THE "OKLAHOMA CITY PLUNDER" 
Turner's Social Drama and Team Relocation

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of the four major professional sports leagues of the United States and Canada, team relocation has been common practice for team owners. Of the 122 teams that make up Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL), 40 have relocated 52 times. Traditionally one might attribute this trend to lackluster fan support, but in modern times the rationale behind team relocation is usually business related. Most commonly, team owners (or ownership groups) will claim that the conditions under which they are operating the franchise are less than favorable for turning profits. The team’s ownership then makes an appeal to the public arguing that the construction of a new stadium will secure the team’s place in the city and result in “increased tax revenues, job creation and community image-building.” As a consequence, team ownership presents the city with an ultimatum: either dedicate public funds to the construction of a state-of-the-art arena or force the team to move to a location more eager to construct a new stadium.

Typically, the city initially opposes financing anything as expensive as an arena or stadium and engages the owners in a debate. The team’s ownership—using the threat of relocation as leverage—forces the city into adopting either a complacent attitude or a more combative one. Though initially resistant, the complacent city eventually gives in to the ownership’s demands, fearing that their city’s prestige and economy are at stake. Alternatively, the combative city sees public funding for private ventures as “socialism for the rich” and decides that there are better uses for their tax dollars than a new stadium. The city subsequently permits the team to move elsewhere. The complacent attitude seems a more common result: 89 of the 122 total pro sports teams play in stadiums built in 1990 or after, and only 12 of the 89 received their new arenas after relocating.

In this “public argument” between the city and the team, each party views the other’s public statements as efforts to empower themselves and strengthen their position. According to Bishop, this process “that begins with a team expressing its desire for a new stadium and concludes with the construction of that stadium has all the makings of what anthropologist Victor Turner calls a ‘social drama.’” Turner defines social dramas as “an eruption from the level surface of ongoing social life, with its interactions, transactions, reciprocities, its customs making for regular, orderly sequences of behavior.” According to Bishop, journalists act as intermediaries in stadium construction social dramas, transmitting and interpreting the messages they receive from the principal parties. The local media, therefore, provides the rhetorical theater in which the conflict between the ownership and the city plays out for all to see.

Bishop only examines the development of stadium construction social dramas in cities that acquiesce (“complacent” cities). This adoption of the complacent attitude results from a combination of mobilization of fan “energies,” support from the local media, and a persuasive economic argument. In Bishop’s analysis, stadium construction and team appeasement are the two inevitable conclusions of this type of social drama. Her analysis, however, overlooks the obvious possibility of team relocation. I contend that—although more rare than the outcome examined by Bishop—the factors in a stadium construction social drama ending in relocation merit consideration as well.

When the city behaves combatively toward a given team’s ownership in a stadium construction drama, the likely outcome is team relocation to a smaller city hungry for professional sports and willing to allocate the money to meet the ownership’s demands. Smaller cities are often motivated to acquire a professional team by a hope that through that acquisition their city will gain “major league status.” Many think that a city that is worthy of a major league sports franchise is both more desirable for potential residents and more lucrative for potential investors. As a result, smaller cities are willing to fight bigger, more cosmopolitan cities tooth and nail to attain a team.
With these factors in mind, I will examine the possibility that Bishop neglects in the context of the Seattle SuperSonics’ move to Oklahoma City in the summer of 2008. After outlining the salient events in the team’s relocation, the specific correspondence with Turner’s elements of social drama will be criticized. Finally, a brief look at the history of relocation social dramas will highlight the wider impact of this type of drama on the country’s social consciousness.

THE SEATTLE SUPERSONICS MOVE TO OKLAHOMA CITY

Before 1960, Seattle saw itself as a provincial city largely isolated from the rest of the country. But the meteoric rise of Boeing and the 1962 World’s Fair—which saw the construction of the Space Needle and Key Arena (the future home of the SuperSonics)—established the city as the financial and industrial capital of the Pacific Northwest. Arriving in 1967 as an NBA expansion team, the SuperSonics became Seattle’s first professional sports team. The team was extremely popular among Seattleites who interpreted their arrival as a validation that Seattle had indeed become an important city on the national level. The Sonics made their city even prouder when they defeated the Washington Bullets in the 1979 NBA Finals in five games, capturing for Seattle its first and only professional sports championship.

Since the Sonics’ 1979 championship, Seattle has grown economically with the rise of the computer industry and culturally with the artistic triumphs of the city’s countercultural movement, notably with the explosion of Grunge in the early 1990s. Seattle also gained two other professional sports teams: MLB’s Mariners and the NFL’s Seahawks, both of which eclipsed the SuperSonics in popularity. The SuperSonics, however, continued to draw crowds, excluding their lame duck years of 2006-08. Although Key Arena had the smallest arena capacity in the NBA (17,098), the team frequently finished near the middle of the pack in the league attendance, measured as the average attendance per game, per season.

In 2002, the SuperSonics ownership led by Starbucks tycoon Howard Schultz began petitioning the city government for a new publicly financed arena. The SuperSonics were still playing in Key Arena, a relic from the 1962 World’s Fair that had been their home since the team’s inception (apart from five years spent playing in the Kingdome). But Schultz’s pleas fell on deaf ears, for the city was not willing to finance another stadium project, having just paid a combined $672 million to finance new stadiums for the Mariners and the Seahawks. Washington state taxpayers, having paid begrudgingly for the other two stadiums, were reluctant to dedicate any more public money toward stadium construction. Frustrated and losing money, Schultz and the other 58 owners—including prominent city oligarchs such as Richard Tait, co-creator of the game “Cranium” and Pete Nordstrom owner of the eponymous department store—decided to sell the SuperSonics and its Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) sister team, the Seattle Storm, to the highest bidder. This turned out to be an ownership group from Oklahoma, which offered $350 million for both teams.

The new ownership group—officially known as Professional Basketball Club, LLC—was led by Oklahoma City businessman Clay Bennett. Bennett was responsible for the NBA’s foray into Oklahoma City during the 2005-06
and 2006-07 seasons when the New Orleans Hornets were displaced by Hurricane Katrina and needed a temporary home. The Hornets ended up playing their home games during those two seasons in Oklahoma City's Ford Center. The Ford Center was an $89 million publicly funded construction project finished in 2002, constructed primarily to lure an NHL or NBA franchise to the city. This goal was accomplished when the New Orleans Hornets fell into Oklahoma City's lap during the 2005-06 season. Residents of Oklahoma City rallied behind the team despite the awareness that the arrangement was only temporary. The venture, however, convinced Bennett that Oklahoma's capital was a viable NBA market.

He was able to convince a group of equally optimistic local investors, and together they swooped up the SuperSonics when the team was put up for sale. The Seattle media was immediately suspicious of the new ownership's intentions for the team, and, despite reassurances to the contrary, many Seattleites began to lament what they viewed as an inevitable relocation. Bennett was legally bound to a clause in the terms of sale that stated that he was required to put in a one-year “good faith effort” to keep the team in Seattle. In compliance with the clause, Bennett announced in February 2007 that the team would stay in return for the publicly funded construction of a $530 million arena in the Seattle suburb Renton, WA. Far more ambitious than Schultz's $220 million plan to renovate Key Arena, nobody outside of Renton took it seriously. The Seattle media interpreted it as a feeble attempt to comply with the good faith clause.

The Renton plan was dropped in April 2007, and the owners announced in November that if Seattle remained idle, the team would relocate to Oklahoma City as soon as it was legally able to do so. In August, the controversy reached a new level of public and media acrimony when team minority owner Aubrey McClendon stated in an interview with the Oklahoma Journal Record, “We didn't buy the team to keep it in Seattle. We hoped to come here.” Additionally, a series of e-mails between the owners of the SuperSonics revealed in April 2008 indicated that the owners had privately communicated their excitement to one another about moving the team to Oklahoma, even while they were publicly stating that they were trying to keep the team in Seattle. In one infamous e-mail, minority owner Tom Ward stated, “Is there any way to move here for next season or are we doomed to have another lame duck season in Seattle?” to which Bennett replied, “I am a man possessed! Will do everything we can. Thanks for hanging in there with me boys, the game is just getting started.”

In response to this e-mail, the previous owner of the SuperSonics, Howard Schultz, filed a lawsuit against Professional Basketball Club, LLC claiming they had committed fraud by violating the good faith clause of the sale, rendering the sale void. Before this point the media and public had seen the SuperSonics' relocation as inevitable, but in the wake of this mounting evidence, public and journalistic support of “Saving the Sonics” skyrocketed.
“Years after his initial observations, Turner determined that although the fashion in which the Ndembu tribe engaged in social drama was unique to their culture (the ‘ritual’), the phenomenon is universal across cultures and subcultures regardless of sophistication.”

The culmination of all these events occurred in June 2008 as the City of Seattle took Professional Basketball Club, LLC to court in order to require the ownership to honor its lease of Key Arena from the city, forcing the SuperSonics to stay in Seattle an additional two years. The trial was marked by a large throng of green and gold fans protesting publicly outside the courthouse. Former players Xavier McDaniel and Gary Payton addressed the crowd, reiterating demands that the SuperSonics stay in Seattle, at least for the next two years until their lease expired. The trial concluded on July 2 with a settlement between the team ownership and the city, one hour before U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman was to deliver her summary judgment. The settlement allowed for the SuperSonics to move but required that the owners pay off the remainder of their lease with the City of Seattle in addition to damages. It was stipulated that if the City of Seattle did not receive a replacement NBA team in five years that Professional Basketball Club, LLC owed them $35 million. Additionally, the ownership agreed to allow the city of Seattle to hold onto the SuperSonics name, color, and history, so that they might be used by an NBA franchise returning to Seattle. Subsequently, the now former Seattle SuperSonics began the process of physically moving the team to Oklahoma City. It was announced a month before the season started in September that the Oklahoma City incarnation of the team would be named the Thunder and would bear no resemblance beyond its personnel to the SuperSonics franchise.

**TURNER’S SOCIAL DRAMA**

Scottish anthropologist Victor Turner conceptualized his notions of “ritual” and “social drama” while observing the characteristics of the social structures and lives of the people of the Ndembu tribe in Central Africa for four years. He was fascinated by the Ndembu people’s inclination toward social conflict that “manifested itself in public episodes of tensional irruption which I called ‘social dramas.’” Social dramas occurred within the Ndembu tribe, as Turner explains it, “when the interests and attitudes of groups and individuals stood in obvious opposition.” Everyone within Ndembu society is forced to take sides during a social drama, sometimes against his own personal will, in accordance with the society’s deeply held sense of morality and loyalty. Years after his initial observations, Turner determined that although the fashion in which the Ndembu tribe engaged in social drama was unique to their culture (the “ritual”), the phenomenon is universal across cultures and subcultures regardless of sophistication.

Turner broke social drama into four main phases: breach, crisis, redressive action, and reintegration (or schism). “Breach” in Frederick Bailey’s words is “a symbolic trigger of confrontation or encounter.” The Breach fundamentally violates a norm of culture integral to its operation, challenging the status quo. “Crisis” occurs if the societal stress caused by the Breach cannot be quelled immediately, and thereby “escalat[ing] the crisis.” During crisis, two main parties become unsure and suspicious of their oppo-
nent. Crisis acts as a crossroads in the social drama, for it marks the point at which society must consider seriously the threatening implications of the breach.

"Redressive Action" occurs when the society takes action to manage the crisis in the form of "adjustive and redressive mechanisms" employed by "representative members of the disturbed social system." Redressive actions vary from culture to culture and from crisis to crisis, but redressive actions can include personal advice, social mediation, or formal judiciary intervention. Executing redressive action often escalates the crisis, as when a dispute is moved from a local court to a district or federal court. If redressive action fails the crisis intensifies, sometimes resulting in violent outbursts or—on a larger geopolitical scale—war.

The fourth and final phase of the social drama consists either of reintegration back into society or, alternatively, of schism from society. When circumstances necessitate schism, the society must split along party lines to prevent further conflict. The door is left open for future reconciliation between the two groups, but typically an invitation from one group to rejoin the other can only occur after some time has past. The respite of the reintegration or schism offers an opportunity to evaluate societal change as a result of the social drama. Did the drama alter existing social mores, add new ones, or drop old ones? Were the basic structural norms preserved?

Ronald Bishop's characterization of stadium controversies as social dramas between team owners and cities fits well into Turner's paradigm. In Bishop's article "If You Build It, We Won't Leave: Turner's Social Drama in Newspaper Coverage of Stadium Construction Controversies," he argues that the scenario in which team owners create a breach by demanding a new, publicly funded stadium is now so common that it has been integrated into the social landscape. Bishop asserts that the unfolding of a stadium construction conflict constitutes a complete social drama story arc.

The stadium construction social drama begins when team officials state publicly that a new stadium is required (to keep the team in the city, to appease fans, to spur economic growth, etc.) and that those opposing construction do not value what is best for their city. This strategy frames the public debate as occurring between a group ostensibly in favor of the city's success and those ostensibly opposed to that success. More explicitly, group A supports the team, enjoys economic prosperity, and wants a happier city; group B hates sports, opposes prosperity, and disregards the perspective of group A. Opponents—often including public officials and prominent citizens—rapidly attempt to counter the efforts of the team owners, resulting in a public conflict. Crisis manifests in the rhetorical clash between stadium proponents and opponents taking place in local media. Proponents emphasize the old trope, that new stadiums bring economic opportunity and growth. Opponents argue that most economists agree that new stadiums have a minimal impact on the city economy and that the divisive arguments of the owners are designed to tear the city apart for their own gain.

Bishop suggests that journalists are predisposed to sympathize with the argument of the team owners for a new stadium; if the team moves, local sports journalists will have
less to report. Team owners and pro-construction advocates, therefore, are likely to receive more media coverage than city officials or protestors. Bishop quietly accuses local journalists covering the stadium controversy of complicity with team owners. Bishop’s view is most likely a product of the “political economy” perspective of public controversy reporting, articulated as follows:

Public controversy as the manufactured product of profit-motivated institutions of power working together to monopolize the premises of discourse and interpretation that circulates in the media. In this model, the media are nothing more than a means of production that conform to a general type of industrial capitalism.

Bishop argues that, as a consequence of this bias in the news media, city officials start to feel pressure in favor of publicly funding a stadium project. This perception of public opinion initiates redressive action to appease the team (and, therefore, the public) before it decides to abandon the city. The final phase of social drama, reintegration, ends with the city submitting to the ownership’s will and providing them with the necessary funding. This solution resolves the conflict between the team and the city, restoring social order within the city. The city and the team ownership assess after the fact the changes in their relationship as well as the changes in their respective relationships with the public. Bishop agrees with Turner that the two parties, having made a deal, now see an alliance where they had once considered one another as opponents.

Bishop’s analysis, however, is blind to the possibility of schism, the more sensational scenario from a team’s choice to move in response to an unsatisfactory redressive action. Some of professional sports’ most notorious stories involve teams leaving behind a city and a legion of adoring fans. These are stories told with a sense of great loss, such as when Walter O’Malley moved the Dodgers to Los Angeles in 1957 and broke Brooklyn’s heart or when a hoard of Mayflower moving trucks carried Baltimore’s beloved Colts to Indianapolis in the middle of a cold night in 1983 or when despondent fans rioted in Cleveland in 1995 at the loss of their cherished Browns.

These tragedies have an important place in American sports lore, which is why it is surprising that Bishop would exclude them from his analysis. Considering the profound sense of loss communities feel as a consequence of team relocation and considering that the frequency of team relocation has risen since 1990, this phenomenon’s conspicuous absence in scholarly literature must be addressed. To begin to meet this deficiency, let us return to the Seattle SuperSonics’ transformation into the Oklahoma City Thunder.

THE “OKLAHOMA CITY PLUNDER”:
TURNER’S SOCIAL DRAMA AND TEAM RELOCATION

For much of their history, the city of Seattle and the SuperSonics have enjoyed an excellent rapport. Many in town genuinely felt that the SuperSonics helped put the city on the map, convincing other Americans that the Pacific Northwest was more than just a backwoods of evergreen trees and geoducts. Together they endured hard times (a heavy recession and population decrease in the 1970s) and enjoyed good times (the 1990s’ tech/coffee/grunge boom). They were the city’s first professional sports franchise. The SuperSonics won the Emerald City its first and only modern championship. It seemed as if they would be together forever.

That strong bond started to weaken when long time owner Barry Ackerly sold the team to the Basketball Club of Seattle in 2002. The Basketball Club of Seattle was noteworthy because it was an ownership group that was comprised of 58 different investors, represented by Mr. Starbucks himself, Howard Schultz. This unprecedented arrangement proved to be an experiment in ownership organization. They faced a number of difficulties in management decisions due to their size and—since some of the team’s investors did not even live in Seattle—it proved nearly impossible to get everyone in the room to vote on critical issues. To facilitate
Even early on it appeared that this ownership model would prove too delocalized to be effective. One prominent instance of the ownership’s impotence occurred when they tried to obtain $220 million in public financing to renovate Key Arena. These renovations were necessary to make the fan friendly but small arena profitable once again. Despite Schultz’s status as the city’s beloved coffee-man, SuperSonics’ ownership failed to convince city officials or tax payers to help finance the renovations.

As described previously, the city had recently completed two stadium projects and was unwilling to invest any more money into such projects. Both the city and the public had a difficult time believing that 58 millionaires could not raise $220 million themselves. In addition, the terms of the lease of Key Arena to the SuperSonics were very favorable to the city. The lease entitled the city to a generous percentage of the arena’s vending and luxury box profits, income which usually goes to team owners. So the Key Arena renovation deal failed, killing the Basketball Club of Seattle’s biggest push to revitalize the franchise. Soon afterwards some of the small-stake owners started to complain about their financial losses and their emotional distance from the team, and the ownership structure began to disintegrate. After reportedly having lost a combined $60 million after five years, the Basketball Club of Seattle’s stakeholders put the team up for sale in 2006.

This sale of the team to the Oklahoma City ownership group caused the breach, the first step in every social drama. The sale of the team to an outside group violated what the fans understood as the norm: what Turner calls “a deliberate non-fulfillment of some crucial norm regulating the intercourse of the parties.” The foreign ownership group’s presence in Seattle seemed confrontational, and fans and local media quickly filled in the blanks as to Professional Basketball Club, LLC’s intentions. Another element of Turner’s concept of breach is that there is always a partially altruistic motive. This case is no exception, for Bennett and his team of investors saw themselves as bringing a team to the deserving basketball fans of Oklahoma City.

The crisis—wherein the Professional Basketball Club, LLC made ambitious demands of Seattle while not so secretly arranging to move the team out of the city—can now be put into full context. The Oklahoman’s demanded of the city twice what the Basketball Club of Seattle was unable to obtain not to renovated beloved Key Area. Paired with owner Aubrey McClendon’s revelation/confirmation in an Oklahoma newspaper that Bennett never had any intention of keeping the team in Seattle, the city felt cheated. To add insult to injury, it was revealed that two members of Basketball Club, LLC were some of the largest contributors in the country to a conservative organization that supported campaigns to ban same-sex marriage. The unease this revelation caused in Seattle turned to outrage when it was discovered that the leaking of that information to local media was a calculated move to alienate the Sonics’ liberal fan base. This incident catalyzed the legal fight between the parties over the lease terms described above and the grassroots organization Save Our Sonics began arranging protests in the state capital, Olympia, at city hall in Seattle.
and wherever the ownership was present. The ownership’s deliberate steps to alienate Seattle and its fans brought about an effort by the city to make the ownership’s transition out of the city as difficult as possible, precluding the possibility of compromise.

Redressive action began as the loyal fans of the SuperSonics used whatever available means to save the team. To much fanfare, the city’s elite stepped forward to keep the SuperSonics in town. Former owner Howard Schultz attempted to sue the Oklahoma City ownership group for violating the good faith clause of the sale. Microsoft CEO Jeffery Ballmer and the City of Seattle arranged a $300 million package to renovate the old Key Arena in March of 2008. Bennett and the Oklahoma City group glibly dismissed Ballmer’s offer as a P.R. stunt, stating that nothing beyond their lawsuit with the city could halt their transition.

Turner notes that the redress will be handled by both the public and its leaders and can take symbolic forms. Here the public’s presence, although at times small (they often protested during business hours on workdays), was representative of the people’s disgust over what was happening to their beloved team. The action taken by Jeffrey Balmer and Howard Schultz represented two of Seattle’s benevolent benefactors heeding the public’s call for action. Their actions were largely symbolic, but, at a basic level, it’s clear that people were encouraged by the actions of the city’s most powerful and influential. Their deeds gave hope to the fans and fueled the effort to save the SuperSonics until the end.

The final step in our team relocation scenario occurs when reintegation becomes impossible, resulting in schism with the community. A settlement that allowed the SuperSonics to move to Oklahoma City was reached on July 2, 2008. This was the end for SuperSonics’ fans. All redressive action had failed, and all that there was left to do was evaluate their new situation and mourn. Turner sees this assessment of the new state of affairs as essential not only to reintegation, but also to schism. Seattle residents since July 2008 have started to examine what can be done to try to lure another basketball team to the city and have discussed plans to renovate Key Arena to NBA standards. The portion of ownership’s settlement with the city allowing Seattle to hold on to the SuperSonics name, colors, logos, and history has also provided some comfort to hurt fans.

The team formerly known as the Seattle SuperSonics was rechristened in Oklahoma City as the Thunder, sporting new jerseys with different colors (a curious combination of black, light blue, and orange). This rebranding represented a complete schism from everything that the team once had with Seattle, from its history, its past and its fans. The severance of the team from its city cut all of the social, economic, and political ties both parties had once enjoyed, rendering each suddenly foreign to the other.

**CONCLUSION**

The economic and emotional trauma to a community in the aftermath of team relocation is poorly understood. I argued that Victor Turner’s conception of a social drama—in which two large, influential parties duke it out while the
public at large is left only to spectate—offers an excellent lens through which to view team relocations. The public represents the second persona, a group formally addressed by the two parties, but with limited influence in their negotiations and limited impact on the outcome of the social drama. In this context the public depend on the two parties to recognize and protect their interests. It chooses to see owners as benevolent stewards of those interests rather than as businessmen (how most owners ultimately see themselves), and when these expectations are not met, the public often feels outraged and impotent. History has seen situations in which, like that in Seattle with the SuperSonics, owners show no concern for the public and act instead in their own interests.

Brooklyn infamously fell victim to team relocation when its beloved Dodgers moved to Los Angeles in 1957. This move resulted from a stadium construction dispute between team owner Walter O’Malley and New York City construction coordinator Robert Moses. The drama was repeated in 1983 as Baltimoreans helplessly witnessed a Mayflower moving truck abscond in the night with their beloved Colts. The drama played out once again in its most intense iteration after the departure of the Browns from Cleveland, culminating with the riotous dismantling of old Municipal Stadium by Browns fans after the last game of the 1995 NFL season. Fans in these situations are powerless and often depend heavily upon their unelected representative, the local sports columnist, to articulate their objections in a way that will be heard by the parties involved in the dispute. Unfortunately, it’s the fans that are hurt the most when a team relocates. Organizations ask them to pass along the stories of franchise legends down to each subsequent generation, fill in the stadiums seats at every home game, and invest in merchandise like the jerseys made to make them feel close to the team. In reality, however, fans appear to be painfully distant from organizations interested in turning profits first and foremost. As long as this is true, Turner’s social drama in the form of team relocation will occur again, resulting yet again in the victimization of the most innocent party, the loyal fans.

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