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does not mean that God plans everything in advance, as if God were merely a bigger and better secondary cause.

Several issues were raised in discussion. Noting that there are other modes of causality, one questioner asked Bracken whether his understanding of causality was not "pathologically univocal." Another cited the Pauline elements of Aquinas's thought to argue that Aquinas was not a strict determinist. In addition, could not the notion of concurrence, as the movement of the Holy Spirit, be a resource for a Whiteheadian? With regard to the experience of evil and suffering, one participant observed that an initial anguish over questions of efficient causality can, over time, give way to a more tenable understanding of "sustaining" causality, possibly articulated with process thought's notion of the divine lure. Asked to identify precisely his problem with Johnson's approach, Bracken answered that his problem was that he found the Thomistic system, as he reads it, to be logically flawed. This response led another to suggest that the real sticking point in the discussion concerned the relationship between philosophy and theology: Johnson seems to have theology in control of the categories, Bracken seems to give philosophy and logic the first and last word. The discussion closed with two caveats: one questioned whether the systems proposed ignored that there must be an asymmetry in the divine-world relationship; another advised an "epistemic humility," citing Catherine LaCugna's foregrounding of the economic over the immanent Trinity.

Dallavalle conducted a short business meeting at the end of the session, requesting the names of possible members for a panel discussion on the immanent-economic distinction at next year's annual meeting.

NANCY A. DALLAVALLE
Fairfield University
Fairfield, Connecticut

RENAISSANCE/MODERN THEOLOGY

Topic: Romano Guardini's Theological Anthropology
Convener: Bradford E. Hinze, Marquette University
Presenter: Robert A. Krieg, University of Notre Dame
Respondent: William Madges, Xavier University, Cincinnati

Romano Guardini (1885–1968), was a Catholic priest and professor of the philosophy of religion and the Catholic world view at the universities of Berlin, Tübingen, and Munich. But more than that, he was a public intellectual, whose numerous writings on the human person, liturgy and the spiritual life, and Christology reached wide audiences during the second and third quarters of this century. Robert Krieg initiated his reflections on this figure by posing the question
whether Guardini is best understood as a forerunner of the Second Vatican Council or a restorationist theologian. Krieg’s concern is that recently selected works by Guardini, his devotional writings and his critique of modernity, have been reprinted and commended by some theologians, without sufficient contextualization and discriminating evaluation. This must be corrected by appreciating Guardini’s writings as they are responding to facets of this contentious period in the history of the Church and Germany. Moreover, Guardini’s theology, shaped by the impulses of phenomenology and personalism, established him as a key catalyst preparing the way for Vatican II. But his work has limitations that must likewise be acknowledged; for example, his Christology suffers from limited use of modern interpretation of biblical materials. Still meriting attention is the one leitmotif that runs through his work from *The Church and the Catholic* (1922) and *The World and the Person* (1939) to *Power and Responsibility* (1951): the human person can only discover his or her identity and freedom in God. Such a theonomous existence enables the human person to resist totalitarian heteronomy and individualistic autonomy. Thus, in personalist idiom and with existentialist realism, Guardini encouraged opposition both to the authoritarianism of Hitler’s Nazism and to the brand of individualistic and atheistic autonomy associated with the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke. In 1939 Guardini was told that he must step down as professor at the University of Berlin because what he taught was not in keeping with the Third Reich’s view of the world. Though never an outspoken critic of Nazism, through his writings he undermined the Nazi regime and offered an alternative vision of personal existence which reflected the integrity of his own life and work.

Two avenues were explored in William Madges’s response. First, Guardini’s central contention that the human person needs to be in relation to God in order to receive its identity as a person resembles Karl Barth’s position. For both the human person is defined from above, a dialectical vision of personhood received through revelation. For both the personal encounter with the divine Thou in and through Jesus Christ provides the basis for resistance to Nazi Germany, although Barth’s more explicit critique was epitomized by his leading role in the Barmen Declaration. Their shared conviction that the human receives personhood through dialogical encounter with God by means of Christian revelation raises questions. Does it sufficiently incorporate a critical approach to the biblical texts and traditions? Moreover, with such a Christological concentration, can Guardini’s position really be viewed as a precursor of Vatican II on the personhood of the non-Christian?

Second, Guardini gave considerable attention to the tension between the person and the community which can be resolved by his proposed relational understanding of the person. Totalitarianism is thus resisted on the one hand, and individualism on the other. But why did Guardini not craft a greater critique of the dangers of communitarianism and of Nazism? This elicits a larger question: What are the implications of his evaluation of the tension between the individual and the community for ecclesiology? More pointedly, does Guardini’s tendency
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to emphasize the deficiencies of individualism more so than those of communitarianism, bolster an unreflective compliance to the exercise of ecclesial power? A lively conversation ensued. The public stature of Guardini was recalled with admiration as some drew attention to facets of his social and cultural setting. Questions about the affinity between his largely uncritical approach to the scriptures and tradition and to the exercise of Church authority in the interest of promoting communal identity were discussed. The appeal of a decontextualized Guardini devoid of discerning evaluation of his work for a personalist, sacramental, and ecclesial vision of Catholicism remains viable for many. But the question and challenge persists: how can the abiding achievement of Guardini be acknowledged, while conceding the limitations of his vision, and the need for critical reappropriation and new efforts in order to address our own situation?

BRADFORD HINZE
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

SPIRITUALITY

Topic: Anthropologies for a Socially Conscious Spirituality: Emmanuel Levinas, Josiah Royce, Gustavo Gutiérrez
Convener: Joan M. Nuth, John Carroll University, Cleveland
Moderator: Mary Frohlich, Catholic Theological Union, Chicago
Presenters: Michael Downey, St. John’s Seminary, Camarillo
Simon J. Hendry, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley

Downey opened the session by considering postmodernism with its lack of unifying perceptions of truth, being, or progress. All seems fragmentary and subjective. How speak of a socially conscious spirituality in this context? Downey finds the thought of Levinas, particularly his idea of “the other,” helpful in this regard. For Levinas, we ought not give up in the midst of the fragmentation in which we find ourselves, but need to make ethical decisions, claiming “Here I stand” and act upon them. However, this “I stand” is not to be understood in any individualist sense, nor is it based upon any fundamental first principles. In contrast to the Enlightenment cogito, Levinas’s “I stand” is uttered in response to the other, whose needs place a demand upon us. Indeed one’s identity as an “I” derives from the call of the other, disposing one to be always a “subject-in-process.” The other has a “face” that is real, concrete, demanding, and often not pretty. This “face” of “the other” calls us away from any self-absorption that results from the collapse of our outer worlds of meaning. Such an ethical priority emphasizes praxis over theory, doing good over questions of truth or being. Obviously, every claim of an “other” upon us is not equally