PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
FOUNDATIONS OF THEOLOGY:
A COMMUNITY'S TRADITION
OF DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE

Several weeks ago, when I was preparing my talk and Elisabeth was in Holland attending the editorial board meeting of *Concilium*, I suggested to Chris we go out to eat. We landed in a Chinese restaurant in Harvard Square. Chris opened her fortune cookie to find: "Life is full of questions without answers." We had been just talking about her upcoming exams, so I teased, "what an appropriate fortune for you! With high school and college examinations ahead, you will face many questions to which you will not know the answers." "Oh no," she retorted, "the fortune fits you. It was made for a theologian. After all, they are always raising questions for which there are no answers." Chris is right. High school quizzes do have answers. At least much more readily than theology does. Does a theology merely raising questions or criticizing past answers have nothing to say? Would not the quip of the Polish satirist fit such a theology? "To preach the Gospel it is necessary to have a church, a pulpit, and a preacher. It indeed would be helpful if one also had a Gospel." Yet to affirm that theology does indeed have a Gospel to interpret and to proclaim does not make the task of theology any easier. Central to the task of theology is the foundations of theology. Does theology have any foundation? What is it?

Last year's theme, "Theology: Ecclesial and Academic," reminded us that the interpretation of the Gospel is not a simple task. It must face conflicts of interpretations, diverse criteria, and distinct social and political matrices. When I had decided on that theme more than two years ago, I had no idea how acute it would become for us. Today, the academic freedom and teaching position of one of our most respected members, a former President of our Society and a former John Courtney Murray awardee, is threatened.

This year's theme, "Theology in the North American Context," looks like a different topic, but is not. By pointing out that theology exists in particular historical, social, and political contexts, it raises the theoretical issue of the significance of such contexts for theology itself. In this presidential address I shall, therefore, explore last year's theme, "Theology: Ecclesial and Academic," from this year's perspective, "Theology within the North American Context," and I shall do so from my perspective as a fundamental theologian.

Such a complex topic as "Theology: Ecclesial and Academic" can be approached in many ways. One can approach the topic as the conflict between the

learned or philosophical faith of elite theologians and the simple faith of the multitude of faithful. The problems was so formulated in the early Church, especially in the debates surrounding the School of Alexandria. So formulated, it stresses the tension between the content and images of faith and the conceptual elucidations of these symbols. This basic problem touches on important issues of the relation between symbols and concepts, between religious ideas and social context, and between catechesis and theology.

Recently, a statement directed to theologians in North America compared theologians to "ferocious lions" chewing away at helpless "lambs" ("simple faithful") and argued for the "primacy of the faith of the simple people." Leave aside for now what that image claims about theologians. What does it claim about the faithful? Does not the modern Enlightenment differ from previous Enlightenments in that it has become a general phenomenon? Is is not a decisive characteristic of modernity that learning is becoming increasingly universal? I attend St. Paul's in Cambridge, where many of the Catholic faculty and students of Harvard University also go. Is it justified to refer to these people in the pew as the "simple faithful?" Should not such language be mindful of Schleiermacher's warning: "Shall the tangle of history so unravel that Christianity becomes identified with barbarism and science with unbelief." Do we want to identify faith with simplicity and science with unbelief?

One can also view the problem as the conflict between religious studies and theological studies. Such a view moves the issue beyond the confines of specifically confessional Roman Catholic problem and into a much more general and theoretical problem. It concerns the very disciplinary and academic nature of theology itself. The emergence of religious studies challenges the location of theology within the university. Not theology but only religious studies has its rightful place in a modern university.

I do not agree with such a claim. It underscores a dichotomy where there should be none. A theology, worthy of its salt, takes into account the transcendental and linguistic turn of modern philosophy. Such a theology must analyze its object within the refraction of human language and subjectivity. At the same time, if religious studies is to take into account the nature of religion, then it has to take into account

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the relation between meaning and truth-claim. Religious studies would then have as its method not only explanatory but also hermeneutical modes of analysis.4

One can also approach the problem of the academic and ecclesial dimension of theology as the relation between theology and the magisterium.5 This approach has been well represented, both historically and systematically, in previous papers at our conventions, especially by our ecclesiologists. There is no need for me to repeat the outstanding work of my predecessors on this issue.

These three approaches deal with the theme as the relation between the content of faith and philosophical rationality, between religious and theological studies, between theology and magisterium. Each raises the fundamental problem as to what counts as rationality or as the foundations of theology and what role does a community have in rational justification and in the foundations of theology. The disagreements in each of the three approaches rest upon deeper disagreements about the foundations of theology, the nature of rationality, the conditions of academic disciplines, and the authority of community. Therefore, I shall attempt to address the more general problem of the nature of rationality and the foundations of theology.

In addressing this problem I shall first analyze its emergence within fundamental theology in the nineteenth century in order to show that certain basic assumptions about knowledge and rationality have deeply affected the traditional fundamental theological conception of the ecclesial and academic nature of theology. Then I shall explore some recent discussions of epistemology in North America in order to contrast contemporary conceptions of rationality with those influencing the traditional Roman Catholic formulation of the problem. Finally, I shall outline my view of theology and its foundations.

I. A FALSE ALTERNATIVE: AUTHORITY OF FAITH AND AUTONOMY OF REASON

My first question is: what conception of rationality underlies the conceptions of theology in traditional fundamental theology? How has this conception of theology influenced the understanding of faith and the relation of theology to the academy and to the ecclesial community?

A. Vatican I and the Roman School of Theology

A starting-point for modern Roman Catholic theology can be found within the Roman School of Theology as it has affected Roman Catholic doctrine on the re-


lation between theology as academic and ecclesial at Vatican I. For this purpose the Syllabus of Errors, the writings of Johann Baptist Franzelin, and the Constitution Dei Filius of Vatican I should be examined. We should examine not only their explicit affirmations, but also their implied conceptions of rationality as they affect the foundations of theology.

The Syllabus of Errors is very important for an understanding and interpretation of Vatican I. The papal decision to publish the Syllabus took place at the same time as decision to call the Council. December 6, 1864 was also the date when the pope communicated his decision to call a council and established the first consultation. Quanta Cura dates from December 8, 1864. Cardinal Bilio, the final editor of the Syllabus was the President of the council’s theological preparatory commission. And most importantly, the Syllabus was to serve as the basis for the proposed schemata. Johann Baptist Franzelin, a professor of the Gregorian University, a leader of the Roman School of Theology, is significant because he authored the relevant sections of the council’s constitution. Franzelin had the task of drawing upon the section of two of the Syllabus of Errors of 1864, basically errors 8 to 14 (DS 2908-2914). Whereas section one dealt with pantheism and naturalism, section two, relevant for our purposes, dealt with moderate rationalism.

These errors were not so much about the doctrine of revelation or of faith as about the nature of theology as a science and its theoretical foundation. The Syllabus rejected the opinion that Catholic dogmas could be scientifically understood and evaluated by a philosophy that understood itself to be autonomous and independent of ecclesial authority. Such an opinion (errors 9 to 11) was thought to stem from Froshhammer’s understanding of the nature of theology as an academic discipline.


*DS 2908-2914.

*DS 2850. See the previous papal encyclical Gravissima inter. I cannot discuss here
The *Syllabus* rejects the theological Enlightenment. It interprets this Enlightenment as the attempt to establish religious truth without any acknowledgment of divine or ecclesial authority. The *Syllabus* criticizes those theological positions making a universal and rational philosophy the norm that judges Christian dogmas. It rejects such a view as another affirmation of the possibility of natural religion without divine revelation. Its condemnations imply a specific view of theology: theology is based upon supernatural revelation. This revelation as interpreted by the teaching office of the Roman Catholic Church is the authoritative principle and the foundation of Catholic theology.

**B. Franzelin’s Epistemology:**

*Revelation as Authoritative Foundation*

In drawing on the relevant sections of the *Syllabus*, Franzelin focused the thematic on the epistemological dimension. His votum treats “unice de ordine cognitionis agere propositum sit ac mandatum.” His intention was to develop “hermeneutically, and theologically” the position of the *Syllabus*. In so doing he made the concept of revelation into a central and foundational category of epistemology. Transcendence was viewed as an epistemological transcendence so that revelation became both the ground as well as the means of religious knowledge. Moreover, this epistemological transcendence was located within the analysis of faith.

Franzelin’s theology was caught up within the framework of the very modern rationality which he criticized. In sketching a raster of heresies he points to an absolute opposition between the autonomy of reason, on the one hand, and the belief in the authority of revelation, on the other hand. In his conception, Christian theology has its foundation exclusively from the standpoint of the formal authority of God. Philosophy and science rest on the standpoint of an autonomous

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rationality. Therefore the autonomous rationality of reason and a Christian faith based on authority are contrasted.

If one examines the anti-Christian elements of the Enlightenment within the eighteenth century in distinction to the nineteenth century, one observes that they criticized religion and Christianity as representing an external, particularistic, and authoritarian faith. They contrasted this faith with the internal freedom and autonomy of a universal rationality. The famous chapter of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Spirit* ridicules the Enlightenment for contrasting the particularism of faith with the pure insight. \(^{14}\) Franzelin’s own view maintains the same basic contrast of that version of the Enlightenment, except in contrasting the authority of faith with the autonomy of reason he takes the side of authority and faith.

Franzelin contrasted faith and reason within the analysis of the act of faith. \(^{15}\) Faith is not a way of knowing based upon insight into reasons but has an external foundation. The formal object of faith and the motive of faith lies in the previously acknowledged authority of another. But how does one acknowledge this authority? If through natural human reasons, then the formal object of faith is not the authority and truthfulness of the revealing God, but rather these natural human reasons. If the external signs of credibility alone provided the ground for belief, then the formal object of faith would be a probable practical judgment rather than the authority of the revealing God.

In his analysis Franzelin disagrees with Suarez’s assumption that the authority of God must be believed on its own account. He follows de Lugo in arguing that such an assumption amounts to an infinite regress or a contradiction. Therefore Franzelin follows the path of de Lugo and proposes that the acknowledgment of the authority of God is an immediate certainty that is not naturally produced but is supernaturally given. The act of faith is thereby distinct from the knowledge of the external signs of credibility. It is an act in which these same signs are known as signs of God. The act of faith is given by a revealing and self-testifying God. Therefore, God is not only the material object of the act of faith, but also the principle of the act of faith. The certitude in the act of faith is not a natural certitude, but an immediate supernatural knowledge of certitude. \(^{16}\)

Franzelin’s explication of the ground of faith in the authority and truthfulness of God and independently of human reason leads him to define faith in a way—which for want of a better term—almost claims a ‘‘Cartesian certitude and immediacy for faith.’’ Not only does he define faith formally as well as materially into relation to God, but he modifies the more traditional emphasis on the natural signs of credibility and subordinates them to the *experientia interna* of faith. \(^{17}\) With such a conclusion, faith takes on characteristics of the transcendental description of knowledge. Neo-Scholasticism had criticized the Enlightenment for autonomy,

\(^{14}\) ‘‘Belief and Pure Insight’’ is the title of the subsection of chapter six where Hegel criticizes the Enlightenment for its failure to grasp the particularity of rationality.


\(^{17}\) Walter, *Die Frage*, 170-207.
certitude, and immediacy of its scientific rationality. Franzelin’s description of faith betrays a similar immediacy and certitude. The attempt to base faith upon the truthfulness and authority of a revealing God leads to the subordination of human elements of credibility and interpretation.

C. Common Presupposition: Autonomous Rationality

The neo-Scholastic critique of the theological Enlightenment argued that those theologians seeking to appropriate the Enlightenment shared the epistemological presuppositions of the Enlightenment. George Hermes deliberately makes the starting-point of his theology the methodic doubt of Cartesianism. By taking this starting-point of doubt, he sought to move to the certitude of faith. Anton Günther the most influential German theologian in the nineteenth century sought to relate theology and anthropology within a Cartesian philosophical framework. His student, Johann Nepomenuk Ehrlich, the first holder of a university chair explicitly called “Fundamental Theology,” sought to give this discipline a more “scientific foundation.” He criticized contemporary developments in apologetics and fundamental theology, especially the Tübingen School, for insufficiently grounding the certitude of faith in human subjectivity. He argued that fundamental theology must adequately ground faith and theology in human subjectivity so that fundamental theology could be considered a scientific discipline.

Although one often recalls the neo-Scholastic critique of the Enlightenment, one often forgets the degree to which neo-Scholasticism itself was permeated with the characteristics of the very rationalism that it sought to overcome. Johann Baptist Franzelin is only one example. Joseph Kleutgen, influential as the theologian-author of Aeterni Patris, displays similar characteristics. Most recent interpretations have demonstrated how heavily his theology was indebted to Descartes’s epistemology: the emphasis upon clear and distinct ideas as well as the immediacy of knowledge and certitude.


19 See Günther’s major work Vorschule zur spekulativen Theologie. Two volumes. (Wein, 1828-29; 2nd ed. 1846-48). For the debate between the neo-scholastics and Günther, see Thomas Schäfer, Dei erkenntnis-theoretische Kontroverse Kleutgen-Günther (Paderborn: Schonigh, 1961).

20 See the analysis by Clemens Engling, Dei Bedeutung der Theologie für philosophische Theoriebildung und gesellschaftliche Praxis (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1977) 74-130.

Vatican I sought to justify the Christian faith before the forum of modern reason. This agenda implied an understanding of modern rationality. In important respects, it modified Franzelin’s schema. The very section on the freedom and dignity of science was absent from Franzelin’s schema and was introduced by the council Fathers. Various speeches criticized the schema’s emphasis on the otherwise of faith to science. Yet in many respects what has endured within Roman Catholicism has been a critique of the Enlightenment and a critique of the autonomy of modern rationality. This understanding went across differences of opinion within theology. Yet this modification of the neo-Scholastic attitude did not go far enough and it was only in Vatican II that it in principle was overcome.

Its consequence for theological method still influences us and contemporary debates about the nature of theology and its relation to the community of the Church. The neo-Scholastic emphasis upon revelation and faith in terms of formal authority of revelation and the relation of this authority to the truthfulness of God led to a de-emphasis of the need for interpretation and community. The authority of revelation is an authority that needs to be gained through the interpretation of what is revelation.

A certain tragic irony exists: This neo-Scholasticism sought to emphasize the importance of the community of faith over against an individualistic rationalism. Its goal could be appropriately characterized—to use Cardinal Ratzinger’s recent formulation—“that either theology is within the community of the church or it does not exist at all.” Yet by basing theology primarily upon the supernatural authority of God over and against all human reasoning and by attributing a direct certitude to faith in this authority, it in fact eliminated community. The certitude that the object of belief is true does not rest in what is believed as mediated in and through the community but formally in the authority of God. The acknowledgment in faith of the authority of God becomes an internal experience rather than a theology within a community and of a community.

The challenge of the relation between the rationality of science and the authority of faith remains before us. In his talk at the University of St. Michael’s college, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger repeated the traditional warning against the autonomy of science and stressed the intimate relation between theology and the Church. Yet his talk contained a very nuanced formulated challenge, “In this sense rationality is part of the essence of Christianity and in a way which is claimed by

22 For the interrelation between the epistemological conception of authority and the political concept of authority, see Yves Congar, “L’eclésiologie de la révolution francaise au concile du Vatican, sous le signe de l’affirmation de l’autorité,” in L’eclésiologie au xixe siècle, ed. M. Nedoncelle et al. (Unam Sanctam 34; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1960) 79-114.

23 For the modifications on Franzelin’s proposed schema in regard to the freedom of science, see Pottmeyer, Wissenschaft, 392-431, and in regard to experience, see Walter, Die Frage, 208-47.

no other religion. Whoever would abolish the path of reason would eliminate an indispensable dimension of faith. It is here a frontier is found that the teachings of the Catholic Church must respect as it encounters theology. An influential tradition of Roman Catholic theology has faced the challenge of the Enlightenment, as I have argued, insofar as it distinguished faith and reason primarily by basing faith upon authority. Such an approach leads not only to the elimination of reason but also of community. In even assumes and reverses of Enlightenment critique of religion.

When we as North Americans take up this challenge, we should recall that the critique of Enlightenment has been an enduring tradition of European Roman Catholicism. Originally, the critique of the Enlightenment was not simply a theoretical or rational critique. It was also a political critique. It was a critique of democracy and a defense of political monarchy. It was a critique of the French revolution along with its ideals of freedom, equality, human rights. It was a critique that failed to grasp how these ideals could be democratically realized and did not imply a negation of authority. Only much later and gradually—partially as a result of the success of the political revolutions—did European Roman Catholicism accept the political Enlightenment for the external realm of the state, but not for the internal realm of the Church. Instead the philosophical Enlightenment remained an object of criticism as representing an autonomous rationality. In the United States, where our country was established upon the very rights and freedoms of Enlightenment ideals, we have not experienced this critique of the Enlightenment. In this respect the American situation differs from the European situation, the origin of our declaration of human rights as well as our democratic constitution was rooted in the Enlightenment tradition.

In turning to the North American experience and in asking what it can contribute to the universal Church, I am turning toward an experience that was quite different from the European Roman Catholic experience. Its confrontation with the Enlightenment was not burdened with the political alliance between the Church and monarchical forms of government. The question is whether it too is burdened with a particular conception of rationality that contrasts a faith based on authority and a rationality that was autonomous, presuppositionless, and hostile to authority. It is in this context that I examine the understanding of rationality that has developed within North America.

II. RATIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF NORTH AMERICAN EPISTEMOLOGY

Several developments in the understanding of rationality have taken place within contemporary epistemology. These developments, though recent, are rooted in a long tradition of American conceptions of rational inquiry and experience. The current criticisms of empiricism, logical positivism and scientism grow out

26 See Pottmeyer, Unfehlbarkeit und Souveränität. Cf. also J. Froschammer, Die politische Bedeutung der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes und der Kirche (Munich, 1869, 2nd ed.).
of this tradition and can be grouped under the critique of foundationalism. The development of a post-empirical philosophy of science and a post-formalistic understanding of the logic of rationality are prime examples of these developments. For our purposes, I shall refer first to the critique of foundationalism as well as to developments that set some boundaries of that critique. Then I shall discuss the positive conception of rationality that is the reverse side of the critique of foundationalism.

A. Critique of Scientism and Foundationalism

Many versions of foundationalism exist. Although a simple definition is not readily attainable, one can concur that "the core of foundationalism is a commitment to some special class of beliefs—so-called basic beliefs—from which all justification derives." 28 Many versions of foundationalism go beyond this core. Some argue that foundational beliefs have a justificational status independent of other beliefs; others argue that the basic beliefs have the highest possible justificatory status; and still others argue that foundationalism implies that justification guarantees truth. Richard Rorty even argues that much of epistemology can be reduced to foundationalism so that a refutation of foundationalism is a refutation of the possibility of epistemology. 29

The critique of foundationalism should therefore be nuanced not only by specifying as much as possible the critique itself, but also by explicating the positive conceptions implied in this critique. 30 The critique of foundationalism takes issue with either empirical or transcendental approaches. Both philosophical trends have their correspondence in empirical or transcendental approaches within theology. Therefore the critique of foundationalism directed against a positivistic empiricism and against a transcendental Cartesianism has its implications for fundamental theology. The underdeterminacy of data to theory and the inadequacy of a positivistic conception of science developed within contemporary philosophy by Willard Quine, Wilfred Sellars, Hilary Putnam, and others is relevant to theology. But the philosophical critique of foundationalism is not simply a critique of reductionistic conceptions of rationality. It also offers a constructive vision of rationality. This vision comes to the fore in areas where the critique of foundationalism crisscrosses with European hermeneutical traditions and critical theory. 31 Nevertheless it does offer emphases and perspectives distinct from those of a her-

meneutical tradition, the Wittgensteinian linguistic tradition, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.

1. Myth of the Given. The term "Myth of the Given," coined by Wilfred Sellars, refers to the myth of "the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder—even 'in principle' into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenal or behavioral, public or private." No matter how subjective or hypothetical, this idea is a fallacy akin to what in ethics is called the "naturalistic fallacy." The critique of the "Myth of the Given" is at the same time a critique of the foundationalism.

The critique of foundationalism does not mean that knowledge has no foundations, but rather that the metaphor of foundation is confusing and misleading. The metaphor is misleading. It prevents one from grasping the intertwine between what is given and what is interpreted. For example, in empirical knowledge the metaphor of foundation hinders one from grasping that "if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former." What is at the heart of the critique of this myth is the rejection of all forms of foundationalism, be they empirical or transcendental.

The myth of the given assumes that there can be certain "givens" (either the evidence of empirical facts or of immediate self-consciousness or immediate experience) that are non-inferentially known to be the case so much so that they do not in any way presuppose any other knowledge of facts, experiences, or general truths. The critique of this myth rejects the notion of an isolated apprehension of facts or of immediate experience. Any apprehension of facts and any immediacy of experience depends upon logical as well as interpretative dimensions. Even in granting that interpretation also depends upon facts or introspection, the critique argues that any "looking" or "introspecting" is at the same time dependent upon interpretation and logic. In addition, one can also explicate the critique of "the myth of the given" in distinctly diverse ways. One can point to the logical underdetermination of theory, or to the underdetermination of theory by methodological rules, or to the logical underdetermination of theories despite collective standards.

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3Sellers, Empiricism, 300.

Within contemporary philosophy of science Thomas Kuhn’s theory on the role of paradigms within scientific change exemplifies on the level of the formation of scientific theory an attempt to take the critique of foundationalism seriously. Kuhn’s argument is based on the underdetermination of theory insofar as he claims that in making a choice among the diverse paradigms, the relevant evidence and methodological standards often do not make one paradigm or theory superior to other paradigms due to the following four basic reasons: ambiguity of shared standards, collective inconsistency of rules, shifting standards, and differences in problem weighting.

2. Conceptual Category and Experience. A second discussion within contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between conceptual categories and human language and experience. This discussion counterbalances in part some of the claims made within the critique of foundationalism and within the Kuhnian version of theory formation and change. In “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Donald Davidson criticizes what he calls the third dogma of empiricism (in reference to Willard Quine’s essay on the two dogmas of empiricism). It is really more a Kantian or rationalist doctrine, for what he criticizes is the dualistic distinction between “conceptual scheme” and the “reality” or “content” upon which it is founded.

Since this influential essay has led to diverse appropriations, it is important to nuance both its philosophical significance and its theological relevance. The analysis posits the limits of rationality in a way different from the critique of foundationalism does. The analysis moves in two directions. On the one hand, language about a categorical framework and the translation or non-translation into another categorical framework often falsely assumes that one has a standpoint outside of categorical frameworks by which one can judge the translation or the lack of translation of categorical frameworks. Or, on the other hand, it falsely assumes that viewpoints are incommensurable and therefore no such language is possible.

34Laudan, Sciences and Values, 87-102.
38See Richard Rorty’s more relativistic interpretation of this essay, “The World Well Lost,” in his Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). See the more nuanced comments by Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Also on Davidson, see Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 129-56.
This analysis does not deny that paradigms, conceptual schemes and frameworks organize data. For it observes the intrinsic relation between conceptual framework as interpretative of reality and the linguistic framework expressing such relationships. It is therefore equally wrong to assume such total independence from language or reality so that incommensurability or interchangeability results.

The separation of the conceptual category from its content is prevalent in several theological moves that are made today. One common theological conviction affirms that the dogmas remain the same but the categories in which they are expressed can be changed. Another affirmation, in some approaches to the history of religions, affirms that the diverse religions are distinct conceptual categories of the one basic religious experience. One such approach even goes so far as to affirm that the structural, transcendental, functional similarity of this underlying experience allows one to call others "anonymous Christians" despite the diversity of the conceptual categories used to express their religiosity. Another common theological conviction affirms an underlying experience or function present in diverse credal or doctrinal formulations of Christian belief. The doctrine of two natures and one person becomes translated into a consciousness Christology in the nineteenth century or into a relational Christology of the twentieth century. The metaphysical categories are exchanged (substantial, consciousness or relational) but the identity of content is retained. Such appropriations of the notion of conceptual categories enables one to affirm a foundational unity despite diversity of categories.

Such affirmations are made too easily. They assume an independent common core that remains through all changes of conceptual schemes. If the conceptual scheme changes, then the meaning changes. Consequently when new conceptual frameworks exist and interpret reality, they cannot be simply reduced to a rational core underlying the diverse conceptual categories. Such a view would be a foundational rationalistic myth that would avoid the problems of the incommensurability of diverse categories.

At the same time the analysis also criticizes much of the language about the incommensurability of diverse categorical frameworks. Such language is contradictory. To assert that our categorical frameworks are radically other from past categorical frameworks also presupposes a standard or place outside of the categorical frameworks by which such a judgment can be known. If categorical frameworks are so incommensurable how is language about them possible? It is therefore necessary to critique not only a rationalistic foundationalism, but also assertions of absolute relativity. In this way the critique of foundationalism is further extended insofar as a transcendental foundationalism is criticized. But in this way boundaries are also placed on the critique of foundationalism through the critique of affirmations of absolute incommensurability. The ability to translate from one epoch to another epoch becomes a challenge that cannot be met either by a transcendental denial of all incommensurability nor by a relativistic affirmation of absolute incommensurability.41

In my opinion, these current reflections on the significance of conceptual categories do not reject the significant Kantian insight, correctly interpreted, into the significance of categories in organizing of experience. They do, however, challenge the rationalist assumption of a common core underlying those categories or the relativistic assumption of the radical incommensurability of diverse categories. These reflections pose the problem of foundations in terms of the acknowledgment of the interrelation between perceptions of reality, language, and conceptual frameworks. The distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content faces the problem of avoiding rationalistic and relativistic assumptions prevalent in fundamental theology. The former, in a transcendental fundamental theology that assumes the identity beneath conceptual diversity; the latter, in an historicist fundamental theology that grasps only the incommensurability of historical periods.

3. Conflation of Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity. This heading refers to the important work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam in regard to reference and truth and the attendant development of a causal theory of reference with a new conception of necessity. In this theory both argue that reference is not fixed by associating definite descriptions with terms of names, but rather by a historical chain of use. There is a social cooperation in the fixing of reference even though all the speakers who use the term do not have one definite description. The significance of this theory of reference is manifold. Insofar as it rejects that proper names and natural kind names are synonymous with definite descriptions or conjunctions or criteria it seeks to rehabilitate “the notion that things and kinds have essences that there are characteristics that something must have to be the thing (or the sort of thing) that it is while freeing that notion from connection with apriori epistemology.”

Kripke suggests that the traditional idea that science discovers necessary truth and the essence of things is in an important sense true. But what is wrong is that

42Unfortunately, Kant has been traditionally misinterpreted in much of Anglo-Saxon literature; for a nuanced interpretation see Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
45Hilary Putnam’s is in some respects similar to Kripke’s, has a more historicist rather than essentialist turn and emphasizes an “internal realism” over the realistic implications of Kripke; see the last two volumes of his collected essays, Mind, Language, and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Realism and Reasons. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
46Putnam, Realism and Reasons 75.
47Ibid., 17.
48Ibid., 74.
epistemic and metaphysical necessity was considered to be apriori true, whereas a posteriori knowledge was considered contingent. Kripke claims that once one has discovered the composition of water in the actual world to be \( H_2O \), one refuses to call hypothetical substances of a different composition water. Putnam suggests that one might be better of suggesting they be thought of as paradigms or stereotypes that others must resemble.

Hilary Putnam develops the implications of this theory of reference for rationality. In his own words: "the actual natural of the paradigms enters into fixing reference, and not just the concepts in our heads." Consequently he points out, "The change of historical transmissions which preserve the reference of a proper name in the Kripke theory is another form of social cooperation in the fixing of reference. The idea that the extensions of our terms are fixed by collective practices and not by concepts in our individual heads is a sharp departure from the way meaning has been viewed ever since the seventeenth century."

These analyses place boundaries around the critique of foundationalism to the extent that they point to empirical necessities or rigid designators that arise through empirical investigation and not simply apriori. Not only do they undercut the critique of the naturalistic fallacy within ethics, but they also refer to the importance of rigid designators of identification. The actual nature of the particular things serving as paradigms of the references becomes central to designation and extension. What we call "Christian" is in part dependent on the origin of what has been historically and originally called Christian and upon what is taken to be Christian. This insight places limits on critiques of the foundationalism.

The critique of positivism and foundationalism within contemporary philosophical discussion raises the question of criteria and the issue of relativism. The two boundaries can be interpreted as modifications of critique of foundationalism and scientism that still takes that critique seriously. This critique challenges not only traditional conceptions of rationality but also liberal nineteenth-century versions of rationality just as it challenges traditional as well as nineteenth-century version of the theological task based upon a foundational conception of rationality, either empirical or transcendental. However this critique of foundational rationality is not just a critique, but also offers a new vision of rationality—that needs to be explicated.

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49 Ibid., 53-58.
50 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 64; Putnam, Realism and Reasons 46-48.
52 Putnam, Realism and Reasons, 75.
54 Putnam, Realism and Reasons, 75.
B. Vision of Rationality: Community and Practice

The converse side of this critique is a vision of rationality. One that moves away from understanding rationality as autonomous, neutral, and individualistic. Instead it relates rationality to praxis, tradition, and norms, and community in a way that constitutes new vision of rationality.

1. Rationality and Practice. Several distinct traditions have developed dealing with the relation between rationality and practice: hermeneutic, Marxist, linguistic, and pragmatic. These traditions differ and have diversely influenced current theological directions. A comparison will profile the specific North American tradition of relating rationality and practice.

The pragmatic tradition originated in Peirce’s appeal to practice as a means of clarifying ideas. Peirce inquired into how we clarify our beliefs, we solve problems, and justify our inferences. His analysis anticipated by almost a century the critique of the “myth of the given.” His analysis found wanting the approaches of radical doubt, certitude of the cogito, clear and distinct ideas, introspection—all actual starting points of the foundational theological endeavors of nineteenth century. In rejecting both intuitive cognition and immediate self-consciousness, Peirce argued that beliefs are distinguished, specified, or identified by the modes of action to which they give rise. What distinguishes this tradition from the other traditions is its non-foundationalism that extends even to practice.

The hermeneutical tradition distinguishes strongly between the interpretation of human cultural expressions and the study of nature. It makes the interpretation of texts paradigmatic and displays affinities with humanities and literary interpretation. Within the hermeneutical tradition, practice is primarily the prudential appropriation of texts to the present situation. Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory attributes to the classics of human culture an authority or epistemic privilege. One appeals to the classic not to question it, but rather to allow it to question us. The result is a prudential appropriation that broadens the horizons of our experience.

The Marxist tradition has the opposite emphasis. It stresses not only the necessity of ordering theory to practice as in Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach

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56I have developed the differences among these four traditions in a forthcoming essay in *Theological Education* (1987).


58For an analysis of the differences between the hermeneutical tradition (Schleiermacher) and the pragmatic tradition (Peirce), see Wayne Proudfoot, *Religious Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 41-74.

that urges philosophers not only to interpret the world, but also to change it.\textsuperscript{60} But it also relates human praxis to the critique of ideology. It attributes an epistemic privilege to the proletariat, which in contemporary language is called the hermeneutical privilege of the oppressed. A particular practice has a foundational privilege over and against the bourgeois classic and enables a critique of the ideological distortions within classics. It is within liberation theology today that this epistemic privilege of praxis has been most forcibly articulated.\textsuperscript{61}

A tradition of linguistic philosophy also grants an epistemic and foundational privilege to practice. Wittgenstein locates practice within a language game and its corresponding form of life. Questions of justification arise only within the framework of linguistic practices and cannot be resolved apart from them.\textsuperscript{62} George Lindbeck's development of a cultural-linguistic approach to religion appropriates this.\textsuperscript{63} It attributes an epistemic privilege to the practice within a particular religious cultural-linguistic framework. This approach raises the question about the legitimacy of the search for foundations outside of that religious cultural-linguistic framework.\textsuperscript{64}

In pointing to a North American tradition and epistemology of relating theory and praxis, I am appealing to a tradition that has developed the philosophical critique of foundationalism.\textsuperscript{65} In this tradition practice and interpretation are related as follows: Interpretation goes beyond experience to the degree that interpretations can never be adequately justified or grounded by experience. Practice often answers the question: how can one know whether the interpretation or the theory that one has adopted is an adequate interpretation of experience? One must act upon the theory, one must test the hypotheses in the reality of practice. This practice is a new experience requiring assessment and further interpretation. In the course of

\textsuperscript{60}See Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" in 


\textsuperscript{62}For the difference between Wittgenstein and the pragmatic tradition, see Robin Haack, "Wittgenstein's Pragmatism," \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly} 19 (1982) 163-71.


\textsuperscript{65}Fiorenza, \textit{Foundational Theology}. Gordon D. Kaufman, \textit{The Theological Imagination. Constructing the Concept of God} (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981) and \textit{Theology for a Nuclear Age} (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985) relies not only on the distinction between God and the world along the lines of H. Richard Niebuhr, but also on the tradition of philosophical pragmatism for the development of criteria within theology.
interpreting new observations and experiences, the theory is developed and extended.

This perspective, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, shows that a significant interrelation exists between the hermeneutical retrieval of a religious tradition and practice as a retroductive warrant that characterizes the distinctiveness of religious tradition. On the one hand, practice as a retroductive warrant provides a testing ground for the intelligibility and veracity of a religious tradition. On the other hand, what constitutes successful and fertile practice is in part determined by the meaning of the religious tradition. One must avoid a foundationalism of practice as if practice itself were a non-epistemic criterion or non-hermeneutical datum. Practice itself is epistemic and in need of interpretation.

The complexity of religious belief and practice is such that, on the one hand, practice serves as a criterion by which the tradition is judged and assessed. New practice leads to new insights into what is considered the essence or the paradigm of the tradition. Consequently, one cannot simply apriori determine the essence or paradigm of a tradition and apply it. Instead practice also contributes to the specification of what is essential or paradigmatic of the tradition. On the other hand, this tradition mutually interacts with practice as a means of interpreting practice. Such method requires a broad reflective equilibrium of diverse elements. As a part of this broad reflective equilibrium, it is necessary to consider the two other aspects of rationality.  

2. Rationality and Regulative Norms. This tradition understands rationality not as static but as changing. As Peirce has noted, an adequate account of rational inquiry has to take into account the norms that serve as the regulative and the critical ideals of such inquiry. Contemporary discussions of rationality have developed this insight in several ways. Some have argued that concrete paradigms have influenced methodic canons and norms. Others have argued that the methods of inquiry themselves have grown and that new styles of rationality have built upon old styles and that there is a long term setting into a “rationality” of accumulated modes of thinking.

66Compare Fiorenza, Foundational Theology and Dennis P. McCann/Charles R. Strain, Polity and Praxis. A Program for American Practical Theology (Minneapolis MN: Winston, 1984). Whereas the notion of reflective equilibrium emphasizes that not only narrow reflective equilibrium but also retroductive warrants and background theories enter into the specification of considered judgments about the essence of Christianity, McCann/Strain approach the essence purely from an evolving historical approach along the lines of Ernst Troeltsch.


These discussions have not resulted in a complete consensus. As a minimum consensus one could state that rationality is not an abstract universal. Instead, the history of rational inquiry has sensitized us to be aware of the degree to which rationality depends upon concrete paradigms, norms, and standards. To understand the history of other cultures it does not suffice simply to apply our canons of rationality. One has also to grasp the canons of rationality implicit within these other historical periods and cultures.

Beyond this minimum consensus, diversity exists. On the one hand, the incommensurability thesis stresses the incommensurability of different frameworks and scientific progress appears almost like revolution or a radical religious conversion. On the other hand, a progressive thesis speaks of a progress in rationality and thereby seeks to overcome the incommensurability. In my opinion the most fruitful approach seeks to describe rationality in relation to "limit rationality." Such an approach takes into account the changing styles of rationality without falling into incommensurability. By positing rationality as a limit conception it avoids both incommensurability as well as progressivism. Yet it is not enough to limit rationality but it is also necessary to bring rationality into relation to a community—our next consideration.

3. Rationality and Community. In North America the relation between community and rationality has a long history. Both Charles Peirce and Josiah Royce have stressed the role of community as a community of interpretation not only of tradition, but also of signs. The logic of inquiry also involves a community of scholars. Within recent philosophy of science the role of community has been underscored in the change of paradigms within science. In recent epistemology, one has appealed to community in order to resolve the problem of skepticism.

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Or one has appealed to a community of conversation to overcome the limitations of objectivism and relativism.\textsuperscript{74}

The pragmatic tradition has emphasized much more than the hermeneutical tradition the role of the community in the logic of belief. Peirce has often been quoted—and criticized—for his claim: “Thus the very origin of the conception of reality shows that his conception essentially involves the notion of a community without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in knowledge. And so those two series of cognition—the real and the unreal—consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions will ever after be denied.”\textsuperscript{75} Many critics have trouble with this claim because “they do not for a moment take seriously that Peirce held an Established (and powerful) Church to be a very good way to fix beliefs.”\textsuperscript{76}

But this emphasis upon community is a consequence of the critique of foundationalism for rationality. The community comes to play a role in several ways: It is not simply the settling of the community into the agreed upon conclusions of the practiced deductions, inductions, and hypothesizing. Instead there is an evolving understanding of what constitutes appropriate methods of inquiry and justification as well as the setting in the approximation of the result of the evolving method of inquiry.

This interrelation between practice and the community of inquiry counters the emphasis on practice, a bare evidential or foundational criterion for truth, as if practice were not in itself in need of interpretation and assessment. The emphasis on practice in contemporary theology often replaces an empirical or transcendental foundationalism with a foundationalism based upon practice. Such a foundationalism of practice fails to see that practice is intertwined with logical, evaluative and interpretive dimensions.\textsuperscript{77}

In a similar fashion my stress that practice and community be viewed within the limits of rationality and the evolving canons of methodic reflectivity seeks to counter the completely relativistic interpretation of rationality as extrinsic: reason is what takes place in contemporary conversation and is what we agree upon. Within North American philosophy, a tradition from James and Dewey to Richard Rorty gives a primacy to the role of conversation, whereas another tradition from Charles S. Peirce to Hilary Putnam stresses not only conversation, but the requirements of method and logic.

My emphasis on broad equilibrium sought to explicate this second strain of North American philosophy. A broad reflective equilibrium includes not only the hermeneutical reconstruction of tradition’s essential paradigms and not only the

\textsuperscript{74}Richard J. Bernstein, \textit{Beyond Objectivism}, especially the introduction.


\textsuperscript{76}Ian Hacking, \textit{Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 59.

retroductive warrants from contemporary experience and practice, but also the relevant background theories that express the evolving and normative canons of reflective method. The conception of reflective equilibrium attempts to bring to consideration practice as retroductive warrants and norms of rationality as background theories. It relates these to each other and to the community’s tradition of beliefs through discourse and dialogue.  

C. Conclusion: Contrasting Conceptions of Rationality

The critique of foundationalism and the emphasis upon practice, changing standards, and community represents a vision of rationality quite distinct from the emphasis in the Roman School on the autonomy, neutrality, and individuality of rationality. The nineteenth-century view of knowledge and science as aiming at certainty has given way to a new view. Empiricists and rationalists had then agreed that knowledge was certain and incorrigible despite disagreements about the attainment of such knowledge. Their agreement had been based upon a classic conception of theoretical rationality, prevalent from Aristotle onward, that identified rationality with what is demonstrable, certain, and autonomous.

The North American vision sees science and rationality as less certain and more fallible. Charles Peirce has argued that this shift from an infallibilist ideal of science with its quest for certainty to a thoroughgoing fallibilism constitutes one of the watersheds in the history of scientific philosophy. Such fallibilism constitutes a profound epistemic revolution. It also provides the context in which we must undertake the fundamental theological task. In this context, the alternative between an autonomous rationality based upon individual certitude and a religious faith based on a communal authority is a false alternative.

III. THEOLOGY AND CHURCH IN FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

The analyses of the critique of foundationalism and of the relation of rationality to practice, norms, and community sets the challenge for fundamental theology within the North American context. A fundamental theological approach to the central historical events of Christianity needs to take into account this critique of foundationalism and this vision of rationality.

A. Foundations of Theology

1. Foundational Historical Events. Such a fundamental theology does not view Christianity’s originating historical events as non-epistemic facts or non-interpreted data. On the contrary the central foundational events of Christianity, such as the foundation of the Church by Jesus, the resurrection of Jesus, Petrine ministry, mission of the Church, are not self-evident data nor in themselves meaningful events. Their nature as event is dependent upon their interpretation and meaning. What counts as Church? What does origin or foundation of Church mean? What is the nature of resurrection if it is not simply to be identified with resuscitation?

78For the significance of background theories within the concept of broad reflective equilibrium, see Norman Daniels, “On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics,” *Philosophical Studies* 37 (1980) 21-36.
These questions cannot be answered apart from the interpretative question of their meaning. Any fundamental theological discussion of the historical origins of Christianity is necessarily caught up in the interpretation of the nature of Christianity.\textsuperscript{79}

One cannot simply approach the origins of Christianity with a contrast between an autonomous rationality, on the one hand, and a faith in the truthfulness of the formal authority of a revealing God, on the other. The foundational revelatory events are themselves epistemic and a part of the identity to be ascertained by interpretation within a community of discourse. The "critique of the myth of the given" is relevant to a community’s foundational scriptures, creeds, liturgical prayers, conciliar decisions, for they are foundational not as non-epistemic data, but rather as objects of the community’s interpretation in a twofold manner.

Traditionally, theology attributes foundational importance to the Scriptures because they contain divine revelation. Yet divine revelation is not a non-epistemic fact.\textsuperscript{80} To the extent that the Scriptures are an interpretation of revelation they provide primarily interpreted data. Consequently one cannot appeal to inipissima verba, historical events, or biblical narrative accounts as sets of first principles, but rather as interpretations and descriptions. Theological interpretation entails the contemporary attempt of the community to interpret the meaning of the originating interpretations of the earliest communities. Scriptures have authority not insofar as they themselves are devoid of a community’s interpretations of its reflective identity and history but precisely insofar as it expresses.\textsuperscript{81}

The task of fundamental theology is to produce a non-foundational approach precisely to the foundational significance of the Scriptures. It does so insofar as it takes seriously the formation of the Scriptures as the expression of a community’s discourse and reflection to elaborate its identity. This question of identity makes it fruitful to bring to the fore the importance of the reflections on historical testimony\textsuperscript{82} and contingent necessity of originating identity.\textsuperscript{83} The testimony of the Scriptures is both a manifestation and proclamation of identity that displays historically the contingent necessary identity rather than a transcendental universal ground of ecclesial existence.

\textsuperscript{79}Fiorenza, \textit{Foundational Theology}, 29-45, 108-72 for the issues of resurrection and foundation of the Church.

\textsuperscript{80}For a nuanced theological analysis of revelation from the perspective of the critique of foundationalism and the myth of the given, see Ronald F. Thiemann, \textit{Revelation and Theology. The Gospel as Narrated Promise} (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1985).


\textsuperscript{82}See the appropriation of Paul Ricoeur’s notion of testimony in my analysis of the resurrection, \textit{Foundational Theology} 29-33.

\textsuperscript{83}See my above analysis of the relevance of Saul A. Kripke’s work. For literature, see above fn. 44. However, I should note that this position has not gone uncriticized. See Nathan U. Salmon, \textit{Reference and Essence} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
2. Foundational Experience. The critique of foundationalism also affects the appeal to transcendental or to phenomenological interpretation of experience as the foundation of theology. Within contemporary American theology, the reliance upon experience is sometime suggested as the American contribution to theology. Obviously one can refer to Edwards, Bushnell, and Emerson and one can argue for what Richard Niebuhr’s “experiential religion.”

Obviously there are refinements within the American tradition of the conceptions of experience in diverse European movements, e.g., Pietism, Methodism, Moravianism or in diverse theological schools, Schleiermacher or the Erlangen School.

Yet the critique of empiricism and foundationalism constitutes a critique of any appeal to experience as non-epistemic or non-hermeneutical, for it shows the linguistic entanglement of experience and the relation between communal practices and experience. As a fundamental theologian, one cannot unambiguously appeal to experience. The linguisticity of experience and even dependencies of direct references of names and to objects of natural kinds depends upon communal practices. Our language of reference is as dependent upon descriptive entities as it is dependent upon communal practices. In this way the theological appeal to experience as a criterion is not an appeal to what is evidential above communal practices of meaning.

Therefore not just the historical foundations but also contemporary experience entails a community of discourse and practice. Experience takes place within communities of discourse and practice. Major shifts are taking place within contemporary experiences because of the broadening of the community of experiences. Not just male experience, but female experience is entering into the discourse of the community. Not just the rich, but also the poor. To the extent that the community of discourse becomes broadened, to that extent what constitutes contemporary experience is broadened. Since the logic of experience is in part dependent upon the community discourses explicating that experience, appeals to experience necessarily involve appeals to communities of discourse.

3. Canons of Rationality and Reflective Equilibrium. The description of the limits of rationality indicated that rationality does not simply have an abstract transcultural structure but instead has diverse paradigms, changing standards, distinct norms of argumentation. These concrete paradigms and standards specify rationality. These changing methods constitute the criteriological level of scientific discourse and set the standards for changes in views.

As an example, one should compare the use of Scripture in the controversial theology following the period of the reformation and counter-reformation and in

86For the important question of how changes take place in our beliefs and convictions, see Gilbert Harman, *Change in View. Principles of Reasoning* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1986).
contemporary ecumenical discussions.\textsuperscript{87} Within controversial theological literature one quoted different scriptural texts as loci of authority in the argumentation with theological opponents. Today, one may also argue from Scripture but the argument is much more complex than the appeal to loci. One has to take into account the historical and social context of the text; one has to take into account form critical and redaction historical elements; one has to take into account the overall rhetorical argument or narrative structure of the text itself, and one has to take into account the history of the text’s reception by audiences.

The appeal to Scripture as central remains constant. What has changed is the canon of rationality according to which Scripture functions within theological discourse. This canon of rationality is in part developed in a community of scholarship in relation to developments in other communities of scholarships. The developments taking place today in the interchange between liberal arts and biblical scholarship is in many ways parallel to earlier exchanges, e.g., the influence of developments in the liberal arts in eleventh century upon theological modes of interpretation.

Allow me to emphasize that such changes of standards do not necessarily entail options for one concrete theological position over another. Instead they describe the concrete paradigms, norms, and limits of argumentation. An example was last year’s spectacle on the occasion of the pope’s visit to Holland. It was reported that he had allegedly claimed that women could not be ordained because they were not at the Last Supper. Others replied that he was wrong because John’s Gospel does place them at the Last Supper at Bethany. The level of such an argument on both sides is inadequate. If the pope had indeed made such a statement, his statement would be inadequate, not because one might disagree with his position, but because the canons of intelligible discourse have changed. He would have had to argue not simply from the Last Supper or the facticity of a tradition, but have had to argue for a religious identity even considering, in possible social and cultural condition, diverse anthropological background theories about the nature of the sexes, etc. Appeals to symbolism would have to take into account the semiotic understanding of the relation between symbols and their reception.

A logic of argumentation exists. This logic of rationality is neither static nor autonomous but is intertwined with the history, norms, and paradigms of concrete communities. Rationality does not depend only upon the transcendental subjectivity of an individual, but depends upon communities of discourse. Such an interdependence between the logic of rationality and communities of discourse dethrones an abstract autonomous rationality. It locates rationality historically within a community of discourse and points to the intrinsic relation between criteria of good theology and communities of discourse.

\textbf{B. Criteria of Good Theology: A Thought Experiment}

Allow me as a thought experiment to ask the question: how does the pope do good theology? How does the pope judge a theological essay that he is writing to be good theology? Assume he is not simply repeating a past statement but that he

\textsuperscript{87}For a survey of even of diverse contemporary appeals to the scriptures as authoritative, see David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).
is faced with a problem that raises different questions in a distinct context than his predecessor faced. I ask this question because too often within Roman Catholicism one receives as an answer: A theologian does good theology when he does his theology in obedience or in conformity with the magisterium, especially the magisterium of the Bishop of Rome. In no way do I want to deny the significance of that statement. It is the tradition within Roman Catholicism that local churches be in communion with the church of Rome and that local theology be in communion with the teaching of Rome. But what constitutes good theology when the Bishop of Rome is genuinely involved in theological reflection? How does the pope do good fundamental theology?

The vision of rationality implied in the critique of foundations and the relation of rationality to tradition, practice, standards, and community has several consequences. First, in appealing either to church tradition or to contemporary experience, a pope sensitive to the critique of foundationalism would have to be aware that he cannot appeal to these as if there were non-epistemic facts. The tradition as well as experience is in need of interpretation. What did the New Testament, Chalcedon, Trent, or Vatican I affirm? These are not non-epistemic facts that can simply be appealed to. But they represent interpretative data, are indeed interpretations and in need of interpretation. Each of these represents interpretations within certain categorical frameworks that may indeed be "rigid designators" of the Christian identity, they cannot be simply reduced to some different category or translation. Attempts of translations involve appeals to other categories.

In addition, he should also take into account the normative accounts of the present theological disciplines within the community of inquiry. For example, when I began to study Christology, scholars emphasized the one-sidedness of an Alexandrian reception of Chalcedon. Today, careful analysis of the drafting committee’s work at Chalcedon has advanced a more Cyrillian interpretation of Chalcedon. A serious retrieval of Chalcedon would have to take into account the diverse interpretations of Chalcedon. Today the study of New Testament scholarship has advanced so that form-criticism and redaction criticism has even found its place within Vatican II’s Constitution on Revelation. Could one appeal to Matthew 16 in a theological argument without any reference to the relevant form-critical and redactional historical issues—not to mention some of the more recent methodic advances? An interpretation that completely bypasses all of these issues and simply refers to the text as an isolated quotation or *ipsissima verba* would fail to meet the normative canons of interpretation within the present community of inquiry.

If he would attempt to relate contemporary experience, he would immediately face the complex problem that contemporary experience does not exist as non-epi-
istic evidence, but as a mediated and interpreted datum. The present pope comes out of a particular phenomenological tradition that is very specifically anti-historicist in its philosophical orientation. Would his very own attempt to articulate contemporary experience need to reflect on the degree to which his own philosophical orientation might influence his own interpretation of this experience and should only with limitation be advanced as a universal interpretation of experience? The charism of the papacy does not exclude that such critical self-reflections needs to be exercised. Insofar as reflection takes place within the categories of languages, he needs to be aware of the degree to which his theological reflection expresses particular linguistic and categorical frameworks. To the degree that he wishes to address to diverse Christian communities, he needs to avoid a foundational fallacy in regard to his own experiential and linguistic frameworks.

To sum up this thought experiment in my own terminology: To do good theology the pope would have to arrive at a prudential judgment involving a broad reflective equilibrium among several diverse criteria. He would have to offer an interpretation of what counts as the normative and paradigmatic within the tradition for the theological question; his interpretation would also have to be aware of relevant background theories and what counts as normative status of an issue or appropriate methods; and finally, he would have to relate his interpretation to contemporary experience in a creative and fruitful manner.

Each of these elements is not simple but is epistemic and is interpretive. His theological reflection is dependent upon the community of scholarship in its long history of research into the interpretation of tradition. Likewise a community of scholarship has a tradition of what constitutes the level of argumentation so that even disagreements should take these standards of argumentation into account. His appeal or communication to contemporary experience would have to face, even when disagreeing, alternative accounts of contemporary experience. In short, each of these three elements (interpretation of the tradition, background standards of scholarship, and contemporary practice and experience) have a relation to a community of discourse and inquiry.

C. Church As A Community Of Discourse And Practice

In emphasizing the importance of discourse and practice for the discovery of truth, one also stresses the importance of the community for Roman Catholic fundamental and systematic theology. I would like, as a conclusion to my talk and to the thought-experiment, to re-examine the traditional relation between fundamental and systematic theology with reference to the notion of community of inquiry that I have developed.

If one examines the relationship between fundamental and systematic theology within classic treatments or the modern textbook tradition, one learns that fundamental theology has the task of proving the truth of Christianity and in particular the legitimacy of the magisterium of the Church. Systematic theology has the task of explicating the truth as taught by the Church's magisterium. Within that conception of the relation between fundamental and systematic theology, the Church as the community of believers manifest in the magisterium belongs to what could be called the logic of justification rather than to the logic of discovery.
The role of the community within the logic of the discovery of the truth is not in the center of discussion. How the magisterium exercises theological reflection for the sake of discovering and interpreting truth is not discussed. What constitutes the criteria by which beliefs are translated into present experience—keeping in mind the inseparability of categorical scheme and content? These are important issues.

Fundamental theology is not just an academic discipline that demonstrates its truth historically and through the arguments of respective disciplines. Such a conception of its task would down play the importance of the community as the locus of faith, inquiry, and discourse. Just as the converse is also true: the teaching office of the Church should not be isolated from the academic teaching discourse. This latter point has been elaborated in a previous presidential address which, in line with the historical research of Yves Congar and M. D. Chenu, has underscored the complementarity between a pastoral teaching role and an academic teaching role within the community of the church.90

My reflections on the broad reflective equilibrium between hermeneutical reconstruction of identity, background theories, and contemporary practice raise the question: How does the Church ascertain and assert its identity within contemporary reflection and practice? The answer is: It does so as a community of faith and discourse seeking to interpret its identity in its tradition, norms, and practice. But who belongs to a faith-community of interpretation? Should not the voice of theologians also have some weight in the interpretation of identity? In the sixteenth century, the Dominican General, Cardinal Juan de Torquemada defended in his Summa de ecclesia the ecclesial magisterium and the infallibility of the Roman Bishop in matters of faith. He lists eight Catholic truths. On the fourth place are the decisions of Councils, on the fifth place, the decisions of the apostolic see, and on the sixth the teachings of the theologians in the universal Church.91 Although his Summa de ecclesia in 1563 contributed strongly to the authority of the papal teaching authority and was influential in the anti-conciliarist movement, his statement treats the community of theologians with more respect than the recent comparison of theologians with lions chewing the bloodied "simple faithful."

D. Conclusion

In conception of rationality that acknowledges the importance of historical community and tradition, rationality does not appear as an autonomous reason in contrast to community, tradition, authority, and faith. Instead, what comes to the


fore in this interpretation is that the vision of rationality in which the necessity of historical identity is linked with the constant interpretation of that identity through discussion. It belongs to the mission of the North American Church as a church within the context of a nation with a positive relation to the Enlightenment and to a scientific rationality that is not autonomous but is self-correcting that it allows for this self-correction to take place within community of public discourse at the intersection between tradition and practice. Within such a community of faith, faith is not what is threatened by discourse on historical identity of one’s tradition, but is open to it because it is a faith not only with belief and wisdom, but also with hope and love.

In addressing the topic “Theology: Academic and Ecclesial” I have argued that the North American vision of rationality dethrones a conception of science as autonomous, neutral, independent of a community of discourse and practice. The alternative between faith as authoritative and rationality as autonomous is a false alternative. A community of discourse is necessary not only for the justification but also for the discovery and interpretation of truth. Such a community of discourse entails that theology be done not as an isolated academic discipline but as a discipline within and for a community of faith. But it also requires that the community of faith be a community of open and free discourse. Truth is achieved not by administratively eliminating discourse, but by entering into discourse. Therefore, as your President during the past year I have urged the Congregation of the Doctrine on Faith and the American bishops to allow Father Charles Curran to continue to teach and to preach within our community of faith and at The Catholic University of America.92

FRANCIS SCHÜSSLER FIORENZA
The Catholic University of America

92 After the annual meeting, the Congregation of Faith rejected the compromise that would have allowed Father Charles Curran to teach in the theology department, but not those limited areas of dissent. It declared him not competent to teach Catholic theology. At the same time the bishops of the Board of Trustees granted tenure to another faculty member only on the condition that he modify and change in writing several of his previous statements. These included whether the Catholic Church’s refusal to ordain women could be considered a discrimination of women and whether first communion should be received before first penance. Such procedures rely more on administrative force than on the authority of persuasive communication to proclaim truth.