three prominent themes, each of which will be caught up into Alexandrian thought. (1) Christ is the Image of God (2 Cor 4:4-6; Col 1:12-16; Heb 1:3); for He is the Son of God, and as Incarnate Son He is the visible manifestation or epiphany of the invisible God, the luminous revelation of the Father, radiance of the Father's glory, imprint of the divine nature. (2) Man is the image of God (1 Cor 11:7-9; Col 3:9-10); for the new creation of man in Christ has restored the original image, and here—as Paul interprets the chronological sequence of Gn—man is a direct reflection of the divine majesty, woman the image of that reflection. (3) The Christian is the image of Christ (Rom 8:29; Phil 3:21; 1 Cor 15:48-49; 2 Cor 3:18). This is Paul's thrilling doctrine of the Christian's progressive divinization. The Spirit, whom the believer has received in baptism, transforms him gradually into the doxa-image of the risen Christ, a transformation which is the mystery of grace here below and will be consummated when the risen Christian bears the likeness of the exalted Christ even in his body.

Second, Greek thought. The Alexandrian Fathers are indebted to Hellenic wisdom, without being enslaved thereto. On the image theme, five pertinent ideas were highly influential, though sometimes baptized and often deepened by their contact with Christian theology. I mean (1) the idea of an intermediary image through which a transcendent God touches this material world; (2) a natural kinship between the human and the divine, an image of God which confers on man a potency for perfection; (3) the actualization of this potency in a gradual process of assimilation whereby man reaches resemblance, genuine likeness, to the divine; (4) the imitation of God by moral and virtuous living, an imitation which marks the passage from potency to realization, from image to likeness; and (5) the category of participation, which underlies all the preceding, explains human divinization, reconciles unity and multiplicity. Put another way, Platonism and Stoicism, in their various phases, were tributary streams to the image theology of early Christianity. The effort, however, to assign a more significant role to Greek thought than to the Bible in this area has miscarried.

Third, Philo of Alexandria. ² The most important figure among the Hellenistic Jews of his age, eclectic in his religious outlook and in his theology, Philo united, without ultimately harmonizing, the two principal intellectual currents that streamed into cosmopolitan Alexandria: Hellenism and Judaism. His philosophical and religious speculations, together with his allegorical interpretation of Scripture, had a profound effect on Alexandrian Christianity: he was one of Origen’s principal sources, and no one exercised greater influence on Clement. Some of his image theology (e.g., the Logos as the Image par excellence, and the human mind as image of the Image) found rich resonance in Christian thinking, though on some points (e.g., the

² For a thorough study of Philo, highly important but not without flaws, cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1947). Jean Daniélon has pointed out that Wolfson “tends too much to present Christian theology as though it were a mere development of the theology of Philo, thus placing it on the same plane with the theologies of Judaism and Islam. It would be better to have portrayed it as a distinct revision of this theology in function of a new Revelation which completes the first” (*Theological Studies* 9 [1948] 589, note 12).
nature of the Logos, the identification of God's "co-workers" in creation, his double-creation theory) he had to be rejected or refined.

Fourth, Irenaeus of Lyons. Here, for the first time, a theology is fashioned around the image of God, in three stages: (1) creation: man's formation to God's image and likeness; (2) degradation: loss of the higher resemblance through sin; and (3) renovation or recapitulation: restoration of the divine likeness through Christ. Or, to phrase it in Peterson's synthesis: Adam was created on the model of the Word Incarnate. The latter is constituted of body, soul, and Holy Spirit; therefore the true man, perfect and living, should consist of body, soul, and Holy Spirit. Before his sin, then, Adam possessed a body that imaged the body which the Word was to assume, and a spirit corresponding to the Holy Spirit who generated and ruled the body of the Word. The Word, becoming man, became what His image was.

**Origen**

In Origen is discoverable a vast theological and spiritual world of ideas centered around the image of God, with rich promise for Trinitarian speculation and for the theology of sanctifying grace. For Origen, only the Logos in His divinity is the immediate Image of the Father. Man is *kat' eikona*, image of the Image; and here Origen's doctrine has four cardinal facets: creation, sin, progress, and transformation.

In creation, man received a participation in God's Image. The true locus of this participation, of this *kat' eikona*, is the interior man, the new man, that sphere of the soul which is influenced by the spirit. It is participation of the Logos by the logos, a communication of Trinitarian life through the Word, a gift whereby the Son-by-nature makes adopted sons. To be *logikos*, therefore, is not simply to be intelligent, rational. "Only the saint is *logikos*,"

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because only the saint participates in the Logos on the higher level designed by God. This supernatural sharing of each logikos in the Logos is the loftiest element of his essence; it makes him “in some fashion” consubstantial with God; it is the single source of human dignity.

Through sin, Satan communicates to man the image of “the earthly,” his own image, with all the vices that attend it. This participation in Satan is acquired or strengthened by alogos action, which lessens man’s qualities as logikos. Sin assimilates man to the animal. But bestial images can only obscure, cannot destroy, the image of God. Though alogos, the sinner is not an animal. Within him abides always the possibility of returning to his primitive state. But sin does mean that the sinner, image of God and of Satan, is inwardly divided. Under what form is the image preserved? Not as sanctifying grace, for supernatural contact with the Logos has been severed. Rather, as an inefficacious desire, a nostalgia, an inner rending in the human spirit, which can be resolved by the action of Christ.

Only through Christ is the image restored—a conversion effected by the redemptive activity of the Saviour and the sinner’s conformation to Christ dead and risen, through contemplation and imitation. But this basic restoration is only a preliminary stage, a point of departure; the image is inchoative divinization, divinization in potency. The phraseology of Gn 1:27 tells Origen that man received in his initial stage the dignity of image, which made it possible for him to acquire by diligent effort, by imitation of God, the perfection of likeness at life’s culmination. And in this progress from image to likeness the principal agent is the Holy Spirit.

Perfect likeness is achieved not in this life but beyond death, in bodily resurrection, where we uncover the ultimate meaning of man’s conformity to Christ dead and risen—a resurrection in which the whole Body of the Lord will share. To be conformed to the glorious humanity of God is to be conformed to the Word of God, and so to God. The ultimate likeness consists above all in this: in heaven we shall be gods, possessing completely the divinity in which we now share only distantly. In and through the one Son all men
will become one only Son; for the Logos will take possession of the whole of the *logikê* nature, to transform every soul into His own perfection.

**ATHANASIUS**

For Athanasius, as for Origen, only God the Word is the Image of the Father. Rational creatures are *kat' eikona*; and the preposition *kata* expresses a relationship to the Word-Image.⁵

Like his Alexandrian predecessors, Athanasius excludes the corporeal from man’s imaging. Unlike them, the concept of a progression from image to likeness is absent from his perspectives. In his view, perfection was given at the outset; man’s task is to recapture it. And in this process it is the ontological that concerns him, it is being rather than appearance that is of interest to him; in a word, participation.

This category of participation, so conspicuous in the totality of Athanasius’ theology, is rarely more in evidence than in his image doctrine. The Word does not participate; creatures participate in Him. To participate in the Word is to be *kat’ eikona*; they are equivalent expressions. But *kat’ eikona* is not mere resemblance, the reproduction of a form; it is ontological participation. It is, in Athanasius’ terse phrase, *to kata theon zên*: God communicates His own divine life. This participation in the Word confers on man a stability, *aph-tharsia*, *athanasia*, which he does not possess of himself; and in virtue of this incorruptibility he is a being like God.

Moreover, there is an intimate relationship between *kat’ eikona* and *logikos*. For Athanasius, to be *kat’ eikona* is to be *kata Logon*; to be *kata Logon* is to be *logikos*; and to be *logikos* is to be not simply rational in an Aristotelian-Scholastic sense, but contemplator of the divine, seeing in the Word the Father of the Word: God is reflected in the pure soul as in a mirror. To be *logikos* is to be, in the coinage of Roger Leys, “Verbified.” Such was man in his primeval creation; such was every man’s vocation; this was the destiny of our race—a destiny that abided despite sin.

The essence of sin, as Athanasius sees it, is forgetfulness of the *kat' eikona*, neglect of the divine power of contemplation, sloth, distaste for the Good. So, too, the consequences of sin center about the *kat' eikona*: men are deprived of the prerogatives conferred by this participation in the divine. Athanasius seems to hover uncertainly between a *kat' eikona* that is simply tarnished, covered over, and a *kat' eikona* that is genuinely destroyed. Perhaps the most plausible summation is Bernard’s. He sees the *kat' eikona* “equivalently divided into two. As grace of union with God, it is lost, then created anew; but as ordination of the soul to God, witness to a calling which abides, it subsists, though neutralized, beneath the blemishes.”

How is the *kat' eikona* restored? In the perspective where it is seen as merely tarnished, Athanasius speaks of a cleaning process; and it almost seems as if man could do it himself. Elsewhere a cleaning process is considered insufficient; the model must be present once more; hence the Incarnation, conformation to Christ, Image of all the virtues of the gospel economy. The Word is not, however, merely model of the restoration; He is its agent as well, because the *kat' eikona* is more participation than resemblance.

Is Athanasius’ image natural or supernatural? Or are there two facets? Despite fluctuations and imprecisions and inconsistencies in thought and terminology, this much can be affirmed with Bernard:

... The unity of his essential perspective abides: the *kat' eikona* sums up the divinizing vocation of man. It is obviously a free gift; and if Athanasius selects it straight off as point of departure, it is because Christ has spoken of the “kingdom prepared for you from the creation of the world.” With this as springboard, it is not surprising that only on the occasion of the Fall does he face up to the problem of “nature”; and this, sullied, wounded, and deposed, remains ever ordained to a vocation which remains faithful to us across all our infidelities. It is only in virtue of this residue that one could speak of a “natural image” of the Word in St. Athanasius.

There is a regrettable feature in Athanasius’ image theology;

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6 *Ibid.*, 69
Bernard has highlighted it. Whereas the preoccupations of the apologist precluded a full development of his image doctrine in the works of his youth (Contra gentes and De incarnacione), the Arian conflict concentrated his attention to such an extent on the theology of the Word that in his more mature works, though he dealt with adoption and grace, there is no studied link between these concepts and kat' eikona.

All in all, however, Athanasius' doctrine of the image—the Image par excellence and Its created participation—remains substantially valid. It is still highly instructive, especially on the relation of Christian anthropology to Trinitarian theology (filii in Filio). And if the content of the image has found more perfect expression, Athanasius remains a link in the process that has made this progress possible.

GREGORY OF NYSSA

For Gregory, perhaps more than for any other of the Alexandrians, the image theme is the focal point of all his work.\(^8\) It commands his outlook on God—the relationship, for example, between Father, Son, and Spirit, equal in dignity, distinct in personality. It commands his outlook on man—on individual man and on humanity as a whole. In Gregory's eyes—as Leys has pointed out in moving fashion—the history of man is but a single history, the history of the parturition, at once sorrowful and glorious, of the image of God in men. "Between God and man rises up as unique Mediator Jesus Christ, eternal Image of the Father inasmuch as He is Word, created image of God inasmuch as He is man, reflected light of God and prototype of the new humanity, glorious first fruits of that pleroma which, in its entirety, is to become His Body.\(^9\)"

In Gregory's vision of the image, man "was made like to God in all things." As God's image, he possesses in his finite way every excellence which is to be found in God. But Gregory sees no

\(^8\) Uncommonly helpful and suggestive on Gregory's image theology is R. Leys, L'Image de Dieu chez Grégoire de Nysse (Brussels and Paris, 1951); I owe much to him.

\(^9\) Ibid., 139.
advantage in an exhaustive catalog of perfections; he is generally content with those qualities which are pertinent to a particular context: immortality, reason, freedom, individual virtues. On the fate of the image, he is as vexing as Athanasius. From some texts we are compelled to conclude that the image is lost through sin; from other texts, that it is blurred, overlaid, obscured. It may well be that there is in Gregory, as in Origen, “the feeling that the soul once stamped with the divine image can never completely lose its trace,” that there is in Gregory an incipient, if hidden and confused, doctrine of the “character,” with the author “portraying not the presence of grace but the fact of being destined for it, not actual sanctification but the sacral character of the soul which still belongs to God, though no longer linked to Him by love.”

Still, true as it is that image doctrine commands Gregory's theology and his anthropology, the aspect I would underline here is its significance for his ascetical and mystical thought. His nuanced ideas in this direction have rarely been given better synthetic expression than in a single paragraph by Leys:

This theme of the image is the soul of his admirable spiritual doctrine—a doctrine whose unity cannot be sufficiently underscored. The life of the mind (l'esprit) is to know God. And there is but one way to know Him, and that is to be like Him, to get to be in His image. To be sure, Gregory speaks also of “the ascent of the soul towards God by the ladder of creatures”; but he has little liking for this, perhaps because of its affinity with that knowledge of God (scarcely unitive) which even the wise of this world can achieve. Rather, the knowledge of God to which he gives preference in his thinking is that of participation in His virtues, in His holiness—that knowledge which is essentially union. The gaze of purity, of goodness, of rectitude, is undoubtedly a gaze “on” God, but primarily it is the gaze “of” God which communicates His divine presence to us. And how participate in that holiness of God? By following Him through faith, eyes closed, wherever He leads; by opening one's heart always to a further and deeper submissiveness;

11 Leys, op. cit., 114.
by divesting oneself of every favor already received through unceasing yearning for what is always beyond; in a word, by the ecstasy which is a going out of oneself. The image of God is not, therefore, static reality but continual growth; and far from being an object of clear vision, it keeps sinking deeper into God’s unknown. No, “the mirror and the cloud” are not, as G. Horn believed, “two methods of knowing God in Gregory of Nyssa.” They form but one: the image is holiness, and holiness is ecstasy, in the night.\textsuperscript{12}

**Cyril of Alexandria**

In harmony with a widespread neo-Alexandrian trend, Cyril refuses to distinguish *eikôn* and *homoiôsis*. He is convinced that the two ideas are indistinguishable in Gn 1:26-27, and he proceeds to employ them without distinction. On the other hand, he insists, with his Alexandrian predecessors, that there is a radical distinction between the Image of God that is God, and the image of God that is man. The difference is reducible to identity of nature in the one case and participation in nature in the other. In fact, it is this notion of participation (methexis), in intimate alliance with imitation (mimēsis) and grace (charis), which more than any other concept dominates Cyril’s theology of the image of God in man.

Where is this image, this likeness to God? On this point Cyril is unequivocal: the image of God is in the soul, not in the body. What, concretely, is the content of the image? My research into Cyril\textsuperscript{13} has unearthed six primary facets: reason, freedom, dominion, sanctification, incorruptibility, and sonship.

First, reason. Man was made in God’s image “inasmuch as he is a rational animal.” At first glance this seems quite simple: man images God with his mind, intelligence, understanding—a resemblance on the level of sheer human nature, with no overtones of grace. In point of fact, this aspect of the image is complex. Reason is a participation in the divine; the light of reason is a sharing in Him who is Light by nature. But this is not the out-and-out natural

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 139-40.

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thing we conceive. Like the Alexandrians before him, Cyril is not disposed to contemplate man in a state of pure nature, in isolation from his concrete destiny. If rationality is fundamentally a natural thing, potentially and in its divinely decreed finality it is supernatural; through the proper use of reason man achieves his actual destiny, which is supernatural. Specifically, what Cyril sees in the mind of every man born into this world is reason in quest of faith. It is in belief, in faith, that the natural image implanted by the Word at man’s formation finds its supernatural fulfillment. In the wake of Clement and Origen, of Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril’s interest in human reason centers in its supernatural finality: it is created to be Christian.

Second, freedom. Man images God with his will. To begin with, man, like God, is not compelled by fate or by his nature to choose this rather than that; he has genuine psychological freedom. But Cyril’s concern is Christian; therefore, freedom means for him the power to choose between good and evil; best of all, man can freely refuse the evil, prefer the good. This is genuine godlikeness: the power to freely choose the good. Moreover, man is predisposed to good. If actual virtue is achieved by deliberate choice, proclivity to virtue is rooted in created nature. In that sense man is “naturally good”; naturally good, he resembles his God. In sum, man has the power to choose good, and he is divinely oriented towards the good by his make-up.

Third, dominion. Here two of Cyril’s positions are clear. The first is the biblical fact: in the person of Adam, human nature was gifted by God with sovereignty. The second is a personal exegesis, not without confirmation from recent biblical scholarship14: this dominion, this sovereignty, is one aspect of the divine image in man. Regrettably, Cyril does not specify the nature of this imperial power; he does not reveal how it was exercised. It is not a constituent part of man’s nature; in all probability it does not flow necessarily from man’s essence.

Fourth, sanctification. It has two aspects, ontological and

dynamic. The ontological aspect is man's participation in God's nature, whereby the Holy Spirit, by a communication of Himself, fashions man to the Son whose Spirit He is, and so to the Father whose Image the Son is. To share God's nature is holiness; and to share God's nature, to be holy, is to be like God. The dynamic aspect is man's conscious imitation of God through virtue; it is life lived in harmony with the exigencies of *methexis*, of participation. Briefly, man is holy, and he lives holily. We resemble God if we share His nature, and we resemble God if we imitate His actions.

On the level of holiness, there is only a difference of stress between Cyril and his Alexandrian predecessors; but the difference in stress is striking. Three factors distinguish him from them: (1) his emphasis on ontological holiness; (2) his unmistakable identification of ontological holiness with the image of God in man; and (3) his insistence that in holiness lies man's most significant resemblance to God.

Fifth, incorruptibility. True, Cyril does put a certain stress (in apparent contradiction to his express exclusion of the body from the image) on corporeal incorruptibility—possessed now in hope, in promise, in first fruits; to be possessed after the resurrection in full realization, in fulfilment, in harvest. But the more profound significance of incorruptibility is seen in its moral implications; it is primarily theological, only secondarily biological. *Phthora* is not simply subjection to physical death and dissolution; it is the condition of a rational creature who is deprived of precisely that life which is divine and eternal, God's life; life will leave his body, because love has fled from his soul. Dominated by concupiscence, separated from God—why, physical death is understandable, is natural. And *aphtharsia* means that the whole man is alive—not with a double life, natural and supernatural; no, he has been divinized—the whole man; he is alive with God's life, one with God, master of his passions. The body is emphasized, yes; the body is *aphthartos* to the extent that it is not dominated by sinful concupiscence. But it is actually the whole man who is lord of his passions, who is one with his God. Here *aphtharsia* joins hands with *hagiasmos*. 
Sixth, sonship. Adoptive sonship is a participation in the Son through the Spirit. There are two stages in our sonship: (1) a radical kinship with God realized by humanity, in Christ, at the moment of the Incarnation; (2) a properly supernatural relationship achieved in the individual, through Christ, by participation in the divine nature and through the Eucharist. Because both stages are necessary for adoptive sonship, it appears that Cyril did not concede it to Adam. Only with the Incarnation does Christ communicate to human beings the Spirit of adoption. Cyril does not find adoptive sonship in the Old Testament, does not find it in humanity’s primitive condition. From this point of view the condition of humanity since the Incarnation is superior to the primitive state of Adam.

The conception of sonship as a facet of the image is discoverable in the earlier Alexandrians. But Cyril is unrivaled in his bold effort to fathom the depths of our divine sonship and link it intelligibly to its Archetype, the Christ who is God’s only Son and yet the first-born among many brethren. And Cyril is significant because he fashions his concept of adoptive sonship not from human adoption but from natural filiation, from the natural Son of God.

What, in Cyril’s view, was the impact of sin on the image? We have lost none of our essential components, but sin did mar the beauty of the image. In the concrete, Adam—and humanity with him—remained rational but lost a certain perfection of intelligence, of wisdom; remained essentially free but did not preserve that unreserved response to grace; was stripped of sovereignty over earth; lost ontological and dynamic holiness; became subject to passions and corruption; remained teknon but was no longer huios, could only call God Father by title of creation, of existence.

Was the image lost or simply disfigured? Here Cyril shows himself heir of disparate traditions. Some passages reveal an image lost, some an image disfigured. In this vacillation Cyril is one with Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa.

Recapitulation—the restoration to man’s original state—comes through Christ. It is achieved radically in the Incarnation, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, with His death as a central facet; it is achieved individually in baptism, where the image is recovered.
Here, reason is perfected by faith; freedom is perfected by grace; dominion is recaptured, though it will not be actualized until the next life; man participates in the divine nature, and virtuous activity is possible; unending life is restored, to be made definitive at the resurrection, and man is freed from slavery to passion; adoptive sonship is given through the Spirit of adoption within us.

CONCLUSION

What I have given above is clearly not a synthesis of Alexandrian image theology. Such a synthesis has not yet been fashioned, though the state of pertinent scholarship makes the present time ripe for it. I have only outlined several image theologies, in the belief that such outlines are bases for intelligent theological discussion. On the level of the very general, I suggest as a fruitful topic the possibility and/or advisability of utilizing image theology as a central facet, an integrating force, in various theological disciplines. More specifically, there is room for spirited conversation on the relationship of the divine image to the body, to sex, to sin, to redemption, to grace. Or, it might be fruitful to compare, or contrast, patristic ideas in this area with the inspired insights of St. Paul, with the medieval evolution in Bernard and Bonaventure and Thomas, with Reformation theology, or with modern Protestant developments in Barth and Brunner. In each of these fields, on each of these points, theology clamors not only for an afternoon of high-level dialogue, but for a lifetime of dedicated scholarship.

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