cooperation. With growing awareness of such a serious issue in the region, some East Asian universities have established their own units to deal with academic fraud and corruption. While it is reasonable to expect some positive instantaneous policy impacts, when considering the width and depth of the issue in the societies, it is just not realistic to hope that the problem will be uprooted in the years to come.

Despite a few scandals, Japan distinguishes itself from its regional neighbors in academic culture. This explains why Japan has been the best performer in the region, as illustrated by its unrivalled 21 Nobel Prizes in science and technology, while other East Asian societies have had none until 2014. It is important to note that Japan’s early Nobel Prizes were won when Japan was in extremely difficult conditions. Similarly, the latest and only Nobel Prize in science and technology based on work conducted in the region was awarded to a Chinese scientist in 2015. Because her work was done almost exclusively during the 1970s, when China was suffering from economic hardship and political isolation, her achievement is no outcome of China’s contemporary academic culture.

As a reaction to rampant academic dishonesty, it is fair to point out that state education policies have begun to stress the need for preventing research misconduct.

Conclusion

Academic culture matters hugely. East Asia’s corrupt academic culture hurts the region’s higher education directly, with profound impact on everyday operations. Only Japan has achieved a good academic culture. Unfortunately, it is far beyond the scope of the higher education sector to solve these widespread, deep-rooted social problems, though the situation differs among the region’s societies. The toxic academic culture is another expression of East Asia’s greatest challenge: universities have not yet figured out how to combine the “standard norms” of Western higher education with traditional values. The Western concept of a university has been adopted only for its practicality. East Asian higher education development is fundamentally about the relations between Western and indigenous higher education traditions, a relationship that has rarely been managed well.

International Higher Education and the “Neo-liberal Turn”

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In its original form, international higher education, which emphasized staff and student mobility and collaboration between universities across national frontiers, was one of the most idealistic, even altruistic, aspects of higher education. The myth-ideal of the wandering scholar in the Middle Ages was reinforced by the role played by imperial universities in educating colonial (and, ultimately, post-colonial) elites and also the role played by modern higher education systems in these countries in terms of aid and capacity building as well as the continued training of elites in the developing world. Today, international education is perhaps the aspect of higher education most associated with markets and competition; its language is now dominated by talk of market shares of international students and global league tables. So complete has been this reversal of perceptions of, and practices in, international higher education, that it passes almost without comment.

The major reason for this reversal has been the impact on higher education of the so-called “neo-liberal turn,” the drift away from the social markets and welfare states developed in the 20th century as a response to recession, depression, and world wars—and which, remarkably, survived the shocks of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession. In the United Kingdom, there is now a strong, if contestable, belief that the ideals of mass higher education—democracy, social justice, individual “improvement” in a still recognizable Victorian sense—are out of sync, out of sympathy, with the dominant ideas of our age: wealth generation, growth, and competitiveness. In a global setting the same has happened. The older ideals of international education—solidarity, development, mutual understanding—have been replaced by new market imperatives summed up in a much over-used word globalization.

Three Shifts

The “neo-liberal turn” has many guises, from the rigidly ideological to the flexibly pragmatic. It is a broad church composed of true believers and outwardly conformingagnostics. For some, it must be embraced by higher education as the major, or perhaps only, driver of future development; for others, it must be accommodated as an inescapable but
contingent set of circumstances. Reductionist definitions of the “neo-liberal turn,” therefore, are dangerous. But three big trends stand out:

The first is the shift from the post-war “welfare state,” forged in the shared memories and solidarities of world war and economic depression, to the so-called “market state.” This has comprised both structural and cultural changes. The first include the retreat from high levels of personal taxation and the consequent increase in state borrowing (and the impact of that borrowing on financial markets) and the shrinking of publicly funded services. The second include the redefinition of the core purposes of the state that have seen a shift from the traditional sense of the state as embodying the public good to the idea of the state as both a “regulator” and also “customer.”

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The second aspect of the “neo-liberal turn” is globalization (actually much older and more complex than is often suggested by contemporary, over-excited accounts). It is older because “world societies” have existed in past history and also because global markets have existed for at least half a millennium. It is more complex because the interactions between global brands and local cultures are highly nuanced and also because there are many forms of globalizations. Some of these “other” globalizations are at odds with the apparently hegemonic free-market geopolitical forms, violently so in the case of fundamentalism and terrorism (which, in turn, have legitimated the frightening contemporary phenomena of the “national security state”). One of the impacts of the discourse about globalization has been to regard not only all goods but also services as tradable commodities. Although the debate about the incorporation of higher education within the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) accords is currently muted, it is surely only a matter of time before higher education surfaces in the debate about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union, and a related trans-Pacific trade treaty.

The third aspect is the revolution in communications—or, more broadly, communicative cultures. This contains many strands—the rise of social networking but also the mediatization of politics as “celebrity” and “brand”; the erosion of traditional print-based “literacies” (pessimists would go further, and lament the death of “logos”); the creation of “virtual” communities (highly beneficial in the case of science, less so in the context of cyber-sex or cyber-crime); the “hollowing-out” of traditional institutions (such as political parties or trade unions), the replacement of traditional top-down hierarchies by “flat” and “instant” linkages (courtesy of Google et al.).

Impact on Higher Education
As a result higher education, international and domestic, now has to operate in very different social, political, economic, and cultural environments than those taken for granted when our contemporary mass systems were first created almost half a century ago. But the impact of these new environments has been more than simply a drive to monolithic markets.

Changes in the nature of the state have certainly weakened its ability to maintain public systems of higher education. Both ideas—of the “public” and of “systems”—have been eroded; the former because it seems to imply publicly provided or funded services, and the latter because it appears to require a degree of top-down “planning” at odds with the free play of “markets.” But the inexorable advance of high-fee funding regimes is far from assured, as countries as different as Chile and Germany have demonstrated by rejecting fees. In addition, the power of the state over higher education has reemerged in the form of more intrusive regulation.

Globalization has multiple and ambiguous impacts. It has produced great opportunities—for example, in terms of cross-cultural learning or transnational education. But it has created new barriers—most notably, in the context of immigration controls. Although free-market globalization is currently its dominant form, other forms exist—actual and potential. New globalizations of resistance to the “neo-liberal” turn or of solidarity built round environmental, equity and ethical concerns are already emerging.

Finally, changes in communicative cultures have radically shaped student expectations and their patterns of learning—as well as problematized the traditional structures of higher education. At present our understanding of this transformation is dominated by Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs) and the power of IT-powered diagnostics and analytics to fine-tune higher education to “satisfy” student-customer needs; the mechanics of e-learning and e-assessment; and worries about Twitter-ish triviality. But there are other aspects of the communications revolution—for example, open-source and “instant” publication, the potential for global research alliances or for more intense engagement with “user” communities—with more collectivist than commercial implications.