ORTHOPRAXIS AND THEOLOGICAL METHOD
IN BERNARD LONERGAN

This dialogue on orthopraxis and theological method would belie the genial contributions of both Bernard Lonergan and Karl Rahner if it devolved into a self-forgetful debate eager to score points on the relative merits of already-out-there-now divergent theologians with their competing systems. Such self-forgetful polemics would ignore the foundational importance of Rahner’s invitation to a reflective self-presence (Bei-sich-sein) and Lonergan’s invitation to engage in a thoroughgoing process of self-appropriation. The dialogue must engage us—not epigonic Lonerganians or Rahnerians. And if the dialogue engages us in all the concreteness of our self-presence or self-consciousness, then it demands that we heighten our conscious presence to an ongoing self-knowledge which not only discloses progressively our radical being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), but also challenges us to transform ourselves and the world into more attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsibly loving life. The genius of both Lonergan and Rahner consists in their initial efforts to thematize the intrinsic relationships constitutive of self and world, and the intrinsic orientations of both toward God. Their achievements generate more questions than answers; they stimulate new efforts towards creative collaboration rather than complacent repetition.

In what follows I can only offer the briefest outline of some of the main contributions Lonergan’s work has made to the tasks intimated in the themes of orthopraxis and theological method. First I shall attempt to contextualize the contributions by discussing praxis and generalized empirical method, then I will take up the issues of orthopraxis and theological method.

PRAXIS AND GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL METHOD

Some might argue that assessing the contributions of Lonergan and Rahner to the themes of orthopraxis and theological method is to slant the dialogue too much toward Kantian or Hegelian perspectives. After all, was not Marx’s resounding call to praxis precisely a critique of the transcendental and theoretical critiques of Kant and Hegel? Are not Rahner and Lonergan both transcendental Thomists and so rather removed from concerns with praxis? I believe that such objections fail to appreciate both the differing contributions of the two theologians and the project envisaged in Marx’s call to praxis.

To begin with the latter, Marx’s lifelong efforts to sublate philosophy into social praxis was by no means a complete negation of the transcendental projects associated with German idealism. If there are few issues on which the many divergent schools of Marxist scholarship agree, this would be one of them. Indeed, I would agree with Alvin
Gouldner’s assessment in his Marxist analysis of Marxism, and with others, that a basic element in the contradictions and anomalies imbedded in the development of Marxist theory and praxis can be traced to German idealist traditions.1 As the young Marx stated with regard to Kant, and the mature Marx with regard to Hegel, the aim of his control of theory through social praxis was not to replace theories or ideas with some kind of mindless activism, but to understand idealists like Kant and Hegel as unknowingly and uncritically reflecting in their theories concrete social values and disvalues.2 As I argue at much greater length in a book I am now writing on the foundations of religious theory and praxis, the modern “turn to the subject” initiated by Kant and German idealism is singularly important for an adequate understanding of contemporary efforts at elaborating a methodologically grounded praxis enlightenment.3 All too briefly stated, the “turn to the subject” has two major phases: the transcendental-idealistic phase (Kant, Hegel, right-wing Hegelians) and the dialectical-materialist phase (left-wing Hegelians, Marx, Marxists). Common to both these phases was a concern to promote the responsible freedom of humankind in the face of the increasing cognitive, social and cultural domination of the natural sciences with their empirico-mathematical techniques of observation, verification and industrial application.4 Kant’s critiques, especially the Critique of Practical Reason, sought to protect the realm of moral praxis and freedom as a noumenal realm over against the phenomenal realm of necessity. Hegel recognized the inconsistency of this phenomenon-noumenon dichotomy and sought to develop a conceptualistic intellectual praxis aimed at sublating all meanings and values into the constitutive meaning of Geist as coherent and complete system.5 The decisive


5 Cf. W. Oelmüller, Die Unbefriedigte Aufklärung: Beiträge zu einer Theorie der
discovery by Hegel of history as constituted by meaning—Lonergan once remarked to me that the earliest expressions of this can be found in Hegel’s early theological writings—was a heady experience indeed.

While the right-wing Hegelians attempted to maintain that the factual institutions of society in Church and State incarnated constitutive reason, the left-wing Hegelians had, perhaps, drunk more deeply of the discovery and tended to follow Feuerbach’s call for an absolute negation of existing historical and social institutions in order to re-create society and history in the anthropocentric image of a radically secularized constitutive rationality. The “‘turn to the subject’” passed from the transcendental-idealistic phase, with its emphasis on moral praxis (freedom) and intellectual praxis (concept), to the dialectical-materialist phase. The young-Hegelians promoted a historical praxis aimed at realizing concretely in history (or materially) constitutive rationality. The empirical methods of the natural sciences, as Feuerbach stated, once united to the new philosophy will collaborate in creating a new truth and new freedom: autonomous secularized humankind.

If Marx could write that “there is no other road for you to truth and freedom except that leading through the brook of fire (the Feuerbach),” he soon recognized that the heady optimism of the young Hegelian emphasis on historical praxis aimed at meaning was neither dialectical nor concretely material enough. The “‘turn to the subject’” would, for Marx, only be real and concrete in so far as a social, revolutionary praxis would aim at realizing the value of human life by transforming society from its capitalist alienated stage of production and social relations of domination to a socialist stage of freely associated producers.

As Professor O’Malley and others have indicated, Marx’s materialist conception of society and history (Marx never wrote of “dialectical materialism”) aimed at fusing natural science and dialectical criticism by materially inverting Hegel’s discussion of the ethical life in *The Philosophy of Right*. If social praxis aims at a unity of theory and
praxis in terms of concrete human values, then Marx was convinced that simple-minded moralisms against greedy capitalists was just so much nonsense. Ignorance of infrastructural value-conflicts rather than greed was at fault. Marx envisaged a massive empirical-dialectical study of economic values as the concrete embodiment of Hegel's abstract ideas. The conceptions of Hegel's discussion of civil society would be materialized in Marx's analysis of capital, landed property, wage labor. Hegel's conceptions of state constitution would be materialized in a treatment of economic activity of the state. Hegel's ideas on international law would materialize in Marx's analysis of international trade. And, finally, world history would be concretized in terms of an analysis of the world market. Marx never lived to complete even the first part of the first part (capital) of this ambitious project. He was constantly revising his dialectical analyses in the light of ever new empirical studies which, as the correspondence over the last thirty years of his life attest, were simply too many for any one person to keep up with.

The purpose of this all too quick overview of the "turn to the subject" in its transcendental-idealistic and dialectical-materialist phases is twofold.

First, it intimates an abiding, deep-rooted dichotomy between the determinism increasingly operative in eighteenth and nineteenth century empirical natural sciences and the concerns of these philosophers of praxis for human freedom. As Alvin Gouldner amply demonstrates in The Two Marxisms, the anomalies in Marx's development itself (e.g., materialist conception of history; the infrastructure as juxtaposing both the forces and relations of production; the necessary empirically analyzable laws of capitalism would inevitably lead to its own breakdown and replacement by socialism versus the need to organize the revolutionary cadres to overthrow capitalism) have not been resolved in the subsequent history of Marxism. We are still confronted in theory and praxis with the two poles of Scientific Marxism (determinism, object-oriented) and Critical Marxism (voluntaristic, subject-oriented); for example, Lenin-Stalin versus Trotsky-Gramsci, Structuralist Marxism versus the Frankfurt School.

Nor is this rift only troublesome for Marxists. In philosophy there are trends either to erect the logical techniques of the natural sciences into the canon for all valid knowledge (e.g., positivism, naturalism, logicism, linguistic analysis of the Vienna circle, historicism, structuralism) or to preserve some domain for freedom which could not be invaded by the sciences (e.g., idealism, some forms of phenomenology, existentialism, personalism.). Human sciences such as psychology and sociology are marked by similar dichotomies, e.g., behaviorism versus

10 Ibid., pp. 18-25.
11 Ibid., pp. 25f., 40-41.
humanism, functionalism versus symbolic interactionism, and most recently sociobiologism versus anthropologism. Nor are we immune from this, as is all too evident in the tensions between religious studies and theology, between historical-critical exegesis and doctrinal systematic.

Second, I believe the philosophical contributions of Rahner and Lonergan can be differentiated according to how each of them directed their own retrievals of Aquinas toward overcoming the dichotomy from differing perspectives. Rahner’s cognitional metaphysics in *Geist in Welt* essayed a quasi-Heideggerian transcendental retrieval of Aquinas which would attempt an ontological mediation of primordially originating experience and conceptualization through an existential thematization of the prior unthematic *existentiell* of transcending experience. Against Kant, Rahner would hold that the “ought” of moral and metaphysical principles was not beyond the range of human experience; against Hegel, he would affirm the unity-in-difference of reality and ideality to be in prethetic experience open to the transcendent rather than in conceptualization *per se*. If from Aquinas Rahner saw the inexhaustible ground and goal of all questioning in God as Mystery, and from Heidegger how the question is the piety of thought, then it is little wonder that his achievements were to roam over the manifold questions confronting Christianity and Catholicism seeking to shift the *status quaesttionis* from the ontic categories of a cosmological metaphysics to the ontological categories of cognitive metaphysics. Where Rahner’s transcendental turn to the subject essayed a creative Catholic response to, and critical appropriation of, the transcendental-idealistic phase, Johann B. Metz’s political theology has attempted to articulate a foundational theology appropriate for those questions and challenges posed by the dialectical-materialist phase of the turn to the subject. While the originating primordial experience as openness to Mystery through the *Woraufliin* of human questing is indeed a foundational orientation of human experience, still for Metz Rahner has paid too little attention both

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15 C. Davis, “The Reconvergence of Theology and Religious Studies,” *Studies in Religion* 4, 3 (1974-75, 205-21; and the five responses to this study in *ibid.*, pp. 222-35.


to the problematic character of human experience, especially in its intrinsically social and historical-dialectical dimensions, and has conceded too much to the conceptional-ideational aspects of transcendental-idealistic traditions in dealing with the many disputed questions in theology.\textsuperscript{19} For Metz, Rahner's achievements were too conceptually immune from the natural and human sciences, not to mention from the concrete histories of suffering associated with the struggles for liberation and redemption.\textsuperscript{20}

Lonergan's retrieval of Aquinas, on the other hand, was not in terms of a cognitional metaphysics but rather a theoretical articulation of cognitive praxis or performance underlying both the transitions from consciousness to knowledge and from knowledge to action.\textsuperscript{21} Instead of moving away from the empirical sciences toward an ontological refuge of human freedom and self-determination, Lonergan proceeded to uncover the dynamic and heuristic performance of questioning as grounding all advances in empirically scientific knowing.\textsuperscript{22} From this he dialectically challenged the notions of deterministic necessity and axiomatic deductivism, which not only misled so many articulations of empirical science, but also alienated social and cultural living. It did this by attempting to impose conceptual necessities through the use of technocratic and bureaucratic techniques.\textsuperscript{23} If Lonergan learned from Aquinas that proportionate being as the concrete universal is shot through with contingency, he creatively transposed those insights in terms of a complementarity of classical and statistical procedures in empirical science. These yielded, not a universe whose laws could be theoretically deduced according to some iron necessity, but a universe of emergent probability open to the rhythms of limitation and transcendence, and constitutive of the dialectical tensions between essential and effective human freedom.\textsuperscript{24} Lonergan's work through \textit{Insight} is a massive transposition of the basic presuppositions underlying the transcendental-idealistic phase of the turn to the subject. The Kantian dichotomy between phenomenal necessity (known by the empirical sciences) and noumenal freedom (oriented to moral praxis) is overcome by advertising to the actually related and recurrent performance of what we do when we


Such attention to cognitive praxis discloses the alienations operative in believing that we know the real through sensitive intuition (sinnliche Anschauung). If knowing is not taking a good look but verifying insights into sensible and imaginative data, then moral praxis is not voluntaristically following the categorical imperatives encapsulated in noumenal subjectivity. Rather, moral praxis positively sublates the underlying sensitive flow of desires and fears, through practical insight and evaluative reflection, to reach decisions on contingent courses of action whereby we can extend the range of effective human freedom.26

The Hegelian shift from sensitive to intellectual intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung) with its orientation toward a conceptualistic intellectual praxis dominated by knowledge and theory is replaced in Lonergan by an attunement to the related and recurrent operations of conscious intentionality which shifts attention from logic to method, and acknowledges the coherent but radically incomplete (and so ongoing) character of the human spirits’ (Geist) quest for meaning and value. 27

The problematic ambiguity of concrete human experiences in history cannot, Lonergan reminds us, be overcome by the equally problematic ambiguity of abstract human knowledge in history.28 The metaphysical logic of an Hegelian type, presupposing as it does an eventual completeness of system and theory, cannot be die Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft.29

Lonergan’s transcendental method strives for coherence but frankly admits its radical incompleteness. The operations of conscious intentionality are indeed both factual (“is”) and normative (“ought”). Yet this fusion of the factual and the normative is not the indicative (“always already”) possession of Geist within the world of theory but is the imperative (“not yet”) beckoning of concrete human strivings toward attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsible love.29

The fusion is a project, not a possession. The foundations of intellectual praxis in transcendental method are not some set of theories, however brilliant, but questioning human beings living within the multiple and changing patterns of natural and historical processes.30 Idealism, as Lonergan mentions, is only a halfway house between empiricism and such a critical realism.31

If Lonergan’s early work can be seen as transposing the basic presuppositions of the transcendental-idealist phase, then I believe his later work (from Method in Theology to his present work in macroeconomics) can be viewed as a creative and critical response to the

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25 Lamb, ibid., pp. 56-93.
27 J. Nilson, Hegel’s Phenomenology and Lonergan’s Insight (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1980).
31 Insight, p. xxviii.
challenge of the dialectical-materialist phase of the "turn toward the subject."

In *Method in Theology* Lonergan indicates the pressing need for dialectical criticism to inform historical and social praxis:

There are the deviations occasioned by neurotic need. There are the refusals to keep on taking the plunge from settled routines to an as yet unexperienced but richer mode of living. There are the mistaken endeavors to quiet an uneasy conscience by ignoring, belittling, denying, rejecting higher values. Preference scales become distorted. Feelings soured. Bias creeps into one's outlook, rationalization into one's morals, ideology into one's thoughts. So one may come to hate the truly good, and love the really evil. Nor is that calamity limited to individuals. It can happen to groups, to nations, to blocks of nations, to mankind. It can take different, opposed, belligerent forms to divide mankind and to menace civilization with destruction. Such is the monster that has stood forth in our day.

The monster of contemporary alienation intimates how the age of innocent criticism, i.e., criticism innocent of its own presuppositions, has begun to end. As Lonergan later wrote "the more human studies turn away from abstract universals and attend to concrete human beings, the more evident it becomes that the scientific age of innocence has come to an end: human authenticity can no longer be taken for granted... It is only after the age of innocence that praxis becomes an academic subject..." Empirical human sciences are not sufficiently objective to the degree that they ignore the complex dialectics of decline in which (1) "the data may be a mixed product of authenticity and unauthenticity," and (2) "that the very investigation of the data may be affected by the personal or inherited unauthenticity of the investigators."

With increasing frequency over the last six years, Lonergan has referred to his work not as "transcendental method" but as "generalized empirical method." His empirical method is "generalized" in two radical ways: (1) it attends to both the data of sense and the data of consciousness; and (2) the data of consciousness involve not only a genetically related series of sublations from data through understanding and judgment to decision and action, but also the need for an ongoing series of dialectically operative methods which are grounded in decisions and actions aimed at promoting good and overcoming alienation. The dialectically operative methods are what Lonergan...
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terms "method as praxis." Where empirical methods move from experiential data, through ranges of understanding relative to the data, and through judgments discerning whether such understandings are correct or not to decisions and actions, method-as-praxis has a reverse orientation. It seeks to explicate the value commitments, or value-conflicts, operative in decisions and actions. People respond to value in actions embodying love or hate even though they cannot explain fully what they are responding to. The knowledge flows from the loving or hating actions; and it flows in terms of judgments of value or disvalue wherein they judge concrete situations in the light of the values they love, and the disvalues they hate. From such judgments they engage in what Ricoeur calls a hermeneutics of recovery (regarding values) and a hermeneutics of suspicion (regarding disvalues) on the level of understanding. Finally, from such decisions, judgments and hermeneutics, they engage in an empirically transformative action which changes both the data of sense and the data of consciousness, which changes both human hearts and human social and cultural institutions.

Although one could claim that all of Lonergan's work in method is praxis in so far as it is concerned with the question of what we do when we know, still Lonergan himself also acknowledges a more transformative sense of praxis in which decision and action precede and ground a knowledge of values, lead to understandings which engage in a hermeneutics of suspicion as well as of recovery, and thereby engages in a transformation not only of the data of sense but also the data of consciousness itself.

Now such a generalized empirical method, with its attention to dialectics and praxis, critically responds to the concerns of the dialectical-materialist phase of the "turn towards the subject." With the young Hegelians it acknowledges the centrality of constitutive meaning in historical praxis. History is constituted by human meanings and values which not only grow and flourish but also disintegrate and decay. While the self-appropriation that is foundational to generalized empirical method is intensely personal, it is not private or monadic. Quite the contrary. Such self-appropriation is intrinsically related (as all persons are) to the ongoing history of humankind itself. Thus Lonergan can creativity and method: studies in honor of bernard lonergan (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).

37 Doran, Subject and Psyche, pp. 253-309; Lamb, History, Method and Theology, pp. 422-53.
38 Lonergan, "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," pp. 345 and 348: "... privacy in the world mediated by meaning has to be contrived and defended and even then it is limited. In that world one is taught by others and, for the most part, what they know they have learnt from others, in an ongoing process that stretches back over millennia.... None of us is an Adam living at the origin of human affairs, becoming all that he is by his own decisions, and learning all that he knows by personal experience, personal insight, personal discernment. We are products of a process that in its several aspects is named socialization, acculturation, education." All human persons are intrinsically related to other human persons. Both the personhood question (Who are we?) and the nature question (What are we?) can only be answered in relation to the ongoing processes of human history. But where the nature question admits of explanatory understanding in terms of the
write that generalized empirical method is indeed experimental. "But the experiment is conducted not by any individual, not by any generation, but by the historical process itself." Unlike the young Hegelians, however, our twentieth century has profoundly shaken secularist faith in humankind's ability to carry off the experiment on its own. In an unpublished essay of 1974 on "Sacralization and Secularization" Lonergan indicates how the undifferentiated sacralism of the Middle Ages led from the seventeenth century onwards to a defensive clerical sacralism in Roman Catholicism which tended to extend "the mantle of religion over the opinions of ignorant men." Such an undifferentiated and defensive sacralism provoked, especially from the nineteenth century onwards, an equally undifferentiated and offensive secularism. We have witnessed, as Max Weber intimates, the alienating transition from a hierarchic sacralist authoritarianism to a bureaucratic secularist authoritarianism.

Like all authoritarianisms, the two tend to reinforce one another over the heads of people and communities. The illusion of a god identical with ecclesial-social institutions is not radically different from the illusion of a humankind identical with political-economic institutions. The need of our times is for a differentiation of sacred and secular attuned to the genuine and the pathological in both. Lonergan's reflections on the structure of the human good and the dialectic of religious experience will be helpful in such a task of differentiation.

The creative and critical responses to the ongoing challenges of Marxist social theory and praxis by generalized empirical method are extensive and deeply transformative. I have already referred to Alvin Gouldner's *The Two Marxisms* which traces the origins and development of the contradictions and anomalies between Scientific Marxism and Critical Marxism. The former is characterized by an empirical determinism convinced that necessary laws of social development would, irrespective of human freedom, lead to the demise of capitalism. The objective creates the subjective. Critical Marxism, on the other hand, is characterized by a dialectical voluntarism convinced of the need to instill a revolutionary messianism in peoples in order to change existing social structures. The subjective creates the objective. Gouldner sees these two Marxisms as two extremes, both present in Marx, and defining (as ideal-types) the ends of a continuum towards one universe of emergent probability, the personhood question admits of narrative-symbolic understanding heuristically oriented into Mystery.

Ibid., p. 345.


or the other of which all subsequent Marxist theory and praxis has vacillated. Nor is he alone in such a formulation; he points to similar studies by Karl Korsch, Lucio Colletti, Merleau-Ponty, Mihailo Marković, Dick Howard, Karl Klare, Eric Hobsbawn and Perry Anderson.

Generalized empirical method exposes the cognitive and epistemological misunderstanding regarding so-called necessary deterministic laws in nature and history by its articulation of concrete cognitive performance and its attendant emergent probability. It also maps out the interlocking mediations of empirical and dialectical methods capable of radically displacing the dichotomies of scientistic determinism and voluntaristic decisionism. In place of these alienated and alienating dichotomies, generalized empirical method elaborates an ongoing complementarity of empirical methods (classical, statistical, genetic) and dialectical methods in which the results of empirical investigations provide the data for a dialectical discernment of the values and disvalues they exhibit. The dialectically foundational articulation of genuinely humanizing praxis promotes a value critique, and systematic understandings of the ramifications of values and disvalues, in order to transform the social situations from which empirical human sciences in turn draw their data. This, in very abbreviated fashion, is the metascientific Theory-Praxis Mediation based on Lonergan's functional specialties I have developed in History, Method and Theology.

Moreover, this is not only relevant to the dichotomy within Marxist social praxis and theory, but also to analogous dichotomies that bedevil both philosophy in general and scientific methodologies. In a letter to Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno wrote in 1935: “A restoration of theology, or better, a radicalization of the dialectic into the very glowing core of theology, would at the same time have to mean an utmost intensification of the social-dialectical, indeed economic, motifs.”

During the past few years Lonergan has taken up again the work in macroeconomics he began during the 1930’s. To those skeptical of self-educated economists, I would recall how neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx nor, for that matter, many of the key figures in Schumpeter’s massive A History of Economic Analysis, had Ph.D.’s in economics. If Marx’s concern with social praxis was guided by a concrete understanding of value as at bottom economic value, then Lonergan has understood how a genuinely dialectical critique of Marxist materialism should meet
head-on the problems of massive economic oppression and exploitation that materialist dialectic sought to remedy. Marx tried to discern criteria for economic progress or decline immanent in the economic infrastructure constituted by the industrializing forces and relations (the human relations to nature and to other human beings) of production. In a critically similar manner, Lonergan's macroeconomics connects his dialectic of the observance or non-observance of the transformative transcendental imperatives (be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be loving) immediately with his macroeconomic analysis. His *Circulation Analysis* tries to discern the criteria immanent in production processes with their alternating stages of surplus expansions and basic expansions. "But the dialectic arises from the contradiction that arises when the criteria are adverted to or not, understood or not, affirmed or denied, observed responsibly or disregarded, by a community of love or a community of egoists."54

Contemporary Catholic social teaching has continually criticized the alienating shortcomings of both late capitalism and state socialism. But, as liberation theologians are quick to point out, if these criticisms, however justified in themselves, are not to degenerate into a value-neutral legitimation of the status quo, then we must elaborate an accurate and critical economic theory and praxis capable of concretely and dialectically overcoming the alienations so massively present in both.55 Moralistic appeals to the common good, subsidiarity and the just wage are hardly sufficient. As I have argued elsewhere, Lonergan's macroeconomics is as insightfully challenging in its potential contributions to really humanizing economic processes, as his earlier work in method is in regard to basic cognitive issues. Just as the latter offers us a way to unmask the myriad forms of empiricism and idealism, not as opposites but as different aspects of a radical neglect of transformative cognitive praxis, so his macroeconomics will help us to understand how the many forms of late capitalism and state socialism are the alienated and alienating results of a deep-seated ignorance of the criteria constitutive of the alternating basic and surplus stages of the production process. As I have argued elsewhere, late capitalism is a bad materialization of idealism, whereas state socialism is a bad idealization of materialism.56


What humankind doesn’t know has hurt it, for this ignorance continues to spawn the economic misadventures (as Lonergan terms them) of colonialism, welfarism and multi-nationalism. Such are the economic monstrosities which have stood forth in our day generating widespread poverty, unemployment, inflations, recessions, militarisms, depressions. The terribly dehumanizing effects can be read all too easily in the massive sufferings of millions of human beings.

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Within the above context I have sketched some of the main critical contributions Lonergan’s generalized empirical method has made to the theme of praxis in the “turn to the subject” with its transcendental-idealistic and dialectical-materialist phases. I concentrated more on the German philosophical context of that turn in order to highlight the similarities and differences between him and Rahner. Where Rahner’s creative contributions have been more directed at a transposition of the issues raised by the transcendental-idealistic phase, Lonergan has essayed a transposition as well of the issues raised by the dialectical-materialist phase. As a result, Lonergan’s articulation of generalized empirical method seems to be especially helpful in sorting out the many methodological misunderstandings that haunt not only philosophy in general, and the philosophies of praxis in particular, but also the human sciences and scholarships.

In the light of these contributions one can, perhaps, appreciate why Lonergan can bluntly write that “orthopraxy has a value beyond orthodoxy” and that the profound change in the structures and procedures of theology articulated in method “places orthopraxis above orthodoxy.” Orthopraxis in this sense has, I believe, two meanings. Its primary meaning refers to the genuine practice of religion whereby humans appropriate the genuine religious meanings and values transmitted by their religious tradition. In this primary sense, then, orthoadoxies can be expressions of the orthopraxis of religious communities at particular places and times. This primary orthopraxis is the concrete realization in

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history of religious conversion as an ongoing withdrawal from a sinful hate and indifference. As genuine (or "ortho-") praxis, it can never be simply taken for granted or automatically guaranteed in any religious tradition. It is the fruit of God's grace and free, human, communal response. Such orthopraxis is foundational to the ongoing religious traditions in history.

A second meaning of orthopraxis might be termed reflective, dialectical orthopraxis. This second meaning moves orthopraxis from its conscious primary meaning to a known and explicit thematization in order to aid theology in a move toward the "third stage of meaning" marked by the modern emergence of historical consciousness and the contemporary emergence of dialectical consciousness. Lonergan sketches the relationship between these two meanings of orthopraxis when he writes:

For religious communities are historical realities. Their authenticity is the resultant not only of the authenticity of their contemporary members but also of the heritage transmitted down the centuries. Whatever the defects of any such heritage, it comes to be accepted in good faith. Good faith is good not evil. It needs to be purified, but the purification will be the slow product of historical research into the screening memories and defense mechanisms and legitimations that betray an original waywardness and a sinister turn. Lonergan sees both religious studies and theology challenged by a contemporary need to develop dialectical and critically practical methods for discerning genuine from alienated aspects in the historical realizations of religious traditions. Based upon his own work on the relationships between intellectual and religious conversions, Lonergan views the orientations of religious studies and theology as heading toward an overlapping and interchangeability. A reflectively dialectical orthopraxis calls for a creative openness to a "whole battery of methods" which, to the extent that they are operative in both religious studies and theology, will lead both sets of disciplines towards overlapping and interchangeability.

This reflective, dialectical orthopraxis is "method as praxis." Lonergan writes of it:

... it discerns a radically distorted situation; it retreats from spontaneous to critical intelligence; it begins from above on the level of evaluations and decisions; and it moves from concord and cooperation towards the development of mutual understanding and more effective communications. The radical oppositions distorting the global situations of humankind means that both religious studies and theology must "undertake dialec-
tic, a dialectic that will assemble all the dialectics that relate religions to organized secularism, religions to one another, and the differing theologies that interpret the same religious communion.”

An illustration of such a dialectics now emerging in Christian theologies is the conflicts in interpretation between historical-critical and social-critical orientations towards past traditions. The conflicts between conservative “orthodoxy” (which might more accurately be termed “palaeodoxy”) and liberal or modernist theologies in the early part of this century could be traced to a common (mis)understanding of revelation. Orthodoxy was viewed principally as affirmations of certain revealed factual truths demanding intellectual assent. These were times when, in Lonergan’s phrase, “contemplative intellect, or speculative reason, or rigorous science were supreme, and practical issues were secondary.” Conservatives appealed to a contemplative or speculative “pure” reason which would assent to revealed, a-historical facts or dogmas. Liberals would reject the latter in favor of reading Scripture as essentially reducible to secular moral values. Liberal historians developed historical-critical techniques which prescinded from the faith (or lack thereof) of the exegete and/or historian. These techniques appealed to rigorous science or scholarship which sought to disclose how religious texts and orthodoxies were primarily expressions of the plausibility structures of the cultures or societies in which the text emerged. Hence we had the themes of liberal historical criticism on the ‘‘hellenization of Christianity’’ during the patristic and conciliar periods.

As Quentin Quesnell has observed, this factual orientation toward revelation, with its consequent reduction of values to secular moral values (à la Neokantians like Ritschl), tended to overlook the rather massive evidence in the Scriptures of a revelation of values transformative of the conduct of the believing communities. In line with this shift, exegetes and historians are now developing social-critical methods which interpret religious texts and doctrines, not as merely reflecting the plausibility structures of the cultures in which they emerged, but more importantly as criticizing those very plausibility structures. For example, there is Norman Gottwald’s The Tribes of Yahweh or Gerard Theis-

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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., pp. 351-52.
sen’s Urchristliche Wundergeschichten, Phyllis Trible’s God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality or Richard Cassidy’s Jesus, Politics, and Society or Ben Meyer’s The Aims of Jesus. These are all very different exegetical and historical works; they raise many methodological issues which will be disputed and discussed for some time. In common, however, are their various critiques of, and corrections to, the presuppositions of liberal historical criticism. They refuse, in various manners, to interpret texts as doing no more than mirroring the plausibility structures and values of the surrounding cultures; instead they indicate the value-conflicts expressed in the texts.

Dialectics move beyond the aims of historical reconstruction. A reflectively dialectical orthopraxis takes seriously the need to thematize value conflicts within the heuristic of discerning values and disvalues capable of distinguishing genuine historical progress toward freedom and humanization from dehumanizing decline. Dialectics, therefore, have to thematize horizons and breakdowns in terms of ongoing heuristics of histories and societies. William Loewe has shown how Lonergan’s soteriology based upon the Law of the Cross is integrated within his philosophy of history with its practical intent. Just as generalized empirical method is an experiment carried on with the historical process itself, so is this method far from being “value-neutral” with regard to psychic, moral, social, intellectual, and religious values and disvalues.

Take, for instance, Lonergan’s outlines of dialectical analysis in his “The Origins of Christian Realism” and The Way to Nicea. These studies are concerned with a dialectical analysis of intellectual value conflicts. Lonergan is interested neither in historical reconstructions of what the Fathers wrote nor in providing fresh data on past historical events. Rather his dialectics is based upon the intellectual appropriation of the cognitive dimensions of orthopraxis, aiming to discern how the values and disvalues such an appropriation uncovers are present in the pre-Nicean movements. He is quite explicit that the Fathers “did not intend or desire” the intellectual value conflict he is analyzing.


The Way to Nicea, p. viii. Remember that the experiment of generalized empirical
traces the conflict of values from Tertullian's naive empiricism, through Origen's Middle Platonist idealism, to Athanasius' hesitant affirmations of the critical realism of the Christian kerygma. While none of the Fathers in question explicitly knew or intended this conflict, it is one which underlies the ongoing differentiations of consciousness in human history. Lonergan's dialectical analysis takes a critically grounded stand on the transformative values of Be Attentive, Be Intelligent, Be Reasonable, Be Responsible, Be Loving. From that stand within intellectual or noetic orthopraxis, it moves on to judgments of value and of disvalue, and to a hermeneutics of suspicion regarding the disvalues of neglecting or truncating those transformative values, and to a hermeneutics of recovery regarding the instances where those values found concrete expression.

What Lonergan's brief analysis offers is, in his words, "a dialectic that, like an X-ray, sets certain key issues in high relief to concentrate on their oppositions and interplay." Now, an X-ray is certainly no substitute for a full color picture. Patristic scholars who have labored long on research, interpretation and historical reconstructions of the period in question, delicately assembling all the hues and tones of an author or event, could be shocked and disappointed at Lonergan's X-ray —especially if they had hardly a clue as to the values in conflict the X-ray highlights. But X-rays are extremely useful in knowingly discerning pathological aberrations from genuine developments provided the practitioners know what to attend to. In Rosemary Haughton's phrase, "the present researches the past for the sake of the future." Where historical-critical methods tend to move from empirical research through exegetical interpretations to historical reconstructions, those social-critical methods which are dialectical tend to move from decisions appropriating certain basic values, through judgments of value and disvalue based upon those decisions, to a hermeneutics of recovery and a hermeneutics of suspicion regarding values and disvalues in traditions in order to promote the communication of historical actions fostering the basic values decided upon. Such social-critical methods are, thereby, emergent realizations of what Lonergan terms "method as praxis" or what I have called a reflectively dialectical orthopraxis.

method "is conducted not by any individual, not by any generation, but by the historical process itself." Lonergan, "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," p. 345.

77 The Way to Nicea, pp. vii-viii.
78 There is, of course, a critical complementarity between historical and dialectical analyses as Lonergan brings out in his functional specialties of how research, interpretation, and history provide results for dialectics, cf. Method in Theology, pp. 125-45, 235ff.
79 R. Haughton, The Catholic Thing (Springfield: Templegate, 1979), p. 17. Note how Haughton's narrative reconstructions here are dialectically oriented to orthopraxis in the present for the sake of the future. On how such an orientation is constitutive of political theology, cf. Lamb, History, Method and Theology, pp. 30-53. For another recent study of this aspect of Catholicism, cf. E. Braxton, The Wisdom Community (New York: Paulist Press, 1980). Braxton acknowledges: "Indeed, much of the dynamic of this book can be understood as an attempt to translate and apply many of the methodological insights of Lonergan and Tracy into a pastoral context." Ibid., p. viii.
It would extend far beyond the scope of this study to analyze the many instances of social-critical methods now emerging in theology. There is an increasing debate among exegetes and theologians concerning the social-critical analyses of Scripture and doctrine on the part of political and liberation theologians. In political theology there are the differences between Metz’s social-critical dialectics (aimed at moving from both conservative, paternalistic and liberal, middle-class forms of Church to the liberating, basic community form of Church) and Hans Küng’s historical-critical reconstructions aimed at liberal, democratic reforms of the Church. There are also the debates among patristic scholars and theologians relative to Erik Peterson’s studies on monotheism as a political problem and the Trinitarian and Christological doctrines as expressions of a spirituality and revelatory transformation of values at odds with Roman political religion. Critics of Latin American liberation theologies claim that the latter fail to observe the distinctions between witness and rigorous reflection, thereby slipping into types of ideological advocacy. Those who argue theoretically for the full incorporation of women into the ministries of the Church are sometimes criticized for slighting the symbolism of sacramental traditions.

While not entering into these and other debates, I would ask to what extent various forms of political and liberation theologies are committed to values neglected in other theologies, to what extent they are calling attention by their hermeneutics of suspicion and of recovery to “the screening memories and defense mechanisms and legitimations that betray an original waywardness and a sinister turn.” The criticisms of their projects which appeal to historical-critical methods might themselves be unaware of the dialectical presuppositions of their own supposed scholarship and the need for a social-critical dialectics of historical criticism itself. The contributions of Lonergan to orthopraxis and

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85 Cf. Meyer, The Aims of Jesus, pp. 13-110, on the hermeneutical issues involved in the historical-critical quest for the historical Jesus. Also Lamb, History, Method and Theology, pp. 41-93, 518-30. An adequate social-critical reconstruction of historical criticism has yet to be written. Note, however, G. Bauer, Geschichtlichkeit: Wege und
theological methods, in my judgment, indicate the importance of complementing and correcting the historical-critical methods by engaging in the development of dialectical, foundational and critically practical methods attuned to the transformation of values revealed in biblical narratives and the praxis of religious conversion. To the degree that the Scriptures and church doctrines expressed genuine (ortho-) religious praxis of communities in the process of conversion or metanoia as an ongoing withdrawal from dehumanizing and depersonalizing sin, to that degree we need today a reflectively dialectical orthopraxis methodologically capable of articulating the dialectic of values and disvalues unknown but consciously operative in scriptural and doctrinal orthodoxies. Lonergan once remarked that faith is indeed a leap, but not a leap into irrationality; faith is a leap into reason away from the biased irrationalities of dehumanizing and depersonalizing social and historical scotosis. The emergence of practical reason as reason yet to be realized in history—an emergence which can be read in the critiques of economic exploitation, racism, sexism, militarism—should be retrieved theologically by showing how religious faith, hope and love are constitutive elements of this reason not yet realized in human social living. 

An important aspect of this retrieval involves the positive sublation of church doctrines or orthodoxy in a reflectively dialectical orthopraxis. It is within the functional specialty of doctrines that Lonergan analyzes the ongoing discovery of mind or reason in history. Doctrines are judgments of truth and falsity, of value and disvalue, heuristically anticipating the reign of God redemptively transforming human history. For “the intelligibility proper to developing doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process. One knows it, not by a priori theorizing, but by a posteriori research, interpretation, history, dialectic, and the decision of foundations.” For Lonergan discerning doctrinal development is discerning the transformatively religious judgments constitutive of practical reason as reason yet to be realized in history. By way of an all too brief illustration, I would aver that the intellectual values and disvalues Lonergan has dialectically analyzed in the pre-Nicene movement can be correlated with the socio-political values and disvalues Erik Peterson has analyzed in his “Monotheismus als politisches Problem,” and the socio-sexual values and disvalues Elizabeth S. Fiorenza has initially discerned in “Early Christian History in a Feminist Perspective.” 


Besides the references in footnotes 74 and 82 above, cf. E. Schüssler Fiorenza,
idealism are not just vague abstractions. As disvalues influencing cultural attitudes and social living, they alienate human beings and destroy effective personal and social freedom.

From the perspective of orthopraxis the real problems within Christianity today are not the result of real distinctions between natures and persons expressed in traditional orthodoxy. The real problems result from a failure of Christians to pay the cost of discipleship (Bonhoeffer) or the price of orthodoxy (Metz). That is, the real problems result from failures to sublate orthodoxy in an orthopraxis commensurate with the dialectics of values unknown but consciously operative in orthodoxy. How different, for instance, would the history of Christianity have been if Christians more genuinely lived the religious values expressed in the Trinitarian and Christological creeds. At a time when political and cultural forces were bent upon deforming Christianity into just another form of Roman imperial religion with a monistic monarchical one god, one emperor, one world, one religion, Nicea affirmed how God is a Trinitarian community of Persons. Instead of hellenizing Christianity such credal confessions expressed a spirituality and a call for metanoia at odds with the plausibility structures and disvalues of the Imperium Romanum. But how genuinely was this orthodoxy lived?

Analogously, today, I would argue that the real problems liberation theologies uncover in the disvalues of class oppression, racism and sexism do not stem from the traditional distinctions between natures and person in Christ, nor are those disvalues reinforced by such distinctions. The massive exploitations of class, race and sex within Christianity have resulted rather from failures to live up to the orthopraxis expressed in Christological orthodoxy. For the critical realist, distinctions between nature and personhood are capable of exposing the alienations resulting from the illusory opposites of naively empiricist forms of dualism and idealist forms of monism. The revelatory transformation of values narratively communicated in, e.g., chapter twenty-five of the Gospel of Matthew is indicative of the critical realism of the Christian kerygmata. Similarly, as I have attempted to show elsewhere, the ecological plundering of nature now going on in industrialized societies is hardly a consequence of Judaeo-Christian values (pace Lynn White), rather it results from forms of naive empiricism and idealism rampant in secularist social and economic policies and practices from the
nineteenth century down to our own day. I have mentioned these issues in order to indicate how, in the framework of Lonergan's generalized empirical method, the dialectical methods needed for a reflective orthopraxis aim at knowingly realizing the transformative value orientations which are unknown but consciously operative in orthodoxy.

CONCLUSIONS

By way of conclusion, I would refer to Michael O'Callaghan's essay on 'Rahner and Lonergan on Foundational Theology' in support of the fundamental similarities between the two Jesuit theologians regarding the foundational primacy of spontaneous religious orthopraxis as an ongoing response to God as loving Mystery. Yet there are differences. Although Rahner's 'first level of reflection' and its 'transcendental experience' have important analogues in Lonergan's differentiation between consciousness and knowledge, nevertheless, Lonergan offers ways to verify the differentiation through a public process of self-appropriation and so he has articulated a generalized empirical method applicable not only to theology but whole series of basic issues in the sciences and scholarly disciplines. Rahner's first level of reflection tends to concentrate upon formulating specifically Christian (and, indeed, specifically Roman Catholic) theological categories. Thus many find his works more helpful in their own efforts to articulate the special foundational categories relevant to religious conversion and spirituality. Rahner is preeminently a mystagogic theologian. On the other hand, those interested in more general theological categories, i.e., categories operative not only in theologizing on the Christian mysteries but also operative in the sciences and other forms of noetic praxis, often find Lonergan's works more helpful. Lonergan is preeminently a methodological theologian. His life-long work has transformed method from its empiricist and idealist reifications as sets of axioms, principles or systems into its concrete embodiments in the related and recurrent activities of ongoing communities of knowers and doers in history. Because of this, Lonergan cannot be accused of trying to immunize theology from critical human sciences and studies. Rahner leaves the intrinsic relationships between his first and second levels of reflection rather vague, to say the least. Lonergan has initiated a framework for a reflectively dialectical orthopraxis critically open to the ongoing procedures and results of empirical and dialectical human sciences and scholarly disciplines. The intrinsic relationships between religious conversion processes and intellectual conversion processes which he has articulated challenge us to work out the constitutive interchangeability

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91 'The Production Process and Exponential Growth,' pp. 284-97.
and overlapping of praxis as practical reason yet to be realized in history and the transcendental imperatives of human questing and questioning for the divine.

Lonergan's contextualization of orthopraxis and theological method within his work on generalized empirical method and macroeconomics is especially relevant in overcoming the long range problems and basic alienations which are at the root of the massive sufferings and victimizations which various political and liberation theologies seek to respond to. Karl Jaspers once observed: "For more than a hundred years it has been gradually realized that the history of scores of centuries is drawing to a close." That aptly describes the epochal implications of the "turn to the subject" which, while it holds the promise of an ever fuller humanization and personalization of life on this planet, is also fraught—as any epochal transition is—with the risks and dangers of refusing to meet the challenges to intelligence, to love, and to freedom which such a turn demands. Neither reflection on theology nor reflection on method are ends in themselves. They are meant to promote a creative and critical collaboration with all humans in the tasks of transforming ourselves and our world into more attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsibly loving life. And, as Christians, we are called to incarnate our struggles for humanization and personalization in the transformative values of doing the truth in love revealed in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

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