This select group was formed to reflect upon and respond to Aidan Nichols’s work on doctrinal development, From Newman to Congar (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1990). The session was designed to offer perspectives on the work of three theologians prominent in Nichols: John Henry Newman, Pierre Rousselot, and Karl Rahner. Each presentation commented on a major aspect of the respective theologian which, when viewed as a whole, offered a multidimensional insight into the development of doctrine over the last one hundred-plus years.

In the case of Newman, the topic was the influence of his spirituality on his theory of development; in that of Rousselot, intentionality; and in respect to Rahner, experience. Among common themes were the roles of intellect, affection, and personal relationship in doctrinal development.

In respect to Newman and his spirituality, the topic of the first presentation by Robert C. Christie, an analysis of his work on the theory of development indicates that his intellectual insights were inseparable from, and dependent upon, his affective relationships with others. These experiences also promoted his spiritual development, and it is through an investigation of his spirituality that we find the connection between relationships, affection, and intellectual development which ultimately coalesced in his insight regarding the developmental nature of dogma. It is notable that his well-known work on development was done simultaneously with two important experiences in his life: his relationship with the Irish Catholic cleric Charles Russell, about whom Newman said, “He had, perhaps, more to do with my conversion than anyone else” (Apologia pro vita sua, ed. Ian Ker [New York: Penguin Books, 1994] 110-11), and his involvement, through Russell’s influence, with the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. This latter fact was instrumental in his overcoming a self-centered willfulness which inhibited both his spiritual and intellectual development. As Newman progressed in surrender of his will to God, so did his grasp of the nature of doctrine. This fact is underscored by his prominent reference to the Spiritual Exercises in his famous treatise on doctrinal development (J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine [Westminster: Christian Classics, 1968] 399, 429).

The second presentation, by Andrew Tallon, concerned doctrinal development and wisdom through an examination of Pierre Rousselot’s thought on “sympathetic knowing” by connaturality. For Nichols, Rousselot’s contribution is his use of the rich Thomist concept of connaturality. The main thesis is that doctrinal development depends on wisdom: wisdom is sympathetic (or affective)
knowing (Kieran Conley, *A Theology of Wisdom: A Study in St. Thomas* [Dubuque: Priory Press, 1963] 112-41); and sympathetic knowing is by connaturality. Connaturality is the cause or effect of affection, especially of affective habits whereby we become attuned to whom and what we know, love, and do. So if we ask “How does affection contribute to doctrinal development?” the answer is “by connaturality.” How so? The Thomist answer, derived from Aristotle, is: by adding experience of a shared form, a primarily affective experience of union of form between oneself and another under the finality of action. Connaturality is not really first and foremost about cognition at all, but about action. Affection adds something essential beyond cognition, resulting in sympathetic knowing, which Rousselot finds Aquinas introducing, under the name “connaturality,” when discussing wisdom. This means two things; (1) we must replace faculty psychology with intentionality analysis (following Lonergan); (2) since a phenomenology of consciousness reveals 3, not 2, intentionalities, namely, affection, cognition, and volition (Andrew Tallon, *Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness* [New York: Fordham University Press, 1997]), we must accord affective intentionality distinct, irreducible status equal to cognition and volition, not reducing affection to either cognition or volition.

The third presentation, by William V. Dych, examined the role of experience in Karl Rahner’s theory of doctrinal development. Rahner, a major contributor to the accepted theory of development at the time of the Second Vatican Council, began to question this theory after the council. This shift in Rahner’s thinking led to a new understanding of the role of experience in this process.

Rahner’s pre-Vatican II understanding of development was a return to the notion of revelation itself as a personal “dialogue between God and human beings” in which something happens, and the communication of truths is related to this happening (Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations*. vol. 1, “The Development of Dogma” [Baltimore: Helicon, 1961] and vol. 4, “Considerations on the Development of Dogma” [Baltimore: Helicon, 1966]). However, numerous factors influencing the postconciliar church placed the question of development in a new context for Rahner, among them pluralism, praxis and theory, the development of modern historical consciousness, and the sense that human beings are not simply passive spectators of the world’s becoming, but are to some extent active agents in this process. These new emphases in theology today give special importance and urgency to the realm of practical theology and to the transposition of faith from theoretical to practical categories.

What are the implications of this transposition from theoretical to practical reason for the role of experience? In the dialectic of God’s presence and absence, God’s presence would be experienced precisely as call and as promise. Second, this experience would be less the private, interior experience of an individual and more the social and very exterior experience of a people. In the first of these, perhaps, lies the real thread that unifies the pre- and postconciliar theology of
Rahner. His theology has always been a highly apophatic theology: the experience of God as the incomprehensible One. God and God’s reign lie beyond the categories of both the theoretical and practical intellect, so that the final word of theological and practical theology is silence before the ever greater One.

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This select group was convened to examine whether “development” is an apt metaphor for understanding how “truth” has been embraced in various ways at different moments in the history of the church. When Newman introduced the idea of development in the nineteenth century, he was working within a context of modernity’s assumptions about the directionality and rationality of history and the architectonic ordering of truth. These modern assumptions are no longer taken for granted. One result has been the onset of crisis for the notion of truth itself, as well as for the notion of the progressive development of its doctrinal and theological expression. The problem with development as a metaphor governing doctrinal change is that it could stand in the way of a free embrace of what the Spirit might send the church. The disintegration of the modern consensus about truth and development therefore requires a hermeneutics for the understanding of faith in its relative continuities and radical discontinuities.

Bradford Hinze approached the topic by focusing on the implications of the recent string of apologies emanating from Rome to Jews, women, non-Catholic Christians, Muslims, and the scientific community (i.e., Galileo), among others. In these apologies the pope has highlighted the importance of dialogue within the church and in relation to various groups addressed in these apologies. Hinze maintains that this way of approaching ecclesial repentance invites a dialogical understanding of revelation and church, and a willingness to acknowledge the sinfulness of the church as a whole. Ecclesial repentance could therefore serve as an impetus for change in teachings and practices of the church and also as an alternative to logic-driven and organic approaches to doctrinal change. The act of ecclesial repentance, which is ultimately a response to the call of the gospel, raises the issue of the historicity of doctrinal truth and the need for a doctrinal change that could be construed as discontinuous or heterogeneous. However,